Th.
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
In Effgiem & librum Dr.s Charlton
Imago pulcra Est. picta sculptoris manu.
At pulcrioem dat libris Autor suis.
Hic Corpus Illis ipsa Mens depingitur
Imo Vniuersi Mens & Ipsius simul
C B.
Lombart. Sculpsit A. Londre.

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
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THE DARKNES of ATHEISM Diſpelled by the LIGHT of NATURE.

A PHYSICO-THEOLOGICALL *TREATISE,*

Written by

WALTER CHARLETON

Dr. in Phyſic, and Phyſician to the late KING.

Heu prima Scelerum cauſſa Mortalibus agris,
Naturam neſcire DEUM.——Sil. Italic 4. p. 56.

DEUS aliquis juſſit & primum ſcribere, & declarationem ejus, ille ipſe novit, me ſcire. Galen. 10. de uſu part.

LONDON,
Printed by *J. F.* for *William Lee*, and are to be ſold at the ſigne of the Great *Turks* Head over againſt *Fetter-Lane* in *Fleetſtreet*. 1652.

Epistola Dedicatoria.

CLARISSIMO,
QUIA
ORNATISSIMO VIRO,
Inclytissimi Medicorum Londinensium
Collegii Præsidi longè dignissimo,
FAUTORI SUO,
Omni officiorum genere æternùm
Colendissimo, *D. D.*
FRANC. PRUJEAN,

GUALT. CHARLETON S.P.D.

Decretum fuisse olim, accepi, à Consultissimis æquè ac Amplissimis celeberrimi nostri Collegii *(quod omnes, quibus cum Literis ac Humanitate aliquod commercium, summa, uti*

decet, veneratione colunt) Fundatoribus; *quòd nullus, tantæ familiæ adſcitus, Librum quemlibet in dias luminis oras effundere audeat, quem* Præſes, *adplaudentibus ſimul* Cenſoribus, *indignum prius non judicaverit, qui diutiùs in Veſtæ penetralibus abditus lateret. Et graviſſimo ſanè conſilio; tametſi enim paucorum admodum, nullorum rectiùs dixerim, nomina veſtris adſcribi* Tabulis *ſolent, qui ſolennia & Eruditionis & ingenii ſui ſpecimina, vel ſcriptis, vel conſiliis medicis, vel diſputationibus, abſtruſiora circa* Phyſices *Theoremata, in Comitiis publicè habitis, priùs non exhibuerint; ideoque ſit ſperandum, neminem ex iis aut meditaturum, aut in publicum daturum aliquid, quod aut Philoſophum recta ratione utentem, aut pium atque Chriſtianiſmo imbutum non deceat: veruntamen, cum quiſque fermè infatuantibus peſſimæ iſtius Sirenum,* φιλαυτίας, *blanditiis ſit nimium obnoxius, Scriptorúmq; plurimis innatum ſit iſtiuſmodi vitium, quòd ſui cerebri Mi-*

nervas

nervas flagrantiùs, quàm modeſtia ferat, ament; quid magis videatur conſultum, quàm ut uniuſcujuſque Collegarum ſcripta, quàm prælo Typographico, priùs ſubjiciantur examini eorum, quibus id muneris ſociorum ſuffragiis demandatum; quo ſit perſpectium magis, an ex iis utilitatis aliquid Artium ſcientiarúmque latifundiis ſuccreſcat, & genti Hippocraticæ honoris? Huic proinde majorum Senatus-conſulto, nedum Philoſophiæ, ejúſve ſobolis Medicinæ, aſt etiam ſacris Religionis Principiis quadantenus ſartis tectiſque conſervandis (ſaltem quoad veſtræ Ditionis extenſionem) utiliſſimo, liberrima voluntatis meæ Συγκαταθέσει *ipſemet obtemperans; En, in manus tuas,* Apollineæ Artis inſigne Deus ac Columen, *haſce meas Philoſophiæ* Primitias *trado: eo duntaxat nomine, quòd ſi oculatiori tuo, quod mihi ſit inſtar omnium, judicio lucis hujus uſura videantur dignæ; & majori, adverſus virulenta* Semicriticorum Zoilorúmque

Συει-

Συνείγματα, *Auctoritate foras prodeant præmunitæ, & Bonorum favori, pleniori cum gratia, commendentur. Cæteroqui, si vel verbulum in eis aut saniori Physiologiæ, aut Fidei Christianæ, aut bonis denique moribus dissonum & incongruum reperiatur: vel Tineis Blattisque perrodendæ mox exponantur; vel fato illi subjaceant acerbissimo, quod exuscitatum impiis Artibus ab* Erichthone *cadaver olim, ad rogum quàm citissimè reduxit, de quo* εὐγλωττος *ille Poeta* Lucanus,

Vadit defunctus ad ignes.

Non est verò, quamobrem tam infaustè ominer. Omnes etenim, dum huncce Atheismi Tumulum *essem meditatus, ingenioli mei nervos, mediusfidius, eò semper intendebam; ut recto, & suis genuinis filiis ab Matre Sancta Ecclesia in Canonicis præscripto, Veritatis tramiti insisterem: ne ab opinione quavis insana, splendidissima tametsi verisimilitudinis specie larvata, aut Mens, aut Calamus unquam ullibi deflecte-*

deflecteretur, salebrosa versùs Hæreseôs, Erroriſve *diverticula; quæ omnia* (Cardiognoſten *humillimè conteſtor*) *ab incunabulis uſque ex animo faſtidivi.*

Nec meo, ad lapſus nimis prono, unicè ſuper hac re, confiſus ſum arbitrio: ſed & labili minùs quorundam etiam Theologorum, *ingenio ſupra vulgus literatorum multùm perſpicaci, & queis nihil ſit magis cordi quàm ipſamet veritas; quibus ſingulas hujuſce Tractatus* Phyſico-theologici *ſchedulas, dum atramento ſcriptorio adhuc diffluerent, tradidi, ſeriò & ſeverè examinandas, imò ubicunq; iis opus viſum fuerit caſtigandas.*

Horum itaq; æquabili judicio ſi tuum etiam, Eruditorum Dictator, *omni ex parte conſenſerit; Librum huncce, ter ſacroſanctiſſimæ* Divini Numinis, *ab execranda Atheorum impietate* (*tremendum cogitatu*) *palàm impetitæ, Majeſtatis* vindicem, *magno tuo* Nomini *à me inſcribi conſecrarique patiatur, Candorem tuum, cæteras tuas virtutes undiquaque illuſtrantem,*

ſtrantem, obnixè ac cum debita Dignitati tuæ obſervantia rogo. Fabrica eſt, cujus Fundamenta præclarum iſtud Matheſeôs lumen, CARTESIUM *dico (cui ſi Fata diuturniorem in terris indulſiſſent incolatum; dubio procul, tam diu anxiéque ab omnibus* Sophiæ *cultoribus exoptatum, Phyſiologiæ ſanioris compendium Reſp. Literaria ab illo ſolo expectaſſet, imò forſan excepiſſet) non ita pridem in* Metaphyſicis *ſuis* Meditationibus *poſuiſſe; certè vix me deceret pluribus tibi inſinuare: qui omnia ejus & perluſtraſti volumina, &, quod ſolertiſſimi pathognomonicon eſt ingenii, perlucidè jamdudum intellexiſti Ænigmata. Fabrica eſt, cujus ſtamina* LUDOVICUS VIVES, PHILIPPUS MORNÆUS, MARINUS MERSENNUS, *&* PETRUS GASSENDUS *(Heroës publico Humanæ gentis commodo, & nobiliorum Diſciplinarum incremento nati) ex denſiſſimis conſertiſſimiſque ſuis ſapientiæ ſylvis profluentèr nobis contulêre. Fabrica, ut uno omnia abſolvam, cujus conſtructionem epide-*

micus

micus fermè ſceleratiſsimi hujus ſeculi Atheiſmus ab omni Erudito efflagitaſſe videatur, omnes apud rectos rerum æſtimatores: & quam nulli, niſi ſacrilegi Libertini *noſtri, quos apud* Dei, *&* Religionis *cauſa Aſſertore prorſus indigna habetur, inutilem cenſebunt vel ſupervacaneam.*

Memini, Vir Excellentiſsime, *te eſſe illum, qui me, poſt præmaturam ſereniſſimi mei quondam Domini,* Caroli, *feræ hujus Britanniæ noſtræ Monarchæ, Apotheoſin, non limis & invidiæ viperco veneno turgentibus, aſt ipſiusmet inſtar Charitatis benignè ridentibus oculis aſpexiſti; in illuſtrem* Collegii *veſtri ſocietatem invitaſti ſæpius; tandemque, quum inaugurali meo munere defunctus eſſem, candidè exporrectaque (quod aiunt) fronte excepiſti. Deinceps verò, toties quoties* Te, *tanquam Æſculapium redivivum, ægrorum levandorum ergô, adivi; me, circa ſtochaſmum, prognôſin, medendi methodum, præſidiorumq; materiam, ſat prolixè, de more meo, diſſeren-*

tem patienter & ſine maligno iſto medicaſtris innato Contradicendi *cacoëthe audiviſti ; & aut meam, ubi rationi aſſentiret, comprobaſti ſententiam, aut rectiorem commonſtraſti. Memini etiam (& magnum* Hippocratis *noſtri Genium ſemper habeam mihi iratum, ſi tanti beneficii fuero unquam oblitus) quàm paterno amore me, epidemica ſuperioris anni Dyſenteria graviſſimè & tantùm non lethaliter infectum, viſitaſti; quanta induſtria ſaluti meæ invigilaſti; quàm admiranda tandem Arte (favente* Archiatro Cœleſti) *animam meam abuſque Charontis cymbula reduxiſti : ita ut dignè canam,*

Auxiliis PRUIAN, anima hæc moribunda revixit;
Ut vigil, infusâ Pallade, flamma ſolet.

Hæc omnia manent alta mente repoſita, nec in Mortis etiam erit tyrannide, viva inſignis tuæ me erga Humanitatis Charagmata, cordis mei meditullio profundiſſimè inſculpta, penitus deradere. Quid verò retribuam tibi Fautor

tor Ampliſsime, *pro tot tantiſque favoribus, præter Animum Gratitudinis & Amoris pleniſsimum, ignoro prorſus: quem tibi* πάνυ τως καὶ ὅλως *addictum, pro conſueta tua Benignitate agnoſcere digneris, etiam atq; etiam te obteſtor. Cæterum ut mundo etiam univerſo clariùs innoteſcat hæc mea* εὐχαριστία; *En, in ipſius teſtimonium levidenſe hoc* τεκμήριον *tibi offero: tot inter volumina, quibus inſtructiſsimos habes Bibliothecæ tuæ forulos, infima verò claſſe reponendum. Reſtant adhuc mihi complurima, in gratæ mentis* μνημόσυνον, *inſuper dicenda: ſed* Amphora jam exiit, currente rota. Deum Opt. Max. *tibi longos, & benefico ſyderum aſpectu proſperos indulgeat annos, in Morborum fœcunda nimis ſobole, in Humani generis excidium, quotidie naſcentium exantlationem fœlicem, ſimul ac Artis noſtræ compendium; ex animo precor.*

Ἐρῤῥωσο θυσεβέστατε, καὶ ἐμοὶ πολὺ φίλτατε *Præſes.*

Ex muſæo meo Londini, Kal. Auguſt. anno ἀπὸ τῆς τοῦ λόγου ἐνσαρκώσεως, 1641. ¶.

A PREPARATORY Advertiſement TO THE READER.

READER,

BEfore you ſet foot within the door of this our *Phyſico-theologicall Labyrinth* (ſo the ſeemingly intricate and obſcure method, wherein the *Rowes* of our own and others *Cogitations* are here ſet, may warrant you to call it) providence enjoyn's, that we tender you a *Præparatory Advertiſement* of ſome things, whoſe præcognition is requiſite, as well to your calm, unpræjudiciall and ſatisfactory *Lecture*, as to the *Præmunition* of this well-intended *Enterpriſe* of our Pen, againſt both thoſe implacable, though

though always foyled Enemies to learned *Induſtry*, impertinent and parcel *Contradiction*, and malevolent *Cenſure*.

The Cardinall points, or *Heads*, under whoſe comprehenſion, *All*, whereof we hope a prævious conſideration, as your homely, but wholeſom Entertainment, during your ſhort Detention in this *Portall*, doth genuinely and regularly fall; are onely theſe *Four*: viz. (1.) The *Occaſion* and *Incitements* to this *Exerciſe*, (2.) The *Neceſsity and Juſtification of Naturall Theology*, in generall; and of this in particular, and therein principally of the *Demonſtration of the Exiſtence of God*, by beams univerſally deradiated from that Catholick *Criterion*, the *Light of Nature*: (3.) The gratefull commemoration of thoſe venerable *Authors*, from whoſe repleniſh't Treaſuries, the richeſt Contributions toward this *Hoſpitall* for the cure of miſerable *Infidels*, were derived: (4.) Our due Confeſsion of thoſe *Defects* and *Impediments*, which rendred us inſufficient to the worthy *Adminiſtration* of a *Province* ſo difficult, ſo ſublime, ſo ſacred, ſo diffuſive.

As

As for the *First* Præconſiderable, *viz.* the *Occaſion*; it is a *Truth*, not more deplorable, then manifeſt, that this our *Iſland*, which may juſtly contend with moſt parts of the Earth, for the Priority of Converſion to *Chriſtianiſme*, and might (Ah! that the righteous Anger of *Divinity* hath left us no other Tenſe to ſpeak in!) not many yeares ſince, have challenged the Garland from the whole, for the orthodox, zealous, and ſincere *Profeſſion* thereof: hath of late produced, and doth at this unhappy day foſter more ſwarms of *Atheiſticall monſters* (ſuch at leaſt, whoſe licentious Practiſes, and inſolent Diſcourſes in Publick, do equally declare their wild Ambition to be ſo accounted; as if the only way to acquire the reputation of being *Tranſcendent Wits*, were to ſeem able, with bold and ſpecious Arguments, to impugne the greateſt and moſt ſacred *Verities*; nay ſuch, upon whoſe Admiſsion, the Certitude of all other Notions doth individually depend) then any *Age*, then any *Nation* hath been infeſted withall. Nor, indeed, can this *Aſſertion* ſound harſh in the ears of any æquitable perſon, who

ſhall but have obſerved, that *Religion* (the *vitall ſpirits* of all Commonweals, and the *Sanction* of all Human Laws) and the ſacred *Authority of the Church* (the onely *Braſen Wall* of defence againſt thoſe *Legions* of *Errors*, and *Illuſions*, which the common *Adverſary* of mankind, by his ſubtle workings upon the *Deceptibility* of our frail Nature, hath advanced) are both ſo ſhatter'd and undermined by our Fatall *Civill Warre*; that there yet remain many and wide *Breaches*, at which whole *Hoſts* of the moſt execrable *Hereſies*, blaſphemous *Enthuſiaſms*, nay even profes't *Atheiſm* have enter'd upon us, without any conſiderable *Oppoſition* from thoſe, who are, by the duty of their *Place* and *Function*, obliged to bee the publick *Champions* of all ſacred *Truths*. This when wee had frequently, and not without due ſorrow conſidered, and upon a profound and reiterated *Examen* of all thoſe bloody *Sophiſms*, which are uſually urged by Atheiſts, to indubitate either the *Exiſtence* of God, or thoſe his Two Cardinal *Attributes*, the *Creation* of the Univerſe, and the conſtant *Conſervation* and *Moderation* of the ſame, by his *Providence*,

Providence; found them to be derived from one of thoſe two poyſonous *Fountains*; either *that Human Affections are imagined to be in God, or that man doth vainly arrogate ſo great Sagacity and perfection of Prudence to his owne Minde, as he thereupon præſumes to be able to comprehend what God can, and determine what he ought to do*: we immediately diſcovered, that the direct way to a full and durable *Solution* of them all, was onely to advertiſe men in the generall, that they ought to ſpeculate their own Mindes, as *Finite ſubſtances*, and the *Supreme Eſſence*, as an *Infinite*, and therefore *Incomprehenſible* one. For, this immenſe *Diſproportion* being once abſtractedly cogitated, and in the cloſeſt preſſures of *Infidelity* always reflected upon: all thoſe Mountainous *Difficulties*, which ſeem to eclipſe the *Light of Nature*, when converted toward *Divinity*, will ſoon leſſen, and vaniſh, like rorid Clouds before the Orient Sun.

The way toward the facile *Redargution* of all, either downright, or oblique and inferrible *Atheiſticall Miſapprehenſions*, appearing thus plain; the reſentment of our *Duty*, both

to *God*, and our *Fellowes* in Humanity; to God in the *vindication* of his injured *Majeſty*, to Man, in the *Rectification* of perverted *Judgments*, according to the capacity of our *Talent*; engaged us to attempt a ſhort progreſſe therein. And to the incitement of this forcible *Motive* we the more readily conformed our Aſſent, becauſe, having not long before propoſed to our ſelves to erect an intire *Fabrick* of *Phyſicall Science* upon *Principles* which ſeem to our judgement to be the moſt ſolid and permanent, becauſe moſt Demonſtrable, at leaſt, moſt Veriſimilous, as to the *Solution* of all Natures *Phænomena*; and firmly embraced that *Axiom* of the Schoolmen, *Nulla res, qualiſcunque eſt, intelligi poteſt, niſi Deus priùs intelligatur*, that no one thing in Nature can be known, unleſſe the Authour of Nature be firſt knowne: we conceived it not only no Apoſtaſie from our Firſt Reſolutions, but a more opportune and advantageous proſecution of them, to beginne at the Demonſtration of the Exiſtence of the onely *Perfect Ens*, and ſo many of his *Proprieties*, or *Attributes*, as relate to the *Univerſe* in generall,

generall, and *Humane nature* in ſpeciall; and this, as a *Foundation*, that muſt not only ſupport, but ennoble and facilitate our future *ſuperſtructions*.

Nor could our often and penſive reflexions upon the vaſt *Diſtance* betwixt the utmoſt Extenſibility of our *Underſtanding*, and the loweſt part of this the moſt ſublime and excellent *Subject*, alter or refract this our *Determination*: for, to counterpoyſe that *Diſcouragement*, we remembred, that to offend of *Zeal*, is more venial then to offend of *Neglect*.

Now, albeit this was the *Series*, or ſubalternate ſyntax of our *Thoughts*, to which our *Deſignation* of this *Work*, as the loweſt link, was connected; yet dare we not ſay, that this *Argument* was wholly of our own *Election*: for we have long inclined to that opinion of *Socrates* *, *Eam mentem Dii ſingulis dant, ut communes utilitates in medium afferant*; That every man's Province is impoſed upon him by the tacite conſignation of *Providence Divine*, and that it is the ſoft and ſecret Touch of that *Univerſall Spirit*, which maintains the common *Harmony* of the World, that *Tunes* the

* *In Oration. ad Philip.*

thoughts of every *Individuall* to this or that particular key: and therefore apprehended it as criminall, to ſtifle or extinguiſh thoſe *ſparks*, which we could not but perceive to be kindled, and glow within our breaſt.

Concerning the *Second*, viz. the *Neceſsity of Naturall Theology*, we are not ſingular in our perſuaſion, that theſe two Poſitions, *That there is a God*, and that *the Soul of man is a ſubſtance perfectly diſtinct from his body, and endowed with Immortality, by the Charter of its Eſſence*; are the Principall among thoſe *Verities*, which are to be demonſtrated by *Philoſophers*, rather then *Divines*. For, though to us whoſe *Mindes* are deeply imbued with the ſacred tincture of *Chriſtianiſme*, it ſufficeth to aſſume upon the evidence of meer *Faith*, that God is, and that the Human Soule, being conſtituted ſuperior to Corruptibility, doth eternally ſurvive the Funerall of the Body: yet, aſſuredly can the meer *Naturall* man, perſiſting in the ſtate of *Infidelity*, never be adduced to embrace either any *Religion*, or any *Morall Virtue*, unleſſe both thoſe *Propoſitions* fundamentall be firſt evicted to him, by *Reaſons*

Apodi-

Apodictical, deſumed from that infallible *Criterion*, the *Light of Nature*; from whoſe Judicature there can be no appeal.

And, ſince in this life of *Senſuality*, the Encouragements and Invitations to *vice*, are both more and ſtronger, then thoſe to *virtue*: moſt certain it is, that very few men would prefer the harſh dictates of *Honeſty* and *Right*, to thoſe more complacent ones of *Pleaſure* and *Profit*; if they neither feared the juſt vindiction of an *All-obſervant Deity*, nor expected a future *Subſiſtence* after Death. Now, however it be indubitable, that the Exiſtence of God ought firmly to be beleeved, becauſe it is commonſtrated in *Sacred Writ*; And, by converſion, that Sacred Writ ought to be beleeved, becauſe it is deſumed from God: for, ſince *Faith* is the Gift of God, he that gives Grace ſufficient for the ſtable Apprehenſion of other things contained therein, can alſo give Grace ſufficient to the admiſsion of his Exiſtence. yet cannot this kind of *Argumentation*, with probable hopes of his Conviction, be propoſed to an *Infidell*; who looks upon *Reaſon* onely,

as

as the chief inducement of *Beleef*: becauſe it is a manifeſt *Circle*, whoſe parts reciprocally depend upon each other for probation, and therefore he may lawfully except againſt it.

Again, as it is indiſpenſably *Neceſſary*, in reſpect of *Infidels*; ſo is it not *Unneceſsary*, in reſpect to *Beleevers*, to prove the *Certitude* of theſe two main Pillars of all Religion, and Morality: ſince the Evidence of *Reaſon*, ſuperannexed to that of *Faith*, muſt of neceſsity if not augment, yet *Corroborate* it: and that happy ſoul muſt, doubtleſſe, have much a clearer perception of the *verity* of *ſupernaturall Objects*, who ſpeculates them both by the *Light* of *Nature*, and of *Grace*.

And therefore, though we ſhould be ſo largely Charitable, as to grant, that there are no Atheiſts to be found among Chriſtians: which is more then the obſervation of the good *Juſtin Martyr* would give him leave to allow, when he ſaid, *dici quidem nonnullos Chriſtianos, eſse verò nullius Numinis cultores* *: and that the Principles of Religion are ſteadily beleeved by All, who make an externall Profeſsion of them: yet notwithſtanding would

* *In Dialog. cum Tryphon.*

it

it not genuinely follow, that therefore it is a *Pleonasm*, or *Parergy* to ratify those Principles to Beleevers, by the concurrent Testimony of that Oracle, *Reason*, to whose *Dictates* all Nations, all Ages, all Interests have unanimously submitted their Assent. For, as it must conduce to the *Information* of *Unbeleevers*: So also, proportionately, to the *Confirmation* of *Beleevers*.

Thirdly, as it hath been the positive and setled judgement of most *Divines*, both Ancient and Recent, not onely that the *Existence* of God may be demonstrated, or irresistibly enforced upon the most prævaricate understanding, by the pressure of *Reasons purely Naturall*; but also, that the Cognition of the *Non-principiate* and *Self-dependent Being*, is farre more easily acquired, then the Cognition of any *Created Nature* whatsoever: insomuch as every man brings into the world with him a certain *Proleptical*, or anticipated *Notion* of the *Deity*, indelebly impressed upon the very substance of his minde; but the *Science* of all other *Entities* doth emerge from the Ideas of their natures, *Extradvenient* or *Adventitious* to the *Cognoscent Fa-*

culty, by the mediation of the *Senſes*: So alſo was it the expreſſe Aſſertion of the wiſeſt of men (*Wiſdom* 13. *v.*8, 9.) and of the greateſt of Apoſtles (*Rom.* 1. *v.* 20.) that the *Creator* was ſo viſibly repreſented in the mirrour of the *Creature*, as no excuſe could remain to thoſe unhappy *Ethnicks*, who making more then ſuperficiall inſpection into the one, did yet prætend an Indiſcovery of the other. *Quid enim aliud conſpicuum hujus mundi theatrum, quàm* παιδευτήριον τῆς θεογνωσίας, καὶ ψυχῶν λογικῶν διδασκαλεῖον? As that not long ſince Vitall Library, Biſhop *Prideaux* (whoſe memory, next that of our *Royall Maſter*, is and ſhall ever be the moſt precious of all others, in our eſteem: not onely in reſpect of his inſatiable native Capacity, ſtupendious Acquiſitions, and ineſtimable Benefits to the Republick of Learning; but alſo of his ſingular Favours to us in particular) hath in a magnificent elegance expreſſed, *in concione ad Artium Baccalaureos, in die Cinerum, de ſcala viſibilium ad inviſibilia.* To which accompliſh't *Paraphraſe* upon that freſhly quoted Text of S^t. *Paul*, we refer our Reader; in order to his own more ample ſatisfaction, and our Juſtification, concerning

cerning the poſſibility, nay facility of the mindes mounting up to a graduable Intellection of the *Supreme Ens*, by the roundles, or ſteps in the *Scale* of ſubordinate and *Created Natures.*

And *Fourthly*, leſt this our charitable Deſign, to ſubvert the chief Citadel of *Atheiſme*, by a Countermine of Arguments purely *Phyſicall* (entruſting the managery of that ſacred Engine, the Teſtimony of *Canonicall Scripture*, to the more expert hands of thoſe, whoſe *Function* entituleth them to the proper uſe thereof) ſhould want any one of the inducements of perſwaſion, requiſite to the accompletion of of its *Defence*; to the Reaſons, and Præcedents now introduced, we may ſuperadd alſo the *Authority* of no leſſe then the *Lateran Councell*, held under Pope *Leo* the tenth. Which, having with exceeding prudence decreed the *Anathematization* of all ſuch *Atheiſts*, who dare queſtion either the *Being* of God, or any of his *Attributes* (whether Abſolute and Incommunicable; ſuch as his *Eternity*, *Immenſity*, *Simplicity*, *Immutability*, *Independence*, &c. perfections concentred in his moſt glorious Eſ-

ſence: or Reſpective, ſuch as his *Omnipræſence*, *Omnipotence*, *Omniſcience*, *Juſtice*, *Mercy*, *Goodneſſe*, *Verity*, *Liberality*, &c. which by effuſion relate to the Creature) or the other Baſis of Religion, the *Immortality* of the *Humane ſoul*: doth, in the cloſe of the *Canon*, not only adhort, but expreſſely command all *Chriſtian Philoſophers*, that they ſharpen their *Style s* for the totall Eraſion of their circumventing *Sophiſmes*, and the deep Engravement of thoſe *Magiſteriall Truths*.

To conclude therefore, inſomuch as not onely multiplyed *Reaſons*, but alſo *Authority* both *Divine* and *Human* conjunctively, both warrant and enjoyne this kinde of *Naturall proceſs* for the convicton of Atheiſme: as wee can perceive no weight in their opinion, who think any *Principle* of *Religion* either prophanely diſparaged and debaſed, or implicitely convelled and ſtaggered, when brought to the Teſt of *Naturall Reaſon*, though only for *Confirmation*; ſo neither have we any cauſe to fear, that the upper Form of *Theologiſts* will contract their browes, and frown upon this our Benevolent

lent and opportune, though imperfect *Treatiſe*.¶

Concerning our *Third* Poſtulate, *viz.* the *Nomination* of thoſe venerable *Writers*, from whoſe large magazines of Knowledge, no ſmall part of our Ammunition for the Battery of the ſtrongeſt hold of the Common Adverſary to Humanity, hath been furniſhed; to this your ſelf will acknowledge us adliged as well by the bond of *Gratitude*, as *Honour*: the firſt adviſing us to return them the due tribute of *Commemoration*, and an open profeſsion of our beholdingneſſe to them; the other impelling us thereupon, in order to the prævention of being reputed *Plagiary*. Bee pleaſed, then, Candid Reader, to know from us, firſt that the Demonſtration of the Exiſtence of God (being the argument of the ſecond Section in the 1. chap.) together with the enſuing Explanation of the ſundry *Scholaſtick Terms*, therein unavoidably uſed, and the *Reſponſes* to the ſeverall *Objections* (whereof ſome were made by the glorious *Marinus Merſennus*, and others by our eminent, M^r. *Hobbs*) was wholly collected out of the incomparable *Metaphyſicks* of that he-

roicall Wit; *Renatus De's Chartes.* Whoſe *Meditations* on that as neceſſary as excellent ſubject, having both frequently and with the moſt abſtracted attention of our mind, read over; and with all poſsible equity of judgement put them into the ſcales againſt the *Cogitations* of *Cornelius ab Hogelande*, the Arguments of *Philippus Mornæus du Pleſsis*, *Hugo Grotius*, and *Petrus Gaſſendus*, concerning the ſame *Theorem*: we found them, by vaſt exceſſes, to overbalance all the others, in the points of comprehenſion, perſpicuity, profundity, conviction. (1.) *Comprehenſion*; becauſe their importance is of ſo great extent, as to take in the ſubſtance of whatever hath, or can be ſaid by the whole world, on that particular. (*Conſule ipſum Carteſium, in Epiſt. dedicat. ad Doct. Sorbon.*) (2.) *Perſpicuity*; becauſe, though they are not accommodated to *junior* or illiterate Capacities; as himſelf prudently intimateth (*in præfat. ad medit. de prima philoſoph.*) yet to thoſe Heads, which ſtudy and contemplation have prepared for the entertainment of Notions ſupernatural, muſt they appear as diſtinct, clear, and bright, as all the *Light of Nature* could make them; nor can he, who doth not,

after

after ſerious lecture, apprehend their *Extraction*, mutual *Connexion*, and genuine, nay indeclinable *Illation*, juſtly pretend to any conſiderable reflexions upon his own Nature. (3.) *Profundity*; becauſe they are their own *Criterion*, being deſumed from the very *Eſſence* of the mind, and proleptical *Impreſſes*, which are the radix, or Foot of all Cognition. (4.) *Conviction*; becauſe they are of the number, and perhaps the principall of thoſe *Verities*, which, like *Geometricall Demonſtrations*, ſtorm the moſt obſtinate judgements, enforce them to a plenary aſſent, and having once gained poſſeſſion of the mind, for ever after exclude all *Dubitation*, and *Apoſtaſie*. So that what *Cicero* (5. *de Finibus.*) ſaid of the Stoicks Philoſophy; *mirabilis eſt apud Stoicos rerum contextus, reſpondent extrema primis, media utriſque, omnia omnibus; quid ſequatur, quid repugnet, vident, & ut in Geometria, prima ſi dederis, danda ſunt omnia*: we may worthily transfer upon the *Metaphyſicall meditations* of *Carteſius*; nay more worthily, for no one *Principle* of his, there propoſed, is precarious, but *Neceſſary*. This perpended, we perceived our ſelves not onely encouraged, bu ſtraightly concerned, to tranſcribe,

ſcribe and accommodate to our præſent ſcope, the ſummary of his 3d. *Meditation.* And, *Secondly*, that many of our Apodictical Reaſons, alleaged for the comprobation of *Providence Divine*, both General and Special, were gleaned from thoſe more fertil Fields of *Lactantius* (de opific. Dei) *Raymundus de Sabunde* (Theologia Natural.) *Aquinas* (contra Gentes) *Ludovicus Vives* (de verit. fidei Chriſtianæ) *Bradwardinus* (de cauſa Dei) *Valeſius* (de ſacra Philoſophia) and chiefly of *Gaſſendus* (in Animadverſ. in phyſ. Epicuri:) the leaves of whoſe moſt learned Works, we bluſh not to confeſſe our ſelves to have been ſo converſant in, that we have ſullyed them by often revolution.

Nor can we expect the Perverſion of this our ingenuous Acknowledgement, by any, but the *Malevolent*, or *Illiterate*, to a *Diminution* of the credit due to this our induſtrious *Spicilegium*; while thoſe *Bookmen*, whoſe vigilant noſtrills are acquainted with the odour of the *Lamp*, need not bee informed, how many anxious hours have been ſpent on the ſedulous *Extraction* of this *Vial* of precious Truths, from the choyceſt *Flowers* of ſo many excellent

Gardens

Gardens (wherein onely to have had ſome recreative and private *Walks*, to many hath been juſtly accounted no obſcure Specimen of both *Literature*, and *Ingenuity*.) eſpecially when we are not deſtitute of grounds for our hopes, that they will ſoon find thoſe Flowers, not to have loſt much of their native *Fragrancy* and *Virtue*, by paſſing the *Alembic* of our Pen; as alſo, that it hath been no ſmall part of our care, to *Refuſe*, as well as *Elect*.

Beſides, there are many *Stars*, and thoſe of the greateſt magnitude, now ſhining with full ſplendor, in the ſphere of *Learned Authors*, whoſe beams were in great part derived from others, whom the revolution of Time had made leſſe vertical, and declined toward the Weſt of Oblivion. Who can blaſt the verdant Laurel on *Virgils* front, by ſaying, though truly, that He converted more then 1000. of *Homers* verſes to his own uſe? Who leſſen the ſound of *Homers* Fame, by exclaiming, that his Muſe was a Drone, and lived upon the Hony ſhe ſo largely ſuck't from the elder *Hives* of *Theocritus*, *Apollonius*, and *Heſiod*? Who detract from the full glory of

Cicero, by objecting that moſt of his ſtrong and limpid ſtreams of Eloquence flowed from thoſe two nobleſt ſprings of Greece, *Plato* and *Demoſthenes*? Or, who will diminiſh one grain of incenſe, in his ſacrifice to the memory of that *Alcides* (for the conqueſt of monſtrous Difficulties) the mighty *Stagirite*; becauſe *Clearchus* hath a tradition, that he ſaw and diſcourſed with that knowing *Jew*, from whoſe oraculous mouth all his Philoſophical Maxims were delivered to him? To come neerer home; who hath thought the leſſe of *Grotius* his Tract of the verity of Chriſtian Religion; becauſe it ſeems a Compendium of *Mornæus*, of the ſame Subject and Inſcription? Or, who undervalued *Mornæus*, in regard of the abundant Contributions he received from *Lactantius*, *Raymundus de Sabunde*, *Aquinas*, & *Ludovicus Vives*? And therefore, though we we are ſufficiently conſcious of the great diſparity betwixt thoſe Giant Wits, and our Pygmie Acquiſitions; and therefore gladly place our ſelves more then one ſphere below them: yet ſhall wee conceive our ſelves not a little injured, if any ſhall deny our Book

Book a room in their Libraries, only becauſe it præſents, in Epitome, and entire, what many moneths reading of the *Schoolmen* would have exhibited at large, and in fractures. *Aphranius*, an eminent *Poet*, for anſwer to thoſe *Semi-Criticks*, who accuſed him of ſtealing many remarkable paſſages from *Menander*, returns thus; *Fateor, accepi non modò abillo, ſed ut quiſque habuit quod conveniret mihi, & à Latino quoque quodcunque me non poſſe facere melius credidi.*

Moreover, every Brain is not conſtellated for new *Diſcoveries*; nor can every Age boaſt the production of a *Copernicus*, *Gilbert*, *Galilæo*, *Merſennus*, *Carteſius*, or a *Harvy*: Providence introducing ſuch, as Time doth *New Stars*, ſingle and ſeldom. ¶.

And as concerning our *laſt Requiſite*, *viz.* an æquitable conſideration of our *Defects* and *Impediments*; to this alſo are we conſtrained to court our Reader, in order to our refraction of the *Rigor* of Cenſure. For though we need not advertiſe, that the Nerves of our *Intellect* are too ſlender and feeble to ſuſtain ſo great a weight; and our *Pencill* too rude and groſſe, to expreſſe ſuch fine *Metaphyſical* and *Theoſo-*

phical Notions, in draughts reſpondent to the life of their Importance; in regard the frequent *ſtooping* of our *Cogitations* below the dignity and due height of the ſubject, muſt ſoon diſcover the one, and the *Roughneſſe* of our *Style* through the whole Piece, as ſoon confeſſe the other: yet can it not be ſupervacaneous for us here to intimate, that we had more then one *Diſadvantage* to encounter.

Firſt, the often Fermentations and Ebullitions of our *Melancholy*; to the tyranny of which fæculent and Saturnine humor both our native Temperament, and ſedentary contemplative condition of life have æqually ſubjected us; could not but as often obnubilate the region of our Mind, and darken the proſpect of our ſoul, by infecting the requiſite purity and lucidity of our ſpirits, with thick clouds of opac and fuliginous Exhalations.

Secondly, the courſe of our *Profeſſion*, rendring us obnoxious to many more *Diſtractions*, *Interturbations*, and *Avocations*, by the intruſion and importunity of the *Sick*, then

then we could obtain minutes of retirement for *Lecture* and *Meditation*; will, wee hope, be confeſt to have had more then a finger in the cauſation of thoſe *Chaſms, Inæqualities*, *Omiſsions*, &c. Lapſes, which occurre to the obſervation of the *Auſtere* and *Curious*.

And, Thirdly, it cannot but deſerve ſome favour, to give notice; that the Clue of our ſtudies was broken off in the midſt, by the rough hand of the late *Epidemick Dyſentery*, which arreſting us even then, when the contexture of this Web required the moſt confirmed vigour of body, and ſerenity of minde; confined us to the dungeon of a ſick bed ſo long and cloſely, that it hath left ſenſible impreſsions of its Malignity, not only upon our Conſtitution, but alſo upon more then halfe of theſe our *Lucrubrations*.

To theſe Mitigatory Arguments, may rightly be added, the *Narrowneſs* of our præſent *Fortunes*, the *Thinneſs* of our *Library*, our tædious attendance on *Commitees* (all the ſad effects of our late *Inteſtine Warres*) together with ſome other private *Remora's*, the

leaſt whereof may ſerve to the *Judicious* and *Benigne*, as a ſufficient incitement to look upon our *Imperfections*, through the diminiſhing Teleſcope of *Charity*.

Now, this humble *Apology* we addreſs only to the *Erudite* and *Candid*, experience having confirmed, that none the ſtrongeſt Charme of Reaſon, can binde the virulent tongue of that livid Viper, *Envy*, the ſpirit of whoſe venom doth wholly conſiſt in *Detraction*.

UPON

UPON
DOCTOR CHARLTON'S
NATURAL THEOLOGY.

SO, our poor Cotſwold Springs, that have no names,
Render their Tribute to your mighty Thames.
But your Book's perfect in it ſelf. We do
Only acknowledge, not encreaſe, what You
Have ſent forth, ſtreaming through the Land agen,
Out of your Generous, purely-flowing Pen.
To give more Elogy, with my ſoft Quil,
To Yours from Eagle's wing, were even as ill,
As threaden lace on cloth of Gold to pin,
Or o'rlay Gold it ſelf with baſer Tin.
Yet may I venture thus: though not to praiſe:
To anſwer OB's, *Envy perhaps will raiſe.*
Tis fit that Cenſure wait on All that's done;
« Wits are made great by Emulation.
Some places are obſcure. *The Book's not Good,*
By every vulgar Head is underſtood.
What you don't underſtand, read o'r again;
Compare, Conferr, and Meditate: 'Tis plain.
Th' Engliſh is Latin. *Know, that th' Engliſh Tongue*
Hath from each Language Conſummation:
And He, that will our Learneſt Writers ſcan,
Muſt be both Latiniſt and Grecian.
The Stile's too High. *Fear not the Critick's Rod:*
« High Phraſe is born of your High Thoughts of GOD.
Forward, Dear Brother: « GIFTS *for uſe are lent:*
« To do moſt good, brings in the moſt * *Content.* p. 120.
Your Phyſick has done Miracles: But ſure,
TH' ATHEIST CONVERTED's, *your Divineſt Cure.*

C. B.

ALIUD.
IN EJUSDEM OPERA.

Charltonus is, qui Helmontium pridem dedit,
Nuperque nobis reddidit Helmontium;
Hunc pulveris miranda ſympathetici,
Hunc eruditis exprimentem paginis
Medentium, De Fluxibus, Lapſus graves;
Nuperrimèque Calculum, fœtum Suum,
(O abditâ præclarior Gemmâ Liber!)
Donaſſe luce publicum gaudet bonum;
Jam nunc ad altiora ſurgit. Numinis
Aſſertor eſt, Vindexque providentiæ.
Fortuna, Fati vis, Voluntas Libera,
Summi docentur obſequi Dictis Dei.
Deo favente, Cuncta. Vocum Copiam
Lectiſſimarum mirer, an Rerum magis?
Utramque miror, pariter atque exoſculor:
Utramque pronus veneror, & longè ſequor.
O Autor annumerande *Charltonis* Tuis!
Gaſſende, Chartes, Magne Sennerte Angliæ!
Et ipſe vivas, & Libri vivant diu!
Et Artium, de Te, optimæ certent diu!
Homines priori Opere devinctos habes;
Nunc Maximum Tibi obligaviſti DEUM.

Clemens Barkſdallus.

THE

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3. *The*

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THE

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD DEMONSTRATED.

CHAP. I.

SECT. I.

ARistotle, though an *Ethnick*, poysoned with the *Macedonian* and *Grecian Idolatry*, nay so given over to that sottish impiety, *Polytheisme*, that he could be content to make a *Goddesse* of his *Wench*, and offer solemn sacrifices to her as a *Deity*, whom his own obscene luxury had degraded from the native dignity of *Humanity*, to devote his orisons to her for *good*, whom his own temptations had frequently subdued to *evill*, as *Gassendus* (*Exercitat.* 3.) out of *Diogenes Laert.* hath accused him; had yet a strong and noble sense of the *supreme Being*, as may, even by his adversaries, be collected from hence, that he never durst adventure on a *Definition*, nay not so much as a *Description* of its *Nature*. For

Section 1. Article 1.

Aristotle, the most knowing and curious Ethnick, did yet by his silence in the cardinal point of *Theology*, proclaim the impossibility of mans full understanding the simple and perfect *Essence* of *God*.

though he ſpun out his ſpeculations of *Immateriall ſubſtances*, (the onely and proper theme of a *Meraphyſitian*) into a long (but knotty and unequall) thread of 14 Books: yet in the 13 firſt of all thoſe, he ſeems little better then wholly ſilent in all things that immediately concern *Theology*; and in ſome few Chapters onely of the laſt affords us a ſparing and timerous diſcourſe of the *Proprieties*, or *Attributes* of the *Firſt Mover*. Now the pride and ambition of his wit would never have ſuffered his pen to have skip't over that ſubject, which being the moſt abſtruſe, ſublime, and excellent, muſt by conſequence, have adferred the moſt of glory and renown unto his memory: had he not been fully convicted, from within, of the immenſe chaſme or gulph, that lay between the utmoſt extent of his own *finite reaſon*, and the incomprehenſibility of the *Eſſence of God*. This his evaſion, or rather ſuperſeſſion, ſome have been pleaſed to urge againſt his honour, as an argument of his *Ignorance* in notions *ſupernaturall*: but, in my conſtruction, tis the cleareſt demonſtration of the *Modeſty* and *ſtrength* of his *Judgment*. For whoever ſhall duely conſider, how impoſſible it muſt be for *humanity*, dull, groſſe, and narrow humanity, to behold *Inviſibility*, derive *Independency*, calculate *Eternity*, circumſcribe *Incircumſcription*, limit *Omnipotence*, underſtand *Omniſcience*, *&c.* and how dangerous a phrenſie that brain muſt be diſordered withall, that attempts to deſcribe what he doth not, cannot know: will ſoon be ſatisfied, that *Amazement*, and pious *ſilence* is the beſt Lecture man can read on that immenſe *ſubject*, of which when we have ſaid all we can, we have ſaid nothing, if we look forward upon that inexhauſtible abyſs of *excellencies*, which muſt remain unſpoken of, and indeed uncomprehended; that a profeſſed *Neſcience* in this particular, is the complement, or zenith of all other *Science*, which the minde of man is capable of in this life; and that *Ariſtotle* may better pretend to the title of the *divine Philoſopher*, for writing ſo little of the *Deity*, then *Plato* for writing ſo much to no purpoſe, the latter ſpeaking little in much, the former all that can be thought in ſaying nothing.

And

And how far the ancient *Hebrews* (whose frequent *visions* of *Gods* reflexive glories, transmitted to them in the necessary allay of *sensible* natures; as of the pillar of a *Cloud*, by day, the pillar of *Fire*, by night, of *Smoak*, *Thunder* and *Lightning* on mount *Sinai*, at the promulgation of the decalogue, &c. might have encouraged them to pretend a nearer acquaintance with *Divinity*, then any other nation of the World) were from daring to conceive any positive *Adumbration* of his *Essence*: sufficiently appears from that high veneration their law enjoyned towards his very *Name*, *Jehovah*. Which was never to be pronounced by any, but the *High Priest*; in any place, but the *Sanctum Sanctorum*; at any time, but on the *Festival of annual expiation*; and in any case, but that of generall *benediction*, when the *Mercy* and goodness of God were to be derived down upon the people by the holy mediation of the anointed successors of *Aaron*; under penalty of no lesse then *death*, and particularly that cruel kinde of death appointed for the punishment of *Blasphemy*: as stands recorded in their *Talmud*, in the sad case of *Teradions* son.

Article 2. The *Hebrews* intimated so much, in the immoderate veneration enjoyned toward his Name, *Jehovah*.

Nor can the more illuminated *Christian*, though the superexcellence of his faith justly entitle him to this dignity, above all other darker Religions; that he hath the *true knowledge of God*, (*i. e.*) that he apprehends him under that *Idea*, which he hath been pleased to afford of himself, in the sacred mysteries of the *Gospell*, as of a *Trinity of Persons in an Unity of Substance*, &c. most judiciously and piously collected and knit together in that admirable Anacephalæosis or summary of the Christian doctrine, called the *Creed of Athanasius*; raise the eye of his understanding so high, as to look directly upon the *Quiddity*, or pure *Essence* of him whose dwelling is in light inaccessible, and invisible: but must think it happiness great enough for the entrancement of his soul, humbly and awefully to speculate him in the shadow of his *Attributes*, and those onely which mortality is qualified to understand.

Article 3. The clearer sighted *Christian* also can perceive no more of the *Divine nature* then what is shadowed in its *Attributes*.

Article 4. And therefore the Author restrains the readers expectation onely to a demonstration of the *Existence of God*, in this Chapter subnecting a short scheme of his present *designe* and *Method*.

This being duly perpended, our *Reader* needs no other advertisement, that in this *Demonstration of the existence of God, from the Idea of him engraven by his own hand on the minde of man*, he is not to expect any bold and vain attempt of the *description* of the *Formality* or *simple Quiddity* of that *supreme Being*, (which is the *Fountain* of all other *Essences*, and *Soul* of all other *Causes*:) and it remains onely on our part, that we tender him an account both of our *designe*, or scope, and of the *method* our pen observes in the pursuance thereof.

Though we are fully perswaded, with *Plato* (*Lib.* 10. *de legib. p.* 871.) upon the conviction of those innate *dictates*, which the reason of every man whispers in the eares of his conscience (which proveth the lowder thunder of the two, and spoke more terror to the miscreant Emperor) that time never produced such a prodigy, as an *Absolute Atheist*, *i. e.* such a fool, as durst indubitate the existence of a *Grand-father Principle*, or *first Intelligence*, from whom, as from the main spring in a Watch, or other Automatous Engine, all motion is derived, and which constantly animates the great machine of the World: yet have we too much ground to suspect, that the accursed sperme of the *Giants* is not yet extinct, that every age can furnish us with a precedent of *Theomachy*, nor need we look beyond our own *Annals* for a second to *Caligula*, or want a parallel for *Epicurus*. Who, though they profest the necessity of a *Deity*, yet sottishly ran into delusions equivalent to the downright denyall thereof, and sinned as high as blasphemy, in their endevours to cut off those two cardinall, and inseparable *Attributes* of the *supreme Essence*, *viz. Omnipotence*, and *Omniscient-omnipresence*, or *Active-ubiquity*; not allowing the *Creation* of the *World*, out of nothing, to the one, nor the *conservation*, or *Government* of the same to the other. And having made reflexions upon the unsuccesfull progress many have made, in their enterprises of confuting this sort of implicite *Atheisme*, by the perswasion of *Scripture* only; we became of opinion that to enter the lists with a *Lucian*, or *Lucretius*, and there contend with him concerning the extent of *Gods Providence* even to every single and individuall nature, urging no other proof of the *Affirmative* but

but the bare *authority of Canonicall Writ* (though to us *Chriſtians* of undoubted truth and more fiduciary then demonſtration) is the ready way to confirm him in his impiety, and ſtiffen his infidelity, in regard a plain and juſt exception lies againſt the *Circle*. Nor have we any probable way left to break his objections, but a ſober reception of them in the ſhield of reaſon, and a ſmart retort of arguments deſumed from the proper magazine of all temporall knowledge, the *Light of Nature*. Hereupon, when we had determined with our ſelves to erect a building of *Phyſicall ſcience*, upon thoſe pillars, or principles, which to our judgment appear moſt ſolid, firm and permanent, becauſe moſt ſenſible in all the operations or effects of *Nature*, that can any way occurre to the diſquiſition of *Philoſophy*; as ſhall be amply commonſtrated in the future application of them to particulars: and ſubmitted our aſſent to that excellent *Rule* of the *School-men*, *Nulla res qualiſcunque eſt, intelligi poteſt, niſi Deus intelligatur prius*, revived into an *Axiome* by the incomparable *Des Cartes*, in theſe words; *Omnem omnis ſcientiæ certitudinem & veritatem, ab una veri Dei cognitione pendere; adeo ut dum ignoramus Deũ eſſe, & verum eſſe, nihil omnino de ulla alia re perfecte ſcire poſſimus*: we conceived it neceſſary to begin as high as the *Firſt Cauſe*, *God*; and endevour the demonſtration firſt of his *Exiſtence*, and conſequently (for ſtrict reaſon will never endure their ſeparation) of thoſe two generall operations of his *Wiſdome*, *Power*, and *Goodneſs*, *viz.* (1.) the *Creation* of the world *ex nihilo*, and and (2.) the continuall *Conſervation* of the ſame, in its primitive harmony, by his *Providence*; and this by *Arguments* ſo purely extracted from the chief inducements of beleef, that no Atheiſt, how acute, or refractary ſoever, can juſtly except againſt them.

SECT. II.

Article 1. The mind of man can have no cognition of the nature of its objects, but by the mediation of their proper Ideas.

'TIs an Aſſertion, which bids defiance to a whole hoſt of Scepticks; that the *Soul* of man, while ſhe animates this admirable engine, the *Body*, can apprehend no more of the *Formes* of *Entities*, then what ſhe reads in thoſe reflex *Characters*, *Images* or *Ideas*, which ſhe findes repreſented to her in the mirrour of *Cogitation*.

Article 2. Those Ideas are 1 Innate. 2 Adventitious. 3 Imaginary.

Now of those *Ideas*, or *Representations* exhibited to the understanding, there are three distinct orders 1. Some are *Innate*, or *Congenial*; for that I may understand, what a *Thing* is, what *Truth* is, what the act of *Cogitation* is: I need the assistance, or information of no other nature, but my own. 2. Others are *Adventitious*, or emergent from external objects; for that I actually hear sounds, see the light of the Sun, feel the heat of fire and become sensible of all other qualities of bodies: I have ever hitherto adjudged these acts of sensation to belong to my essence onely at second hand, as being derivative from other causes, foreign and alien to my nature. 3. And finally others are *Created*, modelled, or coyned in the mint of the *Imagination*; for the *Phansie* of the most stupid Ideot is naturally empowerd to forge, or paint to it self, and represent to the mind what images it please; as *Chimaras*, *Sirens*, *Harpies*, *Goblins*, &c.

Article 3. A strict enquiry, whether the Ideas of objects existent without our selves, hold an exact similitude to their natures.

As for those *Ideas*, on which I look as proceeding from things existent without the circle of my self; I make this enquiry: whether there be any reason sufficient to perswade me to conceive, that such *Ideas* are exactly like to those *things*; whether these *Copies* or transcripts are drawn to the life, so as in all particulars to resemble their *originals*? And the determination, wherewithall I satisfie my self, is this; that the *Affirmative* is taught me by nature, as being hitherto instructed, that those *Ideas* have no dependence at all on my *Will*: and so, by consequence, proceed not from my self, but are obtruded upon my cognition even against my Will. For instance, whether I will, or nill, I am sensible of the heat of *Fire*: and therefore think this perception or Idea of heat, to proceed from something distinct from my self, *viz.* from the heat of that fire, by which I stand, and obvious it is, beyond all hesitancy, that I may judge that this fire doth immit into me rather the *similitude* of it self, then any thing else. The stability of which reasons, I shall now strictly examine. When I here say, *I am thus instructed by Nature*; I intend only that I am rapt on, by a certain spontaneous violence, or native propensity, to submit my assent thereunto; not that tis declared

unto

unto me to be a firm and uncontrollable truth, by the *light of Nature*. For I diſcover a vaſt and irreconcileable diſparity between the *Dictates* of theſe two *Informers*: and the *Difference* may be ſtated thus. Whatever things are declared unto me, by the *light of Nature*; as this, that *I am, becauſe I doubt*, that *2 and 3 make 5*, *&c.* can never, on any pretence, be doubted of, in regard there can be no other *faculty*, or *Criterion*, to whoſe judgement or deciſion, I can afford ſo ample and firme credit, as to that of the *light of Nature*, which onely can teach me, whether thoſe things are true or falſe. But as for thoſe *Inclinations*, or *Propenſions naturall*; I have long ſince found, by deplorable experience, that by them I have been frequently hurried unto, and in a ſort impelled upon this *evill*, in my ſolitary diſputes with my ſelf concerning my judicature and election of the *Good*: and therefore am not in any meaſure convinced, why I ſhould depend upon their information, purſue their conduct, or reſigne my aſſent to their teſtimony, in other caſes. Again, though theſe *Extradvenient Ideas* depend not on my *Will*; yet is that no valid Argument, that therefore of neceſſity they muſt proceed from things without my ſelf: for as thoſe ſtrong *Propenſities*, though ſeated in me, and as it were annexed to my very being, doe yet ſeem clearly diſtinct from my *Will*; ſo alſo perchance there may be another third *Faculty* within me, which I doe not yet ſufficiently underſtand, that coyns thoſe Ideas, as hitherto my conceptions have ever been, that in my *dreams* ſuch *Ideas* are created in my brain, without the aſſiſtance of any forreign *Objects* invading my *ſenſes*. And, laſtly, ſhould I grant thoſe *Counterfeits*, or *Ideas*, to be deſumed from things diſtinct from my ſelfe; yet could it be no juſtifiable inference, that therefore they muſt in all points reſemble thoſe things, or *prototypes*, from which they were tranſmitted: yea, in many particulars, I apprehend them to be diſproportionate and diſſimilar, *toto cœlo*, by inequalities never to be parallels. To inſtance; I finde within my ſelf two divers *Ideas* of the *Sun*, the one taken from my *ſenſe*, (which I therefore think fit to refer to that claſſis of Ideas, called *Adventitious*) repreſenting the Sun in a very ſmall round, of leſs diameter then a Coach wheel: the other from

from the reaſons or *maximes of Aſtronomy*, *i. e.* extracted by way of induction, from certain *Notions* implantate in me, or by any other way whatever compoſed or modelled; which repreſents the Sun in a vaſt circumference, much larger then the Terraqueous Globe. Now both theſe cannot exactly reſpond in magnitude to their *Originall*, the *Sun*, exiſtent without me: and reaſon offers me invincible evidence to aſſure that image to be the moſt unlike, which ſeems to have moſt neerly ſtreamed from the Sun it ſelf. All which conſiderations to ample ſatisfaction evince; that hitherto I have, not upon any *ſcientificall* and *authentick judgement*, but onely upon a certain *obſcure and blinde impulſe* from within, beleived, that there are a ſort of *Entities* exiſtent without the ſphear of my nature, which, by ſubtle tranſfuſion through the organs of my ſenſes, convey the *Ideas*, or *Idols* of themſelves into my mind.

Article 4. A ſecond diſquiſition, whether any of thoſe things whoſe Ideas are found in the mind of man, have any reall exiſtence without it?

But I have found out another certain way, for the more happy progreſs of my enquiry, *Whether any of thoſe entities whoſe Ideas ſojurn within me, have any reall exiſtence without me*; and this is it. Theſe *Ideas*, conſidered in this relation, that they are certain *modi cogitandi*, or means which the ſoul makes uſe of, in order to her act of *Cogitation*; have indeed no *diſſimilitude*, *Alogy*, or inequality amongſt themſelves, and all ſeem to flow from me, in one and the ſame chanel, after one and the ſame manner: but conſidered in this intereſt, that one repreſents one thing, a ſecond another, a third another quite different from both; manifeſt it is, that they hugely differ each from other, as to the degrees of more or leſſe *objective reality*. For doubtleſſe, thoſe *Ideas*, which repreſent *ſubſtances*, are more ſomething, or (to ſpeak more intelligibly, though more ſcholaſtically) contain in them more of *objective reality*; then thoſe which repreſent only certain *modifications* of *ſubſtances*, or meer *Accidents*: and again, that *Idea*, by which I ſpeculate ſome *ſupreme Eſſence*, or *Deity eternall, omniſcient, omnipotent, creator* and *conſervator* of this great All, &c. ſeems in ſevere truth, to comprehend more of *objective Reality*, or *Formall Verity*, then ſuch poor Ideas that carry onely the ſhadowes of ſome ſubordinate, dependent and

and finite ſubſtances. Now evident it is, by the *light of Nature*, that there muſt be ſo much at leaſt, (if not more) in the *Cauſe efficient* and *Total*, as is in the *effect* of the ſame Cauſe. For, I demand, from what can the *effect* derive its reality, but from the *Cauſe*? and how can the *Cauſe* bequeath that to the *effect*, which it ſelf is deſtitute of? Out of which root ſpring two branches of ever flouriſhing truth. (1.) *Nihil à nihilo fieri*, nothing can be made by nothing. (2.) *Id quod magis perfectum eſt, hoc eſt, quod plus realitatis in ſe continet, fieri non poſſe ab eo, quod minus perfectum eſt*, A more perfect ſomething, *i.e.* which imports more of objective reality, cannot be produced by a leſſe perfect ſomething. So that I may ſafely infer, that this poſition hath not its verity reſtrained to thoſe effects onely, whoſe *Reality* is *Actual*, or *Formal*; but extended alſo to thoſe *Ideas*, in which is conſidered only their *Reality objective*. For example; a ſtone, that never was before, cannot only not now begin to be, unleſs it be produced by ſome other thing, which in it ſelf hath formally and eminently what ever is included in the perfect or full nature of the ſtone; nor can heat be introduced into any ſubject, that was not formerly hot, unleſs by ſomething of equal perfection, or at leaſt equivalent to heat: but, beſides all this, there cannot be in me the Idea of a ſtone, unleſs thar Idea be firſt inſerted into me by ſome cauſe, wherein there is ſo much, at leaſt, of reality, as I conceive to be in the ſtone, or in the heat. For though that *Cauſe* transfuſe nothing of its *Actual*, or *Formal* reality into my Idea; yet am not I therefore to apprehend my Idea to be the leſs reall, but that the nature of it is ſuch, that it can require no more reality formal *ex ſe*, then what it borrowes from my *cogitation*, whoſe manner of apprehenſion it is. But that this my Idea, comprehends this or that objective reality, rather then another: this muſt of neceſſity inevitable ariſe unto it from ſome other *Cauſe*, wherein is ſo much at leaſt of reality *Formal*, as the *Idea* contains of *objective*. For if I grant any thing to be found in the Idea, which was not in the Cauſe thereof, that ſomething it muſt derive from nothing: but how imperfect ſoever that *Modus eſſendi*, or manner of being, whereby a thing is *objectively* in the *Intellect*, by an *Idea*, or repreſentative, be; yet is it not

wholy nothing, and cannot therefore proceed from nothing. Nor have I any cause to suspect, that since the reality, which I consider in my Ideas, is onely objective; that therefore the same reality cannot be formally inherent in the causes of them: but that it is sufficient to their nature, that it be in them only objectively. For as that *Modus essendi objectivus* belongs to those *Ideas*, by the charter of their own peculiar nature; so doth that *Modus essendi formalis* properly belong to their causes, (at least to the principal and grand cause) by the law of their essence.

Article 5. A firme induction, that its impossible for any Idea to import or comprehend more of perfection, then its prototype, or cause.

Further, though I allow it possible for one *Idea* to produce another; yet I can never heer admit a possibility of a progress *in infinitum*, of unravelling the pedigree to a length so immense, as never to goe so high as the *Adam*, or Grandfather Idea, but must at length arrive at the *Ne ultra*, or first Idea, whose cause is the *Archtype* or *Protoplast*, wherein all that reality is inherent *Formally*, which is in the Idea only *objectively*. So that by the light of Nature, I read this unalterable Axiome; *that those Ideas or Images of other natures, or entities, which are in my understanding, are certain Counter-parts, or resemblances, which, in truth, come short of the perfection of those objects, from which they were desumed, and cannot be conceived to contain any thing greater, or of more perfection then their Causes.*

Article 6. And therefore, if any Idea contain more of perfection then can be found in our minds: certainly our minds cannot be the efficient of that transcendent Idea.

From hence my thoughts advance to this conclusion. If the reality *objective* of any Idea be so great and excellent, that I may be assured the same cannot be in me, either *Formaliter*, or *Eminenter*; and therefore I cannot be the *Cause* of that *Idea*: by direct and genuine inference I determine, that *I am not alone in the World, but that there is existent in the universe some other Being, which is the father of this Idea.* For if I finde no such Idea occur to my minde, in earnest I know no argument, that may make me confident of the existence of any one thing distinct from my self.

Article 7. The diversity of Ideas, respective to the diversity of Entities.

Now among these *Ideas* (that I may range them into distinct orders respective to the severall *Degrees* of *Entities* from which they exhale, or are derived) there is one which holds forth *me* to my self (concerning which no difficulty can be started, as to

to the concernment of the preſent *Demonſtration*) another which repreſents *God*; others which pourtray things meerly *Corporeal* and *Inanimate*; others which deſcribe *Angels*; others reſemble *Animals*; and finally others that ſhew me other *men* like my ſelfe.

Article 8. The poſſible originals of each ſort ſeverely examined, and all found to be deſumable from our ſelves; the Idea of God only excepted.

As for thoſe *Ideas*, which repreſent *Men*, *Animals*, or *Angels*; I eaſily underſtand, that ſuch may be compoſed and made up of other Ideas, which I uſually conceive of my ſelf, and other corporeall Entities, and of God: though there were neither Men, nor Animals, nor Angels, in the whole World beſide my ſelf. And as for thoſe of *Corporeal Entities*; in them I meet with nothing ſo great, noble, or excellent, which ſeems not to have its fountain or origin in my ſelf. For when I make a deep and ſtrict inquiſition into them, I diſcover, that of thoſe things, which they comprehend, there are only very few, which I clearly and diſtinctly underſtand; ſuch are *Magnitude*, or *Quantity* extended into its three dimenſions of *Longitude*, *Latitude*, *Profundity*; *Figure* ariſing from the termination of that extenſion; *Situation* of parts, or that poſition, which parts variouſly figurated obtain and hold among themſelves; and *Motion*, or the change of ſituation in the whole, or parts compoſing the whole: to which may be ſuperadded *Subſtance*, *Duration*, and *Number*. But as for other things, as *Light*, *Sounds*, *Odors*, *Sapors*, *Heat*, *Cold*, and other *tactile qualities*; theſe fall not under the comprehenſion of my thoughts, but darkly and with as much obſcurity as confuſion: inſomuch that when I have ſumm'd up all I know of them, it amounts to no more then this; that I am even ignorant whether they be true or falſe, (*i. e.*) whether ſuch Ideas, as I conceive of them, be the *Ideas* of things *really exiſtent*, or of *Non-entities*. For though I have faithfully obſerved, that *Falſity*, properly and moſt emphatically ſo called, or *Formal falſity*, can be no where found in the world, but in our *judgments*, or *determinations*: yet is there another *Material falſity* in our Ideas, when they repreſent a *Non-entity* for a real *Entity*, a nothing in ſtead of a ſomething. Thus, to exemplifie, the repreſentations which I have of *Heat* and *Cold* appear ſo narrow, dim, and confuſed; that my moſt intenſe and acute ſpeculations cannot acquire from them

any plenary and stable satisfaction, Whether *cold be only a privation of Heat*, or *Heat no more but the privation of Cold*; Whether both be *real* and *positive qualities*, or neither? and since there can be no *Ideas*, but as of *real* entities; in regard it is a truth apparent, that cold is nothing else but a privation of heat, that same Idea, which exhibits cold as something real and positive, may justly be reputed false: and so likewise may others of the same series. To such Ideas therefore it is not necessary, that I assigne any other original besides my self; for since they may be *materially false*, (*i. e.*) represent nothing under the disguise of something: it is declared unto me by the *Light* of *Nature*, that they proceed from nothing, (*i. e.*) that no other reason can be given, why they are in me, but only this; *that something is wanting to my nature, which is requisite to make it absolutely perfect and compleat*: and if they were true, yet in respect they exhibit so little of reality, that I cannot, in the most abstracted contemplation, clearly distinguish that *little* from *nothing*; I see no reason, why they may not worthily be counted the Minervas of my own brain, or the productions of my own thoughts. Now as concerning those things, which are clear and distinct in the *Ideas* of *Corporeal Natures*; I have discovered, that some of them also be derived from the Idea of my self: such are *Substance*, *Duration*, *Number*, &c. of the same classis. For when I consider a stone to be a substance, or an entity constituted in a capacity of subsisting *per se*; and at the same time consider my self also to be a substance (although I conceive my self to be *Res cogitans*, a thinking ens, and look not upon my self as *Res extensa*, a quantative or extensive; but upon a stone, as *Res extensa*, and not *cogitans*, and that therefore there must be a great dissimilitude between these two conceptions: yet they seem to be reconciled and shake hands *in termino substantialitatis*) and also when I consider, that I now am, and formerly have been; and when I have various cogitations, whose number I comprehend: I then acquire the Ideas of *Duration* and *Number*, which I can after transfer and apply to what other things I please. But for the residue of particular things, whereof the Ideas of *Corporeal Natures* are composed: as *Extension*, *Figure*, *Situation*, and *Motion*:

tion: these have not their residence in me (since I am nothing else, in propriety of essence, but *Res cogitans*) *formaliter*: and yet, in relation that they are only certain *Modi substantiæ*, modificated substance, and I also am a *substance*; they seem to be comprehended in me *eminenter*, by way of *transcendency*. And so there remains unexamined only the *Idea* of *God*; in which I am to consider, whether it include any thing, which cannot be derivative from my self.

Article 9. The Idea of God, here described, cannot be either formally, or materially false, but the most clear, distinct and true of all others.

By the name *God*, I understand a *certain substance, infinite, independent, omnipotent, omniscient, from which as well my own, as all other dependent natures were derived; by whose incomprehensible Wisdome, Power, and Goodness, the universe was created, according to the admirable Idea formed in his own eternall intellect; and is constantly conserved in the same perfect order, and exquisite harmony, which in the beginning he was pleased to institute.*

Now so divine, excellent, and perfect are all these *Attributes*, that when with deep, yet humble and reverentiall thoughts I contemplate them, either conjunctively, or distinctly, I become fully informed, that they are too great and noble, to be derived from so mean, frail, and imperfect a being as my self: and upon this firm foundation I erect to my self this verity; *That God doth exist*. For though the Idea of a substance be included in me for this cause, that I am a substance: yet it doth not necessarily follow, that therefore I can have the Idea of an *infinite* substance, since I am my self but *finite*, unless that Idea first proceed from some *substance really infinite*. Nor am I obliged to think, that I doe not conceive an *infinite*, by a *true Idea*, but, as most schoolmen will have it, by the *Negation of a finite*, as I understand *Rest* and *Darkness* by the *negation* of *Motion* and *Light*: for, on the contrarie, I perspicuously understand, that there is more of *Reality* in an infinite substance, then in a finite; and by consequence that the perception of an infinite essence, the *Deity*, is elder then, and so precedent unto the perception of a finite essence, *my self*. For I demand of the whole world, by what means possible I should come to understand, that I doubt, desire, &c. (*i.e.*) that

thing is wanting to my nature, which I finde requisite to make it perfect; if there were in me no Idea of a more perfect being, by comparing whose perfections to my own deficiencies, I am brought to an assured knowledge of the imperfection, and so the subordination and dependence of my own being.

Nor can it be objected that the *Idea* which I conceive of *God* is *materially false*, and therefore possible to be desumed from nothing, as those Ideas of *Heat* and *Cold* formerly examined: for on the contrary, in this interest, that tis transcendently *clear* and *distinct*, and comprehends more of *objective reality*, then any other Idea, which the minde of man can either conceive, or create; no one is more *true per se*, nor in which less suspicion of falshood can be detected. This Idea, I say, of the supreme Being, perfect and infinite, is most true; for though it might be imagined possible, that there is no such entity existent, as my Idea represents: yet cannot it be imagined, that the Idea of this *Ens summum* can exhibit unto me nothing real, as may the Ideas of Heat, Cold, &c. Moreover, I am confirmed, that this Idea of *God*, is of all others the most *clear* and *distinct*; for whatever of reality, verity and perfection, I clearly and distinctly perceive in all other Ideas, is radically concentred in this one, as in the Archtype, or universal fountain. Nor can this my beleif be staggered by this weak objection, that I cannot comprehend an infinite, or that, besides these Attributes mentioned in the description of this super-excellent Idea, there are myriads of other *Excellencies* in *God*, which are too resplendent and remote to be gazed upon by the weak and purblind eye of mans understanding, and too numerous to fall under the short Arithmetick of reason, much less to be epitomized or decyphered in the [illegible]equall landskip of my cogitations: for I know full well, that it is of the nature of an Infinite, not to be comprehended by me, that am finite; that it is sufficient for me to understand only so much, and to judge all those things, which I perceive to contain, or import any perfection, and perchance innumerable other dignities, of which I am yet ignorant, to be in God either formally, or eminently. So the Idea, which I conceive of him, is of all others, to which my intellect can extend its power of apprehension, the most *perspicuous* and *distinct*.

Not-

Notwithstanding, that I may leave no doubt to eclipse the splendor of this assertion, I permit my thoughts to run into this expostulation. Perhaps I have not the just dimensions of my own essence; that I am a far greater and more perfect something, then hitherto I have perceived my self to be; and that all those *excellencies*, which I speculate in the *Idea* of *God*, are in some measure *potentially* in my nature, though hitherto they have laine dormant, in *Capacity* only, and have not been deduced into *act*: for I already finde my *Cognition* much encreased, nor can I discover any impediment, wherefore it may not be every day more and more enlarged even to infinity; nor also, my cognition being so advanced, why I may not at length, by the benefit and advantage thereof, aspire and arise to all those perfections of God; nor, finally, why this capacity of arriving at all those perfections, may not suffice, upon the stock of its own single power, to the production of their true and adequate Idea. And I am answered from my domestick oracle, the *Light of Nature*; that not one of those illations can stand. For, first, though it be true, that my knowledge may by degrees be very much multiplyed; and that many things are in *potentia* in me, which are not yet awaked into their proper operations: yet not one of all those properly belong to the *Idea* of God, in which there is nothing at all *Potential*; for this very condition, to be capable of augmentation by degrees, is an undeniable argument of imperfection. Secondly, though my cognition should be more and more augmented; nevertheless I understand, that it could never be actually infinite, because it could never be raised to such an Ἄκρον, or zenith, as to be above all possibility of farther access: but my Idea of the divine nature represents him actually infinite, so that nothing is wanting, nothing can be added to the perfection of his nature. And lastly, I perceive that the *objective esse* of an Idea cannot be produced by a bare *potential esse*, which (to speak like a metaphysician, and properly) is a meer nothing: but only by an *Actual*, or *Formal*.

Article 10. A declarement of the impossibility of the divine Ideas desumption either from our selves:

Now albeit there is not one among all these notions, which to my retired and circumspect consideration, doth not appear a most serene

ſerene, noble, and illuſtrious truth, demonſtrable by the *light of Nature*: yet ſince, when with more looſe and unattentive thoughts I examine them, and when the groſſer images of corporeal and ſenſible natures benight the opticks of my reaſon; I cannot ſo eaſily make it out, why the Idea of a being more noble and perfect then my own, muſt of neceſſity proceed from ſome ſuch other being, which is really more perfect; for this reſpect, I ſay, I lead on my mind to a further enquiry, *viz. Whether or no I, who have this Idea, could have an exiſtence, if there were no ſuch Ens as my Idea adumbrates, really exiſtent?* To particular; from what original ſhould my being deſcend? either from *my ſelfe*, or my *Parents*, or ſome other eſſences of perfection infinitely inferior to that of God; for no phanſie can be ſo wild, as to feigne any thing more perfect then, nay not equally perfect with him. Now had I received my being from my ſelfe, undoubtedly I ſhould not then have been ſubject to thoſe frailties of *Dubitation* and *Deſideration*, nor would any thing have been wanting to my nature: for at the ſame inſtant, when I gave to my ſelf a being, aſſuredly I ſhould have given unto my ſelf alſo all thoſe perfections, whereof I have the Idea in my mind, and ſo I my ſelf ſhould have been God. Nor am I bound to conceive, that thoſe *excellencies*, wanting to the accompliſhment of my nature, can be more difficult to acquire, then thoſe graduall abilities, of which I am already maſter: for on the contrary, tis manifeſt, that it muſt import infinitely more of difficulty for me to have had a being, (*i. e.*) for a *Cogitant ſomething* to be deduced from *nothing*, then for me being once conſtituted in a *Capacity*, to attain to the cognition of many things, whereof I am now actually ignorant, which can be eſteemed no more but the *Accidents* of that *ſubſtance*. And aſſuredly, had I borrowed the greater, my *ſubſtantiality*, from my own ſtock of power; I ſhould not have denied unto my ſelf the leſs, thoſe *Accumulations*, or accidentall additions, nor any other of thoſe divine accompliſhments, which I underſtand to be included in the Idea of God: why? becauſe no one of thoſe ſeem more difficult to be acquired; and if any were more difficult for me to aſpire unto, tis more then probable I ſhould underſtand that difficulty,

if

if I had thoſe *Faculties*, of which my nature ſtands poſſeſſed, from my own donation, in reſpect I ſhould find my power to be terminated in them. Nor doe I evade the convictive rigor of theſe reaſons, if I adventure on this ſuppoſition; that I have been ever heretofore, as I now am: as if the induction of this hypotheſis would be, that therefore I am to trace the genealogy of my eſſence no higher then my ſelf, or ſeek out no other cauſe of my Exiſtence; for in reſpect that all *time* may be divided into innumerable parts, each whereof hath no neceſſary dependence on the reſt, either precedent, or ſubſequent; from hence, that I have formerly been, is no valid conſequence that therefore I muſt now be, unleſſe ſome other cauſe be admitted, which dothfreſhly create me in each of thoſe particles, or atoms of time, and particularly in this inſtant moment, (*i. e.*) doth conſtantly conſerve me in being. For manifeſt it muſt be to any that looks attentively into the nature of *Duration*; that to the *Conſervation* of any thing through all thoſe ſeveral minutes, in which its exiſtence endureth, is required no leſs then the ſame power and act, which is neceſſary to the *Creation* of the ſame thing anew, if it were not already exiſtent: and conſequently, that the act of *Conſervation doth not at all, but in the cloudy reaſon of man, differ from the act of Creation.* Theſe things thus ſtated, I am concerned to propoſe to my ſelf this interrogation; Whether there be any power inherent in my nature, whereby I may be enabled to conſerve my ſelf the ſame in the future that I am now in the preſent? for ſince I am nothing but a meer *res cogitans* (for here I preciſely regard only that part of my ſelf, which is properly and diſtinctly a *Cogitant ſubſtance*) if there were any ſuch power conſervatory radicated in my eſſence, doubtleſs I ſhould be conſcious of it; but I am convicted, there is none ſuch, and therefore from this one evidence, that I cannot maintain or perpetuate my own being, for the ſhorteſt moment imaginable: I judge, *that I am ſubordinate unto, and dependent upon ſome other Entity diſtinct from my ſelf.* But (to tolerate any doubt in this my meditation, in order to the excluſion of all doubts from the intended reſult or concluſion) put the caſe, that this Entitie, to whoſe ſufficiency I owe my Conſervation (pardon ô! thou incomprehenſible *Eſſence*, thou

great and sole *Preserver of men*, pardon this supposition, that modestly intends only the clearer demonstration of thy *Supremacy*) is not God; and that I deduce my production from my *Parents*, or some other cause less perfect then God. For determination; tis an *Axiome*, to which every Sceptick will readily condescend, *Tantundem ad minimum esse debere in causa, quantum est in effectu*, there must be so much at least in the cause, as is found in the effect: and therefore since I am *res cogitans*, a substance thinking, and having a certain Idea of God in me, what cause soever be at length assigned for the principle or fountain of my being, that cause also must be *Ens cogitans*, and must possess the Idea of all those perfections, which I ascribe unto God. Now of that cause it may be again enquired, whether it were derived from it self, or from some other Cause; for if from it selfe, then may it bee naturally collected, from what hath preceded in this disquisition, that such a *Cause* is *God*. For as it hath the power (or act) of *self-existence*, or *self-conservation*: so also, undoubtedly hath it the ability of actually possessing all such perfections, the Idea whereof it comprehends in it self, (*i. e.*) all such accomplishments, as I conceive to be concentred in God.

Article 11. Or from some other cause less perfect then God.

But if from some other cause; then I repeat my question again concerning this other cause, whether that had its being from it self, or from another, untill I arrive successively at the *first Cause*, or highest linke in the chain: which also will be *God*. For no melancholy can be so absurd, as to dream of a progress *in infinitum* in the series of Causes; especially, since I doe not here intend that Cause only, which did in *time past produce* me, but principally that, which doth *conserve* me in the *present*. Nor can it be imagined, that a *plurality of Causes* met, concurred, and conspired to the making up of my nature, and that from one cause I inherited the Idea of one of the perfections which I attribute to God; from a second the Idea of another; from a third, the Idea of another, &c. so that all those perfections may, indeed, be found *severally* in the distinct and scattered peices of the Universe, but no where *conjoyned* and amassed together in one single

single Essence, which might be God. For on the contrary, the *Unity*, *Simplicity*, *Inseparability*, or *Identity* of all those excellencies in God, is one of the chiefest of those perfections, which I understand to be in him: nor, assuredly, could the Idea of the *Unity* of all those his Perfections be placed in me by any other cause, from whom I could not acquire the Ideas of other perfections also; nor could he have effected, that I should understand them *conjoyned* and married together by an indissoluble union: unless he had also effected, that I should know what they are, in their *distinction*.

Article 12. Or from our Parents.

To expunge the last scruple, and so render this demonstration of the Existence of God, fair and immaculate; have not my *Progenitors* devolved a being to my *Parents*, and they devolved the like to me? and may not this Idea of those perfections, which I attribute to God, be implanted radically in this my being so derived down to me by propagation, without the necessary insertion of it, by the immediate hand of any such *Supreme nature* really existent, in which all those *Attributes* are *Formally* inherent, and coessential? By no means. For though I may, in some latitude, allow my Parents to be the causes of my generation; yet cannot I think them to be the cause of my Conservation, since they cannot conserve themselves: nor have they made me what I am, (*i. e.*) constituted me to be *Res cogitans*, an Entitie whose nature is to think; but onely as subordinate and instrumental causes, have contributed certain requisite dispositions, or qualifications to that matter, in which I understand my self, (*i. e.*) my mind or rational soul (which in this discourse, I constantly take for the whole of my self) to be enshrined. And upon the credit of this consideration, there can be no difficulty taken up to countermand the certitude of my assertion; but I may safely conclude: that from this position, *I am existent, and my minde contains a certain Idea of a most perfect being*, (i. e.) *of God; it is most genuinly and most evidently demonstrated, that God is also Existent.*

Article 13. The concernment of all; or a concluſion that the Idea of the divine nature is innate and congenial to the mind of man.

Having ſufficiently aſſured my ſelf, that this Idea, which I have of the *Supreme Being*, or moſt and only *perfect Ens*, is too excellent to be deſumed from *my ſelf*, from my *Parents*, or from *other Cauſes*, which import not ſo much of *Reality Formal* and *Eminent*, as the Idea imports of *objective*: it remains only, that I explore *how and when I received this Idea from God.* For I never drew it in through the windowes of my *ſenſes*; nor was it ever obtruded upon me without either my expectation, or notice, as frequently the Ideas of ſenſible objects are, when thoſe objects offer themſelves to the external organs of the ſenſes; nor was it ever *modelled*, or coyned by me, in the laboratory of my *Imagination*, ſince it is not in my power either to detract any thing from, or ſuperadd any thing unto it: Wherefore it muſt be primitively *implanted* in, and *congenial* to my very *Eſſence*, no otherwiſe then as the Idea of my ſelf is implanted, or eſſentially impreſſed upon my ſelf. And ſurely, to a ſober and well ordered conſideration, it can ſeem no wonder, that God, when he was pleaſed to create me, hath imprinted this Idea of himſelf upon my *Soul*, that it might remain as an indelible *Mark* or *Signature*; whereupon when I reflect my cogitations, I ſhould inſtantly know and acknowledge my ſelf to be the work of his almighty hand. Nor is it neceſſary, that this *Mark* or *Impreſs* ſhould be a thing plainly diſtinct from the *work* it ſelf, from my *Eſſence*; but upon this one ground, that God hath created me; tis very credible; that he created me, in ſome degree, or reſpect, after the *Similitude* and image of himſelf, and that this *Similitude*, wherein the Idea of God is included, may be underſtood by me, by the operation or information of the ſame *Faculty*, by which I am impower'd to underſtand my ſelf: (*i. e.*) that when I convert the eye of my Soul, my reaſon, inwards upon my ſelf; I doe not only clearly perceive my ſelf to be an *Entity incompleat*, *dependent* on ſome *Superior principle*, and *indefinitely aſpiring to greater and better things*: but at the ſame inſtant, I underſtand alſo that *Superior Principle*, upon which I depend, to poſſeſs all thoſe greater accompliſhments, not *indefinitely* and *in potentia* only, but even *infinitely* and *actually*, and ſo to be God.

And

And so all the nerves of the Argument may be twisted together into this short (though never-to-be-b oken) Cord; that I cannot but acknowledge it an absolute impossibility that I should exist, being of such a nature as I am, (*i.e.*) having the Idea of God imprinted upon my mind, unless God also did really exist: that very God, I mean, whose Idea is in me, (*i. e.*) an *infinite essence actually possessing all perfections*, which though I cannot *comprehend*, yet in some degree I can, with humility and veneration, *speculate*, through the perspective of profound and abstracted *Cogitation*.

Article 14. An abstract, or Anacephalæosis of the whole demonstration.

Sect. III.

NOw in consideration that many of those *Metaphysical Terms*, and *singular expressions*, which I have been forced to make use of in the precedent demonstration of the *Existence of God*, may be conceived either too *difficult* for the unriper sort of heads, or at least *ambiguous*, and therefore subject to perversion, as not being sufficiently adequate and restrained to those notions, to which I have applied them; I have thought it requisite to subjoyn the particular *Explanation*, or proper *definition* of each, that I could beleive subject to obscurity, or exception.

In the word *Cogitation*, I comprehend whatsoever is so contained in us, that we are immediately conscious thereof. Thus all the operations of the Will, Intellect, Imagination, and Senses fall under this one notion of Cogitations: and the particle *immediately*, I have annexed to exclude all those things, that are consequent to these operations, as motion voluntary hath Cogitation for its original, but is it self plainly distinct from cogitation.

Article 1. The importance of the term, Cogitation.

By an *Idea*, I understand that forme of any Cogitation, by the immediate perception whereof I come to be fully conscious of that particular cogitation; so that I can express no one thing in words, when I understand what I speak, but from thence it is made evident unto me, that I have in me the particular Idea of

Article 2. Of an Idea.

that thing, which I signifie by those words. And so I doe not call only those *Images* depicted or engraven on my *Phansie*, Ideas: yea, in this discourse, I doe not allow them to be Ideas as they are depicted in my *Phansy corporeal, i. e.* in any parcel of my brain; but only as they serve, as certain characters, to informe my *minde*, when converted upon that part of my brain, where my phansie is seated.

Article 3. Of the objective reality of an Idea.

By the *objective reality* of an Idea, I intend the *Entity* of that thing represented by that Idea. And according to the same intention, we may say, the *Perfection objective*, or *Artifice objective*, &c. For whatever things we perceive as in the objects of Ideas, the same things in every particular are objectively included in the Ideas of those objects.

Article 4. Of the Formal, and eminent being of Attributes in the objects of of Ideas.

The same things are said to be *Formally* in the objects of Ideas, when they are truly such in them, as we perceive them to be, or when our Ideas expresly respond to their nature: and *Eminently*, when they are not indeed *Talia*, but *Tanta*, equivalent, insomuch that they may be their convenient substitutes, or serve in their rooms.

Article 5. Of a substance.

A *Substance* signifies any thing wherein, as in *subjecto*, is immediately inherent any *Quality*, or *Attribute*, whose Idea is in us; or upon which any thing, that we perceive, immediately depends for its existence. For we can have no other Idea of a substance, precisely so taken, more then this; that it is a thing, wherein either *Formally*, or *Eminently* that something which we perceive, or which is objectively in any of our Ideas, hath its necessary existence: why? because the light of Nature makes authentick that *Axiome, Nullum esse nihili reale attributum*; or, as *Aristotle, Non-entis non sunt Accidentia.*

Article 6. Of the word, Mind.

By the terme *Mens*, the *Mind*, I import a substance, whose prime Attribute is Cogitation; for in this place I speak rather of the *Mind*, then of the *Soul*, in regard the word Soul is equivocal, and frequently used to expres something corporeal.

By

By a *Body* is implied that *Subſtance* which is the immediate ſubject of *extenſion local*, and other accidents, which preſuppoſe extenſion, as Figure, Situation, local Motion, &c. Article 7. Of a Body.

Two ſubſtances are ſaid to be *really diſtinguiſh't*, when each of them can realy ſubſiſt without the aſſiſtance of the other. Article 8. Of the real diſtinction of two ſubſtances.

That *ſubſtance*, which we underſtand to be *ſupremely perfect*, and wherein we perceive no defect, or limitation of perfection to be involved, is that we call *God*. Article 9. Of the ſubſtance ſupremly perfect.

Sect. IV.

THe Achilles, or moſt potent *objection*, which not only the feirce Militia of the Pulpit; but even ſuch more temperate heads, as have not been refined to a height ſufficient to admit the tincture of abſtracted and immaterial notions, may ſend to encounter my Aſſertion, *That I have a clear, diſtinct, and true Idea of God in my mind*, is this: *Infinitum, quà infinitum, eſt ignotum*, that God being infinite, and therefore incomprehenſible, tis impoſſible for man, while his intellect is muffled up in fleſh, to have a clear and diſtinct Idea of his Being. To inſtance in a thing, betwixt which and the infinity of God is a vaſt diſparity; let the moſt Geometrical wit in the World think with the moſt ſerious, midnight and fixt attention, upon a *Chiliagon*, or figure with a 1000 Angles: yet ſhall he acquire in his mind, but a dark and confuſed repreſentation or modell thereof, and cannot diſtinctly either adumbrate or conceive that chiliagonicall figure; becauſe he doth not particularly and totally ſpeculate each one of the 1000 ſides, or *lateral lines*, of which it doth conſiſt. And if ſo, well may it be doubted, how I can conceive the Idea of an *Infinite*, diſtinctly and without confuſion; when I cannot exalt my thoughts to ſurvey all thoſe innumerable perfections, which meet together to the conſtitution of its infinity. Article 1. *Object.* 1. That the mind of man, being *finite*, cannot extend to the clear and diſtinct intelleſtion of an *Infinite, quatenus* an *Infinite:* and the

This doubt I muſt welcome, and honour, as the laudable effect of that due veneration, or noble zeal, which ought to be kindled Solution thereof by three diſtinctions.

kindled in every breſt, upon the ſenſe of that immenſe diſproportion betwixt the inviſibility, infinity, and incomprehenſibility of the Creator; and the narrow extent, or, indeed, the comparative nothing of the Creature; nor can I think the debaſement of our own limited nature, other then a pious and worthy cognizance of the majeſty and incircumſcription of his: yet to ſatisfie, that none can have a more lively apprehenſion of his own frailties, infirmities and defects, nor a greater eſteem of the excellencies and accompliſhments of God, then my ſelf; and that I more then once look't upon, and throughly examined the weight of this ſcruple, long before I thought it ſafe to acquieſce in the Affirmative, I thus anſwer.

1. An *Infinite, quatenus an infinite*, can, in troth, by no means be *comprehended*; and yet nevertheleſs it may be *underſtood*: inſomuch as clearly and diſtinctly to underſtand the nature of any thing to be ſuch, as that no limits, terminations, or circumſcriptions can be found therein; is clearly and diſtinctly to underſtand the ſame to be infinite. And heer I diſtinguiſh betwixt *Indefinitum* and *Infinitum*; calling, properly and preciſely, that an *infinite*, in which no limits, terms, or ends can be, on any part, diſcovered; in which acceptation, God is only infinite: but ſuch things, wherein, under ſome latitude of reaſon only, I acknowledge no end or termination; ſuch are the extenſions of the imaginary ſpace without *Triſmegiſtus* his circle, or on the outſide of the world; the multitude of Numbers; the diviſibility of the parts of quantity, &c. ſuch I call *Indefinite*, and not infinite, becauſe on ſome part they muſt confeſs a finality, or termination.

2. Again, I put a difference between the *Formal Reaſon*, or *Infinity* of an infinite; and the *ſubject* of that infinity, or *thing* which is infinite. Now, as for the *Infinity*; though we underſtand that to be moſt *Poſitive*; yet we cannot underſtand it but only by a kind of *Negation*, *viz.* from hence, that we can diſcover no limitation in the thing: but as for the *ſubject* of this infinity, or *infinite thing*, we underſtand it *Poſitively*, but not *adequately* (*i. e.*) we doe not comprehend all that is intelligible in that thing. Thus when we caſt our eyes upon the Sea, though our

ſight cannot extend to all and every part thereof, nor meaſure every inch of its immenſe vaſtity; yet may we be properly ſaid to behold the ſea. And if we look upon it at a great diſtance, ſo that our eyes ſeem to take it in all at once, we doe not ſee it but dimly and confuſedly, as it were in a thin, blew landskip; as alſo we doe not imagine a Chiliagon but obſcurely and in fractures, when we comprehend all the lateral lines thereof at once: yet if we approach the ſea at a very vicine diſtance, and earneſtly fixe our eyes upon any one part thereof, ſuch a viſion may be clear and diſtinct, as alſo may the imagination of a Chiliagon, if our Phanſie extend to no more, then one or two of the ſides thereof at once. By the ſame reaſon, that God cannot be comprehended by the narrow mind of man, I willingly grant with all the ſchoolmen; nor can he be diſtinctly underſtood by thoſe, who unadviſedly endevour to comprehend him all at once, and as it were to gaze upon him a far off; in which laudable ſenſe, the moſt ſubtile Dr *Thom. Aquin.* affirmed, *Cognoſcere Deum eſſe in aliquo communi, ſub quadam confuſione, in quantum ſcilicet Deus eſt hominis beatitudo, id naturaliter nobis inſertum eſt*, that the cognition of the Being of God, is implanted in our minds, under a certain confuſion, or cloudy repreſentation: but whoever, with a prævious awe, and becoming reverence, ſhall endevour to ſingle out his perfections, contemplate each ſucceſſively, not ſo much to comprehend them, as to be comprehended by them, and imploy all the nerves of their intellect (ſequeſtred from the contagion of *ſenſibility* and *Corporeity*) in the long and wary ſpeculation of them: ſuch happy perſons ſhall aſſuredly find in him more ſatisfactory, ample, and eaſie matter of clear and diſtinct cognition, then in all the world beſide.

Thirdly, I diſcriminate an Intellection *Adequate*, from an Intellection *Gradual*, or conforme to the ſlender capacity of man. For the *Firſt*, twere madneſs beyond the power of *Hellebor* for any man to dream, that he could underſtand an Infinite, *Conceptu adæquato*, by a comprehenſion fully as large, and exactly proportionate unto that Infinite; nay it may be a very hard queſtion, whether the armes of our underſtanding be long enough to commenſurate the full nature of any Finite object, though nere ſo 3.

ſmall, by an Idea exactly reſpondent, and equal in all points: for the *other*, every ſober man is able to find within himſelf, that the wings of his mind are not ſo clipt, as that it cannot aſpire to the *Gradual* cognition of an Infinite, *finita & ad modulum humani ingenii accommodata cognitione*. If any ſhall pervert this *Diſtinction* to ſo ſiniſter a latitude, as to retort; that when I confeſs my underſtanding too ſhallow and dark to comprehend an infinite, *Conceptu adæquato*, I doe at the ſame time implicitely concede, that I can know no more then a *part* of an infinite, and indeed the leaſt part which can be ſaid to carry the repreſentation of an infinite no more then the effigies of one ſingle hair to repreſent the whole body of a man: I ſhall ſmoothly rejoyne, that to affirme, that if we fully comprehend any thing, that thing muſt be infinite, is a plain and obvious contradiction *in terminis*; ſince the Idea of an infinite, if true, cannot be comprehended, *Incomprehenſibility being the formal attribute of an infinite*; and yet nevertheleſs it is evident, that the Idea, which we have of an infinite, doth reſemble not only ſome one particular part, but even really and truly the *whole* thereof, *eo modo, quo repræſentari debet per humanam ideam*, though doubtleſs a far more accurate and diſtinct, (*i. e.*) perfect Idea may be allowed to be in the more luminous and clear intellect of *God*, of *Angels*, or other *natures* more *intelligent* then man. Thus we doubt not, but a *Clown*, who never heard of *Euclid*, or learned one Axiome in *Geometry*, may notwithſtanding have in his mind the Idea of a whole *Triangle*, when he is once inſtructed, that a *Triangle* is a *Figure comprehended in three lines*, though he remain ignorant of many other things, which a learned Geometrician knowes intelligible in that Figure, and inſatiately ſpeculates in the Idea thereof: for, as to underſtand a figure included in three lines, is ſufficient to acquire the Idea of a whole Triangle; ſo alſo to underſtand a thing not to be comprehended or terminated by any limits or ends, is ſufficient to the acquiſition of a true and entire Idea of the whole infinite.

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This Idea you have of God, is no more then *Ens rationis*, a meer figment, or Chimæra, that hath no exiſtence at all but in your intellect; and therefore hath no more of perfection, or reality objective then your own mind that framed it.

Article 2. *Object.* 2. That the Idea of the divine nature, reſident in the mind of man, is a meer *Ens rationis*: and the *Solut.*

Ens rationis hath a double ſignification; (1.) it imports a meer abſtracted *Notion*, devoid of all reality, or a pure *Non-entity*; (2.) it ſignifies every *operation of the intellect*, or, more plainly, *Ens à ratione profectum*: in which acceptation, the whole World may be properly ſtyled *Ens rationis divinæ*, or an entity created by a ſimple and pure act of the divine intellect. Now in this laſt ſenſe only can I allow that tranſcendent Idea of God to be *Ens rationis*, a clear and diſtinct repreſentation of the moſt perfect Being, engraven by his own finger upon my underſtanding: and to that unprevaricate judgment, that ſhall maturely perpend the contents, and logical connexion of our precedent meditation, it will plainly appear, that we intend ſuch a *Perfection*, or *reality objective* in this Idea, which (no leſs then that *Artifice objective*, which is in the Idea of any engine moſt ingeniouſly fabricated) requires a *Cauſe*, wherein all that is *really* and *formally* contained, which is included in the Idea only *objectively*, and at ſecond hand, or by reflexion.

Article 3. *Object.* 3. That an *effect* may have more of reality, or perfection then its *Cauſe*: and the

Though we grant your *Theſis*, that this Idea hath more of *Perfection*, or *objective reality*, then your *Mind*: yet cannot your *Aſſumption* ſtand, that therefore your *Mind* cannot be the *Author* of this Idea; ſince an *Effect* may have a degree of *Perfection*, or reality, which neither is, nor ever was in the *Cauſe* thereof. To inſtance, common obſervation teacheth, that Flies, Frogs, &c. inſects, as alſo ſome Plants are generated by the Sun, rain, and earth mutually cooperating by a kind of ſeminal confermentation, or fertile putrefaction; and yet in neither of thoſe cauſes will any man allow ſo high a *Perfection*, as that of *Vitality*: *Ergo*, &c.

Solut.

My *Inference* is founded on the rock of reaſon, and therefore too impregnable to be demoliſhed by ſo feeble a battery. For *firſt*, it is indubitate, that there can be no *Perfection* in *Animals* de-

voyd of *reason*, which is not also in *bodies* devoyd of *Animation*; or if there were, that *Perfection* must be *extradvenient*, or derived unto them from some forreign principle: nor are the Sun, rain, and earth the *Adequate Causes* of *Insects*, or *Animals* whose production is spontaneous and without other seminalitie, then that analogous sperme of corruption; and it sounds discordant in the harmonious ears of logick for any man, only because he is ignorant of any other Cause that may conduce to the generation of an insect, (*i.e.*) hath so many degrees of perfection, as as an Insect hath, therefore to stagger the truth of an Axiome ratified by the *Light of Nature*. For, *Quod nihil sit in effectu, quod non vel simili, vel eminentiori aliquo modo præextiterit in causa*, is a *First notion*, at which no man can quarel, but he must implicitely abjure his own reason: nor doth the ancient and vulgar maxime, *à nihilo nihil fieri*, differ from it, but only in terminis; because if it be conceded, that any thing is found in the effect, which cannot be found in its cause, it must also be conceded, that this something was made by nothing; nor am I convinced why nothing may not be the cause of something, but only from this evidence to the contrary, that in such a cause there would not be the same, nor any thing equivalent unto that, which is in the effect. *Secondly*, that my *Mind* cannot be the *Efficient cause* of this transcendent *Idea*, needs neither declarement, nor support, other then this canonical position; that *whatsoever reality or perfection is only objectively in our Ideas, must be either formally, or at least eminently in their prototypes, or originals*: and upon this one pin hangs all the certification, or assurance, that any man can have of the real existence of any other thing in the world (the *Supreme Being* only excepted) besides himself; for from what hint could we have suspected, that such or such things are existent, without the orb of our own nature, but only from this: that their Idea, or representations have been conveyed into our minds, by the organs of our senses? And that we have a certain Idea, or umbrage of the most potent and most perfect Being; as also, that the *Reality objective* of this Idea is so excellent, as that it cannot be discovered to be in us either *Formally*, or *Eminently*: will be so clear, serene, and orthodox a truth, as to be sworne to

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by any, who with thoughts sufficiently constant and attentive (for it is a chief *Postulate*, or requisite condition on the behalfe of any man, that intends his own satisfaction in this abstruse particular, *ut diu multumque in natura Entis summe perfecti contemplanda immoretur*) shall be pleased to consort their meditations with mine upon this excellent and most necessary subject. For tis not in the power of my pen to obtrude that notion upon any man, the admission and retention whereof immediately depend upon his own cogitation; I mean an assurance of the certitude of this demonstration, when he is resolved not to be divorced from that uncomely grandmother of Error, *Prejudice*; nor to open the ears of his beleif to the most prevalent charms of argument, or taste those limpid streams, which flow from the fount of all our knowledge, the *Light of Nature*.

Whereas, upon a profound and calme consideration of all, and each of those Attributes enumerated in your description of that excellent Idea, which you pretend to have of God; as that he is a substance, infinite, independent, superlatively both intelligent and potent, by which your self and all the world was created, &c. we find it not demonstratively necessary, that the Idea of such an Ens, wherein all those perfections are concentred and united, should be implanted in your mind immediately by that Ens: we conclude that it may be framed and composed of your several *Collections* from other *external* objects. To descend to particulars. (1.) When by the word *God*, you understand a *Substance*; *Reason*, not any Idea, assures you, that God doth *exist*: *Substance* and *Existence* being twins, that cannot live but conjoyned hand in hand. (2.) From the notion *Infinite*, (*i. e.*) something that you cannot comprehend nor imagine any limits, or extremes therein, so as that your thoughts can ever arrive at a *Ne ultra*: there ariseth unto your mind an Idea not of an *Infinity divine*; but of the termination or circumscription of your finite nature. (3.) *Independent* sounds no more then this, that you cannot conceive, or imagine any cause or original of God: from whence tis manifest, that from the terme Independent, you can collect no other Idea, but the memory of your own Ideas, which had their several

Article 4. *Object.* 4. That the existence of such an excellent Idea, as hath been described of the *Divine Nature*, doth not necessitate the existence of an *Entity*, in all points respondent, or superior thereto: because of the possible composing such an Idea, out of our collections from *sensible objects*: and the ample

originations at ſuch and ſuch times, and therefore are dependent. Wherefore, to ſay that God is independent, is nothing more then that God is in the number of thoſe things, of which you can imagine no original, or Cauſe: as alſo, to ſay that God is infinite, is all one, in the import, with this, that God is in the catalogue of thoſe things, wherein your thoughts can diſcover no end, limitation, or circumſcription. And thus every Idea of God is excluded; for what Idea can there be, without either original, or termination? (4.) *Superlatively Intelligent*; here we deſire to be informed, by what kind of Idea you underſtand the Intellection of God? (5.) *Moſt potent*; here alſo we require by what Idea you can underſtand potency, which imports things in *futuro* only, and therefore not exiſtent? undoubtedly we aſcend to the cognition of power, by the ſteps of Memory, and reflexion upon former actions, progreſſing by the conduct of Ratiocination, thus; thus he hath done, ergo he had power thus to doe, ergo being ſtill the ſame, he hath power to doe the like again in the future. Now all theſe are Ideas, which may be extracted from external objects. (6.) *Creator* of all things; we can pourtray to our ſelves a certain reſemblance of a *Creation*, by drawing the reflexions of thoſe things we have ſeen with our eyes; as when we imagine a man beginning and growing as it were from a point to that figure and magnitude, which he hath in his full ſtature or virility: nor are we perſwaded that any man can have other Idea then this, at the word Creator; but yet that we can imagine the world to be created, is no obliging argument to prove the creation. And therefore, though it had been demonſtrated by you, that ſomething *Infinite*, *Independent*, &c. doth *exiſt*; yet could it be no genuine inference, that therefore a *Creator* doth *exiſt*; unleſs you ſhall adventure to undertake the juſtification of this argument; ſomething is exiſtent, which we beleive to have created all things beſide it ſelf; ergo the world was once created by that ſomething. In fine, when you affirme that the Idea of God, as alſo of your own Soul, is *implantate* in and *congenial* to your *Eſſence*, we deſire to be inſtructed, whether the ſouls of men, when they ſleep moſt profoundly and without dreams, exerciſe their faculty of *Cogitation*; or more plainly, whether they *think*?

if

if no, then at ſuch times they have no Ideas: and therefore no Idea can be innate, or congenial, for what ever is *innate*, is always *preſent*.

To the *firſt part* of this *objection* I anſwer in general; that no one of thoſe Attributes, which belong to my Idea of the *ſupreme Being*, can poſſibly be deſumed from *External objects*, as from an original, or primitive exemplar: becauſe in God we can find nothing which holds any analogy, or ſimilitude to thoſe things that are in *Corporeal Entities*; but whatſoever we contemplate in our Ideas that is diſſimilar or diſproportionate to corporeal natures, that muſt proceed not from them, but from the cauſe of that diverſity in our cogitation. And here I demand, how any man can deduce the Idea of the *Intellection* of God from corporeal objects? but what kind of Idea I have thereof, I fully explain, when I ſay, that by an Idea I intimate *all that, which is the forme of any perception*: and who is there, that doth not perceive (the *Philoſopher* calls it a *reflex act of the intellect*) that he doth underſtand the nature of this or that object, upon which his cogitations is acting; and by conſequence, who hath not an Idea of his own Intellection, which by indefinite extending of it, he forms to an Idea of the divine Intellection, and ſo of all other of his Attributes? *Solut.*

To the *other part* I return, in breif; that whereas I have made uſe of the Idea of God, which is impreſſed upon the mind of man, as an invincible argument to demonſtrate the exiſtence of God; and that in this Idea ſo immenſe a *Potency* is included, that we may underſtand it to be repugnant to reaſon, if God doth exiſt, that any thing beſides him in the world can exiſt unleſs it be created by him, and dependent upon him: it cannot but appear a direct and juſt induction, that the whole world, or all things elſe which are in being beſides God, were *created* by him. To untie the laſt knot concerning the *eclipſe* of this Idea of God, in our midnight ſleeps, when all our Faculties diſappear; it is required only that I adverti ſe the Reader, that when I affirme that there is a certain Idea of God *innate* and *congenial* to us, I doe not mean that this Idea is *always obverſant*, or conſtantly held forth to the eyes of our mind; for in that ſenſe no Idea can be innate: but only that we have within us a certain *Faculty* or Power *iſtam*

ideam

ideam eliciendi, of *extracting* it; or that by the dignity of our Eſſence, we are empower'd to ſpeculate that *Impreſs* or *Signature* of the *Deity*, when we convert our cogitations attentively upon it.

Article 5. *Object.* 5. That the Idea conceived of God, is capable of *Augmentation* and *diminution*: and the clear

Though we ſhould applaud your *ſuperſtructure*, that the Idea of God is not to be deſumed from any other cauſe but himſelf; yet can we not but ſuſpect the ſtability of your *Corner-ſtone*, or capital reaſon thereof, *viz. that nothing can be ſuperadded unto, nothing detracted from that Idea.* And toward the ſubverſion of it, we need adterre no greater an engine, then our friendly advice, that you would conſider how ſmal a garden-plot of ſcience, well manured, may in proceſs of time be enlarged into a ſpacious campania; that tis not impoſſible for you to be informed, either by men more learned then your ſelf, or by the extraordinary revelation of Angels, or ſome other communication from other natures more intelligent then man, of many more perfections or Attributes in God, then you have hitherto diſcovered: that God himſelf may be pleaſed, by the irradiations of his ſacred Spirit, ſo to illuminate your intellect even in this life of ignorance, as to afford you a brighter reflex of his glories, and ſo augment your knowledge of his excellencies: that your Soul, when ſhe ſhall have the dark curtain of fleſh withdrawn by the rough hand of death, and be advanced to the *Beatifical viſion*; ſhall know ſo much more of *Divinity*, then what you can apprehend now, that in compariſon thereof your preſent Idea of it, may well be accompted imperfect, and therefore capable of addition: that in your infancy you perceived no ſuch Idea at all; at leaſt it was not ſo accurate and perfect as at this day, when it hath received the acceſſes of your more learned ſpeculations: in ſhort, that as you have not attained a full cognition of the perfections of *inferior eſſences*, nor can ever hope for it, at once, but muſt aſcend by the ſucceſſive gradations of new diſcoveries; ſo can you not acquire a full cognition of the *Perfections* of the *ſupreme Ens*, at once, but may have your Idea of him made more and more perfect every day, by new additions.

Solut. When you reprehend this tenent of mine, that the Idea of God engraven on the mind of man, is uncapable either of *Addition*, or

or *Substraction*, you seem to have no regard to that Rule amongst Philosophers, *Essentias rerum esse indivisibiles*. For an Idea represents the *Essence* of a thing; to which, if ought be added, or from which, if ought be substracted, instantly it becomes the Idea of another thing. And by reason of their ignorance of this truth, the Heathen, not conceiving aright of the *true God*, fell into the wofull delusion of framing to themselves the Ideas of *false ones*, and chiefly that of *Pandora*, ὅτι πάντες ὀλύμπια δῶρα ἔχοντες δῶρον ἐδώρησαν, in whom all the endowments, or excellencies of all other gods were concentred. But when once we have conceived the Idea of the true God, however more and more perfections may be revealed unto us, which were not formerly known to be in him, yet nevertheless is not the Idea of him therefore *Augmented*, but onely made more *distinct* and *express*: in regard all those Accomplishments ought to be comprised in the same Idea first conceived, insomuch as it is supposed to have been *true* from the very first conception. Thus the Idea of a *Triangle* receives no inlargement, when severall proprieties are discovered to be therein, which were at first unknown. Nor is our Idea of the Divine Nature formed by us in parcels, or by sensible additions, out of the various perfections or endowments of the Creatures, amassed together, and multiplyed up to the rate of supernaturall: but springs up to us in a moment, perfect and entire, from this one root; that we understand him to be *an infinite Ens, so perfect as to be above all amplification, or accesse of more perfection.*

Article 6. Many scruples, concerning the finality, manner, and form of the Idea impress; as also concerning the seeming Heterogeneity, or Alterity between the essence of the mind and that of the Idea: particularly satisfied.

Hitherto you have well calmed all those tumults of *Doubts*, which arose within us upon the Lecture of your Demonstration of the Existence of God: but yet there remain some few, though considerable scruples, the full and clear solution whereof is required from you, before you can with reason expect to bring us over to your side.

If the Idea of God be impress upon you, as a *mark* or *signature* set by an *Artificer* upon the *work* of his hands; what is the *Modus* of that impression? What the *Form* of that mark? by what means can you discern it? if it be not a thing distinct from

the work it self, from your rational *Soul*, or *Mind*; is your *Soul* then the Idea? is your *Mind* nought else, but *Modus cogitandi*, a certain manner of thinking? can your mind be both the *signature impressed*, and the *subjectum impressionis*, or matter upon which it is impress't? Credible it is, say you, that you are made after the *similitude* of *God*: True, by a *religious Faith* elemented in us by the doctrine of Holy Writ; but how can you make it out from *Natural Reason*, unlesse you adventure to make God *Hominiforme*, like to man? And wherein can that *similitude*, or *typicall analogie* consist? Dare you, being a grosse *Corporeal Ens*, poor despicable Dust and Ashes, presume to resemble your self to that *Eternal*, *Incorporeal*, *Immense*, most *Perfect*, most *Glorious*, and (what is of most weight in this particular) *Invisible* and *Incomprehensible Essence*? Have you beheld him face to face? Nay, with *Moses* in the cleft of the rock, have you seen so much as his back parts; so that you are able to describe his aspect, and make good the Comparison? But you averre, that tis credible for this reason, *Quia creavit*; now we retort upon you, that tis therefore incredible: since there is no necessity that the Work should be like its Maker, unlesse in the point of *Generation*, where the *Production* receives a communication of the same nature, that is in the *Productor*: but you were not Generated by God, nor because he was your Efficient, can you safely inferre, that therefore you are participant of his Nature; but you were onely created, fashioned by him, according to the exemplar or Idea, which was in the *Divine Intellect* from all eternity. So it remains, that you have no more justifiable pretence, to affirm that you are like him; then an *Engine* hath to be thought to bear the image of the *Engineer*, then a *house* hath to be conceived like to the *Mason*, or *Carpenter* that built it.

Further, (not to supersede a jot of your own sense, which may conduce to the illustration of your Position) you subjoyn, that you plainly perceive the *similitude* twixt God and Man, when you understand your self to be an *Ens incompleat*, *dependent* upon some superiour Principle, and indefinitely aspiring to *greater* and *better* things: now in our judgement, this is an undeniable argument of a vast disparity and *Dissimilitude*, since God, on the con-

contrary is moſt *complete*, moſt *independent*, moſt *ſelf-ſufficient*, as being *Maximus & Optimus*. In very ſooth, a *Compariſon* 'twixt *Light* and *Darkneſs*, 'twixt *Heaven* and *Hell*, 'twixt *Good* and *Evil*, 'twixt a *Spirit* and a *Body*, 'twixt *Something* and *Nothing*, may be better endured; as importing infinitely leſs of *Abſurdity*, infinitely leſs of *Impoſsibility*. In fine, it cannot ſound leſſe then a Miracle, that other men ſhould not underſtand the ſame that you doe; and chiefly when there is no reaſon alleadged, why we may not beleive, that God hath impreſſed the Effigies of his Eſſence upon others, as well as upon you. We profeſs, this one argument convinceth us, that the Idea of God is not impreſt upon the mind of man, immediately by himſelf, as a *ſignature*, or *Characteriſm* to confeſſe our Creation; *viz.* that if it were, the *Impreſs* would be one and the ſame in all men; that all men would then conceive God under the ſame *Form* and Idea; would allow him the ſame *Attributes*; would have the ſame thoughts of him in all points. But that all Nations, Ages, Religions, nay and Perſons have had various and diſtinct Ideas of the Divine Nature: is ſo manifeſt upon the oath of Experience, that we may well here be ſilent, as to any other atteſtation.

When you require me to prove, that the Idea of God is impreſt upon the mind of man, as a *Mark* or *Signature* ſet by the *Maker* upon the *Work* of his hands; and what is the *Manner* of that *Impreſſion*; or what the *Form* of that *Mark*: I appeal to the deciſion of any ſober Arbiter, whether it be not the ſame thing, as if, when I had ſurveyed an excellent *Picture*, and deprehended ſo much rare art and exquiſite skill therein, that I could not judge it to be drawn by any hand but that incomparable one of *Apelles*; I ſhould affirm that this *inimitable Artifice*, or *perfection* never to be paralleled, was a certain *Mark*, or note of Diſtinction, ſet by *Apelles* to all his pieces, whereby they may be diſcerned from the ruder draughts of other pencils: and you ſhould notwithſtanding preſs me to tell you, what's the Form of that Mark, or Manner of that Signal? Doubtleſs, ſuch a Queſtion deſerves no other anſwer but a ſmile.

Again, to purſue the ſame adequate *Simile*, put the caſe, that

I should averre, that the singular *Art*, and unrivald skill, whereby as an infallible sign, the *Pictures* of *Apelles* are distinct from the courser paintings of all others in the World; is nothing really distinct from the Pictures themselves; and that you should cavill at my assertion, and by irregular Logick inferre, that therefore those *Pictures* are nought else but the *Artifice* or *Skill*, in an *abstracted acception*, and so are composed of no matter: *Ergo* they are onely *Modi pingendi*, certain manners of painting, &c. Would not your argument be equally both as just and acute, as when you shall thus reason; If there be no distinction between the Idea of God engraven on your *Mind*, and your mind the *subject*, or *recipient* of this engravement; then is your Mind the Idea, and your self nothing but *Modus cogitandi*, then are you both the *Mark* impresst, and the *subject* of the Impression? I professe sincerely, after a due perpension, I cannot determine, which of the two *Inductions* carries the greater weight in the impartial balance of right reason: sure I am, that the *Analogie* stands fair and even in all points.

Nor can your Contradiction of that vetust and almost Catholick Article, *Hominem esse Dei Charagma*, that man is made after the Image of God, founded upon a collection of those various particulars, whereby the *Humane Nature* is discrepant from the *Divine*, be found more Dialecticall, or perswasory, then this feeble, because preposterous *Enunciation*. If any Picture drawn by *Apelles* did ever exactly resemble *Alexander*, then was *Alexander* in all parts exactly like that Picture: but the Picture was made up of severall different ingredients or materials, as divers Colours, oyle, wood, vernish, &c. and *Alexander* composed of skin, flesh, bones, hair, &c. Ergo, no picture was ever like *Alexander*, the Disparity between his nature, and the nature of a Picture, being so great, as never to be reconciled in a full analogie. For every temperate brain knows full well, that it is not required to the *Formality* of an *Image*, or *Pourtracture*, to be the same in *all points* with the *Antitype*, or *Original*; but onely that it resemble in *some*: and we all submit to this Manifest, that that most *perfect Faculty* (so I speak as not being ignorant, that all the *Attributes* of God are in him *Actually*; but wanting a word more

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significant and convenient to this notion) *of cogitation*, which we understand to be in *God*, is in some sort fitly represented by that *imperfect one*, which is in *Man*. Further, I cannot but point obliquely at your imprudence, in chosing rather to compare the Creation of Man by God, with the Mechanick operation of a Mason, or Carpenter, then with the Generation of a Parent; since no pretext of reason can justifie that unmannerly Conference. For though those three manners of acting, *Creation, Generation, Fabrefaction*, stand a whole *Genus* wide of each from other, and can never be brought neerer then the swords point: yet to argue from a Production *Natural* to a *Divine*, is, by a whole climate, a neerer way, then from an *Artificial*. Again, (to leave no point of a scruple unresolved) though I have long since assented, that the resemblance betwixt *God* and *Man*, is not so great as that betwixt a *Parent* and his *issue*; yet cannot I be brought to hold it impossible, that an *operation* should ever be inriched with the *Effigies* of the *operator*; since Experience whispers me, that I have seen a *statuary* carve his own statue, out of white Marble, aswell in the proportion and symmetry, as lineaments of each part, so exquisitely resembling, that every common-eye knew him aswell by his Statue, as his statue by him. Nor is your *Memory* more faithfull, then your *Judgement* profound; for when you accuse me to have said, *that I evidently perceive the similitude betwixt God and Man, from hence, that I understand my self to be an Ens incomplete, dependent, &c.* You make but a confused and perverse rehearsal of my words, which placed in their proper order express the *Antitheton*, or quite contrary, *viz. that from the Imperfection, Subordination, and depending of my own nature, I deduced the highest Perfection, Supremacy, and Indepedency of Gods*; that whereas it was essential to me unceassantly to aspire to greater and better things, and that those greater and better things are actually inherent in God: therefore had I in me something of *Affinity* to those greater and better things, by the incitement whereof I become ambitious and aspiring to them. And truly, this I inserted as an unquestionable remonstrance of the infinite *Dissimilitude*, which I understood to be betwixt *Divinity* and *Humanity*; with design to prevent both misapprehension and scan-

dal, to both which, otherwise I had some reason to conceive my self obnoxious. Finally, whereas you make it no less then a wonder, why all men in general should not understand the same Attributes in God, that I doe; since if the Idea of his Divinity be impresst universally and equally, upon the Minds of men, every one hath as great a privilege, by the Charter of his Essence, to speculate the same, as my self: in sober truth you may with equal reason wonder, that since all men know the Idea of a *Triangle*, why all men doe not yet perceive as many *Proprieties* and *Perfections* in that figure, as learned *Geometricians* doe; and why some reason *truly*, others *falsly* upon that Idea.

CHAP.

CHAP. II.

That God created the world ex nihilo, *proved by Arguments Apodictical.*

SECT. I.

THE *Existence* of God being amply Demonstrated, 'tis a natural consequence, that the whole World, and all things existent therein besides himself, were *Created* by him. For those Attributes, *Omnipotence*, *Omniscience*, and *Independence*, which are particularly, and in association required to that great Act of *Creation*, are all (together with all other *Perfections*, that lie in the ken of mans Cogitation) comprised under the *Idea*, which we hold of his *Essence*. Nor can any man deny, that every single Entity in the vast ark of the Universe, was created by, and holds its existence by dependence upon God; unless he shall have first denyed, that God doth exist: which our precedent Demonstration hath made appear to be impossible. For at the same time he denies, that God doth exist, he unavoidably precipitates himself into an Absurdity, implicitely denying that himself doth exist: which his very act of denyal contradicts; since, had he no existence, he could not deny; all men embracing that *Axiome*, *Non-entis non sunt Actus*.

Article 1. The inseparability, or (rather) identity of *God*, and *Creator*.

Upon a serious perpension of the irresistible pressure or weight of this plain and genuine *Inference*, I once resolved to supersede all other Arguments of the *Creation of the World out of nothing, by the sole and immediate Goodnesse, Wisdome, and Power* [illegible] *ole of our Chri-*

Article 2. The two respects, which inclined the Author to a more ample comprobation of the first Article.

stian breed; together with a dielenchical explosion of that antiquated delusion, that the Universe was *autoctibonous* in its original, or constructed meerly by *Chance*.

Power of the Supreme, because *most perfect Being*; especiliaiy when I converted my thoughts upon the almost Catholick beleif of this truth, every man, at least, every Christian, receiving and retaining it as an Article of Faith: but when my second and more advised meditations had whispered me, that most heads are so indurate by the frost of ignorance, as not to feel the soft touches of a *Collaterall* and *enthymematicall Demonstration*; as also, that my proper business was to evince by the testimony of meer *Reason*, what is commonly embraced upon the single auctority of *Moses* pen: I could not but conceive it necessary, in order to the plenary confutation of that as impious, as ridiculous Error of some antient *Naturalists*, *that the World was made by Chance*, *or Fortune*; to endevour the probation of the same, by other more *direct* and *expres's* means of perswasion, deduced from the *Magna Charta* of all temporal knowledge, the *Light* of *Nature*. Now that I may perform this, with that exactness, and satisfaction, which is due to so excellent a subject; I am necessitated to bespeak my Readers Patience to endure the recital, explanation, and examen of those specious reasons, which deluded the uncircumspect and easie judgements of those unhappy *Pagans*, who sitting in the Philosophers chair, either founded, or supported, or repaired that detestable opinion, that *Fortune was the Author and Architect of this admirable fabrick the Universe*.

Article 3. The summary of *Empedocles*, *Leucippus*, *Epicurus*, *Democritus*, &c. doctrine of the worlds spontaneous result from a *Chaos* of *Atoms*.

Epicurus (for him have I singled out, as the most notorious *Patron*, though not the *Father* of this execrable delusion; since the moniments of time assure the invention hereof upon his great Master, *Leucippus*) being great with a monstrous design to expunge those Characters of Piety and reverence towards the Deity, which the observation of prodigious Meteors, of frequent Eclipses of the two great Lamps of heaven, of Thunder, and Coruscations, of Earthquakes, of the regular and constant motions of the Sphears, &c. had impressed upon the minds of men; as also to eradicate all conceit of the so-much talkt of Compensation of good and evil actions after death openly breaks forth into the insolent assertion of these three horrid positions; (1) *Quod mundum non sit à Deo constitutus*, that the World was not constituted by

by God; (2.) *Quod mundus à Deo non gubernetur*, that the World was not governed by God; (3.) *Quod animus noſter non ſuperſit à funere*, that the ſoul of man doth not ſurvive the funeral of his body. The *Firſt* he eſſayes to declare thus; *Exiſtimare oportet mundos, uti & finitam omnem concretionem in immenſo inani factam, quidpiam ſimile cum iis, quas paſſim obſervamus, habentem, ortum ex infinita rerum univerſitate habuiſſe; & alios quidem majores, alios minores, per proprios quoſdam Atomorum quaſi Vortices (Συςρόφους) ſeu convolutiones, ſeorſim procreatos, &c. (in Epiſt. ad Herodotum apud Diogen. Laert. lib. 10.)* The ſubſtance of all which, and much more to the ſame intent, may be rendred more plainly thus. That the Celeſtiall orbs, and all their radiant Furniture the ſtars, are wheeld about, by a conſtant and even circumgyration; that they veer perpetually towards that point of the World, unto which they firſt inclin'd, and never change either the way, or tenor of their Circumvolutions; that they obſerve the ſame diſtance each from other, which they obtained at the inſtant of their Formation, nor ſink down upon, and ſo crowd or enterfeire each the other; that the Eclipſes of the two great Luminaries neceſſarily ſucceed upon the conjunction of the ſame Cauſes, in our days, as in the infancy of Nature, and may therefore with ſo much facility, as certainty, be prognoſticated and predicted by the rules of *Aſtronomy*; in brief, that ſuch and ſuch determinate effects ariſe from the Concurrenee and coefficiencies of ſuch and ſuch particular Cauſes, &c. all theſe we are not to referre to any other *Principle*, or *Efficient*, but that *Fortune*, whereby they were ſo and ſo diſpoſed in the firſt *Caſual Emergency* of the World; nor are thoſe conſtant and ſetled operations produced by any other *neceſſity*, then what fell to their Efficients, at the primitive ſegregation, concourſe, diſpoſition, coadunation of thoſe *Atoms*, whereof their bodies are compacted. That before the conſtitution of the Univerſe, there was an infinite Chaos of Atoms, of various figures and magnitudes, in an infinite ſpace, floating hither and thither, hurried up and down, on all ſides crowding, impelling, and juſtling each other, by reaſon of the Tendency reſulting from their own innate Gravity. That after a long, long afflux, reflux, con-

flux, elevation, depreſſion, coagmentation and other various and ſucceſſive agitations and molitions of theſe Atoms, when each order had chanced to confront and meet with others moſt conſimilar and convenient; then at laſt they all conſpired, acquieſced, and fixed in this regular poſition and ſituation, which conſtitutes the Forme of the Univerſe; as *Lucretius* (who was deplorably infected with this accurſt contagion of *Epicurus*) hath briefly expreſt it;

Quæ quia multa modis multis vexata per omne
Ex infinito vexantur percita plagis,
Omne genus motus, & cœtus experiundo,
Tandem deveniunt in tales diſpoſituras,
Qualibus hæc rebus conſiſtit ſumma creata, &c.

The Worlds *Materials* having firſt been toſt,
An infinite *Time*, within an infinite *Roome*,
From this to that uncircumſcribed coaſt,
And made by their own *Tendency* to roame
In various *Motions*; did at laſt quieſce
In theſe *Poſitions*, which they now poſſeſs.

That upon the *Diacriſis*, or ſegregation of heterogeneal Atoms, ſucceeding upon a circumvolution, gyration, or vertiginous eddy of them, in the confuſion of their eternal Chaos; the more groſs and ponderous tended towards the *Center*, or downwards, and in their deſcent expreſſed the more gracile and lighter, and impelled them upwards, which convening all together in the *circumference* of the immenſe vortex, wedged in each other into the form of an integument or cortex, called *Cœlum* or *heaven*; but the more groſs and weighty, crowding to the centrals, were there compacted and coagmentated into a ſolid maſs the *Earth*: and the remaining matter of a midle nature, upon the concurſe of its inſenſible particles aſſumed to it ſelf the form of a Humid ſubſtance, and part thereof being afterward circumagitated unceſſantly, and ſo both tornated and calefacted, was graduated into many orbs of *Light*, the *Sun*, *Moon* and *Stars*: the reſidue being reſer-

ſerved for the compaction of other bodies; &c. And this, if my memory hath proved a faithfull Steward of my readings, is the marrow of *Leucippus*, *Empedocles*, *Epicurus*, and *Democritus* their doctrine concerning the ſpontaneous configuration of the Univerſe.

Article 4. A *Digreſſion*, winnowing the Chaffe from the Wheat concealed in the former theory of *Epicurus*, & by the corollary of ſome caſtigations, reſtrictions and additions, declaring the great advantages, that this *Hypotheſis* of *Atoms* hath beyond any other concerning the *Material Principle* of all *Bodies*, as yet excogitated.

Tis proverbial amongſt Scholars, and long ſince applyed by an Author of good repute (*Aneponymus, in lib. de ſubſtant. phyſic.*) to this particular Caſe; *Nullam eſſe tam falſam opinionem, quæ non habeat aliquid veri admiſtum; ſed tamen illud admiſtione ejuſdam falſi obſcurari*: that no opinion hath ſo much of falſhood, as not to contain ſome ſprinkling of truth; though that ſpark of truth be ſo obſcured by the cloud of prejudice ariſing from the diſcovery of the falſity admixt, that it may require the ſubtile and deciſive judgement of an *Oedipus* for its diſcernment and ſequeſtration. And in this heap of *droſs* lies raked up ſo much pure and rich *metall*, as, if by the chymiſtry of an induſtrious hand extracted, may more then fully compenſate the patient Lecture of a ſhort *Digreſſion*.

In this old Romance of the ſpontaneous reſult of the World from a Caſual ſegregation and diſpoſition of that Abyſſe of Atoms, which rowled up and down, to and fro, by an impetuous and continual inquietude, eſtuation, or civil war, cauſed by their ingenite propenſity to motion, in the range of the infinite ſpace; ſome things ſound ſo harſh and diſcordant to meer Reaſon, as they are juſtly to be abominated; others carry the ſmooth face of ſo much Veriſimility, as they deſerve to be admitted, at leaſt diligently and impartially examined. The Poſitions we are to reject, are theſe; (1.) *that the Chaos of Atoms was non-principiate*, or as antient as Eternity: (2.) that they were not created *ex nihilo, ab aliqua beata ſimul ac immortali Cauſa*, by God: (3.) that they were not becalmd, ſeparated, ranged, and diſpoſed into their proper ſtations, in that ſerene order and figure, which they are now of inevitable neceſſity bound to obſerve, in every ſingle concretion, or individual Entity, by the artifice of any other *Cauſe*, but the blind Ordination, or improvident diſpoſure of *Fortune*. All which ſmells ſo ſtrong of the Fable, and ſtrikes the noſethrills as wel

of the meer Natural man, as the Pious, with ſuch infectious ſtench, that nothing but the opportunity of confutation can excuſe my coming ſo neer it. And yet notwithſtanding, I have never yet found out any juſtifiable ground, why *Atoms* may not be reputed *Mundi materies*, the Material Principle of the Univerſe, provided that we allow, that God created that firſt *Matter* out of *Nothing*; that his Wiſdome modelled and caſt them into that excellent compoſure or figure, which the viſible World now holds; and that ever ſince, by reaſon of the impulſion of their native *Tendency*, or primitive *impreſſion*, they ſtrictly conform to the laws of his *beneplacuits*, and punctually execute thoſe ſeveral functions, which his almighty *Will* then charged upon their determinate and ſpecifical *Concretions*. For, with the advantage of theſe reſtrictions, the *Atoms* of *Epicurus* have more of probability, and hold rational through moſt of thoſe operations, which occurr to the curioſity of the Philoſopher, with more familiarity to our conceptions, and leſs variation or apoſtaſie from the firſt Hypotheſis, then the impoſſible *Materia Prima* of *Ariſtotle*, then the *Subſtantial Principle* of *Plato*, the *Hyle* of the *Stoicks*, or, indeed, then any other imaginable *Præexiſtent* in the immenſe ſpace. And after a mature confronting, collation, and comparative perpenſion, of the moſt general *conveniences* and *congruities* of all; we have found that, from the ground-work of *Atoms*, we are able to make out what is *Material*, what *Corporeal*, what *Great*, what *Little*, what *Rare*, *Denſe*, *&c.* but from the others we could never deduce the formal attributes of a *body*, or *ſubſtance*, while the original of all things is determined abſolutely devoyd both of *Quantity* and *Quality Actual*, and amounts to no higher a degree of reality, then a meer *Privation*; which a righteous enquiry will ſoon reduce to *nothing*.

Nor is that affrighting *Difficulty* in the *Theory of Atoms*, which the eye of every *Pedantick Sophiſter* firſt glances upon, at the very mention thereof, more then this ſhadow of a ſcruple; *viz.* how ſo vaſt a maſs, as this Giant the Univerſe, could be made up of ſuch minute particles, as Atoms, which every man underſtands to be much below the perception of ſenſe, and never to be fathomed but by the ſubtile arms of the Intellect? For I dare entruſt the

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ſolution of it to any moderate judgement, that ſhall take the pleaſure to conceive this *Analytick Scale*, or degradation of *Magnitude*. Let us grant the *globe of Earth*, which ſeems to contain moſt of *corporeity*, to be but one part of the Univerſe compoſed of many ſuch maſſes congeſted, and the law of conſequence will compell us to concede, that the globe of the earth may be coagmentated of many ſmaller maſſes piled one upon another, or of mountains, as *Atlas*, *Caucaſus* &c. cemented together; that thoſe *Mountains* may reſult from an aggregation of rocks, thoſe *rocks* from an accumulation of *ſtones*, thoſe ſtones from a conflux, and ferrumination of grains of *ſand*, that *ſand* from a leſſer aſſembly of *duſt*, that *duſt* from a minor collection of *Atoms*. This granted, let us have recourſe to that famous Demonſtration of the glorious *Archimed* (*in Aren.*) whereby it is evicted, that twenty five *Cyphers*, or Arithmetical notes ſet in ſucceſſive order, 100000 &c. do exhibite the full number of thoſe Granules of ſand, which ſuffice to make up the vaſt bulk of the World, according to the vulgarly received magnitude thereof, though each of thoſe granules be determined ſo exiguous, that one grain of Popie ſeed may contain ten thouſand of them. I ſay, according to the Magnitude vulgarly received; for if, with *Ariſtarchus* (whoſe opinion *Copernicus*, in the laſt age, revived) you ſhall goe higher, and enlarge the extenſion of the world: yet according to the *Algebra* of *Archimed*, will no more then ſixty four *Cyphers* be required to calculate the number of grains of ſand, of the ſame dimenſions with the former, which equal the almoſt incredible vaſtity of the Univerſe. Now, if you pleaſe to goe lower in the quantity of thoſe minute grains, and ſink them down even to the tenuity of an *Atom*; imagine that each of thoſe ſmall particles is compoſed of ten hundred thouſand Atoms, and advance this number by multiplying it into 64, and even then will the number of thoſe particles be expreſt by no more then 70. Lower yet, if you think your laſt diviſion went not ſo far as *inſectility*, dichotomize thoſe minute particles each into ten hundred millions; and then, upon a juſt Multiplication made, the number provenient ſhall not exceed the reach of 76 Cyphers. Nay drive the matter ſo far, that your thoughts may even loſe themſelves in the purſuit; and you

ſhall ſtill deprehend how eaſily you may be ſupplyed with Cyphers enough to fulfill the number of all thoſe Atoms, which are neceſſary to the amaſsment of a bulk, equal to this of the World.

There is yet a *fourth* incongruity in this doctrine of *Epicurus*, worthy our exploſion; *viz. That Atoms had, from all eternity, a faculty of Motion, or impetuous tendency, inherent in them*, and *received not the ſame from any forreign principle, or impreſſion extradvenient.* But yet can I meet with no impediment, that may hinder me from conceiving, that Atoms are perpetually active and moveable, by the agitation of that internal tendency, or virtual impreſſion, which the *Father of Nature* conferred upon them, in the firſt moment of their miraculous production *ex nihilo.* And truly, thus refined, the Hypotheſis of *Atoms* is leſs guilty of either inconvenience or incertitude, then any other concerning the firſt material principle; nay, it hath thus much more of congruity and ſatisfaction then all the reſt, that it fitly declares the radical Cauſe of all Motion, activity or energie in ſecond Cauſes, or natures once removed from the *Primus Motor*, God: which can by no means be commonſtrated from any other ſuppoſition, with the like conſtancy, correſpondence, and perſpicuity; eſpecially if we look upon that *Form*, which the Schools commonly conclude on, as the main ſpring in all motion, or efficient of all activity. For whatever of real *Entity* they allow to be therein, they deſume from no other origine, but the ſimple and naked *Matter*: and yet, by unpardonable incircumſpection, or forgetfulneſs, they make that Matter abſolutely *idle*, and *devoid* of all *Motive* or *active virtue.*

Nor did *Plato* himſelf miſs this conſideration, but ſeems to have held the lamp to poſterity, in this particular; for though he reſtrains not his notion to the word, *Atoms*, yet from his deſcription of an *Exiguity*, *Quam intellectus, non ſenſus capiat*, and from the immediate ſubjunction of *De multitudine illarum, déq; motionibus, aliiſque facultatibus, congruum prorſus erat Deum providere, quatenus natura neceſſitati obediens ultrò obſecundaret*, &c. (*in Timæo*) tis a lawful conjecture, that he pointed directly upon the ſenſe. Theſe ſhort Animadverſions premiſed, that we may as well ſupply the Defects, as correct the depravities

of

of this opinion of *Epicurus*; ſuppoſe we, in ſhort, that God in the firſt act of his Wiſdome and Power, out of the *Tohu*, or nothing, created ſuch a proportionate congeries, or juſt maſs of Atoms, as was neceſſary to the conſtitution of the Univerſe: ſuppoſe we alſo, that all thoſe Atoms, in the inſtant of their creation received immediately from God a faculty of *ſelf-motion*, and conſequently of concurring, crowding, juſtling, repelling, reſilition, exſilition, and reciprocal complectence, concatenation revinction, &c. according to the reſpective preordination in the *Divine Intellect*: and then will all the ſubſequent operations of nature remain ſo clear and eaſie, that a meer *Ethnick* by the guidance of thoſe two lamps, *Senſe* and *Ratiocination*, may progreſs to a phyſical theory of them, and thereby ſalve all the *Phænomena's* with leſs apoſtaſie from firſt Principles propoſed, then by any other hypotheſis yet excogitated. A meer *Ethnick*, I ſay; for we, who have devolved unto us the ineſtimable bleſſing of *Moſes* hiſtory of the Creation, have far other thoughts of that method or order, wherein the World was founded, and finiſhed by God: but the pure Natural man, who wants the illumination of ſacred Writ, can follow no other conduct, but what, by the light of nature, appears moſt conſonant to truth. My *Digreſſion* is now ended, and I returne to the diſcharge of my Aſſumption, the redargution of that blaſphemous opinion, which aſcribes the honour of the Worlds compoſure to *Fortune*.

Sect. II.

Article 1. The conceit of the Worlds fortuitous production, diſparaged by a prepollency even of Pagan *Auctority*, that profoundly aſſerted the contrary, *viz.* of

AND firſt I oppoſe to the Patron of this error, the more noble *Auctority* of many antient and eminent *Philoſophers*; who, though unhappily born and educated in the midnight of Paganiſm, had yet their intellectuals, ſo irradiated by the refulgent Light of Nature, which their Vigilancy and aſſiduous Contemplation always kept, like the Veſtal tapours, ſhining and unecliped by the Cimmerian foggs of *Tradition* and *Prejudice*, that they diſcovered more then a glimps of *Divinity* in the original of the World. For *Tha-*

Article 2. *Thales Milesius.*

Thales Milesius, being introduced by *Diogenes Laertius* (*in vita ejusdem*) as rendring a reason, *Cur mundus sit pulcherrimus*, of the extreme glory, comelines, and decency of the World, and exact symmetry observed in all and every part thereof; most wisely sets up his rest, and silences all further dispute, in this full solution, ποίημα γὰρ τοῦ Θεοῦ, *tis the Artifice of God.*

Article 3. *Anaxagoras.*

That *Anaxagoras* had found out the same truth, by his retrograde tracing of nature up to her first head, or fountain; can be obscure to none, that shall doe his meditations so much right, as to interpret his νοῦς, *Mens*, or *supreme Intelligence*, to be the same with that, which we call *God*: for even our *School-men* doe as much, frequently using those appellatives, *Summa Intelligentia*, and *Deus*, indifferently and as Synonomas.

Article 4. *Pythagoras* and *Plato.*

Of *Pythagoras* and *Plato* we need no other record, then the single testimony of *Timæus Locrus*, who, being a famous Pythagorean, and therefore prudently deputed by *Plato* to deliver his own sense, in that golden Dialogue concerning *Nature*, (which in the Commentary of *Marsilius Ficinus*, signifies no more then *Divinitatis instrumentum*) in many passages of the debate, or investigation, takes occasion to declare, *Deum esse Parentem ac opificem mundi.* Nor can it cost the study of many houres to collect from *Plato's* other inquest into Divinity called *Parmenides* (who also was a disciple of *Pythagoras*) or *De uno omnium principio*, and the now mentioned description of Nature, *Timæus*, conferred together; that both *Pythagoras* and *Plato* shook hands in that opinion, that the world had its beginning, οὐ κατὰ χρόνον, not in *Time*, in regard, as they conceived, it never had beginning, ἀλλὰ κατ' ἐπίνοιαν, but in *Cogitation*, *i. e.* though it be Non-principiate, yet may our thoughts have the licence to assume that there was some præexistent matter, out of which it was formed. For they both apprehended so absolute a dependence of the world upon God; that God being existent in the World, must of necessity be reputed the Efficient thereof, insomuch as the World could have no other Cause of its Matter, Distinction, Disposition, Beauty,

Beauty and ornament. And is not this the ſame, that our Doctors now admit, while they defend, that the World might have been created by God, had his Wiſdome thought fit, from all Eternity; and if ſo, yet notwithſtanding he muſt ſtill have been the Cauſe of it, in regard of that neceſſary dependence of the World upon him, for if there were no God, there could be no World: κατ' ἰσονομίαν, by the ſame reaſon, as though we grant the Sun together with its light, or a Seal together with its ſignature, to have been from all Eternity; yet muſt we grant the Sun to be the Cauſe of his light, and the Seal to be the Cauſe of its impreſſion. For they condeſcend to this, that an Effect may be coævous to its Cauſe; and that, though the *Cauſe* be not *prior Tempore*, it ſufficeth that it be onely *prior Natura*, or τῇ φύσει, which is the very expreſſion of *Timæus Locrus*. However this may be diſputed, yet ſure I am, that as well theſe two Patriarchs of Learning, as all their Sectators and Interpreters were unanimous in this point, That God was Author of the Univerſe.

Article 5. The *Stoicks*.

What the *Stoicks* thoughts were, concerning this grand particular; is publick, and cannot eſcape the cognizance of any, who have look't into the lives of the Scholiarchs, or Heads of that numerous Sect, amply regiſtred by the even pen of *Diogen. Laert.* or read *Cicero's* ſecond Book, *De natura Deorum*, where he elegantly perſonates *Balbus* ſmartly and profoundly diſputing againſt *Velleius* and *Epicurus*; whither I remit the unſatisfied Reader, in avoidance of Prolixity.

Article 6. *Ariſtotle*.

For the grand ſignieur of the Schools, *Ariſtotle*; truth is, I cannot conceal, that when he maintains (*in* 8. *Phyſic. & prioribus de Cœlo*) the Univerſe to be *ingenitum*, without origination, and contemns that forementioned diſtinction of *Priority*, τῇ φύσει, & κατὰ χρόνον, as excogitated by *Pythagoras*, and continued by *Plato*, rather διδασκαλίας χάριν, for the convenience of *Doctrine*, then the intereſt of *Truth*: he is poſitive, that he could not admit the World to have had any Author at all; and therefore *Simplicius* (*in* 8. *Phyſic. digreſs.* 3.) chiding *Philoponus* for daring to aſſert, that the World had its origin and production from

God, according to the testimony of *Moses* Chronicle, cries out that his doctrine was repugnant to the Fundamentals of his oracle, *Arist.* and in some sort highly derogatory to the majesty of the assigned *Productor*; since it tacitly rendred him subject to that imperfection, *Mutability*, which is incompatible with the constant simplicity of an Essence sufficiently accomplisht for so mighty an action, and implies that he was not the same from all Eternity, and but lately became *Parens, Conditórque mundi*. But yet have I ground enough to stand upon, that *Arist.* grew wiser, as he grew elder, and that the flame of his reason shined brighter when that of his life burned dim; for in the last exercise of his pen, his book *De mundo*, which most Antiquaries conclude written in the close of his studies, (*cap.* 5. & 6.) he sings a palinodia, and makes open profession, that the universal harmony, consonance, and pulchritude of this great machine were ὀπὸ τῦ πάντων γενετῆρος, *ab universorum Conditore*: Confirming the verity of that pious Adage confest and pronounced by all men, ἐκ Θεῦ τὰ πάντα, *All from God.* That he hinted this from that oraculous Motto, fathered upon *Zoroaster*, that King and Magus of the antient *Bactrians*, and contemporany to *Ninus* and *Semiramis*, as *Eusebius* (*lib.* 10. *de prap. Evangel. cap.* 3.) accounts; *Factor, qui per se operans, fabrifecit mundum* doth not want its share of probability, insomuch as the monuments of the *Chaldean* Learning were ransackt by the *Platonicks*, and so came to the view of *Aristotle*, is manifest as well from the circumstance of *Time*, his life falling not much below the plunder of the Oriental Libraries, as from the *Rhapsodies* or Excerptions, which the *Pythagoreans* had made out of the relicts of *Zoroaster* and *Trismegistus*, and transmitted down to the hands of *Plato* and his Scholars, who frequently inspersed them upon their own writings, a copious series of which sentential transcriptions hath been not long since bequeathed to posterity by the bounty of *Cæsar Longinus*. But however, I am inclined to beleive rather, that his second thoughts, and more advanced Contemplations on the excellency and glory of the structure, lighted him to this recantation, and enforced him to confess, that the fabrick of the world was too full of Wisdome and Providence, to have been performed by any thing below the

Highest:

Higheſt: for tis warrantable for me to conjecture, that ſince he had his erudition, at leaſt his education, at the feet of *Plato*, and ſo could not be ignorant of any Tradition of moment, which his Maſter knew; had his judgement been imbued with that leſſon in his greener yeers, he could not well have ſtifled it till immediately before his death, eſpecially when the knowledge of this great truth might have preſerved him from that ſwarm of Difficulties, which he endured in maintaining his Theſis of the *Non-production*, or *Eternity* of the World. There are, I confeſs, who ſtiffely queſtion the propriety of legitimation of this book, *De Mundo*, owning it upon ſome younger Compoſer; who ambitious to have the Minerva of his own colder brain, long lived in eſtimation, gave it the glorious name of *Ariſtotle*, and under the defence of that proſperous title, committed it to the encounter of *Cenſure*. To the ſatisfaction of theſe, I ſhall alledge a place or two out of thoſe pieces, which have ever eſcaped the imputation of ſpurious; whereby the former ſentence is ſo ratified, that *Ariſtotle* may appear to have had great indignation againſt their incogitancy and ſtupidity, who could beleive the world to be once produced, and yet aſcribe the production thereof to Fortune. *Dignum eſt*, ſaith he, (*in* 2. *Phyſic. cap.* 4.) *admiratione aſſerere iſtos, Animalia quidem & Plantas à Fortuna neque eſſe, neque fieri, ſed aut naturam aut quandam mentem, aut quampiam aliam Cauſam habere* (*viz. non ex cujuſvis ſemine quidvis naſcitur, ſed ex hoc quidem olea, ex illo vero homo*) *cœlum autem, & quæ ſunt ſenſibilium diviniſſima, ſponte nata fuiſſe, nec cauſam ullam, qualem animalia plantæque ſortiuntur, habuiſſe.*

« Tis well worthy our admiration, how theſe men can affirm, « that Animals and Plants neither proceed from, nor can be made « by Fortune; but muſt have either Nature, or ſome Intelligence « or other efficient (for the ſeminalities of things do not fly out in- « to promiſcuous and indifferent Generations, but every diſtinct « ſpecies hath its ſeed reſtrained and determined to the procreati- « on of its like: nor can the fructifying principle of an Olive de- « viate into the production of a Vine; or the ſperm of man pro- « duce any thing but man) but as for the Heavens, and other « peices of the world, which ſeem of farre greater alliance to Di-

« vinity : that these are spontaneous and casual in their originals, « and have not obtained any Efficient to their Formations, equal « to that of Animals or Plants. And (*in* 1. *de Anim. Part. c.* 1.) he speaks expressely to the same purpose, though in other words ; which, to prevent the further trouble of the Reader, I shall faithfully transcribe. *Quamobrem verisimilius dixerim cœlum & factum esse ab ejusmodi causa; si factum est ; & magis esse ob eam causam, quam Animalia caduca atque mortalia : ordo enim, certúsque status longe magis in ipsis rebus cœlestibus, quam in nobis patet ; incerta enim, et inconstans, fortuitáque conditio in genere mortali est potius. At illi genus Animalium quódque natura constare, extitisséque censent; cœlum autem ipsum Fortuna, spontéque ejusmodi constitisse volunt ; in quo tamen nihil Fortunæ ac temeritatis deprehendi potest.* Again, *Calius Rhodiginus* (*lib.* 17. *cap.* 34. *pag.* 814) reports of him, that, though during the greatest part of his life he had ascribed all effects solely to *secondary* and *inferiour* Causes, yet immediately before his death, when his soul began to be weaned from sensibility, and feel her wings, he most earnestly implored the compassion and forgiveness of the *First and Supreme Cause*, *Primæ causæ misericordiam intentius implorabat*, &c. To these I might have annexed a third text of *Aristotle*, selected by the Master of Roman Eloquence, and adæquately engrafted into his second discourse *De Natura Deorum* : but I conceived the two former to be testimony sufficient to the stability of my assertion, that he abhorred the absurd usurpation of *Fortune*.

Now if the meer *Naturall Explorator* shall but perpend both the *Number* and *Dignity* of these more venerable Professors of Science, wholly abating the weight of their Reasons ; I cannot doubt, but he will finde them infinitely to overbalance the single School of *Epicurus*, and of reputation great enough to excuse the conformity of his judgement to theirs : if he look no higher then the point of *Auctority*.

SECT.

Sect. III.

Article 1. The pretext of Fortune destroyed, by the constancy of Nature in her act of specification, (*i. e.*) the restraint and determination of the seminalities of *Animals* to the procreation of their like in *specie*: and the Atheists objection, of frequent Anomalous and Heteroplasmical, or monstrous Productions, dissolved.

TIs no easie wonder, how any man, whose Faculties are not in disorder, nor the Oeconomie of his head subverted into a Wildness beyond the absurdities of Melancholy adust, can be infatuated into a conceit, that so great, so unform, so durable, so magnificent, and therefore so glorious a work, as this of the World, could be performed by the lesse then feeble, and ignorant hands of *Nothing*, of *Fortune*. For however it may be allowed, that this imaginary Deity, may produce some effects extraordinary or miraculous: yet how petite and inconsiderable are those atcheivements of *Chance*, if put in the scale against those more admirable performances of *Reason* and *Wisdome*? Suppose we, that *Prodigies* may arise from the unequal concurrence of dissimilar and disproportionate *Actives* and *Passives*; and Monsters be generated by the casual confusion of distinct seminalities, as well amongst Animals, as Plants: yet how incomparably more prodigious are those ordinary propagations in each *Classis*; which by the certain and invariable law of their peculiar species, are restrained to their determinate Forms, and whose Constancy excludes all pretence of Fortune, or the accidental Efficiency of Chance? I leave to the decision of every sober man, which hath most of the Miracle; that the seed of every Animal should be confined to the procreation of its like *in specie*, for the most part; and that the *Plastick Spirit* thereof punctually observe the modell, or pattern of that Fabrick of the body, from whence it came: or that, upon a preposterous commixture of various and unequal seeds, once in an age, there should succeed the production of some new *Heteroclite*, or unpatternd Monster, whose Composition is onely *contingent*, and difform to the Idea of either its *Active*, or *Passive* Principle, in the simplicity of their divided *Figures*. And are not the exquisite Delineations of every *Embryon*, woven out by the subtile fingers of *Archeus*, or the *Formative spirit*; the multiplicity, distinction, elaboration of *organs* both external,

and internal; the ſeverall *Functions*, and *Offices* aſſigned to thoſe organs, and ſo artificially contrived, that every one is *diſtinct*, yet none *independent*; every one *ſingle*, yet all *conſpiring* to the ſame end, all *operative*, yet none (*per ſe*) *locomotive*: are not theſe certain and præordinate effects, with innumerable others, the meaneſt whereof we cannot ſeriouſly think upon, without a rapture of amazement, more worthy our admiration, then a ſingle *irregularity*, a ſpontaneous *Monſter* of Nilus, a bipartite *Centaure*, a prodigious *Inſect*, &c. whoſe generations are accounted *accidental*, and their configurations not preordained, but the inconſiderate and extemporary reſults of *Fortune*? Perhaps theſe ſtupid Idolaters of Chance will referre theſe conſtant and ſeded operations to *Nature*; but whatever they mean by Nature, how immenſe a ſtock of *Wiſdom* muſt it neceſſarily be endowed withall, which in all its works ſo cunningly contrives ſo great variety of organs, obſerves ſuch exact Symmetry in all parts, ſo providently diſpoſeth every member, and fits them to the eaſie execution of their predeſtinate functions? If they goe farther, and affirm, that *Nature is nothing but the primitive Conſtitution of the World, which reſulted from the caſual ſeparation, conflux, and diſpoſition of its material principle, Atoms; and that it doth conſtantly perſiſt in the ſame Method, which it firſt obtained from Fortune*: the anſwer is eaſie, that though Nature be conſtant to that order, in all her productions, which the World obtained in its firſt compoſure; yet how ridiculouſly ſtupid muſt he be, who can admit a ſerious perſwaſion, that the bodies of Animals, in the beginning could be ſo exquiſitely configurated by meer Chance, and without the direction and indeed the deſignement of an infinite *Wiſdome*; in whoſe eternal intellect the *prototypes* of each *ſpecies* were firſt adumbrated? Let them object again, that every day affords examples of the skill of *Fortune*, in the production of *Froggs*, *Toads*, *Flies*, and other ſpontaneous *Inſects*: and I ſhall ſoon return, that thoſe Inſects or ſpontaneous Animals have their *Cauſes certain*, and by reaſon of that energie once conferred upon their *Efficients*, muſt ariſe to animation in ſuch or ſuch a *Figure*, according to the magnitude, number, ſituation, complexion, quiet, motion, or, in a word, the *Temperament* of thoſe

parts

particles, out of which their bodies are amaſſed; and according to the activity of that domeſtick *Heat*, which ferments and actuates the matter: Secondly, that our debate is about the *original of Nature it ſelf*, and of that preciſe *Virtue* radically implanted in the *ſeeds* of things; or more emphatically, what hand inoculated that *procreative power* in each ſeminality, and endowed it with a capacity requiſite to the conformation of bodies ſo admirable in their ſtructure: if there were not ſome principle in the nonage of the Univerſe, who infuſed that *Prolifical* or fertile *Tincture*, ordained that ſcheme of members, and gave it rules to act by; from which it never ſwerves, but upon a diſobedience and non-conformity of matter. If we lookt no farther then the *Cortex* or *Exteriors* of *Animals*; and there ſpeculated as well the amiable comelineſs of their *Figures* in the whole (for there is no real Deformity in Nature) as the *geometrical Analogie*, or convenience betwixt the *Members* and their *Actions*, each being reſpectively configurated to the performance of its peculiar office: 'twere more then ſufficient to diſcover to us the impoſſibility of their primitive inſtitution by Fortune. But when we *diſſect* them, prie into their *Entrals*, and there ſurvey the almoſt infinite multitude of organs, principal and ſubordinate; the variety of their uſes, ſome being officiall to *Nutrition*, ſome to *Vitality*, ſome to *Generation*, others to *Senſe*, others to *Locomotion*, none impeding the activity of another, but all unanimouſly conſpiring to conſerve the œconomy of that *Form*, which, like the main *ſpring* in an Automaton, invigorates, and actuates the whole fabrick: either we muſt bid defiance to the chief inducement of beleif, and drown the loud clamors of our Conſcience, or elſe fall down, tranſported with an ecſtaſie of pious Wonder, and humbly confeſs, that theſe are the *Impreſſes* of the infinite *power* and *wiſdome* of an *omniſcient, and omnipotent Creator*; but not the *Contingencies*, or temerarious effects of *Chance*. Thoughts like theſe had the prudent *Gaſſendus*, when, in his deteſtation of the intereſt of that Pretendreſs, Fortune (*cap. de exortu mundi.*) his golden pen dropt this rhetorical logick; *Id quod ſtuporem generat, diſpoſitio interna eſt in corporibus Animalium. Nam ſi foret quidem duntaxat multitudo aliqua partium, forte fortuna commiſtarum, tum ea poſſet*

posset Fortunæ tribui: at in multitudine illa pene innumerabili nullam esse partem, non tantam, non talem, non ubi, non quomodo, non cum ea functione, qua congruum est, ut neque inutilis sit, neque esse commodior valeat: rationem prorsus omnem fugit, ut ita fieri non sapientia, sed Fortuna sit constitutum.

Article 2. The necessity of the Worlds Creation by an Agent infinite in Science and Power, proclaimed by the constant Uniformity of Nature, in her perpetuation of *Vegetables*.

Nor doe *Animals* alone, but *Vegetables* also, though of an inferior Classis, amply and sensibly testifie the *Divinity* of their *Founder*, and confute the *Apotheosis* of *Fortune*. Thus, when the Aliment of a Plant, being the aqueous irrigation of the earth insensibly prolected, ascends from the lowest filament of the shaggy root up to the *Trunck*, and thence works up to the extremities of every branch and twigge; can we imagine, that this thin, insipid juice can be so inspissated, and so ingeniously moulded into a *Bud*; that bud discriminated and variegated into a larger particoloured *Blossom*; that Blossom gradually expanded into a determinate *flower*, which gratifies our eyes with the beauty of its embroidery, and our nostrils with the fragrancy of its odour; that Flower lost in the richer emergencie of a *Fruit*, which hath its figure, colour, magnitude, odour, sapour, maturity, duration, all certain and constant; and the abridgement, or Epitome of this included in the *seed* of that fruit, which being insperst upon the earth, is impregnate with a Faculty to expand it self into a second Plant, in all things rivall to the former, and empowered to act all those several Metamorphoses over again, to a perpetuall rejuvenescence of that peculiar species: can we, I say, imagine, that all this could arise from a *spontaneous range of Atoms*, or that *Necessity* which ensued upon the casual disposition of the *First matter*; and not rather with devout hymns proclaim the *Efficiency* of a Glorious and Eternall *Cause*, whose *Esence* being incomprehensible, and *Attributes* infinite Intelligence, Goodnesse, Power, Beatitude, Glory, &c. must therefore be the *Ordainer*, *Creater*, and *Consecrator* of all things?

Let

Let us ſink our meditations yet one degree lower on the ſcale of Creatures, and conſider how convincively even *Inanimates* argue for the wiſedom of their *Maker*. Doth not the *Sun* (to omit the ſpeculation of its glorious *Light*, and comfortable *Influence*; the former whereof is ſo excellent, the other ſo neceſſary, that they challenge as due the *Admiration* of all, and have drawn the *Adoration* of many ingenious nations) by three prevalent arguments. *viz.* the *Commodiouſneſs of its ſituation*, the *Deſignment of its motion*, and the *Line or tract of its revolution*, ſufficiently illuſtrate the forecaſt and artifice of its *Creator*?

Article 3. The Sun convincively demonſtrates the infinite wiſdom of its Creator, by 3 Arguments: *viz.*

First *by the univerſal Convenience of its ſituation*. For had it been placed in any other orb, either inferior, or ſuperior to its own; ſuch horrid incommodities, as are inconſiſtent with its uſe and intention, and deſtructive to the two principal deſignes of Nature, Conſervation and Generation, muſt unavoidably have followed; nor had the whole fabrick of the Univerſe been more then one degree removed from the confuſion of its originary Chaos. To particular; had the Sun been ſetled in the loweſt ſphear, and obtained that place, which the Moon now poſſeſſeth: the year had been no longer then a moneth; for in that account of time, it muſt have fulfilled its courſe through every part of the Ecliptick, and ſo the intervalls of ſeaſons had ſuffered ſuch a contraction, that muſt have been repugnant to their inſtitution, *i. e.* muſt have prevented the production of all things; For the *Antipraxis, or Counter-activity of contrary ſeaſons, immaturely ſucceeding one upon the neck of another, deſtroys the principles of Vegetation, and checks the promotion of ſeminalities*. Again, by this unſafe vicinity, or too neer approach to the globe of the earth, its intenſer beams had verified the Conflagration of Phaeton; at leaſt proved ſo intolerable, as that all things muſt have had the ycie and glutinous temper of the Salamander, or elſe been torrified into cynders; and to have had no Sun at all, had been the eaſier miſery. For if there be (and ſome are poſitive there muſt be) an intention and remiſſion of heat, reſpective to the different points, or acceſs and receſs of the Sun, in its proper orb;

1. The univerſal convenience of its ſituation in its proper orb.

and that in its *Apogæum*, or mountee to the higheſt point in Cancer, the heat is not ſo ſcorching under that Tropick on this ſide the Æquator, as on the other ſide, in its *Perigæum* or ſtoop to the loweſt point of its excentricity in Capricorne: we cannot with any pretext of reaſon doubt, that, had the Sun been lodged in the bed of the Moon, it had long ſince anticipated the general combuſtion of the laſt day, and calcined all things to the exiguity of their primitive Atoms. And on the other extreme, had the Sun been appointed to the eight or higheſt ſphear; then muſt it have been, by reaſon of the exceeding ſlow motion aſſigned to that ſphear, ſo many thouſand years in the abſolution of its courſe, as that it muſt have extended one year to the compute of *Platos* Jubile; nor could the world (if learned men gueſs aright concerning its duration) have attained to the period of one revolution. Beſides that Hemiſphear, which firſt faced the Sun in the beginning of its tedious gyre, muſt have enjoyd the curſe of a long long day, and conſequently have miſt the fertile bleſſing of a viciſſitude, or reciprocal ſucceſſion of diſtinct ſeaſons; but the oppoſite Hemiſphear muſt have, for many myriads of ages, continued as cold, dark and barren as the grave, and ſo half of the earth had been made to no purpoſe. And the like diſcommodities, though more moderate, would have ſucceeded to the earth, had the Sun obtained a ſituation in any one of the other ſix orbs, between the two former extreams.

2. The appointment of its continual Circumgyration.

Secondly, *by the appointment of its Circumrotation.* For had it remained fixt and not moved at all; then muſt the world have wanted that neceſſary diviſion of times and ſeaſons, of Spring and Autumne, Summer and Winter, day and night: and by conſequence, the generation and conſervation of things dependent on thoſe viciſſitudes of Heat and Cold; it being neceſſary, that the fixation of this Luminary muſt have cauſed a perpetual ſummer in one hemiſphear, and as laſting and diſconſolate a Winter in the other; or driven nature upon the exigent of making another Sun to irradiate and cheriſh the oppoſite half of the earth, it being experimentally true (and therefore advanced to the dignity of an Axiome by *Galilæo*, *Philolaus*, *Nicetron*, *Kircherus*, and other junior

junior Maſters in the *Opticks*) *that no ſpherical luminous body, of what diameter ſoever, can project its light upon the whole ſphear of another at once, or in a fixt poſition; though it illuminate more then the half of a leſſer placed at convenient diſtance.*

3. The contrivement of its oblique motion along the line Ecliptick.

Laſtly, *by the contrivement of its oblique motion along the line Ecliptick.* For had its revolution been aſſigned to any other circle; diſcommodities no leſs fatal then the former had unavoidably enſued. *Firſt*, had it ſayled along on either ſide the *Æquator*, ſome parts of the earth could have known no Sun at all, but ſhould have groand under the oppreſſion of perpetual frigidity and opacity; while others had ſuffered the contrary extream of an everlaſting noon, and been parched by the violence of its too conſtant and perpendicular beams: and ſo the whole had been inhabitable; an *Alternation* of *Heat* and *Cold* being indiſpenſably requiſite aſwell to the *Conſervation* and growth of all things in their *Individuals*, as to their *Propagation* in *Specie*. *Secondly*, had it been confined to the conduct of the Æquator; firſt unto a parallel ſphear, or ſuch who have the Pole for their Zenith, its revolution could have made neither perfect day, nor perfect night; for being in the Æquator, it would interſect their horizon, and be half above, and half below it: and to thoſe, who inhabite under the Æquator, though it made a diſtinction of day and night, yet would it not make any conſiderable diſtinction of ſeaſons; for the Sun being always vertical to them, in that ſituation, would have introduced a conſtant Summer, and the perpendicularity of its unremitted heat have exhauſted the fructifying humidity of the earth, and ſo left the womb of our common mother, ſqualid and barren as the deſert *Sarra* in *Africa*. *Laſtly*, had it moved directly upon the Æquator, unto what poſition ſoever; well might it have deſcribed a day, but never meaſured out a year: for the progreſſion of it from Weſt to Eaſt (by the compaſs of which motion the circle of the year is conſtituted) had been wanting; in regard that tis impoſſible that on one and the ſame circle, obſerving the ſame Poles, the Sun ſhould have performed its two contrary motions, one from Eaſt to Weſt, which defines the day, the other from Weſt to Eaſt, which meaſures out the year, both at once. Now all theſe palpable inconveniences (with many

other first observed and enumerated to us by a *Spanish*, and lately most elegantly explained by an *English Physician*; both which selected this choice subject, as an impregnable argument of the *Wisdome of the Creator*) were artificially prævented by the device of the Suns motion along the Ecliptick, and the obliquity of its annual progress upon the Poles of the *Zodiack*, full 23 degrees, and an half from the Poles of the World.

Now this meditation naturally applies it self, and so clearly demonstrates the forecast and artifice of an infinite Intelligence; that I have nothing left to say, but this; that tis a wonder, which nothing but the delusion of the Father of lies can make out to belief, how *Epicurus*, being a Philosopher, in many abstrusities of nature acute enough, nay beyond most of his Tutors, as *Diogenes Laertius* testifies of him; and one that pretended to so much insight in the problems of Astronomy, as to be able to salve all the *Phænomena*, or Apparitions above the Terraqueous orb, (*in Epist. ad Pythoclem*) could yet be so infatuated, as to ascribe the composure, and location of the Sun, and the invention of its regular, and to all parts convenient motion, to the *Temerity* and *Incogitancy* of *Fortune*. Nor could I have conceived it possible that so much of the *Scholar*, and so much of the *Fool* could have at once met in one and the same brain; had not I been perswaded thereto, by the agreeing testimonies of many credible Authors, high both in Antiquity and Fame.

Article 4. The impresses of an infinite Intelligence, plainly legible in the fronts even of Subterraneous Inanimates.

If these Arguments reach not, we may descend yet lower (if there be any thing low in Nature) and from the entrals of our Grandmother fetch *Stones* and *Mineral Concretions*, to give in evidence against the insolent arrogance of *Fortune*. For who dares contract the suspicion of madnes so meritoriously, as once to dream that the *Magnet* obtained its rich endowments of *Verticity* and *Attraction*; the *Adamant* its radiant tralucency and conical angularity; *Alum* its octohedrical or eight-faced Figure; *Salt* its Sexangular; *Nitre* its striate or ycicle-resembling; *Vitriol* its multangular, &c. from a meer accidental and undetermined conflux and coalition of their minute and insensible particles: and not from the provident and artificial disposition of them into such

and

and ſuch ſituations, as are requiſite to the cauſation of thoſe particular qualities and Figures, by the diſcreet and methodicall influence of an infinite wiſdome? If any ſuch there be (and I have reaſon for more then my fears, that ſuch there are, in theſe accurſed days, when all the *Errors* of the elder world are revived, deſperate *Hæreſies* belched out even by thoſe, who profeſs to be the Patriots of truth, and horrid *Blaſphemies* applauded as commendable ſtrains of high devotion) who tremble not to deny the Creation of all things by God: theſe I ſhall pity, and leave to ponder that exclamation of *Gaſſendus*, (*de exortu mundi*) *O quam hebetem eſſe oportet, aut quam reclamantem habere conſcientiam, ſi dum ad iſta attenditur, ſola interim Fortuna laudatur!* « O how inſenſible muſt that man be either of the adviſoes of « reaſon, or the convulſions of Conſcience; who can conſider « theſe things, and yet aſcribe the honour of their Creation to « Fortune!

Article 5. The impoſſibility of the worlds Creation by any Agent but God, illuſtrated both by the Magnitude, and Pulchritude thereof: and the Epicureans dream, of a motive facuky eternally inherent in Atoms, derided.

And if the Characters of an *Infinite Wiſdome* be ſo plainly viſible in the *ſingle and divided peices of the Univerſe*; how incomparably more legible muſt they be in the *Whole*, wherein *Amplitude* holds an æmulous contention with *Pulckritude*? True it is, the *Epicureans* were not ſtaggered at the conſideration of ſo vaſt a maſs, inſtantly addreſſing themſelves for refuge, to *an infinite ſtock of Atoms congeſted in an infinite ſpace.* But this Sanctuary is rotten, and cannot protect the credulity of any, unleſs it be ſupported by this additional baſe; that there was ſome firſt *Active principle*, which by its infinite power firſt *created* out of nothing, and then *congeſted* this maſs of Atoms into a Chaos, and after by its infinite wiſdome *digeſted* the ſame into that exquiſite order which doth now conſtitute the form of the world. Is it poſſible for any thing that dares pretend to *Humanity*, to imagine, or by any ſpecious argument to hope to perſwade, that ſo many minute bodies, or Atoms, by the raſh and undeterminate conduct of their own innate propenſity to motion, indifferently hurried up and down, hither and thither, and by reaſon of the diſcord ariſing from their different quantities, and Figures, apt to maintain an everlaſting civil war and confuſion;

could notwithſtanding by a ſpontaneous direction meet and unite in that juſt number, which was ſufficient to make up the Globe of the *Earth*, requiſite to compoſe the body of the Sun, proportioned to the dimenſions of the *Moon*, equal to the ſeveral orbs of thoſe radiant Centinels of night, the *Stars*, whoſe multitude exceeds the figures of Arithmetick, and their magnitude never yet rightly explored; in fine, exactly accommodate to the great body of the *World*, whoſe bounds we know not, and whoſe dimenſions are immenſe? The conviction of this impoſſibility they have endevoured (though by running into as great a one) thus to evade, As he (ſay they) muſt have been deceived, who having obſerved the generation of nothing greater then a *Flea*, could not therefore beleive the generation of an *Elephant*, as if there could not be found matter enough to ariſe to ſo gigantick a body: ſo are we deceived, while regarding the generation of onely ſmal things we beleive that the great body of the univerſe could not be made up by the ſame means, and after the ſame manner; as if ſo vaſt a proportion of matter could not concur and unite into one Form; nay by ſo much the more are we deceived, by how much the more proportion the matter of a Flea holds to that of an Elephant, and the matter of an Elephant holds to that of the World; then the matter of the World holds to that maſs of Atoms, which is infinite in the infinite ſpace. But I may with good reaſon demand, how they can be aſſured, that in the imaginary ſpace, without the circumferrence of the world, there is ſuch an inexhauſtible abyſs of matter, as ſufficeth to the generation not onely of this world, but of an infinite multitude of others, fully as large as this: ſo, well as we are aſſured, that in this world is contained matter ſufficient to the compoſition of an Elephant, as well as of a Flea? Sure I am, no man ever ſaw the outſide of the world; and if ſo, is it not a meer Rhodomontado of phanſie, or (as *Pliny* calls it) a high madneſs, to imagine ſuch an infinite abyſs of matter? Let us, however, deal with theſe, as wiſe Phyſicians with Hypochondriacks, that they may the more eaſily cure them, allow them their abſurdities; and grant that from eternity there was ſuch an infinity of Atoms, confuſedly hurried to and fro, in an infinite ſpace: yet the difficulty will always remain, how in ſo great a laxity and infinite

infinite liberty of range, ſo many Atoms could ſo convene and combine together, as to terminate and ſettle each other, by reciprocal coherence and mutual concatenation; how ſo orderly marſhal and diſpoſe their ſeveral diviſions into ſuch elegant Figures: how adapt thoſe figures to ſuch genuine and conſtant operations; and all this without the counſell, diſpoſition, and revinction of any other cauſe, but their own rude and giddy propenſity to motion, and the caſual reſult of their ceſſation from diſcord? That *Animals* have obtained ſuch exquiſite forms, reſpective to their ſeveral deſtinations; this we can refer to the artifice of their peculiar *Seminalities*, or the cunning of that *Formative virtue*, which lying ambuſcadoed in the ſpumous conſiſtence of their genital emiſſions, and being once awakened into Activity by the excitement of a convenient *Matrix*, or *Receptarie*, immediately deſignes this or that parcel of matter for ſuch or ſuch a part, another for another, and ſo ſpins it out into an uniform labyrinth of members, at laſt weaving all thoſe into an ingenious *Figure*, in all points reſembling the Protoplaſt or firſt genitor of that ſpecies; who received this *Seminal Tincture*, or faculty prolifical from the immediate bounty of its *Creator*. But that *Atoms*, as they are in their naked and incomplex nature, ſhould be allowed to have a *Plaſtick* or *fabrefactive virtue* equal to that conferred upon the ſeeds of Animals; is a figment as worthy our ſpleen, as that ridiculous branch of the ſame root the *Autochthones*, or ſpontaneous eruption of our firſt Parents from the confermentation of *Water and Earth*, and the production of mankinde like that of Muſhroms: which whimſey is alſo entituled to *Epicurus*, by no meaner a tradition then that of *Cenſorinus* (*de Di. Nat. cap. 2.*) whoſe words, for the more clear and credible tranſmiſsion of the Fable, I thought it not altogether impertinent here to inſert. *Nec longe ſecus Epicurus credidit, limo calefactos uteros neſcio quos, radicibus terræ cohærenteis primum inrepviſſe, & infantibus ex ſe editis ingenitum lactis humorem, natura miniſtrante præbuiſſe; quos ita educatos, & adultos genus hominum propagaſſe.* To this we may adde (for a ſingle teſtimony is not ſtrong enough to oblige any man to beleive ſo unpardonable a dotage in a grave Philoſopher) the concur-

concurrent Auctorities of *Lactantius* (*lib.* 2. *cap.* 7.) *Plutarch* (5. *Placit.* 19.) *Diogenes Laertius* (*lib.* 2. *in vita Archelai Athenienſ.*) *Diodorus Siculus* (*lib.* 1.) and *Macrobius* (3. *Saturn.* 6.) Though, for my part, I conceive this phrenſie to have poſſeſſed many heads, upon whoſe skulls corruption had planted growing Perewikes of Moſs, many hundreds of years before *Epicurus* his was warm; in regard many antient Nations, in particular the *Ægyptians* and *Phœnicians*, contending for the honor of ſeniority, have gloried in the title of *Autochthonæ*, and thought their Eſchutcheons ſufficiently noble, if charged onely with this impreſs, *Terræ filii*. But I return from this my Excurſion.

If the World, indeed, were as *Ovids* Chaos, *rudis indigeſtaque moles*, a deformed and promiſcuous miſcellanie, or maſſe of Heterogeneities, and the ſeveral parts of it variouſly blended together without either diſcrimination or order: then might the pretence of *Fortune* be more plauſible. For ſhould we take a man, who had been born and bred up to maturity of years in ſome obſcure cavern of the earth, and never lookt abroad upon the World, nor heard of more then what immediately concerned his aliment and other natural neceſſities; on a ſuddain educe him from his dungeon, and ſhew him an Animal cut in peices, and all its diſſimilar parts, as skin, muſcles, fat, veins, arteries, nerves, tendons, ligaments, cartilages, bones, marrow, &c. laied together in a promiſcuous heap: doubtleſs we could not quarrel at his incredulity, if he would not be perſwaded, that any thing but *Chance* had a hand in that confuſion. But ſhould we inſtantly preſent him another Animal, feeding, walking, and performing all the comely functions of vitality; inſtruct him in the ſeveral uſes and actions of all thoſe parts, which he had formerly ſurveyed in the diſorder of an heap; then kill that Animal alſo, and for his farther information, anatomzie its careaſe; and exhibite to him the ſeveral parts, in all things reſpondent to the former: tis conjectural that we ſhould finde, that the rudeneſs of his education would not ſo totally have extinguiſhed the *Light of Nature* in him, as not to have left ſome ſpark, by the glimmering whereof he might diſcover ſome more noble *Principle* then Fortune, to have been the *Efficient* of that more then ingenious machine.

Now

Now we cannot but obſerve, that in the great engine of the univerſe, nothing is with leſs order, decency, beauty, uniformity, ſymmetry, conſtancy, in a word, with leſs wiſdom, either deſigned, or finiſhed; then in the ſmaller organ of an Animal, in the perfection of its integrality. And if ſo, how neer comes it to an abſolute contradiction, that we ſhould acknowledge ſome *noble and prudent Cauſe*, that moulded and compacted all thoſe different parts into one moſt elegant and accompliſht body, and exactly accommodated that body to the eaſie execution of its predeſtinate operations: and yet not acknowledg the ſame, in the ordination and conſtruction of the more admirable, becauſe more difficult fabrick of the Univerſe? I ſay, a *Contradiction*; for if the eaſier Artifice of an *Animal* be conceded too *hard*; aſſuredly the more difficult machination of the innumerably organ'd *World* muſt needs be granted *impoſſible*, to be wrought by the impotent and ignorant fingers of *Fortune*. *Quanto enim major operis moles, tanto erit ut ſapientia, ita & potentia majus argumentum; non quod aliunde elaboratio minutorum corpuſculorum non commendet artificem: ſed quod in opere ingenti & ſymmetriam ſervare induſtrium, & materiam regere operoſum eſſe videatur.*

Article 6. The *Epicureans* grand Argument, of the poſſibility of the configuration of the Univerſe by a caſual and ſpontaneous diſpoſition of Atoms, from the frequent actuall production of an Inſect by the ſame means or principles; countermined by an Inverſion or Argument *à majori ad minus.*

Laſtly, as the Votaries of Fortune have argued *à minori ad majus*, thus; if the ſmaller machine of a *Hand-worm*, wherein the almoſt inviſible (without an engyſcope, or magnifying glaſs) exiguity of the whole frame, the multiplicity of organs, and the variety of reſpective functions aſſigned thereunto, may worthily contend, concerning elegance of compoſure, wtih the large captain of the watry regiments, the *Whale*, may be configured by *Chance*, or the caſual concourſe of convenient particles of the *Firſt matter*: why may not the groſſer movement of the *Univerſe* be alſo wrought by the like contingent ſegregation of diſagreeing, and convention of conſimilar Atoms; whoſe tumultuation and conflict growing from the antipathy of different *magnitude* and *Figure*, made the *Chaos*; and their working themſelves into peculiar orders, by the accidental conflux and mutual coherence of *Homogeneities*, made the *forme* of the *World*. So we, by

counter-demonſtration, may argue *à majori ad minus*, thus; if Fortune had the power and skill to make the *World*, why can ſhe not make the more rude and facile movement of a *Watch*? If Atoms could ſpontaneouſly range and combine themſelves into the immenſe batlements of the World: why not alſo into the narrower ſtructure of a *Caſtle*? If they met into the mighty bulwarks of an *Iſland*: why not into the thinner and more fragil rampiers of a *Fort*? If they could diſpoſe themſelves into wide campania's of *Herbs* and variegated *Flowers*: why not into a peice of *Landskip Tapeſtry*? All which require, as infinitely leſs of *Power*, ſo alſo of *Science*.

Should they endevour a ſubterfuge, by replying; that theſe are the *Effects* of *Art*, and not of *Nature*: we may prevent their evaſion by rejoyning, that ſince they allow *Chance* to have an intereſt even in the operations of *Art*; why doe they not aſwell make her the Foundereſs of a *City*, as of the ædifice of a ſpontaneous *Animal*, whoſe ſtructure is more difficult? We are not backward to confeſs, what we lately ſuppoſed concerning the diſſected and diſordered parts of an Animal, that if the World were but a promiſcuous heap of different materials, ſuch as ſtones, Timber, Sand, Lime, Clay, Nailes, Tyles, &c. confuſedly congeſted: then could not our choler ſwell to ſo high a tide of indignation againſt the arrogance of Fortune; nor ſhould we be ſo well provided of arms to fight in defence of a divine contrivement. But ſince the building of the ſame is, by infinite tranſcendency, more durable, more diſtinct, more ſymmetrical, and more gorgeous in all its parts, then the moſt elaborate and magnificent Palace: ſince the *Heart* of a *Piſmire* hath more of magiſterial artifice, then the *Eſchurial*; the *proboſcis* or trunk of a *Flea* more induſtry in its delicate and ſinuous perforation, then all the coſtly *Aquæducts* of *Nero's Rome*, the *Arſenal* at *Venice*, or the two Spaniſh *Engines*, one for the traduction and elevation of Water, at *Toledo*, the other for the automatous coyning of money, at *Segovia*, both admired by a Perſon for the moſt part above admiration, Sr. *Kenelme Digby*; ſince the *breaſt* or laboratory of a *Bee* contains more anfractuous convolutions then the *Labyrinth* of *Dædalus*, and more Cellules then the famous monaſtery of

of S^t. *Lawrence*, in *Spain*, for bravery and amplitude of architecture reputed the eighth wonder of the World: and since the *skull* of a *Louse* hath more ventrieles or receptaries for the numerous swarms of Animal spirits, then the spatious *Amphitheatre* of Rome had seats for the spectators: in fine, since the meanest peice of Nature throwes disparagement and contempt upon the greatest masterpeice of Art; how can it be, that man, noble and ingenious man, should fall so much lower then his incircumspect Father *Adam*, as to confess the visible influence of *Prudence* in the *easier*, and yet, at the same time, deny any cause, but *Ignorance* to have been exercised in the *harder*; to admit the managery of an *Architect*, or knowing principle, in the structure of a *house*, and yet determine the more magnificent Creation of the *Universe* upon the blind disposal of *Fortune*?

Article 7. An exception against the seeming disparity betwixt their inference and ours, prevented: and the invalidity of theirs, though their own hypothesis were conceded *in terminis*, declared, by an adequate similitude.

To conclude this unworthy vindication of the injured wisdom of our Maker, by leaving no possible objection unanswered, let us suppose that our opponents should recurre to their old starting hole, or salley port, the *Spontaneous motion of Atoms*, and urge, that if the materials of a house, or other artificial structure, were endowed with an innate propensity to motion, as the materials of the World were; then might they also, without the direction of any external Agent, onely by reciprocal convention, complication and revinction, acquire setled and orderly situations, and so dispose themselves into a regular Fabrick: but since they are devoid of all domestick Activity, the disparity betwixt the operations of chance, and those of Art, is so great, that an argument drawn from the impossibility of a performance by one, is not conclusive against the possibility of an atcheivement by the other. And when we have supposed this retort, let us also suppose what they would have, *viz.* that the materials of a house were radically impregnated with a perpetual tendency to motion; and that, by the drift of this internal activity, they should from different quarters meet together in one heap, there croud, compress, express, impell, repell, detrude, elevate, circumgyrate, fix each other, and at last by reciprocal combination acquiesce: yet can it never be supposed, by a sober imagination, that the result of all this hurly

burly betwixt those unequal parts, and the peace ensuing upon the casual acquisition of situations proper and convenient to each, would be a well ordered ædifice; nay any thing half so neer allied to architecture as a ruine.

I conceive the wit of *Balbus* wound up to a very happy strain, when disputing against *Velleius* (one that blush't not to weare the infamous badge of *Epicurus*) concerning this monstrous figment of the worlds Projection from the dissolution of the Chaos, and a fortuitous concursion of the universal matter; he invented this apposite *similitude*: *Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intelligo cur idem non putet, si innumerabiles, unius & viginti formæ literarum vel aureæ, vel quales-libet aliquo conjiciantur, posse ex his in terram excussis Annales Ennij, ut deinceps legi possint effici; quod nescio anne in uno quidem versu possit tantum valere Fortuna.* Upon which we may briefly thus descant; if that congruous series of letters, which is necessary to the lecture of one page, line, or word, can never result from a careless congestion of prints; but must be the setled effect of great industry and diligence in the *Compositor*: undoubtedly, with no less violence to reason, can any man opinion, that the innumerable parts of the World, that observe a far more distinct and elegant order then the characters of any Typographer disposed into words, lines, pages, sheets, should attain to that admirable Form, which they now hold; by a meer fortuitous assembly; and not by the certain and predestinate ordination of some *supremely-intelligent Cause.*

Article 8. The conclusion of this section; or, the æquipondium of the precedēt reasons, if perpended in the mass and conjunctively, to the most perfect demonstration.

These reasons, though not woven into that strict method, which is required to fulfill the web of perfect demonstrations; doe yet seem strong enough in their single inferences undeniably to conclude the *Creation of the Universe out of no præexistence, by the sole and immediate Fiat of the same Essence*, and if judiciously twisted together into one *Syndrome*, or complex Argument, must oblige as firmly; since they clearly evince the first *Article* of the *Christians Creed*, as an uncontrollable verity, which none, but such degenerate miscreants, in whom the *Light of Nature* is wholly extinct, or such as are desperatly resolved to shut the eye

of

of their minde againſt the ſplendor of that infallible *Criterion*, can longer doubt of. And therefore, having determined neither to ſcandal the intellectuals of my Reader, either by indubitating his facile perception of the force of thoſe proofs already urged, or multiplying others in order to the illuſtration of that truth, to which he hath formerly ſubmitted his plenary aſſent; nor unfruitfully to ſpend that time and paper, which I have devoted to the explanation and ratification of other neceſſary points, on a work of ſupererogation: I ſhall onely fringe this exercise with that pertinent and emphatical paſſage of *Lactantius* (*De Opif. Dei cap. 6.*) *Tanta ergo qui videat & talia, poteſt exiſtimare nulla effecta eſſe conſilio, nulla providentia, nulla ratione divina; ſed ex Atomis ſubtilibus, exiguis concreta eſſe tanta miracula? uonne prodigio ſimile eſt, aut natum eſſe hominem qui hæc diceret, ut Leucippum; aut extitiſſe qui crederet, ut Democritum, qui auditor ejus fuit; vel Epicurum, in quem vanitas omnis de Leucippi fonte profluxit?* and ſo proceed to the ſatisfaction of two collateral *Scruples*.

Sect. IV.

Scruple 1.

Article 1. That Antique abſurd expoſtulation, what *Inſtruments Auxiliants*, *materials* pre-

THe Curioſity of ſome, (whether more *inſolent* or *vain*, is hard to determine,) hath been ſo audacious, as to adventure upon this *Quere*; *If God made the world, pray what inſtruments, tools, mechanick engines, what aſſiſtants did he make uſe of in the work?*

diſpoſd, God made uſe of, in his act of Fabrication of the Univerſe, copiouſly ſatisfied: and the *energie* of the divine *Will* commonſtrated ſuperior to the indigence of either.

The Satisfaction.

This is no green impiety (unleſs it hath lately budded forth again amongſt thoſe Human-devils, the *Ranters*; the report of whoſe prodigious blaſphemies hath ſometimes tranſported me to a hatred, at leaſt a contempt of my ſelf, for being in the ſame rank of Creatures; and made me wiſh for a ſecond deluge) but almoſt half as old as Time, and may be traced as high as the Epoche of the Grecian learning; witneſs thoſe many ſecret convulſions of it by *Plato* (both in his *Parmenides* and *Timaus*) while he frequently affirmes the *divine Nature* to be *Inorganical*, and the immediate operations of the *univerſal cauſe* to be above the neceſſity of *Corporeal means*: witneſs alſo *Cicero* (moſt of whoſe ſtreams came out of the Grecian fountain) who (*in* 1. *De Nat. Deor.*) introducing the Atheiſt, *Vellejus* diſputing againſt *Plato* and the *Stoicks*, who held the divine eſſence to be the Author of the Univerſe; propoſeth the ſcruple at large, in theſe Words: *Quibus enim oculis intueri potuit veſter Plato fabricam illam tanti operis, qua conſtrui à Deo atque ædificari mundum facit? quæ molitio? quæ ferramenta? qui vectes? quæ machinæ? qui miniſtri tanti muneris fuerunt? &c.* That boldneſs is the daughter of ignorance, is herein plainly verified; for had theſe unhappy Pagans underſtood any thing of the majeſtick eſſence of divinity, or but apprehended the vaſt diſparity between the efficiency of the *Higheſt*, and that of all other *Subordinate cauſes*; tis more then probable, they had not been ſo ſawcy with his imperial Attribute, *Omnipotence*, nor run into that common miſtake of fleſh and bloud, of *meaſuring the ways of God by the ways of man*. True tis, that man hath need of inſtruments to the performance of any peice of Art, nor can the Geometrician draw his lines without a rule, or deſcribe a circle without the help of his compaſs; the Carpenter work without his Axe, Saw, and other tools; the Smith without his fire, hammer, anvill, &c. all which the wit of man, ſharpned by neceſſity, hath invented to compenſate the inſufficiency of his naked hands, made by nature either too ſoft, too weak, or too obtuſe for thoſe difficult uſes:

uſes: But yet what can impede our aſſurance of the eternal exiſtence of a more *Noble Efficient*; whoſe *Will* is infinite *Power*, and that *Power* infinite *Activity*; whoſe ſingle *Let it be done*, is both *Cauſe* and *Means*; and whoſe ſimple act of *Volition* not onely the *Efficient*, but alſo the *Inſtrument*? Do not we obſerve (that I may extract an *Argument* from the evidence of *ſenſe*) how, in the twinckling of a lovers eye, that comely Arch of colours, the *Rain-bow*, is painted on the clouds; and yet without either hand, compaſs, or pencill? doe we not behold whole mountains of ponderous *Clouds* piled one upon another; and yet neither veſſels to lave up, nor engines to ſuſtain that ſea of water? And cannot theſe familiar obſervations inſtruct us with more knowledge, then to doubt the fabrication of the world without *corporeal organs*? Why is our reaſon ſo immodeſt, as to inquire into the ability of the *Firſt cauſe*; when alas! it is not large enough to comprehend the efficacy of the weakeſt *Secondary*? if the meaneſt and moſt ordinary effect of Nature imports ſo much ſtupendious induſtry, as tranſcends the narrow capacity of man; what audacious ignorance is it in him, to queſtion the energie of that *Principle*, that made Nature her ſelf, and preſcribed her rules to act by: from which ſhe cannot vary, without a miraculous diſpenſation? We are willing forſooth, to profeſs, that we cannot underſtand by what artifice the delicate body of a *Piſmire* is configurated, animated, and impowered for the noble actions of *ſenſe* and *voluntary motion*, nay (for ought we know to the contrary) for that more noble and elaborate office of *diſcourſe* alſo: and yet, when we come to contemplate the more magnificent *form* of the *Univerſe*, ſhall we degenerate into ſuch impertinent Ideots, as to debate the *Mathematick energie* of its *Creator*, and demand how he could operate without *Engines* to tranſport, adſer, and winde up the materials, with ſcaffolds to advance the roof, or ſervants to aſſiſt in ſeveral offices requiſite? Aſſuredly, as the frame of that ſlender Animal doth confeſs a certain *Faculty*, by which it was modelled, delineated, and compacted; though the reaſon and manner of its contexture remain in the dark to us: ſo alſo doth the huge machine of this viſible World proclaim a certain *Energetical principle*, of infinitly

finitly more potency and perfection, by which it was composed; though the manner and way of its composure be too abstruse and sublime for the discernment of our weak-sighted intellectuals. Now, whether you shall denominate that *Energy*, a *Power divine*, or *God*; it is indifferent: but indispensably necessary, that you acknowledge it to be so great, as by incomputable intervals to exceed the comprehension of the minde of man; nor is it safe for us to attempt the commensuration of it by the unequal module, or scale of *particular finite Causes*, since even from these our reason stands so remote, as to be able at most onely to conjecture their dimensions. Upon this consideration, if a *Pilot*, while he onely sits in the steerage and hands the helme, doth direct the ship in its course, by a far more excellent industry, then all the rude officers inservient thereunto, that stretch their tougher sinewes to hoise and tack about her sayls, and toyle their tawny bodies in other inferior labours: if a *Prince*, who sits calmely in his throne, doth by a single nod of his sceptre awe millions of his subjects to obedience, and by the magick of a smile or frown conjure whole nations into joy or terror; if he, I say, doth govern his people, by a more mysterious and noble influence, then all his subordinate ministers of state, with all their tumultuous pains and travell, either in the transmission, or execution of his mandates: if an *Architect*, or master-builder, who in his closet onely draws the plat-form, and designes the figure of the structure; doth by his meer designation, operate more exquisitely, and by a more excellent artifice contribute to the perfection of the work, then all the swarm of bustling mechanicks imployd in squaring, or placing the materials: why should we not allow that mighty *Pilot*, *Prince*, and *Architect of the World* to be empowerd with a certain kind of *Efficacy* so eminent, that whatever can be thought most absolute and puissant in all other natures, must be infinitely inferior to it? And therefore when we, who have learned our lesson out of the sacred leaves of *Moses*, say that he made the universe *solo nutu, atque simplici volitione*, by one simple and entire act of his *Will*, expreſt in that word, *Fiat*; we speak all that can be understood by us of that miracle.

As for the last part of the Atheists indecent expostulation; *viz.*

what

What coadjutors or miniſters had God to attend him, and what materials præexiſtent and prepared to conform to his diſpoſure? that may be ſoon reſolved, by offering that *ſupereminence*, whereby he is, by infinite exceſſes, above all other *Efficients*. For what were the *Prerogative* of *Divinity*, if it were ſubject to the want of the ſame *means*, or cooperating *Cauſes*, with us deſpicable and impotent men? To conclude, it will not onely ſuppreſs all dangerous *Curioſities* of this kind, but alſo highly commend our *judgments*; that we draw a large line of diſtinction betwixt the *Almightineſs* of the *Creator*, and the *reſtrained activity*, or rather pure *imbecillity* of the *Creature*; aſcribe to him a *ſuperlative and pancratical energie*, or *virtue paramount*; and on our devout knees proclaim him more able to *create*, then *want* either *miniſters*, or *matter*, whereby, whereon to accompliſh his *Will*.

Scruple 2.

Article 2: A ſecond immodeſt interrogation, wherefore God ſo long deferred the creation, reſolved: with a detection of the unreaſonableneſs of undecent curioſity.

The other profane *Scruple* objected by the Atheiſt, is this; *Cur Deus tamdiu à fabricatione mundi abſtinuerit?* If God were elder then Time, and the world made in the beginning of time; why did he ſo long ſuſpend the Fabrication of it?

The Reſponſe.

This is alſo a poyſon ſpit from the accurſed jaws of that black Viper, *Velleius*, againſt the *Stoicks* (*apud Ciceron. 1. de nat. Deor.*) in this ſquallid ſtream; *iſto igitur tam immenſo ſpatio, quæro, cur Pronœa veſtra* (ſo according to their own phraſe he calls that *Minde*, or *ſupreme Intelligence*, to whom that ſober ſect of Philoſophers juſtly aſcribed the origination of all things except the *material Principle*, which they erroneouſly affirmed to have been the *Aſhes*, or cynders of a former World, whoſe production alſo they conceived to have been, like that fabulous one of the Phœnix, out of the urne of its predeceſſor) *ceſſaverit? laborémne fugiebat?* and not lately wiped clean off, and its contagious venome cured by the generous antidote of *Euſebius*, who

(*in* 1. *de præp. Evang.* 1.) moſt expreſly, amply, and judiciouſly oppoſed it. However, leſt this poyſon ferment afreſh, and again exulcerate the impure *Libertines* of this Age (not more for its extraordinary *Calamities*, then unpattern'd *Impieties*, as well the wonder, as grief of our poſterity) and ſince it cannot but be thought moſt pertinent to my preſent ſcope: I ſhall endevour the total extinction of it, by applying a ſmart *Alexiterion* of reaſon.

From an *Agent infinite in Wiſdome, Power, and Liberty*, ſuch as we muſt allow *God* to be, no account either of *Motives*, *Means*, or *Time*, ought to be required. It was, according to their meaſure of time, about ſix thouſand years from the nativity of the Univerſe, when the unhappy diſciples of *Epicurus* diſſeminated this uncivil interrogation: but had it been created many myriads of myriads of thouſands ſooner then it was, tis open to conjecture, that they would have inſiſted on the ſame ſawcy demand; ſince eternity compared to more myriads of years, then all the figures of Arithmetick can amount to the computation of, muſt yet import a vaſt tract or flux of *Time* (for other idiome to expreſs this notion, I could not either recognize, or excogitate) below the foot of that accompt; and that precedent ſpace might have afforded room enough for the intruſion of the ſame frivolous quære. And therefore it becomes us, either not to enquire, why the world was produced, rather then not produced; or allowing its production, to eſteem it all one, whether it were produced then, before, or after, in this ſo great a latitude of Eternity. For the ſame queſtion now propoſed, why God did not determine in himſelf to create the World, ten millions of years ſooner then he did; may alſo be revived hereafter, concerning theſe times of ours, if another rand of ten millions more ſhould be unravelled. From whence this modeſt and truly humane leſſon fairly infers it ſelf; that it is oraculous in the greateſt wiſdome to ſay, *God Created the World in that article of eternity* (we may now call it *Time*) *which ſeemed moſt opportune to his Wiſdom*. For, that he had ſome important reaſons ſo long to deferr the creation, and then onely to contrive and finiſh it, when he did; though thoſe reaſons be cryptick and ignote to us: we may more then con-

conjecture, from the consideration of his inexhaustible and ever moving abyss of his *Prudence*, which is the rule to all other his actions. And truely, if *Princes* ground many of their designes upon profound reasons of State, the knowledge whereof is never diffused among their subjects, but lockt up in the cabinet of their own heart: why may not *God*, who is all *Counsel* and *Prudence*, be afforded the prerogative of having some weighty respects, that moved him to create the World, then when he did, rather then either sooner or later? Which respects, for ought we can explore, is *Mercy* in him to conceal from us: sure I am, tis a pride not much beneath, if not equal to that of *Lucifer*, in us to dare to enquire. Tis a confest truth, that no man can know the thoughts of another, who is constant to his resolve to reserve them sealed up within his own breast; and can any man be so incurably overrun with the itch of vanity, when he despaires of pretending certainly to divine the cogitations of his familiar friend, whose inclinations he hath so frequently read in the book of his conversation: yet to arrogate to himself an ability of searching into the abscondite counsels of him, whom neither *Minde* nor *Sense* can touch? Wherefore tis our duty to reclaim our wild curiosities, to set bounds to our inquisitions, and gratefully sate our boulimie of science with this wholsome morsel; that from hence, that the World was once created, we may safely inferre, that the *Creator* was pleased to declare himself so *Potent*, that no impediment could intervene betwixt his eternal decree, and the opportune execution thereof: so *Free*, as to be above the impulsion or constraint of any necessity: so *Wise*, as to prevent all temerity and colluſion of Fortune: so *Good*, that the prescience of mans future ingratitude, and so the infertility of his masterpeice, could not dehort him from fulfilling his purpose of conferring that inestimable blessing of *Existence* both upon him, and all things else for his sake.

As for the last clause of this foolish demand, *An vigilarit tanto æternitatis spatio, an verò dormierit mundi opifex*? Whether *God* continued *vigilant*, or *dormant* from eternity, untill he set about the fabrick of this vast All? This includes a manifest *incongruity*, and speaks a *contradiction* loud enough to answer

and refute it ſelf. For thoſe two terms, *Sleep* and *Divinity*, ſtand at open defiance, and placed in one notion reciprocally deny each other; the one importing an *Affection* of a *Body*, or the effect of the Concidence, or Anguſtation of the ventricles of the brain, and ſlender conduits of the nerves in an Animal, cauſed either by a deficiency, or quiet of the ſpirits inſervient to the Animal Faculties, and cauſing a temporary and periodical ceſſation from the offices of ſenſe and Arbitrary motion: the other expreſſing an *Eternal ſimple Eſſence*, neither oppreſt with corporeity, nor (therefore) ſubject to defatigation upon any exolution or waſt of ſpirits; and conſequently not capable of ſleep. However, to manifeſt the extreme ſtupidity of their reply; *viz. that if he were perpetually awake, yet we muſt grant him to have been conſtantly idle*, before he began his work of Creation: I ſhall vouchſafe them that judicious rejoynder of many *Fathers* (whoſe ſtudies were alſo not rarely infeſted with theſe vermine) that in all that precedent tract of eternity (mortality will excuſe the neceſſary ſoleciſme) he was fully imployed *in the moſt bliſsfull contemplation of himſelf*. Which is an operation moſt eaſie, moſt quiet, moſt pleaſant; as all Philoſophers, who ever have, by the ſteps of abſtracted meditation, advanced their minds ſo high as to ken that perfection of beatitude, have obſerved.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Why God Created the World.

SECT. I.

THat *every Action presupposeth an end, or scope*; is Canonical: and hence is it customary amongst men, by so much the more hardly to beleive that such or such a considerable Action was done by such or such a Person; by how much the less either of probable *Pleasure*, or *Emolument* may appear to have invited him to that enterprise. Nor was *Velleius* a stranger to this rule; for fighting the unjust quarrel of that usurpress, Fortune, and having at first invaded *Providence Divine* with direct and down-right blowes, unsuccesfully: he at last contrives to wound it with oblique thrusts, and attempts to stab the opinion of the Worlds Creation by God, by striking at the End, or more plainly by cutting off all possibility of either *Pleasure* or *Profit* to accrew to him thereby. And in pursuance of this stratagem, he endevours to prove (1.) *Conditum non fuisse mundum Dei causa*; that the World was not created for Gods sake, (*i. e.*) that he is no more concerned in the construction of it, then if it had never been altered from its Chaos: (2) *neque hominum gratia*, nor for the behoof of man, (*i. e.*) that man hath no juster plea to the Royalty of the World, then the meanest Animal; nor did Nature look with a more amorous and indulgent aspect upon him, then upon any other of her productions.

Article 1. The improbability of the worlds creation by God, insinuated, by the Atheists, from his defect of any possible *Motive*, *scope* or *final cause*.

Article 2. Their first Argument, that the divine Nature is above the capacity of either *emolument*, or *delectation*, from the Universe.

The *First* position he essays to illustrate and inferre by a *Socratical* way of argumentation, or by circumventing our judgements with a chain of *Interogatories*, all whose links are dependent each upon other, though by a connexion so subtile, as to be imperceptible to the incircumspect; the *Abstract* whereof, as taken by *Cicero* (1. *De Natur. Deorum*) lies in these words. *Quid autem erat, quod concupisceret Deus, mundum signis & luminibus, tanquam Ædilis, ornare? Si ut Deus melius habitaret; antea, videlicet tempore infinito, in tenebris, tanquam in gurgustio habitaverat? post autem; varietaténe eum delectari putamus, qua Cœlum & Terras exornatas videmus? quæ ista potest esse oblectatio Deo, quæ si esset, non ea tamdiu carere potuisset?* "What politique respect put God upon the servile office "of an Ædile? What motive prevailed with him to trim the "Universe with gawdy Asterisms, and imbellish the azure roof "thereof with variety of refulgent studs? if to better his habitati- "on; tis a signe that forever before he was but ill accommodated "with a dark and narrow mansion: But afterwards, can we "conceive that he entertained and solaced himself with that va- "riety of beauteous forms, wherewith we observe both stories "of this great Palace to be adorned? What delight is that, "wherewith divinity can be affected? if any such there be, why "would he so long deny himself the fruition of it?

Nor did *Velleius* want a second to joyne with him in this bloudy design for the assassination of that sacred Truth, *That God made the World chiefly for his own Glory*; for that witty villain *Lucretius* (and the finest wits, if not maturely pruned and kept under by the severe hand of Prudence, are the rankest Plants and most apt to run up to the highest impieties) hath digested the challenge into verse, thus:

Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos
Inlicere, ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem?
Nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur,
Quoi veteres obsunt; sed quoi nil accidit ægri,
Tempore in anteacto, cum pulchre degeret ævum,
Quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tali?

An

An, credo, in tenebris vita, ac mœrore jacebat,
Donec diluxit rerum genitalis origo? &c. in lib. 5.

After ſo long Content, what new delight
Could th'happy Gods to this great change invite?
To affect Innovation, doth confeſs
The preſent ſtate obnoxious to diſtreſs.
He only can t'enjoy new things deſire,
Whom the deficience of the old doth tire.
What therefore could Divinity perſwade,
To leave his antient quiet, for a trade
Of Architecture? Can I think, till then
Him cloyſterd in a dark and narrow Den? &c.

The Refutation.

Article 3. The ſatisfactory refutation thereof; and *Gods glory* manifeſted to have been his prime and principal end.

Tis an Apophthegme fathered (and that not unjuſtly) upon *Epicurus*; *Pacere ſapientem omnia ſui cauſſa*, that a wiſeman in all his actions doth principally regard himſelf. And could not this learn his Scholars more diſcretion, then to doubt, whether or no *God* the *Elixir of wiſdome*, in this weighty operation had an eye upon himſelf, or reflected upon his own concernment? The Word, *God*, to a metaphyſical conſideration, contains reaſons more then enough to decide this idle controverſie, excited only by a predominion of *ſenſuality*. For when there was nothing exiſtent beſides himſelf; tis plain, that he could gratifie nothing beſides himſelf: and as he not only derived the power of operating from himſelf alone, but alſo was the *exemplar* to himſelf; ſo alſo muſt he be the principal *End* of his operation. The *End* I ſay, *non utilitatis*; as if his *Eſſence* were capable of *melioration*, his *Beatitude* ſo remiſs, as to admit of *Augmentation*, his *Condition* ſo imperfect, as to be improved by *Alteration*: *ſed gloriæ*, which as he could not want, ſo was there no reaſon why he ſhould want. Such was the Freedom of his Will, that no neceſſity could conſtrain him to the production of any thing; ſuch the Bounty, that none could reſtrain him from the voluntary profuſion of his goodneſs. When twas indifferent to him, or to conſtitute a World, or to continue alone; he yet was pleaſed to follow the propenſity of his own infinity

infinity Benignity, and to create: insomuch as he judged it better that there should be other natures beside his own, to which he might impart the overflowings of his goodness; then not. *Better*, I say, not for *himself*; for as the perpetual *Emanation* or *diffusion* of his *Goodness* upon the creature, since time (the *Image of eternity*, as *Plato* (in *Timæo*) describes it) began, hath not diminished: so could not the *Concentration*, or *Confinement* of it to the orb of his own essence, have lessened his *Felicity*; which hath *Plenitude* and *Constancy* for its supporters, and is therefore raised above the imperfections of *Access* or *Change*. And upon this perswasion (I cannot forget to speak after the manner of men) he vouchsafed to constitute all other natures that are besides his own; and more especially Man: not that he might receive any emolument from them, since himself is all goodness, and by consequence all glory; but that, conferring respective endowments upon them, he might have convenient subjects, whereon to exercise his immense liberality and make known his magnificence. That since the creation he expects from man the retribution of *Reverence*, *Adoration*, and *Obedience*; ariseth not *ex indigentia*, from any need he stands in of, or benefit that redounds to him by the unfruitfull homage of man: but, *ne homines sint erga ipsum ingrati*, from his own free *Love* to prevent mans being hurried into that misery of *Ingratitude*. I say, *Misery* of *Ingratitude*; for that forlorn hope of hell having once taken possession of the minde of man, instantly brings in a whole host of perturbations, subverts its government, destroys its tranquillity, and so layes it open to the devastation of *Infelicity*.

And whereas they demand, *Why God, if he take any delight in these experiments of his wisedome, Power, and munificence, would so long endure the privation, or rather defect of that delight?* The solution is obvious, that this kinde of *delectation* is no more then *Accidentary* to him, and can adfer infinitely less of addition to that fulness of *Beatitude*, formally radicated in his *Essence*; then one smal drop of water superaffused to the immensity of a million of Oceans. For *sibi sufficientissimus*, All to himself, is his peculiar Motto; since he hath the source of all that's *Amiable* and *Delectable*, arising from, and perpetually flowing

flowing round his own moſt perfect nature, nor can he be affected with the unequal oblation of humane *Doxologie*, otherwiſe then by reflecting upon his own *Goodneſs*, which freely ordained, formed, and diſpoſed man to that honourable and beatifical duety: and therefore that ſentence of the School Divine, *Quicquid agit præter ſeipſum, ad alterius commodum ſpectat*, deſerves our gratefull aſſent; for all his *Extrinſecall* or *Emanative* operations look *directly* upon the benefit of that Creature, whom he hath adopted to be the object of his Love, which is Man; *obliquely* upon the convenience or accommodation of all other Creatures, neceſſary or adjuvant to the well being of that Favorite; and by *reflexion*, upon his own munificence. And hence is it manifeſt, that he adorned the Univerſe with aſteriſms, and beautified the heavens with radiant lamps; not that he might better his own habitation, which is impoſſible, he being a manſion to himſelf, and his eternal condition being extreme felicity: but provide a more commodious place of reſidence for men, for whoſe ſake principally (after that of his own Glory) he intended the Creation, He, doubtleſs, could want the illumination of neither Sun, nor Moon, whoſe dwelling is in light inacceſſible; nor be enriched by the faint ſplendor of the Stars, whoſe glory is ſo refulgent, that we hyperbolize the luſtre of the Meridian Sun, when we define it to be the ſhadow of its Creator; and ſince thoſe ſhining orbs are but pale tapours kindled at his more ſplendid abyſs of light, how infinitely more lucent muſt his eſſence be, who is deſcribed by ſome to be *Superſubſtantialis Lux?* (*Athanas Kircher in metaphyſic. Lucis & umbra, Epichiremate* 5.) Nor can we ſay leſs of that admirable *variety of forms*, wherewith we obſerve both ſtories of the World to be adorned; for if they appear ſo full of *Elegance* and *beauty*; how incomparably more fair and amiable muſt their *Maker* be, who is the *Soul* of *Pulchritude*, and by the Analogy which they hold to the comely ideas in his intellect, all things are determined to perfection? For that mighty *Cauſe*, which can give being to ſo many various perfections, muſt of neceſſity poſſeſs all thoſe perfections, *modo eminentiori*, in a tranſcendent manner. Wherefore the excellencies of his own nature did, before he was pleaſed to create others, ſo amply ſuffice to the

Accompletion of his beatitude; that they now at this day wholly ſuffice to the ſame; nor is he capable of having his Felicity encreaſed by the contributions of any thing without himſelf. And ſince all things created, are nought but certain *Emiſſions*, or as it were *deradiations*, which he pleaſed to diffuſe from himſelf; tis perſpicuous, that before that *Diffuſion* he comprehended all natures in his own, as in their *Fountain*, and therefore could not have his being meliorated by their production; as alſo, that he may at pleaſure, adnihilate all again, with no more detriment to his glory, then the Sun can want thoſe beams, which yeſterday it emitted upon my hand.

Sect. II.

Neque Hominum gratiâ.

Article 1. Their ſecond Argument; that God had no eſpecial regard to the benefit of *Man*: and the

THis *ſecond Poſition* he likewiſe inſinuates, by the ſame impoſture of enſnaring the minde in a complex ſeries of *Queſtions*, after this manner; « If all things were conſtituted by God « for the ſake of *Man* onely, as you affirme, then either for the « peculiar intereſt of *Wiſe men* or *Fools*? if for the ſole behoof « of *Wiſe men*; then a far leſs proviſion might have ſerved « the turn: for no age could ever glory in the production of ma- « ny ſuch at once; and if all that ever were, or ſhall be, met toge- « ther into one colonie, a very ſmal Iſland might be both large and « rich enough to accommodate them with neceſſaries: and ſo the « greateſt part of the creation muſt be confeſt ſuperfluous, as to « the principal deſtination thereof? But if for *Fools* only; then « you entangle your ſelves in a two fold *Incongruity*. *Firſt*, you « entrench upon the *Juſtice* of the Creator, ſince thereby you im- « plicitely confeſs, that he was partial in conferring ſo great a be- « nefit upon thoſe, who muſt ſo ill deſerve, as not to know right- « ly how to uſe it: *Secondly*, you infringe his *Providence*, by « making him not to have had a foreſight of the unfruitfulneſs of « his chief deſign, which muſt miſcarry and be quite loſt in a con-

« trary

« trary event: Fools being without any diſpute, moſt miſerable « in that they are Fools; for what can be reputed a more abſo- « lute miſery, then Fatuity? And if for the conjunctive intereſt, « or promiſcuous concernment of both; then do you offer vio- « lence to the goodneſs of the Architect; in regard, that during « life there unavoidably occur ſo many bitter diſcommodities, « that wiſe men cannot ſweeten them with the compenſation of « Commodities: and Fools neither avoid them as they approach, « nor endure them when they come, &c.

Nor was *Velleius* ſingular in this error; for *Lactantius* (*Lib.* 7. *cap.* 5.) hath accuſed *Epicurus* alſo of words to the ſame effect; which according to the record of his indictment run thus: *Quid enim Deo cultus hominis confert beato, & nulla re indigenti? vel ſi tantum honoris homini habuit, ut ipſius cauſâ mundum fabricaret, ut inſtrueret eum ſapientia, ut dominum viventium faceret, eúmque diligeret tanquam filium; cur mortalem fragilemque conſtituit? cur omnibus malis, quem diligebat, objecit? Cum oporteret & beatum eſſe hominem, tanquam conjunctum & proximum Deo; & perpetuum, ſicut eſt ipſe, ad quem colendum & contemplandum figuratus eſt.* What advantage can the barren veneration of man yeeld to God, who is perfectly happy, and knows no indigency? or, if he deigned to beſtow ſo high honour upon man, as to create the whole world for his uſe, to endue him with wiſdome, to inaugurate him Lord royall of all living creatures, and love him with as much affection and indulgence as a Son; why did he yet make him mortal, and ſo fatally ſubject to fragility? why expoſe him whom he adopted to a filial love, to the invaſion of all kinds of evill? when on the contrary, in all reaſon, man alſo ought to have been both compleatly happy, as being allied to God, by a very neer affinity; and immortal as God himſelf, to the worſhip and contemplation of whom he was configurated.

Fortification thereof by 8 reaſons.

Lucretius alſo would not be exempted from acting a part in this tragical ſcene; but ſcorning to come behind the moſt adventurous Bravo, that had bid defiance to Divinity, or be outdone by any in the feats of Atheiſme: he not only ſucks all the venome in the former Arguments, but adds much of his own alſo,

and distills it together through his quill into 8 *reasons.*

1. That God reaps no benefit by the fealty and doxologies of man: *Quid enim immortalibus atque beatis gratia nostra queat largirier emolumenti, ut nostra quidquam causa gerere aggrederentur?*

2. That in case man had never had existence, it could not have been unpleasant not to have been at all. *Qui nunqam blandum vitæ gustavit amorem, nec fuit in numero; quid obest non esse beatum?* What never knew existence, can nere know the want of bliss: Nothing can feel no woe.

3. That the greatest moity of the Earth is wholly barren and unprofitable to man.

Principio, quantum Cœli tegit impetus ingens,
Inde avidam partem montes, sylvæque ferarum
Possedêre: tenent rupes, vastæque paludes,
Et mare, quod late terrarum distinet oras;
Inde duas perro prope partes fervidus ardor,
Assiduusque geli casus mortalibus aufert, &c.

4. That even from those narrow cantons of the earth, which are inhabited, men reap no other harvest, but what themselves have sown, with uncessant toyle; nor doe they find any ground fruitfull, but what they have manured with their own industry, and enriched with the salt dew of their own laborious brows:

Quod supereſt arvi, tamen id natura sua vi
Sentibus obducat, ni vis humana resistat, &c.

5. That even those fruits of the earth, which they have so dearly earned, with the profusion of so many showers of sweat, frequently miscarry, and become abortive; the hopes of the husband-man being often frustrated by the unexpected intervention of cross seasons, Ustilagos or Blites, Mildewes, Sulphureous Meteors, late Frosts, high Winds, &c.

6. That if neither the world, nor men, had ever been existent; their Ideas had never falne under the conception of the divine intellect.

7. That

7 That poor, weak, and fragil man is obnoxious to deſtruction by a thouſand divers contingencies; the ravenous appetite of wild Beaſts, the deleterious punctures of Serpents, the conflagration of Lightning, the contuſion of Thunderbolts, the eruption of Earth-quakes, the arſenical eructations of Minerals, the epidemick contagion of Peſtilential Diſeaſes, kindled either by Anomalous ſeaſons, Tempeſts, or malignant impreſſions in the aer; the invaſion of inteſtine infirmities, upon the civil war often breaking out between the Heterogeneities of his bloud, or a mutiny of his Elements; and though he eſcape all theſe, yet doth the Palſie hand of Time ſoon ſhake down his ounce of ſand, and then turn him over to be devoured by oblivion.

8. *Tum porro puer, ut ſævis projectus ab undis*
Navita, nudus humi jacet infans, indigus omni
Vitai auxilio, cum primum in luminis oras
Nixibus ex alvo matris natura profudit,
Vagituque locum lugubri complet, ut æquum 'ſt,
Quoi tantum in vita reſtet tranſire malorum. &c.

That Nature ſeems more a ſtep-mother to man, then any other Animal; having caſt him into the world naked, feeble, unarmed, unprovided for in all but want, and by his early tears portending that deluge of calamities, which in caſe he be ſo miſerable to ſurvive his birth, muſt drown all the comforts of his life, and waſh him into earth again after a ſhort flight of time; in brief, ſhe expoſeth him, as a baſtard, to be taken up and nurſed by the charity of that giddy headed goſſip, Fortune: who hath no ſooner ſmiled him into ſtrength enough to ſuffer, but ſhe contracts her browes, diſinherits and abandons the deſolate wretch to all the hardſhip and afflictions, that the witty malice of Fate (to whom our tortures are pleaſures, and the hoarſe groans of the rack ſound perfect melody) can either invent or inflict.

And thus have we heard, in Summary, the plea of thoſe three eminent Levellers, who endevoured to ſupplant man of his birthright, to take away the prerogative of his nature, and reduce him to no greater a ſhare in the favour of his Maker, then the meaneſt

of his fellow Animals. It comes now to our turn to examine, whether their Arguments are ſtrong enough to carry the Cauſe.

The Refutation.

Article 2. The total redargution thereof by a commonſtrace that the benefit and felicity of man, was Gods ſecondary end: and the impoſſibility of ſatisfaction to the firſt end, by any creature but man, concluded, from his

1. *Rationality.*

That God, in his atcheivem of the Univerſe, had a principal regard to *Man*, above all other the works of his hands; and conſidered him, *tanquam finem interjectum*, as the *Mediate* or *Secondary End*, his own *Glory* being the *Immediate* or *Primary*, or, more plainly, the end of that end: is clearly deduceable even from this; *that man only among that infinite variety of natures liſted in the inventory of the Creation, is conſtituted in a capacity to ſatisfie that firſt end; his intellectuals, or cogitative eſſence being, by a genial verticity, or ſpontaneous propenſion, qualified to admire, in admiration to ſpeculate, in ſpeculation to acknowledge, in acknowledgement to laud the Goodneſs, Wiſdome, and Power of the Worlds Creator*; while the ignoble Faculties of all other Animals are terminated in the inferior offices of ſenſe, nor ever attain above the inconſiderate operations of their brutal appetites. And this one reaſon, if duely perpended, will be found of weight enough to counterpoize all thoſe empty frothy ſophiſms alleaged to the contrary: nor can any æquitable conſideration (if I rightly underſtand its value) allow it to be much leſs then *Apodictical*. I ſay if duely perpended: for we are not raſhly to underſtand this peculiar *Adæquation* or Præeminence of man to conſiſt in the bare *Uprightneſs of his Figure*, which accommodates him *Cœlum intuëri, & erectos ad ſidera tollere vultus*. For, according to the vulgar acceptation of *Erectneſs*, and as it is conſidered to be a poſition oppoſite to *Proneneſs*, or the horizontal ſituation of the *Spina dorſi*, or rack bones in Animals progredient with their bellies toward the earth: man hath no reaſon to boaſt a ſingularity therein. Since many other Animals, as the *Penguin*, a kind of water fowle frequent upon the ſtraights of Magellan; the devout inſect of Province, or *Prega Dio*, the praying Graſhopper, ſo called becauſe for the moſt part found in an upright poſture anſwerable to that of man, when his hands

are elevated at his devotions; the *Bitour*, which my ſelf hath ſometimes obſerved ſtanding upright as an arrow falne perpendicular, and his eyes ſo advanced, as to ſhoot their viſual beams point blank at the zenith, or vertical point of heaven; all *Plane Fiſhes*, that have the apophyſes or proceſſes of their ſpine carried laterally, or made like the teeth of a Comb, as the *Thornback*, *Plaice*, *Flounder*, *Soles*, &c. and their eyes placed in the upper ſide of their head, and ſo pointing directly upward; and diverſe others attaining an erectneſs beyond his, and by reaſon of the ſublimimity of their faces taking a far larger proſpect of the firmament. For man cannot look ſo high as the Æquinoctial circle, unleſs he either recline the ſpondils of his neck and loyns, or place himſelf in a ſupine poſition. And therefore *Lactantius*, though he conceived his argument impregnable, when he ſaid (*Lib.* 7. *cap.* 5.) *Quod planius argumentum proferri poteſt, & mundum hominis, & hominem ſuâ cauſſa Deum feciſſe, quam quod ex omnibus Animantibus ſolus ita formatus eſt, ut oculi ejus ad cœlum directi, facies ad Deum ſpectans, vultus cum ſuo parente communis ſit?* to him that ſhall literally interpret the ſame, cannot appear to have ſtopt the mouth of contradiction: unleſs perhaps we ſhall afford him ſo much favour, as to reſtrain the erectnes of man to that preciſe definition of our Maſter *Galen* (*De uſu part. lib.* 1.) which allowes thoſe Animals only to have an erect figure *whoſe ſpines and thigh bones are ſituate in right lines.* For in this ſtrict ſignification, no Animal (for ought Zographers, or thoſe that write the Natural Hiſtories of living Creatures have diſcovered, or our ſelves obſerved) can exactly fulfill that figure, but man; all others having their thighs pitched at angles, either right, or obtuſe, or acute, to their ſpines. And for this reſpect was it, that having premiſed, that *Man only was conſtituted in a capacity to ſatisfie that prime end of the Creation, the glory of God*; I thought neceſſary to ſubjoyn, *his intellectual or Cogitative ſoul being naturally diſpoſed to admire*, &c. thereby importing, that the baſis of my Argument was fixt upon the very root of his *Eſſence*, or *better Nature*, as *Plato* calls it, whoſe propriety is *ſurſum ſpicere*, to look up to his original, and ſpeculate the excellencies of his Maker. And thus underſtood, I prefer *Plato's* etymologie

of

of ἄνθρωπος, and am perſwaded that the primitive Grecian ſo denominated man, *quaſi* ἀναθρῶντα ἃ ὄπωπε, *Contemplantem quæ videt*: nor can I conceive that *Anaxagoras* ſpake other then tropologically, when being askt, *cur natus eſſet*, he ſmartly and pathetically returned, *ut videret cœlum & terras*; by that figurative expreſſion intending, that man was made not to gape about or gaze upon the external beauties of heaven and earth, with the dull eye of his body: but to have his thoughts ſublime, and with the acies of his mind to ſpeculate the Wiſdome, &c. of him that made them. Now by virtue of this divine Prerogative is it, that man is of undoubted right entituled to the eſpecial care, and declared to be the *Secondary end*, or ſcope of the *Creator*. But farther to expatiate upon this manifeſt truth; were to light a candle to ſhew the Sun in the Meridian.

2. *Sermocination.*

Nor by the title of Cogitation only, doth man lay claim to this dignity; but he inherits a ſecond endowment alſo more noble then any other Animal, whereby he is empowerd to fulfill the principal deſtination of the World, the glory of God: and that is *Sermocination* or *Locution*. For the tongue of man only can own that character, ὄργανον διαλεκτικὸν, *inſerviens ſermocinationi inſtrumentum*, and can modulate the inſpired aër into articulate ſounds, and ſo intelligibly proclaim the majeſty of his *Efficient*. This *Lactantius* wiſely urged againſt *Epicurus* his objective expoſtulation, *Quæ utilitas Deo in Homine, ut eum propter ſe faceret?* appoſitely oppoſing, *ſcilicet ut eſſet, qui opera ejus intelligeret, qui providentiam diſponendi, rationem faciendi, virtutem conſummandi & ſenſu admirari, & voce proloqui poſſet*, &c. and (*in lib. de Ira Dei cap.* 13.) more plainly he ſays, *Num & mutorum cauſſâ Deus laboravit? minimè, quia ſunt & rationis & loquelæ expertia: ſed intelligimus & ipſa eodem modo ad uſum hominis à Deo facta*, &c.

As for that couchant *Dilemma* of *Velleius*, *whether the World was intended for the uſe of wiſe men, or Fools*: tis ſoon extricated, by diſtinguiſhing the purpoſe of the Creator into *General* and *Particular*: and ſo returning, that the Goodneſs of God had a reſpect to the benefit of all, *in general*; but of wiſe men in *eſpecial*.

Now

Now, if by *Wiſe men*, he mean ſuch, whoſe minds are imbued with the maximes of Virtue, and their lives conform to the upright rules of morality (who only, in the judgment of Philoſophy, can challenge that Attribute) then is it not eaſie to doubt, that the beneficence of God was loſt to them, or unadviſedly placed upon them: ſince their opportune, moderate, and grateſull husbandry of theſe bleſſings, though it cannot be extended ſo high as abſolute merit; may yet reach ſo far as to juſtifie the prudence of their donation, and manifeſt the provident-collocation of them upon convenient ſubjects, *i. e.* upon ſuch as make it the conſtant buſineſs of their lives to learn how rightly to uſe them, and practiſe that excellent leſſon, of imploying all things to the temporal ſupportation, comfort, and improvement of themſelves, and themſelves to magnifie the bounty of that hand, that ſo freely beſtowed them.

And on the other ſide, if by *Fools* he intend ſuch as are degenerated from the nobility of their nature, degraded below meer Humanity, that know no good beyond the preſent blandiſhments of ſenſuality, and have ſworn themſelves voluntary captives to their own luxurious Appetites, (and ſuch was the wiſe mans fool) then can neither the Juſtice of God be taxed for conferring ſuch rich favours upon thoſe, that know only how to abuſe them; nor his Præviſion diſparaged, as not foreſeeing the miſcarriage or unfruitfulneſs of his charity: ſince he left it in the arbitrary power of their Wills to make an election of Good or Evill, to turn to the right hand, and purſue the real and true delights of virtue, or deflect on the left, and be loſt in the deviations of the only apparent and falſe pleaſures of vice: having ſet before them the means both of Sapience and Reſipiſcence, and furniſhed them with advantages and opportunities either to acquire more knowledge, or at leaſt recant and diſclaim their ignorance. Or, if by Fools, he deſigne ſuch as our common Ideots, in whom the light of Nature is totally eclipſed, by ſome native diſtemper, or non-ſymmetrical configuration, or contingent concuſſion of the brain, or Preſence-Chamber of the Intellect: then alſo is the caſe the ſame with divine Prudence, *ſiquidem ex ipſorum deſipientia, caterorum ſapientia efflorescit & collucet magis*, ſince the

ſtolidity of an ignorant hath this uſe, that it ſerves as a foyl to ſet off the ingenuity of the knowing, and by the incompatible diſparity which appears at the conference of thoſe two contraries, infinitely enhanceth the value of wiſdom. The ſatisfactory force of this ſolution maturely perpended, it can be reputed neither incogitancy nor precipitation in me to omit the prolix appropriation of thoſe pertinent *ſimilitudes*; that the wary husbandman doth cultivate and prepare his field, as well for the fertility of Pulſe, as Wheat; that the moſt skilfull Gardiner provides room in his nurſery for the ſprouting of wild, degenerous, and barren plants, as well as for the geniculation of wholſome, generous and fruitful; that Princes account Plebeians, as well as Nobles, members of their Common-wealth; and that *Apelles* prepared his Tables as well to receive the black of ſhadowing, as the finer touches of his Pencill, and the brighter gradualities of Colours, in emulation of the life. And this, not only becauſe I conceive the objection already more then refuted, and therefore all that can be ſuperadded may found as nothing to the purpoſe: but chiefly becauſe I underſtand, that the Logick of *ſimiles*, or the way of probation by *Comparatives*, is at beſt but *Analogiſme*; and therefore inconſiſtent with my aſſumption of declining all but *Demonſtrations*, or *Reaſons* equally convictive.

As for that demand, *Why God did not endow his favorite with immortality, but expoſed him to the ſtroke of death*; it is manifeſt that the ſoul of man is conſtituted immortal, and ſhall enjoy a being to all eternity, by the Charter of its *Eſſence*, and not *ex gratia* only, as M^r. *Hobbs* endevours to aſſert (*in Leviathan*) But the demonſtration of this grand truth, being too large to be circumſcribed by a Parentheſis, or foiſted in by way of digreſſion; I have reſerved for a ſingular Chapter in the future.

Article 3. *Lucretius* his 8 reaſons ſubverted, particularly.

For thoſe remaining difficulties contained in the Arguments of *Lucretius*; they are eaſily ſalved, by anſwering ſuccinctly to the

1. *Firſt*, that the motive which inclined the divine Will to create the World, was not any poſſibility of emolument accruable to God from the veneration and gratitude of man: but the voluntary

tary diffuſion of his own communicative goodneſs, in chief; and the benefit of man, as ſubſervient thereto.

Second, that though that Axiome be undeniable, *Non entis non ſunt accidentia*, and therefore it could have been no trouble to us, not to have been at all; yet that invincible reluctancy againſt *Adnihilation*, radicated in every vital entity, is demonſtration enough, that to be, is far better then not to be, and we our ſelves experimentally find, *that tis one degree of happineſs to have obtained exiſtence*; becauſe to be nothing, is a meer *Privation*; to be ſomething, attains to the perfection of *Reality*. Upon which ground many have erected a conjecture, the the devill himſelf would not conſent to his own Adnihilation, though he might evade his torments by the bargain: with advantage preferring the miſerable condition of ſomething, to the horrid opacity of nothing. 2.

Third, that God made ſuch abundant proviſion conductive to the utility of men, that both from the *Amplitude* and *Variety* of his work, they might collect matter ſufficient to incite them to the conſtant contemplation of his *Wiſdome*, and gratefull acknowledgement of his *Munificence*: as alſo, that having obſerved what of the Creatures were leſs commodious, they might be directed in their election of the more commodious and beneficial, as well for their Conſervation as Delight. 3.

Fourth, that the labours of *Agriculture* are ſuperfluous, and voluntarily undergon by man, more for the maintainance of his *delicacy* and inordinate *luxury*, then the proviſion of *Neceſſaries* to his livelyhood. Since the ſame liberal earth, which is Mother, Nurſe, and Purveyer to all other *Animals*, cannot be thought inhoſpitable to man only, nor ſo cruelly penurious as to exclude her beſt gueſt from participating the inexhauſtible bounty of her table. And though we grant ſome moderate labour neceſſary in order to the comfortable ſuſtentation of our prodigal bodies, always upon the expence; yet have we good cauſe to eſteem that more a bleſſing then a curſe, ſince the ſweat of induſtry is ſweet. Not only be- 4.

cauſe the active genius of man is conſtellated for buſineſs, and therefore never more oppreſt then with the burthen of idleneſs; but alſo becauſe the ſprightly hopes of a wealthy harveſt ſweeten and compenſate the labour of ſemination. Nor is the contentment which growes from ingenious Husbandry much below any other ſolace of the mind, in this life; if we may credit the experience of many Princes, who having ſurfetted on the diſtractions of royalty, have voluntarily quitted the magnified pleaſures of the Court (magnified only by ſuch ambitious Novices, who never diſcovered the gall that lyes at the bottom of thoſe guilded ſweets) and with ineſtimable advantage exchanged the tumult of their palaces for the privacy of Granges; have found it a greater delight to cultivate the obedient and gratefull earth, then rule that giddy beaſt, the multitude; a happier entertainment of the mind, and more wholſome exerciſe of the body, to hold the eaſie plough, then ſway an unweildy Scepter, and revell in the infatuating pomp of greatneſs.

5. *Fifth*, that thoſe prepoſterous ſeaſons, Blights, Mildews, Combuſtions, &c. putrefactive accidents, that make the pregnant earth ſuffer abortion, and ſo nip the forward hopes of the laborious ſwain; doe neither intervene ſo *frequently*, nor invade ſo *generally*, as to introduce an univerſal famine, or ſo cut off all proviſion, as not to leave a ſufficient ſtock of Aliment for the ſuſtentation of mankind.

6. *Sixth*, that the divine Intellect was the univerſal exemplar to it ſelf, framing the types or ideas both of the world and of man, within it ſelf, and accordingly configurating them. This may be evinced by an argument *à minori*; ſince even our ſelves have a power to deſign and modell ſome artificial engine, whoſe pattern or idea we never borrowed from any thing exiſtent without the circle of our ſelves, but coyned in the ſolitary receſſes of our mind.

7. *Seventh*, concerning mans being obnoxious to the injury of many Contingencies, as the voracity of wild beaſts, the venome of Serpents, the conflagration of Lightning, the contagion of the Peſtilence

Peſtilence, the corruption of ſwarms of other diſeaſes both epidemick and ſporadick, &c. that all theſe are the regular effects of Gods *Generall Providence*, and have their cauſes, times, and finalities preordained, and inſcribed in the diary of Fate, to whoſe preſcience nothing is contingent. But of this more ſatisfactorily in our ſubſequent conſideration of univerſal Providence; whither in ſtrictneſs of method, it refers it ſelf.

Eight, that this complaint againſt the unkindneſs of Nature, for producing man, tender, naked, unarmed, &c. is groſly unjuſt. For the imbecillity of our Infancy is neceſſary to the perfection and maturity of thoſe noble organs, contrived for the adminiſtration of the mandates of that Empreſs, the *Cogitant Soul*; and is amply compenſated either by the vigor and acuteneſs of the ſenſes, or by diuturnity of life. It being obſerved by Naturaliſts, that thoſe Animals which live long, have a long geſtation in the womb, a long infancy, and attain but ſlowly to their maturity and ſtandard of growth; the four general motions of life, *Inception*, *Augmentation*, *State*, and *Declination*, carrying ſet and proportional intervals each to other, as that truly noble Philoſopher, *Scaliger* hath hinted, in his correction of that fabulous tradition of the extreme longævity of Deer in theſe words: *De ejus vitæ longitudine fabulantur, neque enim aut geſtatio aut incrementum hinnulorum ejuſmodi ſunt, ut præſtent argumentum longævi Animalis.* As for his being born *naked*; tis no diſfavour, nor neglect in her, for that cumberſom wardrobe of raggs, which man hath gotten upon his back, is become neceſſary only by the delicacy of his education and cuſtome, not ſo intended by nature in the primitive ſimplicity and eucraſie of his conſtitution; when there needed nothing but the skin either to warme, or adorn the body. Laſtly, thoſe *Armes*, which Nature hath denied him; either he wants not at all, or his own ingenious hands can provide at pleaſure. 8.

CHAP. IV.

The General Providence of God, DEMONSTRATED.

SECT. I.

Article 1. The Authors reasons for his present adherence to the common discrimination of *Providence* from *Creation.*

THE Synopsis of my method, exhibited in the hem of the first Section of the first Chapter, was designed as a clue to conduct the thoughts of my Reader along the series of those *Attributes* of the *supreme Ens*, which (as being of most general concernment, and such as may be clearly demonstrated by the *Light of Nature*, even to those, who either never heard of, or except against the testimony of *Holy Writ*) I have promised to illustrate, by the conviction of Arguments deduced from that catholique Criterion, *Reason*; to whose Judicature all Nations and Ages have readily submitted their assent: and therefore I am not necessitated here to insert any farther explanation of the connexion and dependence of this *Theme* upon the precedent; but only, in avoydance of misconception, to advertise, that when I say, the *Creation* of the World *ex nihilo*, and the constant *Conservation* of the same in its primitive order and harmonious Coefficiency of causes subordinate, are the general operations of the *Wisdome* and *Power* of the *First cause*; I doe not intend, that those are *Acts really distinct* each from other (for in the demonstration of the Existence of God tis plainly, though succinctly evinced, that *the Conservation of the Universe is nothing*

thing but the Act of Creation prolonged or continued) but only conform my theory to the cuſtomary notions and terms of the Schools, and yeeld to the neceſſity of a diviſion in the groſs capacity of mans underſtanding, in order to the more gentle enforcement of a ſtable beleif.

Article 2. The Definition and received Diviſion of divine Providence.

The Act of *Conſervation* of all things in their originary ſtations, and the perpetual obedience of all ſecond Cauſes, in their ſeveral motions, to the laws of his will, that elemented them; hath ever been called *Providence divine*: which derived high enough, ſeems to import, *the conſtant operation of an infinite Wiſdom, and infinite Power, combined in the effuſion of an infinite Goodneſs.* This *Providence* (for to that Appellation, as moſt antient, moſt common, and therefore moſt familiar, I ſhall adhere) moſt Clerks have branched into *General*, whereby the government of the whole Univerſe is adminiſtred: and *Particular*, or *ſpecial*, whereby God doth take ſpecial care of mankind, and regulate the affairs of his maſter-peice. Now according to this neceſſary *Diviſion*, muſt I range my forces into two Files, and draw up one to defeat thoſe Atheiſts, who have proclaimed open hoſtility againſt the *Firſt*; and the other to ſubdue thoſe, that have declared againſt the *Second*.

Article 3. A ſhort liſt of the principal ethnick *Phyſiologiſts*, who, in order to their propagation of Atheiſm, have attempted the eradication of this magiſterial verity of divine Providence: & a gentle cure of S. *Hieroms* wound, cauſed by his venial lapſe from the ſame.

The Colonell to that black regiment, that fought againſt the opinion of the government of the World by the Sceptre of Divine Monarchy, is generally accounted *Epicurus*; but in the authentique records of *Stobaus* (*Ecl. Phyſ.* 25.) we may finde him to have been no more then Captain-lievtenant to *Leucippus*, who of all the Græcian Philoſophers, whoſe doctrines have eſcaped the ſpunge of oblivion, was the firſt that appeared in the field againſt univerſal Providence, and not long after furrendred the ſtaffe to *Democritus* the elder, whoſe immediate ſucceſſor was *Heraclitus*, as we are told by *Nemeſius* (*De nat. Homin.* 13.) But whoever led up the van, was cloſely followed by many both of the ſame and ſucceeding ages; the moſt eminent whereof were *Dicearchus* (*Cicero* 4. *Academ.*) *Strato* (*Idem de Divinat.* 2.) *Ennius* (*Idem de Nat. Deor.* 3.) *Lucretius* (*Libro ejus* 2.) *Velleius* (*Cicero*

(*Cicero de Nat. Deor.* 1.) *Lucian* (*in his Accus.*) who like a facetious villain, perſonates *Jupiter* complaining of the oppreſſion of overmuch buſineſs; nay the devout Father S. *Hieron.* (*in Comment. in Abac.*) ſeems to have eſpouſed the quarrel, though doubtleſs upon another intereſt. His words I ſhall faithfully tranſcribe for two important reaſons. Firſt becauſe I would not appear to have fixt a ſcandal upon ſo venerable a Pillar of our Church, who otherwiſe hath deſerved ſo amply of the Chriſtian faith; that the conſideration of the tranſcendent merits of his pious labours had once almoſt perſwaded me to beleive the poſſibility of *juſtification by works*. Secondly, to deliver his memory from the imputation of impiety; for it may be naturally collected from the ſyntax and ſcope of his diſcourſe, that it was a noble eſteem which he had of the majeſty of the Divine Nature, whom he thought too fully taken up with the blisfull contemplation of his own perfections (in truth, the only Felicity God can be capable of) to be concerned in ordering the trifling occurrences of the world; and not any conceit of the inſufficiency of omnipotence, that caſt him upon this rock. *Caterum abſurdum eſt* (ſays he) *ad hoc Dei deducere majeſtatem ut ſciat per momenta ſingula, quot naſcantur culices, quotve moriantur: quot cimicum & pulicum & muſcarum ſit in terra multitudo: quanti piſces in aqua natent, & qui de minoribus majorum præda cedere debeant. Non ſimus tam fatui Adulatores Dei, ut dum potentiam ejus ad ima detrahimus, in noſipſos injurioſi ſimus, eandem rationabilium, quam irrationabilium Providentiam eſſe dicentes.*

So that his diminution of the univerſality of Providence, may ſeem the pardonable effect of immoderate devotion, and but a high ſtrained deſcription of the glory of that eſſence, which in ſtrict truth, can be concerned in nothing but it ſelf; and muſt then appear to be undervalued, when moſt magnified by the extenſion of its influence to petty and trivial mutations, and conceived to act a part in the interludes of Flies, order the militia of Piſmires, and decree what, and how many Gnats ſhall be devoured by ſwallowes in a ſummers day. But as for *Epicurus*, and the reſt of that miſcreant crew; tis more then probable, that a quite different

different intereſt inveigled them into this dangerous error. For, *firſt*, their own writings bare record, that they made it the grand ſcope of their ſtudies to promote Atheiſme, by plotting how to undermine the received beleif of an omnipotent *eternal Being*, to murder the *immortality of the Soul* (the baſis of all religion) and deride the *Compenſation of good and evil actions after death*. In particular, *Epicurus* did not bluſh to profeſs that the chief end at which his *Phyſiology* was collineated, was this; *ut mens ex perſpectis cauſis conquieſcat, neque aliam eamque divinam ſubeſſe cauſam ſuſpicando, felicitatem interturbet*. And *Secondly*, the grounds upon which they erected this deteſtable negation of univerſal Providence, may ſufficiently ſatisfie a heedfull enquirer; that not any intenſe honour or veneration of the moſt perfect and happy nature, tranſported their minds to this height of deluſion: but rather a confirmed *infidelity of the infinity of his Wiſdome and Power*, which is affirmed by us, that maintain the diffuſion of Providence over all, and deſcry the finger of Divinity in the ſmalleſt actions of inferior cauſes, though ne're ſo contemptible in the eyes of Humane reaſon. But a more ample knowledge of this doth offer it ſelf to our thoughts, in the particular examination of their Arguments: to which we therefore immediately addreſs.

Article 4. The Atheiſts firſt Argument againſt univerſal Providence, with the abſurd and malicious comment of *Lucretius* thereupon.

The *Firſt Argument* they drew from the apparent *incompatibility of buſineſs and happineſs*; or more plainly, from the vaſt diſparity between the bliſfull condition or contemplative quiet of the ſupreme Nature, and the trouble, or diſturbance (for ſo their ignorance unfitly apprehended it) that muſt ariſe from the overſight and managery of ſuch infinite variety of Actions, as are every minute performed within the immenſe Amphitheatre of the World. For *Epicurus*, indiſcreetly attempting to take the altitude of the *Divine Intellect*, by the unequal *Jacobs*-ſtaffe of the *Humane*; raſhly inferred, that it could not be extended be[illegible] the ſphear of its own manſion, and that no *Intelligence* could be ſo large, as not to be overwhelmed by that Ocean of Cares, that muſt flow from the multitude and diverſity of continual emergencies here below. This he contracted into that ſentence; *Quod eſt beatum & immortale, neque ſibi habet, neque*

alteri exhibet negotium ; which ſo pleaſed him, that he reputed it a Cornerſtone in the fabrick of ſcience, and enacted it to ſtand in the front of thoſe *Sententiæ ratæ*, which he dared Scepticity withall.

Nor did his ſedulous Commentator *Lucretius*, recede an inch from the ſame text; but fondly commenſurating the power of an *Infinite wiſdome*, by the narrow capacity of his own *finite reaſon*, preached to the world; that to aſcribe the government of ſublunary affairs to the Gods, was impiety in the inference, and muſt implicitly deſtroy the fundamentals of their *Divinity*, which is made up of *Beatitude* and *Immortality*, neither of which can conſiſt with the perpetual diſquiet, and impetuous anxiety of mind, which the Adminiſtration of ſo vaſt and tumultuous a Commonwealth, as this of the World, muſt introduce. For when he would impoſe, that the ſhoulders of Divinity, though a real *Atlas*, are too weak to ſuſtain ſo great a weight, as that of *Rector General*; under a pretext of tender zeal (forſooth) he inſimulates thoſe of prophanation, *Qui ſummum illud, quicquid eſt, tam triſti, atque multiplici miniſterio polluunt*, as *Pliny* expreſſes it: and therefore exclaims.

Nam (proh! Sancta Deûm tranquilla pectora pace,
Quæ placidum degunt ævum, vitamque ſerenam)
Quis regere immenſi ſummam? Quis habere profundi
Indu-manu validas potis eſt moderanter habenas?
Quis pariter Cœlos omneis convertere? & omneis
Ignibus æthereis terras ſuffire feraceis?
Omnibus inque locis eſſe omni tempore præſtò,
Nubibus ut faciat tenebras, cœlique ſerena
Concutiat ſonitu? tum fulmina mittat, & ædeis
Sæpe ſuas diſturbet? & in diverſa recedens
Saviat, exercens telum; quod ſæpe nocenteis
Præterit, exanimatque indignos, inque merenteis? &c. lib. 2.

Ah! ſince the happy and immortal *Powers*
In calme content melt their eternal houres,
Feaſting on *ſelf-enjoyment*; who can keep
The reins of *Nature*? Who command the *Deep*?

To

To wind about the ponderous *Sphears*, what arme
Hath ſtrength enough? what *Influence* can warme
The fruitfull earth with *Fires atherial*? who
Can fill all places, and all actions doe?
To veil the face of *Light* with ſable clouds,
And wrap the lucid *ſky* in ſulph'ry ſhrouds:
Whoſe *Coruſcations* ſplit the fluid aer,
Convell the feet of Rocks, and with deſpair
Affect poor *Mortals* into *Quick ſilver*: then turn,
And with Granadoes his own *Temples* burn:
Then dart his flames at *Innocence*, and wound
Virtue, while guilty *Vice* continues ſound?

Article 5. Their ſecond *Argument*: and its convenient diſſection into two parts, *viz.* 1. The irregularity of contingencies: and

Their other *Argument* is extracted from the conceived *Uncertainty and irregularity of Contingencies*, and the *unequal diſpenſation of good and evill*; all things ſeeming to fall out according to the giddy lottery of Chance, and as confuſedly as if there were no Providence at all. This may be collected as well from that ſpeech of *Epicurus*, charged upon him by that heroick Champian of Divine Monarchy, *Lactantius*; *Nulla diſpoſitio eſt, multa enim facta ſunt aliter, quàm fieri debuerunt*: as from the context of his *Phyſiology*, wherein having made it his *Hypotheſis*, that all bodies both cœleſtial and ſublunary were at firſt configurated by Fortune, *i. e.* aroſe to ſuch and ſuch particular figures, by the caſual ſegregation, convention and complexion of the General matter, divided into ſeveral maſſes; and that, by the inclination of their convenient *Figures*, they were adliged to ſuch and ſuch peculiar *Motions*, and accommodated to the neceſſary cauſation of determinate viciſſitudes: he proceeds to reduce all ſucceeding events in the World to that primitive ſeries of Cauſes, which made their own ſpontaneous eruption out of the Chaos, and attained to the certain rules of their future activity, at the ſame time they attained to their diſtinctions and ſingle eſſences; denominating that chain of cauſalities, *Nature*, and holding her to be her own *Directreſs*, and by the law of innate tendency obliged to a perpetual continuation of the ſame motions begun in

the firſt minute of the worlds compoſure; according to that exclamation of *Pontanus* (*Lib.* 1. *de Stellis.*)

Quid vexare Deos fruſtrà juvat? ordine certo
Fert Natura vices; labuntur & ordine certo
Sydera; tam varios rerum patientia caſus.
Illa ſuos peragunt motus, ſervantque tenorem
Sorte datum, &c.

What boot's it man with fruitleſs praiers to fret
The Ears o'th *Gods*; when *Natures Laws* are ſet,
Beyond *Repeal* or *Alteration*?
The radiant *Lamps* of heaven ſtill move on
In their old tracks: nor can the *Planets* ſtray,
In all their wandrings, from their native way;
Or change that *Tenor*, which at firſt they got
Conſign'd unto them, by their proper *Lot*.

The reſult of all which is, that *Epicurus* would perſwade, that the Univerſe is a Commonwealth, wherein every ſingle member is, by the ſignature and neceſſity of its particular conſtitution, inſtructed in, and impelled upon the præciſe performance of its peculiar office; ſo as not to want the direction of any *Superintendent*, or to conform to the directions of a *General Councel*: and ſeems to allow this only difference between the univerſal *Politie* of the *World*, and the particular *Republique* of *mankind*; that in *this*, men frequently make deflexions from the general ſcope, by reaſon of the ſeductions of their unſtable and irregular judgments; but in *that*, all individuals punctually keep to their primitive aſſignations, and ſo conſpire to the ſatisfaction of the common intereſt, by reaſon of the conſtancy of their natures, and unalterable neceſſity of their forms. And this Abridgement of his doctrine, *Plutarch* (*de Fato*) hath prepared to our hands, when perſonating *Epicurus*, he thus argues; *Nulla eſt opus ſapientia ordinis inſtruendi in exercitu, ſi militum quivis ſua ſponte noverit locum, ordinem, ſtationem, quam accipere debet & tueri: neque etiam opus oli-toribus, Fabriſve murariis, ſi aqua illeic ultrò affluat indigentibus irrationeplantis; heic lateres, ligna, lapideſque eas, natura duce, motiones atque inclinationes ſubeant, quibus in ſua loca, inque expetitam concinnitatem coeant, &c.*

Now

Now for the other part of the Argument, *viz. the unequal distribution of Good and Evill, and the ordinary intervention of many effects inconsistent with the justice and righteous administration of Divinity*: this is clearly hinted by *Lucretius*, who makes it the main scope of his sixth *Canto*, to alienate mens minds from the beleif of an *Universal moderator*, by several instances of events, that seem to hold too visible an affinity to *Temerity* and *Inconsideration*, to have any relation at all to the judicious method requisite to *Providence*; and particularly towers himself over that one example of the *Thunder-bolt*, as if his reason had flown to a pitch above all possibility of contradiction, when yet the summary of all that bold discourse, abstracted by an impartial hand, amounts to no more then this.

2. The unequal or injust distribution of *good* and *evill*.

Since we observe the Thunder-bolt (1.) To be, for the most part, discharged on the heads of the *Innocent*, and not the *Guilty*: (2.) To batter *Sancta Deûm delubra*, the Temples of the Gods themselves, more frequently then common buildings: (3.) To be idly spent at random, upon the sea and void Campanias; and so seems not to have been the Artillery of *Divine Vengeance*, prepared for the punishment of impious mortals: (4.) To be generated, like other meteors, by natural Causes, being a sulphureous exhalation compacted in the clouds, and thence darted *ala volee*, or at a venture, on whatever is situate in the level of its projection: it appears an absurdity of timerous superstition to beleive, that every single occurrence is præordained by *Wisdom*, or that all extemporary *Accidents* have their præscripts in the book of *Fate*.

And these are the *Goliah* objections, or nerves of the Atheists Remonstrance against *Universal Providence*; which though many of the *Fathers*, and particularly S. *Clement* (*in* 5. *Strom.*) have decreed to be filed amongst those impious questions, that deserve no answer but a whip, like the doubts of a Mahometan in point of faith: yet since promise hath made it my duty, to endevour the demonstration of the Attributes of the divine nature (such at least as occurre to the contemplation of a meer Philosopher, who hath wholly referred himself to the Testimonies of the *Light of Nature*) by the conviction of *Reason* alone; I am confident so clearly and fully to confute, that no man, who

hath not ſtubbornly put out the eye of his ſoul, ſhall in the future remain a Sceptick, as to this particular.

Sect. II.

The Vindication.

Article 1. That the Notion of general Providence is *Prolepticall* inferred from the univerſality of its reception.

FIrſt I plead *the general conſent of all Nations and Ages in the acknowledgement* of *Providence*; for, according to the Logical *Canons* even of *Epicurus* (*apud Gaſſend. in Animadverſ. in Canonic. Epicuri*) any motion, that is held in common, and by long preſcription grown into κοινὴν ἀνθρώπων πρόληψιν, *Anticipation*, ought not to be doubted of; as being its own *Criterion*, and from which there lies no farther Appeal.

Article 2. From the miſplaced devotion of Idolaters.

Now that all *Nations* have met in one Chorus to proclaim the univerſal and abſolute ſoveraignty of Providence, cannot be obſcure to any, that have, but with half an eye, glanced on the Records of Antient and Cuſtomes of Preſent; or but conſidered, that even the Idolatry of the moſt ſtupid and barbarous people that ever lived, doth plainly commonſtrate, that they paid both their ſacrifices and orizons, as homage to ſome *Power*, which held the rains of ſecond Cauſes, and could diſpoſe them to the production of good or evil events, according to his own beneplacets; and therefore not only in publique Calamities, as War, Peſtilence, Famine, &c. but alſo in the private diſtreſſes of each Family and Perſon, they immediately addreſſed themſelves to the Sanctuary of their devotions, hoping by that means to appeaſe the anger of that flexible hand, that had the arbitrary donation of happineſs and miſery.

Article 3. From the confeſſion of moſt Philoſophers of the higheſt form; as of

That all Philoſophers alſo (who being generally reputed wiſe men, and all their very Tenets exemplary; could not but draw whole ſhoals of under-heads into the ſtream of their opinions) gave

gave in their votes on the ſide of Providence; cannot coſt much oyle to illuſtrate: it being obvious, firſt, that

1. *Ecphantus.*

Ecphantus, with moſt of that elder ſect, who gave in their names to the doctrine of Atoms, did yet eſtabliſh the neceſſary conceſſion of ſome univerſal Moderator, and unanimouſly referred the ordination of all contingents, as well frequent as rare, auſpicious and inauſpicious, popular and domeſtique, to the arbitrary diſpoſal of one common Pilot, who ſate at the helme of this great veſſel, the Univerſe. (*Leg. Stobæum in Ecl. Phyſ.*)

2. *Plato.*

Secondly, that thoſe alſo, who held the World to be *Non-principiate*, or to have been ſo old, as never to have been young, did yet notwithſtanding condemn the delirium of *Fortune*, and concluded the guberation of all upon the *ſupreme Intelligence*. For *Plato* ſeems ſo ſtrongly convicted, and his reaſon ſo violently raviſhed into the armes of Divine Providence; that, though he inclined to the eternity of the World, he yet conceded the production thereof in time, as a neceſſary Hypotheſis, or foundation, whereon he might the more firmely erect his ſuperſtructure of that magiſterial Truth, which otherwiſe would have been impoſſible to be made out, *viz. The univerſal Adminiſtration of Providence.* And thus much he frequently declared, *in Lib. de Legibus*: *in Epinomide, & in Timæo* more expreſly; out of which meditation *Plutarch* (*De procreat. Anim. ex Timæo, & de Fato*) collected his tripartite diſtinction of Providence. *Prima enim* (ſays he) *& ſuprema, eſt Primi Dei intelligentia, ſive mavis, voluntas benefica erga res omnes; qua primum ſingulæ divinæ res omninò optimè ac pulcherrimè ordinatæ ſunt: ſecunda ſecundorum deorum per cœlum incedentium qua res mortales ordinatè fiunt, & ſingulorum generum conſtantia atque ſalus procuratur: Tertia non inepte dicitur Providentia, & Procuratio Geniorum, qui circa terram collocati, humanarum actionum cuſtodes atque inſpectores ſunt.*

3. *Ariſtotle.*

And *Ariſtotle*, who was much more bold and plain in his aſſertion of the Worlds eternity, though (*in Metaphyſ.* 12. *cap.* 9.) he pretends an unwillingneſs to have the majeſtick ſanctity of the *ſupreme Nature* diſparaged, by being debaſed to the overſight of petit and inconſiderable affairs tranſacted heer below;

and

and therefore limited his juriſdiction to the cœleſtial orbs: yet was he forced to confeſs the impoſſibility of the worlds ſubſiſtence in the due harmony and requiſite order of all its motions, without the conſtant regulation thereof by *Providence*, as *Laertius*, *Theodoretus*, *Stobæus*, and other of his moſt judicious *Expoſitors* have aſſured us. And upon this conſideration was it, that the good Father, *Origen* allowed him to have been one degree leſs impious then *Epicurus*. Nay *Cicero* (2. *de Natur. deorum*) makes him upon ſecond thoughts, to have profeſſed a recantation, by allowing the ubiquity of the divine Wiſdome, and extending the arme of Providence, which he had formerly ſhortned and terminated in the loweſt ſphear, even to the meaneſt of ſublunary paſſages, introducing him diſguiſed (doubtleſs to prevent the diſhonour of unconſtancy to his own principles) under a third perſon telling a ſtory of ſome, *Qui poſt ævum tranſactum in locis ſubterraneis, & repente emerſi, intuitique hunc ordinem rerum, ipſum ſine numine eſſe non poſſe arbitrarentur.*

4. The *Stoicks*.

Thirdly, that the *Stoicks*, albeit upon that vulgar preſumption that to aſſign the procuration of all minute and trivial occurences, to that *Nature*, which is all *Felicity* and *Quiet*, was implicitly to infringe the right hand of its divinity; they abridged its empire, and limited its influence to the more weighty and popular actions of mankind only; were howſoever zealous aſſertors of Providence; is manifeſt from that ſaying of *Cotta* reproving *Balbus*, an eminent Stoick (*apud Cicer. de natur. Deor.* 3.) *At enim minora dii neque agellos ſingulorum, nec viticulas proſequuntur; nec ſi uredo, aut grando quidpiam nocuit, id Iovi animadvertendum fuit; nec in regnis quidem reges omnia minima curant: ſic enim dicitis*, &c.

5. The *Academicks* and *Scepticks*.

And laſtly, that the *Academicks* and *Scepticks* were of the ſame perſwaſion; however being carried againſt the ſtream of all *Affirmative* learning, by the contrary tide of their own *Negative* humor, and obliged to fall foul upon all truths, in defence of their own affected *Neſcience*; they have been obſerved to have had ſome light skirmiſhes with the Champians of *Providence*. Nor need we acquieſce in the bare affirmation hereof, while to any man, that ſhall with equanimity and attention compare

their

their tender arguments againſt the opinion of general Providence, with thoſe more ſinewy and vehement reaſons of their profeſt neutrality in many other notions; there will offer it ſelf a fair ground for more then conjecture, that they purpoſely contrived them ſoft, gentle, and diſſoluble, that ſo they might ſeem neither to quit their habit of contradiction, nor yet to dare the ſubverſion of that catholick poſition, to which all men (thoſe few of the black guard of Hell, whom we lately nominated, excepted) had ſubſcribed, and which the dictates of their own domeſtick oracle, Reaſon, had confirmed as ſacred and uncontrollable. To which we may annex the teſtimony of *Gaſſendus*, who (*in Animadverſ. in lib.* 10. *Diogen. Laert. de Phyſiologia Epicuri pag.* 731.) ſpeaking conjunctively of both thoſe ſects, ſaies thus: *ut argumentati ſunt adverſus Providentiam, ſic opinioni de providentia ſuam probabilitatem fecerunt, neque ſaltem ea fronte fuerunt, ut eſſe providentiam abſolutè inficiarentur.*

Article 4. A review of the induction: and the Argument found to be *Apodictical* on one ſide; and on the other only *perſwaſive*.

Now to take the juſt dimenſions of this Argument, let us allow it, like *Janus*, to have two faces; and then ſurvey the aſpect of each a part. On one hand it looks *Abſolute and Apodictical*: on the other only *Perſwaſive*.

Apodictical; ſince the univerſality of any beleif (ſuch eſpecially, as hath ever been atteſted even by thoſe, who have made the profoundeſt ſearch into its fundamentals, and ſtreyned every nerve in the whole body of reaſon to demoliſh it,) is no obſcure proof, that it muſt be one of thoſe λήμματα, ἔννοιαι, or *Implantate Notions*, which the ſame hand, that made our nature, hath engraven on the table of our minds, and left it not in the power of our depraved Wills totally to obliterate.

That there are ſome *Implantate Notions*, no man, who hath but learned the Alphabet of his own Nature, will diſpute. Nor is it leſs certain, that all Philoſophers have decreed *Anticipation* (which *Ariſtotle* (*in* 1. *Poſter.* 1.) calls προυπάρχουσαν γνῶσιν, *praexiſtentem cognitionem*; and *Cicero* hath interpreted (1 *de Nat. Deor.*) *notionem menti inſitam, & anteceptam quandam in animo informationem*), to be the Touch-ſtone of verity: nay *Empiricus* himſelf forgot his cuſtome of Scepticiſme, when he

to this point, and grew positive (*adverſ. Gramm. & adverſ. Ethic.*) οὔτε ζητεῖν, οὔτε ἀπορεῖν ἐπὶ ἄνευ προλήψεως, that no man could ſo much as enquire, or doubt of any thing without *Prænotion.*

And that the Notion of the worlds regiment by univerſal Providence, is one of thoſe propoſitions, *Quæ ſunt in nobis adeo antiquæ, ut iis, ex quo eſſe & ſentire cœpimus, evaſerimus informati:* which, like letters carved on the bark of a young plant, are impreſſed upon our very Intellect, and grow up together with us; is already proved collaterally and upon induction, in our *Demonſtration of the Exiſtence of God:* for therein it is cleared, that the excellent *Idea*, which we have of the *Supreme Beeing*, contains all *Perfections* whatever, and among the reſt, that noble Attribute, *Creator*; which to him that ſhall attentively conſider the nature of *Duration*, muſt ſound one and the ſame thing, with *Conſervator*, or *Governour.*

Only perſwaſive; ſince humane Auctority, conſidered *per ſe*, is but an inartificial Argument, and binds not, but when conſorted with others more rational, into one ſyndrome or multiplex demonſtration: nor is the concentration of all mens minds in one and the ſame aſſertion, an infallible Criterion of its verity. For the judgement of man in generall lyes open to the encroachments of Errot, and the common infirmity of humane nature is not only diſcoverable in the groſs and viſible deluſions of vulgar heads (whoſe buſineſs is to beleive, not examine) but hath frequently broken out upon the foundeſt brains, and conſeſt it ſelf Epidemical in the abſurd miſtakes of the greateſt Criticks of Truth, eſpecially in the promotion and tranſmiſſion of opinions hæreditary and traditional.

Sect.

Sect. III.

Article 1. Gods General Providence demonstrated by the *Idea* of his *Nature* reflected on our thoughts.

LEt us not, therefore, entrust the supportation of so weighty a Truth to that fragile reed of *Auctority*; but give our selves liberty to imagine, that no man ever believed or asserted an universal Providence: and having thus devested our minds of all *Presumption*, or *Anticipation*, expose them as tables newly derased to receive the pure impressions or sincere documents of the *Light of Nature*; converting our contemplations, First upon the *Nature of God*, and thence upon the *most exact order and confederacy of all secondary causes in the world.*

First, I say, let us set our reason a work upon the *nature of the First Cause*, or *Eternal Being*; and order our cogitations thus. The same demonstration, whereby the mind of man is convicted of the *Existence of God*, doth also at the same time violently, but naturally, conclude his nature to be so *accomplisht in all Perfections*, as to be above all *Access* or *Addition*. For manifest it is, that by the terme, *God*, every man doth understand *something to which no perfection is wanting*: and should it be granted possible, that the mind of man could conceive any perfection more then what is comprehended in the idea, which it holds of the nature of God; yet still would that thing, to which it could ascribe that perfection, be God. Since tis impossible to cogitate any perfection, which is not the essential propriety of some Nature: and to think any Nature more perfect then the *Divine*, plainly absurd; because we conceive that to be most perfect, or else we do not conceive it to be *God*; *God*, and *Absolute Perfection being one and the same thing*, and ordinarily conceived as one notion. Now, to be so infinitely *Wise*, *Potent*, and *Good*, as to order all things in the world to the best, to regulate and predetermine the operations of all second Causes, to keep Nature her self sober and in tune, and so prevent those discords, which otherwise would in a moment succeed to the reduction of all to a greater confusion then that of the Chaos; in a word, to conserve all things in existence: this no man will deny to be a *Perfection*, since we define the per-

fection of man, by his *abilities for dominion* (i. e.) in the judgement of our reaſon, every man is eſteemed by ſo much the more perfect, by how much the more generous, auguſt, liberal, prudent and benigne mind he is endued withall, and by inference, by how much the more digne he is to bear rule over others. Therefore is this *Perfection*, *Mundo providere, ſeu ſingulis rebus conſulere*, to take care of the world, and provide for the ſubſiſtence of every ſingle entity; of neceſſity to be aſcribed to *God*.

For though that obſolet fallacy, that *buſineſs* imports *diſquiet*, and diſquiet contradicts *felicity*, be retrived upon us; and our reaſon ſeem captived in the ſnare of this concluſion; That this *Perfection*, as it ſtands in relation to *Divinity*, muſt be an *imperfection*, as being point blanck repugnant to its nature, which cannot at once be ſuperlatively happy, and yet ſubject to multiplicity of buſineſs: yet we may ſoon redeem it to the liberty of truth, by conceiving ſome nature, wherein theſe two ſeeming contraries may be reconciled, (*i. e.*) the *Procuration of affaires* may ſhake hands with *extreme beatitude*. Nor do we conceive an impoſſibility herein; becauſe even among men we daily find, that thoſe Negotiations, which are an oppreſſion to a low, narrow and unpractiſed Wit, are but the pleaſant diverſions and familiar recreations of a ſublime, capacious, and polypragmatical: and by conſequence that Nature which is able to ſuſtain the adminiſtration of affairs infinite in number and variety, without detriment to its complet happineſs; muſt be conceded, by incomputable degrees of tranſcendency more perfect, then that whoſe quiet muſt ſuffer diminution by the diſtraction of cares. Wherefore let us not ſuffer our cogitations to acquieſce in this imperfect, but vigorouſly advance to that *moſt perfect Nature*, whoſe propriety it is to be at once both *ſupremely Provident*, and *ſupremely Beate*. And ſince we conceive *God* to be ſuch, it is of neceſſity inevitable, that we grant *Univerſal Providence to be his proper Attribute*.

For Confirmation, or (more properly) requiſite Explanation (for ſure no man, whoſe intellectuals are not ſuppreſſed by that intolerable tyrant, profeſt *Incredulity*, can longer doubt) of this; let us reflect upon our *Idea* of the *Deity*, and therein we ſhall diſcover, that tis impoſſible for the minde of man to conceive the

the import of this word, *God*; and not in the ſame numerical notion to underſtand him to be moſt *Wiſe*, moſt *Potent*, moſt *Good*, or *in abſtracto*, *infinite Wiſdome*, *infinite Power*, *infinite Goodneſs*, *aſſimilated*, *or rather identified into one ſimple eternal eſſence*. For undoubtedly our minds would ſpeculate the Idea of a poor inconſiderable and imperfect *Divinity*; if they conceived it ſubject to circumſcription, and apprehended his *Intellection* ſo narrow as not actually to comprehend all things; his *Power* ſo reſtrained, as to know *Impoſsibility*; his *Goodneſs* ſo ſcant and ſhallow, as to be exhauſted in a partial diffuſion, or limited by the admixture of *Envy*, (i. e.) withdrawn from, or denied unto any of the works of his hand, out of a deſigne to delight, or glory in their infelicity.

Article 2. The ſame particularly ſupported by that trinity of Attributes, *viz.* his 1. Infinite *Wiſdome.*

Now if God be *infinitely wiſe*, he muſt be *Omniſcient*; and conſequently, muſt underſtand not only the ſimple and naked *Forms* of all natures in the Univerſe, but hold alſo a full and clear theory of their *Eſſential proprieties*, how and by what kind of activities they operate toward the ſatisfaction of their prædeſtinate ends, and in what method they may be moſt conveniently diſpoſed to maintain the order and harmony of the whole; and ſo muſt know and exerciſe the due adminiſtration of all things in this vaſt Common-wealth. I ſay, muſt *know* and *exerciſe*; for if he underſtood the politie or method of the worlds Gubernation, only *Contemplatively*: then would not his *Intellection* be complet and abſolute in all points, and we ſhould have been compelled to recurre to our former device of cogitating ſome other nature more perfect, which might be actually poſſeſſed of both the *Theorical* and *Practical Intelligence*. Again, ſince *Sapience* doth conſiſt in, and manifeſt it ſelf cheifly by *Action*, and the real adminiſtration of difficult and important affairs; with what ſhadow of reaſon can we argue God to be moſt *Sapient*, if we conceive him to be *Idle*, devoyd of all action, and taking care of nothing?

2. Infinite *Power.*

Secondly, if God be *infinitely Potent*, then muſt he be *Omnipotent*: and ſo to his power there is no ἀδύνατον, or *impoſsibility*.

But how can we apprehend this aright, unleſs we firſt grant, that having produced all things, and endowed them with faculties reſpectively inſervient to their conducement to the ſatisfaction of the general end; he doth, through all the independent ſubdiviſions of time, (*i.e.*) conſtantly, moderate their activities, in full conformity to the prudent rules of his own *Will*: and how can this be done, unleſs we allow him to have a hand in all operations, and that both Cauſes and effects doe ſo fully and wholly depend upon him, that they can have neither *Exiſtence*, nor *Motion*, without the aſſent and coefficiency of his *Beneplacet*. Again, *Action* is the Pathognomonick, or proper manifeſt of *Power*; nay, in preciſe and orthodox logick, they are *Correlatives*, or twins that are born, live and dye together; and we are not now to learn, that Gods prime ſcope in the Creation, was to have an opportunity for the manifeſtation of his excellencies: if ſo, can *Inactivity* declare *Supreme Power*, or a ceſſation from acting not induce a ſuſpicion of *Laſſitude* and imbecillity?

3. Infinite *Goodneſs.*

Laſtly, if God be *infinitely good*; it neceſſarily followes, *Goodneſs* being *Communicative*, that all natures muſt be ſenſible of, by participating that his inexhauſtible goodneſs. And with what unpardonable incogitancy can that be aſſerted, while we opinion that he doth *concenter* his goodneſs, and when he hath created ſo many excellent natures, take no care or make no proviſion for their welbeing, but abandon them to the impendent miſery of confuſion? Might we not juſtly cenſure him of *Malevolence* or *Envy*, if he ſhould withhold the communication of his perpetual Providence from the works of his own hands; which muſt unavoydably periſh by the Antipathies of their Conſtitutions, and relaps into their primitive nothing in that moment, when he ſhould intermit his act of *Conſervation*? Nay, ſo eſſential is the conſtant overſight and tuition of the Creator to the ſubſiſtence of the Creature; that ſome contemplative heads have hereupon hinted a conjecture, that nothing ſhall go to the diſſolution of all, at the period of time, but the meer *Ceſſation of Providence*, or the dereliction of Nature to the neceſſary diſcord of her ſeveral peices.

And

And thus hath the clue of Gods chief *Attributes* (chief in his relation to the World) in a direct line conducted our ſingle reaſon to the demonſtration of his *General Providence*; which indeed, is the cleareſt mirror of his ſuperexcellent Nature, and to the opticks of mortality doth afford a lively reflexion of his *infinite Wiſedome, Power, and Goodneſs*. It ſucceeds, that we endevour to look at Providence through the *Teleſcope* or Perſpective of the *World*.

Article 3. The neceſſity of the worlds gubernation, by the indefinent influence of Gods general Providence, demonſtrated from the conſideration of the abſolute and total dependence of all *Second Cauſes* upon the *Firſt*.

Since God made the World, as hath been already proved; it cannot but be abſurd to imagine, that he inſtantly deſerted it, or having once impreſt a virtue of motion upon the greater wheels of this vaſt machin, immediately withdrew his hand from action, leaving them to be carried on by their own rapt or ſwinge; and all the leſſer and ſubordinate wheels of particular natures to conforme to the impulſion of thoſe greater. For though he made all things *Perfect*, (*i. e.*) omitted nothing requirable to the integral accompliſhment of each Creature, *in ſuo genere*: yet ſince himſelf is the *Univerſal Soul*, that both *Materiald* and *Informed* each particle of this great body; in ſtrictneſs of conſequence, nothing can have exiſtence longer then he ſhall pleaſe, in every minute of its duration, freſhly to create it, or (to ſpeak the intereſt of Providence) to conſerve it in being, by a continual communication of it ſelf; all the *Actions* of *Divinity*, being *real Divinity at ſecond hand*, or nothing but *Diffuſions*, or *Emanations* of its own eſſence.

Again, who ever reared a magnificent ſtructure a purpoſe to ruine it? and ſince there is no *Artificer* ſo unnatural or ſtupid, as not to deſire rather that his *Artifice* ſhould proſper and continue long by careſull looking to, then be expoſed to ruine by neglect or violence: tis infinitely more improbable, that the great *Exemplar* of all *Mechanicks* (for no age ever produced a peice of *Art, whoſe pattern was not firſt in Nature*) ſhould ſo far grow out of love with his own operation, and deſpiſe thoſe perfections, which were but the *extracts* of himſelf; as to diſclaim it, commit it to the imminent diſorder and demolition of *Fortune*, and not make proviſion of all things conducible to its preſervation: eſpecially, when

when no *Intellect* but his own could be large enough to comprehend the Idea of the work, no *Prudence* but his own abſolute enough to project the convenient modell of its due gubernation, no *Power* but his own almighty enough to furniſh him with requiſites thereto.

Nor can it, with ſafety, or honour to our judgements, be imagined, that God might, had he ſo pleaſed, have conſtituted the World in ſuch abſolute perfection, as that from the minute of its complete exiſtence it might have continued *independent*, and to all eternity have ſubſiſted *by it ſelf*, and all its appointed motions have conſtantly, without intermiſſion, or variation, ſucceeded by the direction of their bequeathed impreſſions, without the aſſiduous moderation of his care, or the minutely ſupply of his providence, ſince the Univerſe, according to the Grammar of ſound Philoſophy, is no *Noune Subſtantive*, and enjoyes *reality* only by a *diſtinction*: *i. e.* is *ſomething by dependence upon him, who was eternally contrary to nothing*; and being, at that inſtant, when *Omniety* informed *Nullity* into *exiſtence*, educed out of nothing, by the ſingle *Fiat* of *God*, and thence forward continued to be ſomething by the continued Power of the Creator: muſt unavoidably revert to nothing again, if the perſeverance of that identical power be ſubſtracted, from which it once obtained to be ſomething. And as *Light* cannot ſubſiſt, if ſeparated from a *lucid body*; but inſtantly vaniſhes into opacity: ſo cannot the World (which is but a reflexive deradiation from that *Light*, which is inviſible) continue, if the perpetual ſourſe of that miraculous *Virtue*, which upholds its exiſtence, be withdrawn, but muſt immediately vaniſh into nothing. For the *Analogy* holds in all points, and the dependence of the *Creature* upon the *Creator*, is as highly abſolute, as that of *Light* upon the *Sun*, or other *lucid body*. And though there are ſome things, which being once aſſiſted into determinate eſſences by their cauſes, doe afterwards ſubſiſt without them, and keep poſſeſſion of thoſe Forms by their own native force: yet are they ſuch as were ſtill *ſomething* before their ſpecification to this or that nature by their cauſes; ſince all that natural Cauſes can doe, is *to mould an old matter into a new figure*, and ſo diſpoſe the faculties exiſtent therein, that a

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new ſomething may ſtart out of the ruines of an old ſomething. But the World which was nothing before the fruitfull voyce of *Elohim* called it into ſomething, hath nothing from it ſelf to ſubſiſt upon; but muſt therefore, in the twinckling of an eye, become nothing again, unleſs its exiſtence be ſupported and maintained by the conſtant recruit of the ſame *miraculous Power*, which firſt created it. I ſay, the ſame *miraculous Power*; for the *Creation* doubtleſs was the greateſt *miracle*, that ever was wrought: it being more difficult to turn *Nothing* into *all things*, by the bare *nutus* or *vote* of the *Firſt Cauſe*, then to produce an extraordinary *effect* by inverting the uſual method of *Secondary Cauſes*; a harder wonder to make *Nature* herſelf, then to præpoſter, or tranſcend her cuſtomary rules of acting, to the cauſation of an effect either againſt, or above her ſelf. Though to ſpeak rationally, and as men that underſtand ſomething of *Theoſophy*; nothing can be a miracle to him, to whom all things are not only of equal *poſsibility*, but of equal *facility* alſo. When therefore we ſay, that *God is the Cauſe of the world*; we are to underſtand him to be ſo in the ſame relation, that the *Sun* is the *Cauſe of Light*: and by conſequence, as the *Light* diſappears in the Aer, when the *Sun* diſcontinues its *Actinoboliſme* or deradiation in our hemiſphear, by viſiting the lower; ſo alſo muſt the *World* diſappear and be loſt in adnihilation, when *God* ſhall pleaſe to diſcontinue his influx of minutely *Creation*, or (to ſpeak more conform to our præſent ſcope, though it ſignifie the ſame thing in height of truth) to intermit his *Providence*.

Article 4. The vaſtity of the World: the infinite variety of its parts: and the irreconcileable diſcord of many natures: demonſtrate as much.

Moreover, ſo immenſe are the bounds of this vaſt Empire, the World, ſo numerous and various its ſubdiviſions, and thoſe again dichotomized into ſo many myriads of Cantons, or Provinces, and each of thoſe peopled with ſo many millions of different and diſcordant natures; that no reaſon can admit it ſo much as probable, that a conſtant correſpondence could be maintained, and a general amity obſerved though all, without the conſerving influence of a *Rector General*, or *Supervisor*, whoſe *Will* receives laws from his *Wiſdome*, and gives them to all beſides himſelf. And therefore their thoughts miſſed not much of the white of

truth, who conceived *God* to hold the ſame place in the world, as a *Pilot* in a ſhip, a *Charioter* in his Chariot, a *Chantor* in a Chorus, a *Father* in a family, a *Monarch* in a Kingdome, or a *General* in an Army. For, as the firſt preſerves from ſhipwrack, the ſecond from deviation and ſubverſion, the third from diſcord, the fourth from poverty and deſolation, the fifth from diviſions, and the laſt from confuſion: ſo doth the wiſe overſight of God regulate the efficiencies of all *Natural Agents*, with ſuch admirable politie, that the whole is preſerved in ſafety, in the direct road that leadeth to the general end, in harmony, in proſperity, in union, in perfect order.

To draw a line yet more parallel; we every day obſerve in the ſad experiments of death, what a leaden and unweildly maſs of clay the *body* becomes, ſo ſoon as its ſprightly Tenant, the *Soul*, hath ſurrendred to corruption; and it needs not much proof, that the *Soul* of this gigantik *body*, the Univerſe, is *God*: therefore when this ſoul ſhall withdraw and ceaſe its Animation, muſt that body fall by its own weight, and ſuffer diſſolution.

Not that therefore, in ſtrictneſs of ſenſe, or without the latitude of a metaphor, *God* is a *Soul*, and the *World* his *Body*; but becauſe the informing and actuating Preſence of God is as abſolutely neceſſary to the vitality of the World, and the moderation of all its parts in the due execution of their diſtinct offices, as the Preſence of a ſoul to the animation of a body, and the regulation of all its members in the requiſite adminiſtrations of their ſeveral functions.

Article 5. Under what reſtriction we are to underſtand that tropology of ſome Hermetical Philoſophers, *Deum eſſe Animam Mundi.*

And upon this ground, our zeal ought not to diſtaſt that *Figurative expreſſion* of thoſe *myſtical and ſymbolical Philoſophers*, who call *God*, the *Soul of the World*; nor be captious at that rhetorique, which hath comparatively ſtyled him, the *Pilot*, *Emperour*, and *General of Nature*: ſince 'tis the moſt mannerly language mortality can invent, for the explanation of his *Government*; nor is it probable, that thoſe profound ſpeculators, who firſt adopted thoſe modeſt metaphors, to ſhadow the unutterable infinity of his *Wiſdome* and *Power*, were ignorant that there ought ſtill this *difference* to be allowed, that though a *Pilot* is not *ubiquitary* in

all

all parts of his ſhip, nor an *Emperour* actually *omnipreſent* in all places of his dominions, nor a *General locally preſent* in all quarters and ſtations of his Army; yet God is *intimately omnipreſent* in every particle of the world. So that what is uncertainly ſaid of the *Soul, Tota in toto, & tota in qualibet parte*: may be moſt certainly ſaid of *God, Totus in toto, and totus in qualibet parte.*

In fine, as the inſpection and conſideration of the World, hath formerly repleniſhed us with irrefutable Arguments of its *Creation* by God: ſo alſo may it evince the conſtant *Conſervation* of it, by the influence of his *Providence.*

For whoever (though a meer *Pagan*, whoſe brain never received the impreſſion of either of thoſe two notions, *Creator* and *Providence*) ſhall ſpeculate the world in an Engyſcope or magnifying Glaſs, *i.e.* ſhal look upon it in the diſtinction of its ſeveral orders of natures, obſerve the commodious diſpoſition of parts ſo vaſt in quantity, ſo infinite in diverſity, ſo ſymmetrical in proportions, ſo exquiſite in pulchritude: ſhall contemplate the comelineſs, ſplendor, conſtancy, converſions, revolutions, viciſsitudes, and harmony of celeſtial bodies: ſhall thence deſcend to ſublunary, and with ſober admiration conſider the neceſſary difference of ſeaſons, the certain-uncertain ſucceſſion of contrary tempeſts, the inexhauſtible treaſury of Jewels, Metals, and other wealthy Minerals concreted in the fertile womb of the earth; the numerous, uſefull and elegant ſtock of vegetables; the ſwarms of various Animals, and in each of theſe, the multitude, ſymmetry, connexion, and deſtination of organs: I ſay, whoever ſhall with attentive thoughts perpend the excellencies of theſe unimitable *Artifices* (for all things are *Artificiall, Nature being the Art of God*) cannot, unleſs he contradict the teſtimony of his own *Conſcience*, and invalidate the evidence of that authentique *Criterion*, the *Light of Nature*, but be ſatisfied; that as nothing leſs then an infinite *Power and Wiſdome* could contrive and finiſh, ſo nothing leſs then the unceſſant vigilancy and moderation of an infinite *Providence* can conſerve and regulate them, in order to the mutual benefit each of other, and all conſpiring, though in their contentions, to the promotion of the common intereſt.

Article 6. The Atheiſts ſubterfuges of *Nature* and *Fortune*, precluded.

If any ſhall yet ſtand out and object, that what I call *Providence*, is no other but *Nature* nicknamed, all thoſe ſetled motions and regular effects in the world being but the neceſſary products of its eſtabliſht laws, and unalterable method: yet ſince they all declare an *Infinite intelligence* in that Nature, which could decree thoſe perfect conſtitutions, and ſo ſtrictly oblige all things to obſerve them in order to a general and particular good; he muſt at laſt by compulſion diſcover *Divinity* diſguiſed under the vizard of Nature, by whoſe counſel and directions all things operate.

Nor can any man with more hopes of ſafety recurre to *Fortune*; or affirme, that there is no *Præordination* of contingencies, but that all events are the inconſiderate and extemporary reſults of *Chance*: ſince we have lately beheld the ruines of that Sanctuary, nor dare I be ſo uncharitable, as to preſume that the reaſon of any thing prætending to humanity, can be ſo infatuted with the ſtupid idolatry of that Fairy Queen, as to expect a farther refutation of that delirium.

Sect. IV.

HAving, with perſpicuity equal to the higheſt expectation, demonſtrated the neceſſity of *Univerſal Providence*, from the nature both of the *Agent* and *Patient*; *God* and the *World*; it remains only that we withdraw that curtain of *objections*, wherewith the Impiety of its adverſaries hath darkned the proſpect of leſs ocular diſcerners, and terminated the viſion of thoſe whoſe opticks have not been ſtrong enough to transfix it.

Article 1. The Atheiſts firſt Antiprovidential Argument refuted, by the *Perfection* of the *Divine Nature*: and their abſurdity, in commenſurating the *excellencies* of *God*, by the infinitely inferior *Faculties* of man, detected.

The firſt, we may remember, was that vanity of *Epicurus*, that *the condition of a bliſsful and immortal Nature* (ſuch was his character of Divinity) *is inconſiſtent with the neceſſary perturbations and perplexities of buſineſs.*

But

But alas! how groſly muſt he delude himſelf, who fathoms the extent of an *Infinite*, by the unequal geometry of a *Finite*, and limits incomprehenſible *Omniety* to the narrow circumſcriptions of *Humanity*; which in compariſon is but one remove from *Nullity*? Had *God*, indeed, been, as he conceived him, of *Humane figure*; it had been no error in the Court of Reaſon to have concluded him not much ſuperior in the capacity of his *Intellect*: but when the *Divine Nature*, as himſelf acknowledged, muſt tranſcend all other in perfection and excellencies; how palpable a contradiction did he fall upon, in commenſurating the latitude of its *Power* and *Wiſdome*, by the ſpan of an imperfect and caduce nature, betwixt which and *Omnipotent-omniſcience* are ſo many degrees of difference, as all the figures and cyphers of Arithmetick cannot amount to their compute, nor is mortality qualified to conceive. To paint a *Sound*, is a far eaſier task, then to deſcribe the imperveſtigable manner of *Gods operations*: and to deny the poſſibility of that, whoſe reaſon we cannot explore, is to proclaim our ignorance of any nature more perfect then our own; and that upon conſequence, is to make our nature more imperfect then really it is, by rendring it uncapable of the greateſt *Truth*; nay, of that truth, upon whoſe certitude, the aſſurance of all poſſible cognition doth neceſſarily depend. This had the raſh *Epicurus* conſidered, doubtleſs he never had diſparaged the nature of man, by equalizing it to Gods. I ſay, *diſparaged*; becauſe to conceive a *Finite eſſence*, as *perfect* as an *Infinite*, is openly to confeſs that nature, which can conceive ſo horrid and ſenſible an *Abſurdity*, to be far more frail and contemptible, then all other of its actions declare it to be: not but, in direct verity, tis the greateſt diſparagement, and no leſs then blaſphemy to the infinitely ſacred majeſty of *God*, to be put in the ſcales againſt vile, ignorant, and impotent *Man*.

And while his thoughts flagged ſo many ſphears below the *Empyreum* of all perfection, twas no wonder that he was ſtaggered at *Univerſal Providence*; that being a notion impoſſible to be inſtilled into any mind, that is not firſt prepared with the beleif of an *Univerſal Intelligence*.

Again, to draw into a ſharper angle, and render the abſurdity

of this Compariſon more ridiculous; the Reaſons why a man, though of the ſtrongeſt brain, and greateſt abilities for buſineſs, muſt of neceſſity ſuffer diſquiet, diſtractions and wearisome ſolicitude from the multiplicity of cares, are (1.) the narrowneſs of his Underſtanding, which cannot be expanſed to take in all the remote, proxime, and confederate Cauſes, events, dependencies, connexions, circumſtances, &c. of occurrences: (2.) the ſhortneſs of his Power, which cannot ſtretch to furniſh him with all things neceſſary as well to the prevention and remove of all incident impediments, as to the molition, promotion, and accompletion of his deſignes: and (3.) the reſtraint of his Perſon to Time, Place and diſtance. But, on the other ſide, God is Omniſcient, Omnipotent, Omnipreſent; and therefore in the prædordination, direction and compulſion of all things to the cauſation of thoſe effects, which his Will hath decreed, he knows infinitely leſs of labour or diſquiet, then the healthieſt man doth in the motions of reſpiration, in his ſoundeſt ſleep.

Article 2. Divinity demonſtrated ſuperior to the circumſcription both of *Time* and *Place*.

That God is not ſubject to the reſtraint of *Time*, is manifeſt from his *Eternity*; for that is *indiviſible*, and knows no diſtinction of tenſes: and therefore what we (whoſe imperfect reaſon cannot compute the duration of things, but by the ſucceſſive inſtances, or concatenated moments of time) call *Prædeſtination*, is really no prædetermination of what's to come, in reſpect to God, but an act of his will already accompliſht, and as ſoon fulfilled as decreed; and ſo we may truely ſay, that in relation to himſelf, there is no *Foreknowledge* in God, all things which to our inferior Capacities ſeem either paſt, or to come, being actually præſent to him, whoſe whole duration is altogether, or but one conſtant and permanent point, one τὸ νῦν, entire in unity, and uncapable of diviſion into ſucceſſive minutes, or articles.

That he is not ſubject to the reſtraint of *Place*, is evident from his *Omniety*, his being all in all; *Ubiquity* being the proper and inſeparable *Attribute* of his nature. His being *All in All*, not only *ratione Præſentiæ*, but *ratione Eſſentiæ* alſo; he being the chief *Soul* not only of all *Bodies*, but of all *Spirits* alſo. And for this reaſon we cannot offend Theology, if we affirme, that God

is

is as *fully Preſent* in Hell among the accurſed, as in Heaven among the bleſſed natures, though not ſo *comfortably*; and that the Devils would rejoyce if they could conceive it poſſible for him to be abſent thence: ſince their exiſtence, and ſo their Torments would then ceaſe, his preſence being the original and ſupport of all exiſtence.

Now if all this be amaſſed into one demonſtration, and that duely perpended; I demand as well of the moſt contumacious infidelity, as the rankeſt ignorance, what can remain deſirable, in order to the full information of our reaſon; that if there were a million of Worlds, nay as many as there are individuals in this, and in each a 1000000 times more buſineſs then in this: yet could the overſight and gubernation of them all, and the regular managery of every the ſmalleſt occurrence in them, put *Divinity* to no more trouble, diſquiet, or interruption of felicity, then the ſimple *Act* of *Volition* doth induce upon the ſoul of man.

Article 3. That the procuration of all the infinitely various actions of ſecond cauſes, in the World, cannot be any interturbation of Gods ſerene *felicity*, proved by an Argument *à minori*.

However, for further illuſtration, I cannot think it unneceſſary to ſuperadd this; that ſince *Man* himſelf doth ordinarily perform ſome actions, particularly thoſe, which he is not only qualified and impowered, but alſo inclined to doe, by the native virtue, or congenial propenſity of his Eſſence, as to *Cogitate*, *Deſire*, *Love*, *Rejoyce* in the manifeſtation of his good parts or endowments, &c. not only without labour and inquietude, but even with ſuperlative delight and content: it cannot but be concordant to reaſon to aſſert, that *God* is ſo far from ſuſtaining any difficulty, moleſtation, or diminution of felicity, in the conſtant act of *Univerſal Providence*; which is the natural effect of his *Infinite Intelligence* and *Indefatigable Activity*, that is rather a part of his *Beatitude* ſo to exerciſe and manifeſt his *Divinity*. Not that the abyſs of his *Happineſs* was not full before the World was; but becauſe, being moved by his own immenſe *Goodneſs* to create a convenient ſubject, whereon to actuate his *Munificence*, he is pleaſed ſtill to dolight himſelf in the continued diffuſion and communication of his excellencies, by the conſervation and regulation of the ſame, according to the moſt prudent laws of his Will.

I have often conſulted the moſt knowing and beſt ordered minds,

minds, with whom I could attain the bleſſing of a free converſation (and ſuch, doubtleſs, are the only competent judges of delight) wherein lay the Philoſophers ſtone of *Content* in this life, and in what actions of their lives they diſcovered the higheſt and moſt permanent pleaſure: and they all concurred in this determination, *Aliis proaeſſe, & quàm licet plurimis bene facere.* And this upon no ſlender ground, ſince the *Beatitude* of *Man* doth radically and totally conſiſt in his *appropinquation* to *God*, and we never come ſo neer him, in this remote vale of tears, as when we go out of our ſelves to relieve the neceſſities, lighten the oppreſſions, and prevent or repair the ruines of others. For *Charity* is the only excellence, wherein we may, in ſome ſort, rival our maker: and were but our *Wills* conſtantly fixt upon the practiſe of this virtue, and our *Abilities* of doing good but half ſo infinite as our Wills (for the wings of our *Underſtanding* are, indeed, but *ſhort*; but thoſe of our *Will* are *long*, and have a liberty to fly at all, as ſhall be ſingularly proved in convenient place) we might anticipate no ſmall part of the joys of heaven, while we ſojourne upon earth, and ſhould need no other Heraldry to teſtifie our ſelves the off-ſpring of *Divinity*. Now if it be ſo intenſe a *delight* to the mind of *man*, which is but a beam deradiated from that immenſe *Sun of Charity*, to do good: ought we to think it a *trouble* to *God*, who is *moſt intelligent*, and ſo beſt knows the neceſſities of all things; *moſt beneficent*, and ſo moſt ready to relieve them; *moſt rich*, and ſo not obnoxious to impoveriſhment by the continual profuſion of his favours; to be a *general benefactor* by his Providence?

Article 4. The ſame illuſtrated by a ſecond compariſon.

To conclude; if the *viſible* and *periſhable Sun* can with unceſſant liberality, diffuſe his conſolatory and all-impregnating ſtreams of light, heat, and influence on all parts of the ſenſible or adſpectable World; and ſo concurre to the generation, vitality, growth, perfection and conſervation of all ſublunary Natures; and this without labour, laſſation, or exhauſtion: Why ſhould not the *Inviſible*, *Unperiſhable*, and *Infinite Sun* (of which the other is but a dark and contracted ſhadow) be allowed to have his *Wiſdome*, *Power*, *and Goodneſs* (which Trinity of Attributes make

make the unity of Providence, as I have formerly hinted) in all places, and at all times diffuſed, in their operations, over all his Works, with the ſame facility.

Article 5. That the adminiſtration of petty occurrences can be no *indignity* or diſparagement to the ſacred Majeſty of God; but, on the contrary abſolutely *eſſentiall* to him, firmly evicted, from the univerſality of his *Cognition* and *Preſence*.

And as it can be no *Interturbation* to the ſerene *Felicity*, ſo neither can it be a *Diſhonour* or diſparagement to the ſuperexcellent *Majeſty* of *God*, to tranſmit the rayes of his *Providence* to the moſt minute, and ſeemingly moſt trivial and contemptible tranſactions on this great exchange of the world. And therefore *Pliny*, who ſaid, *neceſſe eſt ut Deus tam triſti, tamque multiplici miniſterio polluatur*; might with leſs abſurdity have affirmed, that the Sun doth an action much below the dignity of ſo glorious a creature, and muſt have the purity of his light ſuffer diminution and contamination, when it projects its radiant beams upon ſordid and putrid bodies; when it cooperates to the production of Toads, Serpents, worms and other the like baſe vermin; and when it promotes the fertility of noxious and deleterious weeds, as well as wholſome and medical plants. For thoſe things which appear vile, deſpicable and ugly to the queazy judgment of man; are not ſo really to *Nature*: ſince ſhe knowes no *deformity*, and therefore all her pieces muſt be amiable: not really ſo to the eyes of the *Author of Nature*, ſince he hath thought good to configurate them according to the moſt exact ideas in his own wiſe intellect; and therefore *Beauty* is beſt defined by the conformity every thing holds to its primitive exemplar in the Intellect of its Creator: not ſo to *themſelves*, ſince they have obtained a perfection congruous to their *ſpecies*, and enjoy an abſolute pulchritude reſpective to their diſtinct kinde; and therefore no Animal is ſo inſenſible of the perfection of its *Forme*, as to deſire either to loſe, or exchange it.

Again, thoſe Actions, which ſeem various, cary the face of multiplicity, and fill up whole ſheets, in the diary of man; ſtand but for an unit in the Arithmetick of Nature and make but a monoſyllable in the book of Fate: it being the natural prerogative of Ubiquitary Omnipotence, to doe all things at once.

Conſider we, with what eaſe and quiet the pale and feeble *Soul* of a *Tree* can at once provide for the *Vegetation* as well of each

leafe and blossome, as of the trunck and root, and cook the insipid juice of the earth into an Aliment convenient to the conservation and growth of each single fiber and filament both of the cortex or bark, and of the interior and medullary substance: in a word, transfuse a vital influence through each indivisible particle of that great mass, of which it is composed.

Consider we, how easily the more luminous and energetical *Soul* of an *Elephant*, can at one and the same time, in one and the same blast, or deradiation of virtue, administer its nourishing influx to each particle of that vast body; and omitts not to take care of every single haire among so many myriads as cloth the skin, in its common doale or distribution of Vitality.

And when we have thus gently informed our selves, that tis as easie to the weak and evanid soul of a *Plant* (which the best *Physiology* defines to be nothing, *but a certain modification of matter volatilized, or a contexture of smooth, globular equal and so of calefactive Atoms, woven by the seminal virtue or plastick Faculty of that particular species, and soon dissolved again, upon a variation of figure and situation of those insensible particles of which it is composed*) to make provision for the livelyhood & sustentation of all parts in that mass, as for any one of them: that tis as genuine and familiar to the *Soul* of an *Animal* (which is also a *Corporeal substance*, or the more spiritual part of the bloud subtiliated by vital heat, traduced from its genitor) to animate and govern all parts of its body, as any one: we cannot but acknowledge, that the *Procuration* and *Administration* of all the affairs of the world, is as facil and natural to the *Providence of God* (who is the *Soul* of all *Souls*, and the *life* of *Spirits*) as to take the care of any one individual Nature.

If the oversight and regency of but half so many different operations, as that immaterial Empress, which keeps her invisible Court somewhere within us, doth every minute, even when we are fast lockt in the narcotick armes of Morpheus, and all our thoughts keep holy day, order and effect, while she maintains the oeconomy of the body; were charged upon the hands of our understanding, but for one houre: without question, the burden would prove insupportable, nor could either the skill or strength

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of our limited reaſon, in any meaſure reſponſible, ſuffice to the due adminiſtration of ſo large a Province. When, therefore, to fathom the depth of that immenſe natural prudence, and ſoveraign virtue, wherewith the ſoul of man is richly endowed, and which ſhe conſtantly declares in the proſperous exerciſe of her Monarchy, with the ſhort line of our intelligence; or to eſtimate her Providence according to the rate of our cheaper faculties; is both ignorance and unjuſtice: how infinitely more ſtupid and unwarrantable a courſe doth that wretch take, who adventures to commenſurate the ſuperexcellent *knowledge* and almighty *virtue* of *God*, whereby he procures and moderates the affairs of the World?

That man is, for the moſt, incurious of ſmal and trivial occurrences; is ſo far from being a wonder, that contrariwiſe thoſe, who could tripartite their thoughts to the contrivemẽt of but three different buſineſſes, at once, as *Caſar*, have been lookt upon as *Prodigies*: and he that can lay the grounds of but one popular deſigne, ſo as to have it ſucceed without impediment, or the intervention of croſs accidents; is reputed a profound *Politician*, and his head a whole ſphear above the vulgar. This, I am not ignorant, the haughtineſs of his ſpirit hath referred to the *fixation of his thoughts upon objects either of his pleaſure or ambition*; when in modeſt truth, this pretenſion of *ſublimity* is but a gloſs, or ſpecious vermiſh to conceal the *imbecillity* and *limitation* of his *intelligence*. For that being two narrow, to be extended to the forecaſt and regulation of many things at once; and his ſtomach too high to deſcend to a due acknowledgment of the imperfection of his nature: he guilds over the poverty with the pride of his minde, and endevours to excuſe his frailty, by inſimulating, that to attend the ſtudy of trifles, and in the interim ſuperſed the proſection of matters of importance, is a diſparagement to the nobility of his Intellectuals. When if his reaſon were ſo capacious, as to admit the care of petty affairs, without the confuſion, or neglect of others of more concernment; nothing, though nere ſo mean and ordinary, could ſeem below the dignity of his Providence. But that *God* ſhould be incurious of any action in the World, is abſolutely impoſſible; ſince contrapugnant to the *Univerſality*

verſality of his *Cognition* and *Præſence*: for what is *Omniſcient* and *Ubiquitary*, can be ignorant of nothing; and conſequently it can be no more either of *Profanation* to the *Sanctity*, or *diſhonour* to the glorious *Majeſty* of the *Deity*, to extend his Providence to the meaneſt contingents in nature, then it can be to the *Soul*, to vegetate and inſpire each ſingle *hair* of that body ſhe informs.

Sect. V.

Article 1. The firſt diviſion of the Atheiſts ſecond objection; *viz.* that *the apparent irregularity of events doth juſtifie their non-prædeſtination or meer Contingency*; ſtrongly convelled: and that to the præordination of divinity nothing can be caſual; clearly commonſtrated.

TO their *Second objection*, *that all events in the World are either the non-prædeſtinate and extemporary reſults of Chance; or the neceſſary and ſetled effects of Nature, all Actives and Paſſives being, by the unalterable laws of their primitive conſtitutions, firmely adliged unto, and irreſiſtibly impelled upon the cauſation of determinate effects reſpective to the energy of their particular configurations*: we as eaſily as uprightly anſwer,

Firſt, that to the prædeſtination of that *Almighty Cauſe*, which can and doth diſpoſe the motions of all things according to the præſcripts of his own *Will*, no event can be caſual or unexpected; though indeed, if we have regard to the præſcience and forecaſt of man, to whoſe dim opticks all things are inviſible, that ſtand in the dark of futurity, many events ſeem meer *Accidents*, and the moſt mature *determinations* of *Fate* may paſs for the raſh and inconſiderate *hitts* of *Fortune*.

And if ſo, how audacious a temerity is it in us, ſo to magnifie our own ſlender perſpicacity, as when we cannot diſcern why this or that particular concurſe and encounter of natural cauſes ſhould occur, rather then another, and ſuch or ſuch an iſſue of their confederate activities ſucceed, rather then another; inſtantly to conclude, that there can be no *Superior Cauſe*, or *ſuperintendent power*, which hath thus or thus ordained and diſpoſed thoſe certain means to thoſe certain ends, and whoſe counſels we are not

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privy unto? Look we no farther then the ordinary Providence of *Princes*, and in every *Republick* our observation shall meet with a thousand events, which in the judgements of their vulgar subjects, and such as stand aloof from the Councel table, are deemed meer *Contingents*, as never at all designed upon any secret reasons of State; when yet to the Prince himself, and those to whom he hath communicated the mystery of his designations, they really are the *intended effects of his Prudence*, which had so politickly ordered his affairs, and so wisely prepared all Agents requisite to the bringing about of his purposes, that they could not but hit and be accomplish't accordingly. And is there then, why we should not be confirmed, that in this *immense Commonwealth*, in whose government the most inobservant cannot but take notice of innumerable passages so admirable, both in respect of the weak *Instruments* that served to bring them to pass, and of the obscurity or impervestigability of the *Ends*, at which they were levelled; that nothing less then an *infinite Wisdome* could contrive, nothing less then an *infinite Power* effect them: there must of necessity be a *Rector General* or *President Paramount*, by whose soveraign dictates all subordinate ministers are set on work, in order to the execution of his pleasure, and in their operations vary not a hairs-bredth from the rules prescribed by his Will; though neither the *manner* of their *activities*, nor the *Ends* to which they are destined fall under the discovery of our purblinde reason? For the *Polity* of *God* is inscrutable, and may well delight our *Piety* with wonder, but must empuzle our insolent *Curiosity*: and the eye of our souls, being in this life far dimmer then that of *Moses* body, cannot survey so much as the back parts, or *dark side* of *Divinity*; much less pry into the maze of his *Counsels*, and read the invisible decrees of that mystical *Senate*, wherein though there be a consult of *three Persons*, there is yet but *one minde*, which votes without contradiction, and his *Volition*, *deliberation* and *Election*, make but one simple act. For my part, that the wayes of God in the World are past finding out; that there is a *Sanctum Sanctorum* in the Ark of Providence, into which blind mortality cannot look; and that the cryptick turnings, doublings, and redoublings of that hand, which works all its rarities in the

dark, and ſometimes inverts, now and then tranſcends, and anon infringes the *Axioms* of *Nature* (to ſhew, that as he made, ſo he can alter her, and tune all her ſtrings to a concord with his will) make a labyrinth to intricate and loſe the preſumptious reaſon of man, that dares hope to explore and trace it: this, I ſay, is demonſtration enough to me, that there is one *Univerſal Intelligence*, which both moves and directs all individual *Agents* to act, in order to the accompliſhment of ſome poſitive end, for the moſt part beſt, and many times only known to himſelf.

Nor is it an illegal proceſs of our reaſon, but the beſt logick, as to *ſupernaturals*; to conclude not only the excellencies, but even the neceſſary being of ſome things, meerly from hence that we cannot fully comprehend them: ſince their very being above our capacity, is argument both clear and ſtrong enough, that they are not only ſo as, but more perfect and far greater then we underſtand them to be; as he that ſees but a ſmall part of the ſea with a Teleſcope at diſtance, may ſafely conclude that tis exceeding large; becauſe the circumferrence thereof is, by infinite degrees of magnitude, wider then to be drawn into the aperture of his ſlender tube. Sure I am, at leaſt, that the *Antiſyllogiſme*, or *Counter-argument*; the underſtanding of man cannot diſcover its abſtruſe and myſterious plots, reſolve its multiplex ænigma's, nor analyze its method, or ſeries of Cauſes ſubordinate, and ſo by a retrograde chaſe hunt out its firſt and chief intention: *Ergo*, there can be no Providence: is intolerable, and deſerves a greater doſe of Ellebor, then that abſurdity of the blinde man, who concluded there was not, nor could be any ſuch thing as light, or Colours, only becauſe he could not ſee them. When therefore we ſhall have run our eager contemplations to a ſtand, in the wilderneſs of Providence, and loſt our buſie thoughts in the maze of Gods ſecret decrees; all the ſatisfaction our bold curioſity can return home with, will be only this: that all occurrences in the World are predetermined, have their *Cauſes*, *Times*, and *Ends* punctually ſet down in the *Ephemerides* of *Fate*; and though in the incompetent judgment of man, ſome of them may ſeem the *Peraventures*, or temerarious *Hits* of *Chance*: yet are they the mature *Deſignations* of the *ſupreme Wiſdome*: though in the

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ears of man, they may sound *discords* to the musick of *particular Natures*, yet will they at last be found *well composed Aers* necessary both to sweeten, and fill up the common *Harmony* of the Universe. To instance; are there not many *Monsters*, *Heteroclites*, *Equivocal* and irregular births, on the earth: many prodigious and new-faced *Meteors* in the upper, and uncertain *Anomalies* or unseasonable *Tempests* in the lower division of the Aer: many new *Phænomena* among the fixed; various encounters, divisions, and conspiracies among the erratick stars &c. and yet doe not all these, as Chrotchets and Quavers in a grave and solemn lesson on a Lute, conduce to the advancement of the *General Melody*? Doth not *irregularity* render *order* the more conspicuous and amiable? and *Deformity*, like the *Negro* drawn at *Cleopatra's* elbow, serve as a foile to set off *Beauty*? Are not the *Moles* on the cheeks of *Nature*, as those on *Venus* skin, placed there to illustrate or whiten the snow, and sweeten the feature of her face? Is it not exceeding gracefull in a *Comœdian*, to temper and endear the sage and weighty scenes of *Princes*, and Melancholy *States-men*, with the light interludes of *Pantalons*, *Clowns*, and *Anticks*? Doth not the *Painter* then shew the most of skill, when he refracts the glaring luster of his *lighter* Colours, with a veil of *Sables*; and makes the *beauty* of his peice more visible by clouding it with a becoming *shadow*? And without doubt, every man will readily conjoyne his vote to ours, that he is best able to *adorn* and imbellish a piece of Art, who first *contrived* and wrought it: and therefore the *Perfection* and *Condecoration* of a work doth properly and solely belong to his hand, that brought it to that height, as to want only ornament; nor is it his part to prescribe what's necessary to the conciliation of gracefulness and decorament to an engine, who is ignorant of the modell, and holds not a perfect Idea of the Artifice thereof. Now the importance of all these *similes* being put together, who can be so ignorant in the Alphabet, or rudiments of ratiocination, as not, at first sight, to spell them into this short lesson, consisting only of two orthodox Positions.

First, that those subitaneous *Accidents*, which the ignorance or carelesness of the vulgar doth usually refer to the blind sortilegies

legies of *Chance*; are truely the meer *hand of God*, and the prudent designes of that *Catholick Providence, which hath numbred the sands on the Sea shoar, and weighed the dust of the earth in a balance: which feeds the young Ravens, when they cry, and while the old ones wander for meat: which thundereth marvellously with his voyce; and doth great things, that we cannot comprehend: for he saith to the snow, Be thou on the earth; likewise to the smal rain, and to the great rain of his strength: by whose breath frost is given; and the breadth of the waters is straightned: which turneth the bright clouds round about by his Counsels, that they may doe what ever he commandeth them upon the earth: who made the ordinances of heaven, and hath set the dominions thereof in the earth: who can binde the sweet influences of the Pleiades, and lose the bands of Orion: can bring forth Mazaroth in his season, and guide Arcturus with his sons, &c.*

Secondly, that those *Monstrosities*, or extraordinary and prodigious effects, which the nescience of the multitude cals *Irregularities*, *Perversions*, and *Deformities* of *Nature*; to wiser considerations, prove themselves to be no wanton excursions, or randome shots of her hand, made without aim at any final cause; but *praeordained*, and *collineated* by that sure one of *Divine Providence*, point blanck at some certain *end*, *private* or *publick*. The *former* being known only to himself, *à priori*; and frequently mistaken by man, *à posteriori*: the *later*, indeed, we have a liberty to conjecture, to be either that he leaves the straight, and chalks out this serpentine and crooked line, to satisfie the World of his *Prerogative*, that himself is the *Agent*, and *Nature* but his *Instrument*, and therefore to be turned, wrenched, altered, and perverted at his pleasure; or else, that his wisdome thinks those spots requisite to enhance the beauty of the whole, those private fewds and petty discords betwixt Individuals, necessary not only to endear, but conserve the peace of the whole.

Both which durable Truths are, with so much piety, as judgement, contracted by that *Emperor* of the *Stoicks* as well as of the *Romans*, *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus* (of whom the smooth *Herodian* (*initio historiae*) gives this glorious Character, μόνος τὲ βασιλέων φιλοσοφίαν, ὐ λόγοις, ὐδὲ δογμάτων γνώσεσι,

σεμνῷ

σεμνῷ δ' ἤθει καὶ βίῳ σώφρονι διηρώσατο: *Solus imperatorum sapientiæ studium non verbis aut decretorum scientia, sed gravitate morum, vitæque continentia usurpavit*) into one short meditation, in these words; Τὰ τῶν θεῶν, προνοίας μετὰ τὰ τῆς τύχης ἐκ ἄνευ φύσεως ἢ συγκλώσεως, καὶ ἁπλοκῆς τῆ προνοίᾳ διοικημένων. πάντα ἐκεῖθεν ῥεῖ, πρόσεισι δὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον, καὶ τὸ τῷ ὅλῳ κόσμῳ συμφέρον, ἧ μέρος εἶ. παντὶ δὲ φύσεως μέρει ἀγαθὸν, ὃ φέρει ἡ τῆς ὅλης φύσις, καὶ ὃ ἐκείνης ἐστὶ σωστικόν. Σώζουσι δὲ κόσμον ὥσπερ αἱ τῶν στοιχείων, ἅπως καὶ αἱ τῶν συγκριμάτων μεταβολαί: *Quæ ad Deos ut auctores referuntur, ea Providentiæ plena esse nemo dubitat. Quæ Fortunæ vulgò adscribuntur, ne illa quidem extra Naturæ leges, fatalemque illum contextum, complexúmque rerum, quæ a providentia administrantur. Inde omnia fluunt: adde quod necessarium est, quicquid est, & toti universo (cujus tu pars es) conducibile. Porro autem quod natura Universi fert, quódque ad eam facit conservandam, id bonum est unicuivis Universi particulæ. Conservant autem mundum, quemadmodum elementorum, ita & ex iis concretarum rerum mutationes.* Libri εἰς ἑαυτὸν primi sect. ultima.

Secondly, that no *Natural Agent* hath the reins in its own hands, or the liberty to act in a *loose and arbitrary way*; but all things observe that immutable *Tenor*, or setled course, which they began to operate in at their first inauguration to essence: provided that we understand this assertion under a twofold *restriction*.

Article 2. The Authors *Antithesis*, that all Natural Agents are under the strict laws of their distinct species.

First, that this Tenor or establisht method, was not instituted by the improvidence of Fortune, as our Atheists would have it; but ordained, enrolled and enacted by the counsel of an infinite Wisdome.

Article 3. A second *Counterposition*, that those laws were instituted and sancited by an *infinite wisdom*.

Secondly, *that this supernatural Nature, which excogitated and decreed this convenient law, and endowed each single entity* Article 4. A third, that the *legislator* hath reserved to himself a prærogative power to alter, transcend, invert, or repeal the laws of Nature.

with a Power or Faculty reſpective to its duty thereto, and obſervance or execution thereof; hath not thereby ſo tied up his own hands, or limited his Prærogative, as not to have reſerved to himſelf an abſolute ſuperiority, or capacity, at pleaſure to infringe, tranſcend, or pervert it, by giving ſpecial diſpenſation to any of his Creatures, to vary the manner of their Activities, in order to the Cauſation of any effect, which his own prudence ſhall think expedient.

Article 5. The verity of the firſt and ſecond Poſitions, amply demonſtrated.

For the *Firſt* and *Second* of theſe *Poſitions*; *viz.* that as well the general Law of Nature, as thoſe particular and œconomical rules, which being engraven not only upon every diſtinct ſpecies, but alſo upon every ſingle or individual entity, ſtand both for warrant and directions to them in their ſeveral operations; were made and eſtabliſhed by the counſel of an infinite Wiſdome: may (if we may aſſume the liberty to aggravate what we have formerly adſend toward the atteſtation of the ſame ſubject) be thus demonſtrated.

In the whole *Scale* of *Creatures*, we finde but five *Gradations* or roundles, by which our contemplations may orderly aſcend to the higheſt pinnacle, or ſummity of Nature, and thence take a full ſurvey of all her Provinces at large: and thoſe are *Exiſtence*, *Life*, *Senſe*, *Locomotion voluntary*, and *Reaſon*. To ſpeak yet more perſpicuouſly.

Firſt, there are ſome things, which have obtained a bare *Exiſtence*, or meer *Being* only, and remain devoid of all the other four: ſuch are all *ſimple bodies*, as the *Heavens*, and thoſe four which common Phyſiology calls στοιχεῖα *Elements*; and all συγκείμενα inanimate *Concretions*, or Compoſitions, as Stones, Metals, Minerals, &c.

Secondly, ſome have not only Exiſtence, but alſo *Vitality* or *Vegetability* allotted unto them, and yet want ſenſe, and motion arbitrary; as all *Vegetables*.

A *Third* Claſſis endowed with *Being*, *Life*, and *Senſe*; and yet hath not attained ſo high as *Animal* or *voluntary motion*: to which belong all *Conchylia*, as Oyſters, Muſcles, Cockles, &c. which *Ariſtotle* (3. *De Gener. Animal. cap.* 2.) for the ſame reaſon

reaſon, facetiouſly calls *Aquatiles Plantas*, a kind of *Water Plants*; as by an inverſion, he calls earthly Plants, *Oſtrea Terrena*, a kind of *Land Oyſters*: becauſe they have not, as he opinioned, the power of tranſlating themſelves *de loco in locum* (though our *Democritus Londinenſis*, that incomparable indagator of Natures Arcana, Dr. *Harvey*, hath obſerved that Oyſters protrude, or belch out on the conical extreme of their ſhells, a certain Filme or natural ſaile, by the help whereof they remove, veer, tack about, and ſo, obſerving the Tides, conduct themſelves to ſhoars, rocks, and other places of advantage both for their feeding, and quiet) but are tumbled up and down by the impulſe of the Current.

Others of a *fourth order* are admitted to goe higher, and to their *Exiſtence*, *Vitality*, and *Senſibility*, is alſo ſuperadded *Locomotion arbitrary*, or the Faculty of removing their ſtations at pleaſure; but yet they are excluded from the perfection of *Rationality*, and know nothing good or evill, but by the diſcernment or diſcrimination of *Senſe*: as all brute Animals, Quadrupeds, Birds, Fiſhes, Amphibions, and Inſects.

And *Laſtly*, others there are, which being higheſt in the favour of their maker, poſſeſs all theſe accumulated endowments together, and have *Exiſtence*, *Life*, *Senſe*, *Voluntary motion*, and *Ratiocination* contorted together into one excellent Nature, which ſeems in an epitomy or contraction to comprehend all the others: and theſe are *our ſelves*. Some over pregnant Wits there have been, I well remember, who have added one round more to this Ladder of *Corporeal Natures*, making the *Zoophytes* or *Plant-Animals* an half-pace, or midle ſtep betwixt the 2 and 3 degrees: but untill either an autoptical experiment, or the obſervation of ſome, who are more curious of Truth, then exotique Rarities, ſhall remove thoſe ſcruples which I have in me, concerning the fidelity of thoſe large ſtories obtruded upon us by Travellers, of the *Herba mimoſa*, or mimick Plant, deſcribed by *Chriſtopher Acoſta*, firſt, afterwards by *Cluſius*, and ſince grown traditional amongſt all *Botanicks*; of the *Boramez*, or *Vegetable Lambe of Tartary* (no ſparing relation whereof was firſt communicated to the world in the common language of Europe, by *Sigiſmund*

Baron of Verbestein (*in rerum Moscoviarum Commentariis*) then countenanced by the glorious Pen of *Jul. Cæsar Scaliger* (*Exercit.* 181. *Sect.* 29.) since made more passant by *Fortunius Licetus* (*Lib.* 3. *de spont. vivent. ortu, cap.* 4.) and *Libavius* (*part* 2. *singul. exercitat. de Agno vegetabili Scythiæ*) and now taken for granted by all or most Herbarists of our age; of the *Sponge*, &c. I shall beg leave to suspend my belief, that there are any such Heteroclites, or midle Natures, *half Vegetable, half sensible*; or, at least, that both Faculties are so conspicuous and eminent in them, as that thence they should deserve really to be accounted a distinct order of Creatures.

Now the *Faculties*, or *essential proprieties* of all things being thus incommunicable downward, and each distinct classis so confined to its proper orb of endowments, that it can never advance upward, and usurpe more perfection then what it already stands possessed of by the Charter of its particular specification; it follows, that we explore the *reason* or *original* of this *Limitation*, and why those Natures of the first degree, are limited to meer Existence, and cannot aspire to Vegetation: why those of the second are chained down to Existence and Vegetation, without possibility of being ever promoted to Sense; those of the third preferd to Sense, but denied the additional favour of Locomotion voluntary; those of the fourth admitted to Arbitrary motion, but excluded Reason; and those of the highest enriched with all. Either this *Necessity* must be imposed upon them by *Fortune*; or by *themselves*; or by some *other principle*, which hath the free donation, and so the limitation of all those priviledges or Faculties.

First, not by *Fortune*; for that she could not institute these assignations, draw this Helix, that still enlargeth into a wider capacity, nor make this law of Propriety inviolable: is amply manifest from the *Perpetuity*, or constant observation of the same by all corporeal entities, every one having their peculiar capacities so defined, circumscribed, and immured, that no one did ever, since the first hour of Time, exceed the bounds of its own species, nor climbe up to the state of its superior; for *Constancy* and *Fortune* are Antagonists never to be reconciled, but, like *Castor* and

Pollux,

Pollux, when one peeps above, the other ſculks below the horizon.

Secondly, not by *Themſelves*; for there is in every thing a kind of native Ambition to ennoble its nature, enlarge its power, nay (ſo much as in it lies) to mount even to infinity, according to that Axiom of *Scaliger* (*Exercit. 9. pag. 52.*) *Unicuique enti ineſt appetitio infinitatis.* Thus ſimple Natures covet to become compounds; Compounds ſpurre on to arrive at Vegetables; thoſe affect the dignity of Senſe; ſenſibles grow deſirous of muſculary Motion, &c. Can wee conceive, that a *Plant* would continue fixed and nayled down by its own roots to the earth, and there live a cold, dull, unactive life; if it could give to its ſelf motion and abilities for nobler actions? That a *Beaſt* would be conſtant to the groſs and heavy operations of meer ſenſe, ſubmit to the burdens, and endure the tyrannous oppreſſions of man; if it could endow it ſelf with the prerogative of Reaſon, and ſo become equal to his imperious Lord? Of that man would ſit down quiet, and remain ſubject to the infirmities, calamities, and mortality of his nature; if he had any hopes to better it, to wind up himſelf to heaven, and there take the wall of Cherubins, nay rival the calme felicity and immortality of God? For ſo invincible a reluctancy have we againſt the neceſſity of our frailties, and ſo unceſſant hormetick a deſire to be above them, by the melioration of our ſtate; that we may truly accommodate to our pride, what the eloquent *Tertullian* ſpake to expreſs that of ſome of the Roman Emperours; *ſi ipſi ſe Deos facere potuiſſent, certè quidem homines nunquam fuiſſent*, could they have made themſelves Gods, doubtleſs they never would have been men. Seeing therefore, that tis repugnant to that inſatiable *Appetite* of *Melioration*, even to infinity, radically inherent in every entity create, though (I confeſs) ſcarce perceptible in bodies devoid of Animation; to deny to it ſelf any perfection, which is in its own power to give, or acquire: what clearer evidence can be expected, to enſure our reaſon, that the *Ampliation*, and *Limitation* of all *Natural Faculties*, or endowments, is not in the arbitrary diſpoſition, or elective power of *Finite eſſences*; and, by conſequence, that the *Law* of *Propriety*, or the reſtriction of every

species to its own orb of activity, was not made by compact among themselves, but imposed upon them by an *Infinite*.

This considered, it remains indisputable, that the *Distribution* and *Assignation* of those different *Qualifications*, being neither in the power of *Fortune*, nor of the *Things* that enjoy them: it must properly and solely belong to that *supernatural Infinite*, which is the fountain of *Being*, *Life*, *Sense*, *Locomotion* and *Reason*, and therefore had the power freely to give them; being induced to the *Collocation* of them by the meer invitement of his own *Goodness*, and directed in the convenient *Distribution* of them by the Counsel of his own *Wisdome*.

This Truth, all Ages have held sacred, and the wiser Ethnicks both of *Greece* and *Rome* ever engraffed it into their Creed, preaching it to the world, though blended under the Chaos of their symbolical or Hieroglyphical Idolatry. For *Homer*, courting the propitious aspect of his best Deity, *Jupiter*, in a panegyricall Hymn; ascribes to him, as a chief and peculiar Attribute, the power of *Circumscribing and Bounding* of all things, thus bespeaking him.

Ζλῶα θεῶν θ' ἄριστον ἀείσομαι, ἠδὲ μέγιστον,
Εὐρύοπα, κραίοντα, τελεσφόρον, &c.

Jovem Deorum optimum canam, & maximum,
Lateſonantem, validiſsimum, Terminos afferentem, &c.

And *Aristotle* likewise (*de Mundo Tom.* 2. *pag.* 1592.) cals his *Infinitum divinum*, or God, περιωμένον, διὰ τὸ περιλαβεῖν πάντα, καὶ μηδὲν ἐν τοῖς οὖσιν ἄπειρον εἶναι, *Quod ab eo omnia terminata sunt, ac nihil in rerum natura sit infinitum*, from his setting bounds to all things, and leaving nothing undefined. Nor was this unacknowledged by the elder Romans; for they had a set form of devotion, and a solemn sacrifice appointed particularly *ad Iovem terminalem*, as *Dionysius Halicarnass.* (*Antiquit. Roman. Lib.* 2. *p.* 133.) hath transmitted to posterity. To this also seems the sweet tongued *Ovid* to allude, when in his description of the Creation, he saith, *Limitibus discrevit omnia certis.*

Now

Now the *Faculties* of all *Natural Agents* being immediately *derived* from, and ſtrictly *limited* by *God*, ſo that no one can ever tranſcend its own, nor uſurpe upon anothers confines: the *Light of Nature* will infer, that all their *operations* alſo are præſcribed, and both the *manner*, and *end* of all their activities preciſely predetermined, nay the very time and place with all other adjuncts and circumſtances of their effects appointed by the *Providence* of his *Infinite Wiſdome*.

Hitherto have we confronted only *Nature* to *Fortune*; let us therefore now give her one charge more with an *Argument* deſumed *à minori*, from *Art*.

Did ever any man, that beheld the curious Mathematicks of *Archimedes* his Sphear; the automatous flight of *Regiomontanus* his Eagle; the artificial wings of *Architas* Dove; or thoſe inanimate Birds that the ingenious Mathematician, whom the glorious *Charles* the fifth ſelected for his companion in his retirement from Empire ſent flying in at his window; or but obſerve the regular motions in a *trochiliack Horodice*, or Wrench conceive that the motions of thoſe engines were originally ſpontaneous, inſtituted by meer chance; or that each wheel aſſumed to it ſelf, by Lot, its particular figure, ſituation, axis, number of teeth, and preciſe meaſure of circumrotation? Undoubtedly no; but on the contrary, inſtantly concluded, that they were the appointed effects of provident induſtry, and had their models grounded upon maximes of the higheſt and moſt learned reaſon. And yet is our Atheiſt ſo effronted with impudence, as to give check to his own Conſcience, by daring to affirme; that the ſyſtem of the Celeſtial orbs, the Laws of natural motions, and the Architecture of thoſe admirable organs in the body of an Animal (which are engines, whoſe Artifice doth, by incomprehenſible exceſſe, tranſcend our theory in the mathematicks; inſomuch that ſome of the ſtrongeſt skuls of our age have ventured crazing to finde out the *Geometry of the Muſcles*, or the *Mechanicks* of *Voluntary motion*: and yet are forced, by an hoſt of difficulties, to retire and ſuſpend their hopes of perfecting their deſigne) were contrived by *Fortune*, and not by the skill of an *Artiſt infinite in Science and Power*. How familiar is this Logick to every mans underſtanding;

ding; the Figures of all things in the adspectable World, are exactly Geometrical, their actions and uses respectively accommodate, their motions constant and regular at all times, their effects certain, and the laws of every distinct species immutable (as to themselves) *ergo* those *Figures*, *Actions*, *Uses*, *Motions*, and *Laws* were delineated, appointed, assigned, begun, and enacted, by an *Omniscient and omnipotent Providence?* And this I conceive sufficient to demonstrate the truth of our *First assertion*; *viz. that that constant Tenor, or established method, according to which all Natural causes operate, was instituted and is perpetuated by an Infinite Wisdome.*

Article 6. The verity of the third Position demonstrated.

For the support of our *Third Thesis*; that though the actions of all *Second* causes are *impulsive* and *necessary*, yet those of the *First Cause* are *Elective* and *Arbitrary*; though God hath by the severe laws of Nature, bound up the hands of his Creatures, limited their activities, and punctually consigned them their several provinces: yet he hath reserved his own free, and as an absolute Monarch, can at pleasure alter, transcend, or pervert those Statutes, and give a new Commission to his Ministers to work by a new way, in order to the causation of any extraordinary effect, which his providence hath decreed, of universal, or particular benefit: we need erect no other pillar of argument, but that one firme and immoveable basis, the importance of the word, *Creator*.

For since to be able to *produce all things out of nothing*, by the single efficacy of his word, or the energetical blast of his will, to endow each distinct species with faculties exactly proportionate and meridional to their distinct destinations, and to entail upon them to the expiration of Times own lease, that estate, in which he enfeoffed them at their creation: doth necessarily imply a greater perfection of power, then meerly to *vary* or *innovate* their efficiencies, according to the expedients, emergencies, or occasional designes of his *Providence*: it remains indisputable upon consequence, that to allow him the *Greater*, and yet deny him the *less*: to beleive him to be the *Author* of that *mighty and difficult miracle*, the Creation, and yet doubt the supremacy of his Power, by conceiving that he cannot turn Natural Agents out of their common

common road, and order their digreſſions to the effecting of *ſmaller and eaſier Rarities*; muſt be a manifeſt *Contradiction*, and an *Abſurdity* that ſtabbs it ſelf.

Article 7. A farther confirmation of the ſame by an Argument, from the miraculous operations of God *in præterito*.

However, that we may not ſeem to entruſt ſo noble and ſacred a Truth, to the protection of one ſingle Reaſon; it becomes our care to ſuperadd, for the more ſecurity, this defence alſo. *If God hath frequently manifeſted his Supremacy, by working effects as well above, as againſt the eſtabliſht and cuſtomary power of natural Agents, in times paſt; then, doubtleſs, is not his arme ſhortned, nor the fountain of his energy dryed up, and he can do the like, in the future: but he frequently hath*; ergo, &c.

The *Major*, I am ſure, no man will boggle at, who ſhall conſider, that tis the proper *privilege* of *Divinity*, to be *ſtill the ſame*, that that *virtue*, which is extreme, and ſo above all *addition*, muſt neceſſarily alſo be above all decay or *diminution*; and therefore he that conceives God ſubject to *Mutability*, *Auxority*, or *Defluxe*, blaſphemes the Simplicity, Purity and Eternity of his Eſſence, and holds but a falſe Idea of his Nature.

Nor can the *Minor* require more proof then its bare Prolation; unleſs the unbeleif of any man ſhall be ſo inflexible, as not to bowe at the Convulſion of a truth, which the Records of all Nations, Times, and Religions, lye open to atteſt; For that there have been obſerved *Prodigious and miraculous accidents*, (ſuch as the moſt obſtinate Idolaters of Nature, and thoſe who grew gray in the ſtudy of her laws, cuſtomes, and ſecret magnalias, and kept a liſt of her forces; were ſurprized with aſtoniſhment at the conſideration of: and after a vain and tedious ſcrutiny into their abſtruſe Cauſalities, were forced to refer to the immediate arme of a *Supernatural efficient*) the indiſputable monuments of faithfull Antiquity bear witneſs. And he, who hath not heard of thoſe *Three grand Examples* (to omit the enumeration of any other, that are not univerſally beleived by men of all intereſts and perſwaſions) of the ſuperiority of Gods power to that of his ſervant, Nature; *viz.* The *Univerſal deluge*, the *Ceſſation of Oracles*, and the total *Eclipſe of the Sun* at the paſſion of our *Redeemer*: can give but weak teſtimony, that he is either *Iew*, *Mahometan*, or *Chriſtian*.

Article 8. That there was an univerſal Deluge.

The *Firſt* being reputed not onely true, but ſacred, and therefore held as point of faith in common by all three Religions; nay countenanced even by Pagan ſtories, and more, their ſetled account of time; they computing the ſecond ſpace or intervall of Time (the *Firſt* being little better to them then *Prolepticall*, or as the Heathen called it, *Adelon*, immaniſeſt and obſcure, was dated from the beginning of the World to *Ogyges Floud*, which was about 530 yeers after *Noahs*) from the Floud to the firſt *Olympiad*, which anſwers to the year of the World 3174. and comes within about 20 years before the foundation of Rome.

Article 9. The Ceſſation of Satans Oracles, after the advent of the Word of Truth, proved authentiquely.

The *Second* being imbraced, and made authentical by the general conſent of Chriſtians, upon the forced acknowledgment of thoſe, whoſe intereſt obliged them to invalidate it; and thoſe not only *Pagans* ſurrounded with the horrid darkneſſe of idolatry, and expecting no day-break from the glorious Sun of Righteouſneſs; but even of the *Devil* himſelf: who though the Father of lies, and his honour ſo highly concerned in the interciſion of his impoſtures and deluſions, could not yet diſſemble this verity; but at four ſeverall times, and in as many ſeverall places publickly proclaimed it. Firſt, when from his famous Oracle at *Delphos* he confeſt himſelf to be tongue-tied, his fallacious predictions countermanded, and his ſo ſolemnly pretended Divinity expired; being able to return no other anſwer to the great *Auguſtus* (whoſe errand was to have his fortune told him) but this:

Me Puer Hebræus, Divos Deus ipſe gubernans,
Cedere ſede jubet, triſtemque redire ſub Orcum;
Aris ergo dehinc tacitus diſcedito noſtris.

An *Hebrew Child*, that *God*, whoſe power's above
All other Gods, commands me to remove
Hence to the *Cours* of *ſorrow*; wherefore, goe,
My Altars quit in ſilence, and nere moe
Of *Future* things from me expect to know.

A ſecond time, when Legion howled out the hideous dirge of their black Prince, and the ſhoars were heard by Mariners far off at ſea to echo their groans into this diſmal note; *Great Pan is dead:* as *Plutarch* hath reported in his *defect of Oracles*. A third, about the time of *Conſtantine*, ſo affectionately magnified by *Euſebius*, in his ſad complaint, that his lips were ſealed up, his Prognoſticks ſuppreſſed, and his ſophiſtry fooled, by the *Righteous upon earth:* as the ſame *Euſebius* hath related *in Vita Conſtantini*. And again, in his excuſe to the Emperour *Iulian*; who being ſuperſtitiouſly curious to foreknow the ſucceſs of his great expedition into Perſia, and therefore addreſſing himſelf with exceeding ſolemnity to the temple of *Apollo Daphnes*, to anticipate the knowledg of his fortune, could notwithſtanding worm out of him no other ſatisfaction but this; *that he ſhould firſt remove the bodies about him, before he could have the liberty to return him an anſwer*: as *Theodoret* hath regiſtred, who alſo tells us, that not long after that Temple was conſumed by lightning.

But I muſt heer arreſt my Reader with a civil and ſhort Advertiſement, that by the *Ceſſation of Oracles*, I may not intend a *total and abſolute expulſion* of that grand *Impoſtor* from all his Fanes, Tripods, and other ſhops wherein he profeſſed his deluſions, at once; as if the *Incarnation of Truth* had ſtrook him dumb at one blow: but an extermination of him from his metropolitan Temple at Delphos, and an *Interciſion*, *Diminution*, or *ſenſible Decay* of his Amphibologies, Predictions and other Colluſions in all other places. For, otherwiſe, I ſhould not only ſteal a contradiction upon my ſelf, that unſatisfactory reſponſe, which he ſtammerd out to *Iulian*, being full 363 years after the nativity of him, that cruſh't the Serpents head; but alſo incur the juſt cenſure either of being ignorant of, or undecently neglecting thoſe ſolid reaſons, which *Plutarch*, *Suetonius*, and our modern learned Wits, *Montacutius*, and *Dr. Browne* have adduced to atteſt the continuation of his ceremonious Legerdemain and ſolemn cheats practiſed upon groſs and credulous Pagans, in the point of *Vaticination*, much beyond the riſing, ſetting, and reſurrection of the *Sun of righteouſneſs*, who came down to diſpell

thoſe foggs of Hell, and irradiate the poor benighted world with *Light ſupernatural.*

Article 10. That there was a prodigious Eclips of the Sun, at the paſſion of our Saviour.

And the *Laſt* is ſworn to by all. For (1) the *Chriſtian* hath it ratified to him both by ſacred and profane Auctority: (2) the *Jews*, that deny Chriſt to have bin the true Meſſias, do yet acknowledg the prodigious Eclipſe of the Sun, that renowned his paſſion: and (3) the *Turks*, who allow him to have bin no more then a geat and holy Prophet, as their Alcoran frequently intimateth; are yet ſo zealous of the honour of their antient records, that they would confute him with a ſcimiter, who ſhould dare to indubitate the preterition of ſo remarkable a wonder, which certified the half of the earth of its verity, by the ſenſible perſwaſion of a panick terror; inſomuch that many of the Jews who beheld it, were ſo ſhatterd with fear, that their hearts were rent aſwell as the vail of the Temple, and themſelves ready to ſneak into the graves of thoſe Saints, that were newly riſen, to evidence his conqueſt over death, and give humanity a prelibation or taſt of the benefit of his ſufferings. Nor was this, as other Eclipſes, only *Partial* and *Vertical* to Hieruſalem; but the darkneſs was viſible to the whole *Hemiſphear*: els, how could the *Ægyptian Aſtronomer* take notice of it, and being amazed at the unnatural Apparition, cry out, *Aut Deus Naturæ patitur, aut machina mundi diſſolvitur*; as the reverend Father, his nameſake, *Dionyſius* hath remembred in his Epiſtle to *Polycarpus, and Apollophanes?* els, how could the antient Greeks, in their Annals, have filed up a monſtrous Defection of the great Luminary, in the 4th. year of 202. *Olympiad*; as *Phlegon Trallianus* noteth? Now the 4th. year of the 202. *Olympiad* jumps even with the 19th. of *Tiberius*, and the 33. of the Nativity, which was the 4745. of the Julian period; and therefore that exact ſynchroniſme makes that monſtrous Eclipſe obſerved by the more mathematical eyes of the Greeks, to be the ſame which happened at the death of the *Lord of life.*

That

That the *Catholique Deluge* was purely *Supernatural*, and the deſtruction of all Living Creatures upon the ſublunary Globe (thoſe few that were ſhifted aboard the Ark, only preſerved) by an *Abyſs of Waters*, immediately cauſed by the revenging *Will* of that ſame Fruitfull *Spirit*, that formerly *brooding* upon the ſame abyſs of waters, had hatcht them into being; though of ſome difficulty to him, that ſhall wave all teſtimonies deduceable from the ſacred relation adſcribed to *Moſes*: can yet be no impoſſibility to prove, from Conſiderations meerly *Phyſical*. For

Article 11. A *Demonſtration* of the impoſſibility of the Catholique Deluges proceeding from *Cauſes Natural*.

Firſt, the vaſt *Quantity* of Waters requiſite to overflow the whole earth, and prevail upon the high hills, nay exceed the heads of the moſt lofty mountains by 15 cubits (for *mountains* there were before the floud; els how could the waters by degrees encreaſing, aſcend and cover them: and therefore thoſe wanton Wits, which affirm the Antediluvian earth to have had her face a meer *Plane* or level, without thoſe protuberancies and rugoſities, undertake not only a *Paradox*, but a manifeſt *Abſurdity*, point blanck repugnant aſwell to the *Text*, as to the natural *Neceſſity* of thoſe *Inaqualities*) could not be powred out from the *Receptaries* or ſtorehouſes of the *Ocean*; the Earth having as great (if not a greater) ſhare in the Terraqueous Globe, as the Waters, and the perpendicular Altitude of the mountains, by more then two parts of three, at leaſt, tranſcending the profundity of the deepeſt Chanel of the Sea, that ever the ſounding line of any Mariner did profound, except of that *Barathrum or Vorago Aquarum, in mari dulci*, between *Roeſt* and *Leoffelt*, deſcribed by *Olaus Magnus*; which yet is but a kind of *Sluice* or ſink, and therefore of no conſiderable latitude. For that the Eminency of the higheſt Hills hath ſcarcely the ſame proportion to the Semidiametre of the Earth, that there is betwixt 1. & 1000; hath bin frequently demonſtrated by many of our beſt Geographers: and though we deſcend to *Eratoſthenes* his commenſuration, who hath affirmed, that by inſtruments Dioptrick, and an exact meaſure of the diſtances of Places, he hath certainly found the Altitude of the higheſt mountains not to exceed *ten ſtadia*; we ſhall not however be provided of water enough in the bowells of the Sea to advance

our inundation, the depth of the profoundest ocean seldom amounting to a 100 *Fathom*, as *Scaliger* (38 *Exercit. contra Cardanum*) hath upon justifiable grounds declared.

Nor can this immane Collection of Waters be derived, as some have inconsiderately opinioned, from the *Whole lower Region of the Aer condensed into clouds, and those compresst into waters.* For (to take no strict notice of that large *Tohu, Vacuum Coacervatum*, or *Nothing*, which must then have bin introduced, from the surface of the Waters up to the midle region; which *Nature* could never endure, nor had *God* any necessity to enforce,) if Aer condensed into Water shrinks into a space or Continent, 400. times less then what it possest before condensation (for since Water *weighs* 400. times heavier then Aer, as the subtile *Galileo* (*Dialog.* 1. *del moviment. pag.* 81.) examining the proportions of Gravity betwixt those two bodies, demonstratively discovered; it must necessarily carry the same proportion also to *Space*, or *Locality*,) then assuredly, when we shall have calculated the perpendicular height of the Atmosphear, or lower region of the Aer, and reduced it to the 400th. part: we shall soon be satisfied, that the Addition which the Aer Aquæfied could bring to the waters of the Sea effused upon the bosome of the earth, cannot suffice to swell the Deluge so high as the semialtitude of many lofty mountains, such as *Slorus* in Norway (which *Franc. Patricius*, out of *Fr. Bacon* and *Scaliger*, hath accounted the highest on the earth,) *Athos* in Macedonia, *Tenariff*, *Caucasus*, *Atlas*, &c. whose tops make large encroachments on the midle region, and seem to invade the Firmament.

Again, to charge this immense Accumulation of Waters upon 40. *days rain*, though we should conced that rain to be neither Sea evaporated, nor Aer condensed; is not to undo, but entangle the miracle. For taking the Altitude of the mountains according to the calculation of the most moderate Geometry; and then soberly perpending what aggravation to the Waters of the Sea now converted upon the earth, the most violent natural rain of 40. days and nights could probably make, which the most hyperbolical conceit cannot advance higher then 40. fathom: we shall easily detect the difficulty.

And

And *ſecondly*, as *Nature* could not afford the *Material Cauſe* of this general Inundation, the *Waters*; ſo neither the Mighty *Efficient*, or *Impulſive*, that ſhould with ſuch prodigious impetuoſity hoyſe up ſo huge a maſs of Sea, contrary to the ſtrong renitency, or depreſſure of its Gravity, drive it from its native eaſy Currents in the declining veins and cavities of the earth, upon an abſolute ἄνω φορείαν or Acclivity on the elevated ſurface thereof, and make it fall in Cataracts up-hill. For (1) though the *Waters deſire to ſtand above the mountains*, as the Divine Hebrew Poet hath pleaſed to phraſe it (*Pſalm* 104. *verſ.* 9.) yet they but deſire it, and by their own inherent and eſſential Tendency are renderd uncapable to ſatisfy that elemental ambition; for water permitted to its own propenſity or inclination, immediately tendeth downward: and therfore he that can conceive a river to deſert its declive chanel, and climb a precipice, without the violence of a Miracle; hath a ſtrong Phanſy, but a weak judgement: nor need any man deſpair to perſwade his credulity, that *Helmonts* ridiculous Romance of the *Cauſe of Earthquaks* (viz. that an *Angel*, or miniſter of Divine revenge, deſcends into the Centrals of the Earth, and there with a great *Clapper* or Sledge giving a mighty *Thump* againſt the feet of Rocks, makes a hoarſe or grave kind of *Bom*, which enlarging its ſound, rends the foundations thereof, and puts the percuſſed maſs into a *rigor*, or ſhaking fit of an Ague.) is a ſolid and philoſophical Verity.

And *thirdly*, as the Waters could not elevate themſelves, ſo neither could the *Attractive Virtue* of thoſe *Celeſtial Magnets*, the Sun, Moon and Stars, work them out of their depths, by rarefying them into vapours, which mounted up to the midle region of the Aer, and there encountred by intenſe Cold, ſhould be reduced to clouds, and thoſe again diſſolved in Cataracts. For ſhould we grant, what the *Arabian Aſtrologers* returned in anſwer to the *Ægyptian Caliph*, who had ſet them to unty this knot; *viz.* that there was a great *Conjunction* of ♄ and ♃ not long before the flóud, and the malignant influence of that confederacy much aggravated by another fatal Convention of all the *Planets*, in the watery ſigne of *Piſces*, immediately preceding it, as *Sepher Juchaſin* (*fol.* 148.) hath delivered; which the learned

learned *Mirandula* hath ſufficiently diſproved, and ſmiled at yet muſt the greatneſs of the *Effect* manifeſtly confute the poſſibility of that for a *Cauſe*. Firſt, becauſe Nature hath frequently ſhewed to the world the like Conjunctions, but never the like event: and again, becauſe thoſe *Luminaries* are not commiſſioned with ſo unlimited a power, and in their ſtrongeſt conſpiracies of influence can at moſt but weakly *incline* or *diſpoſe*, not at all *compell* or *neceſſitate*; nor are their deſtinations to *ruine*, but *conſerve* the world.

If therfore *Nature*, uniting all her diviſions of Waters below the Moon, into one great heap, or Abyſs, muſt yet fall very much ſhort of that immane proportion requiſite to furniſh out the Deluge; and though her ſtock had bin large enough, yet could ſhe not, without apparent deſtruction of her ſelf, *i. e.* infringing thoſe fundamental Conſtitutions, or Elementary Laws, whoſe conſtant *Tenor* only defines her to be Nature, aſſiſt to their eruption out of their proper Receptaries, and their prepoſterous Aſcenſion up hill: truely, I am yet to learn, what can be conceived to remain, but this, that thoſe *Decumani Fluctus*, thoſe immens Cataracts had both their *ſupply* and *motion* immediatly from that high hand, to which nothing that he *wills* can be difficult.

With this *Problem*, I confeſs, I have more then once impuzled my reaſon; yet doth the difficulty ſometimes enflame my Curioſity to enquire out the perveſtigable part of the miracle: viz. *Whence Omnipotence ſummoned this mighty Syndrome, or Conflux of Waters to appear, at ſo ſhort a warning, upon the face of the Earth*, or in what part of the Univerſe they were quartered before, and *by what wayes and means they were drawn off again and voyded after the Floud*? That eminent Maſter of the Opticks, and excellent Mathematician, *Chriſtoph. Scheinerus* (*in Roſa Vrſina, pag.* 693.) diſcourſing againſt thoſe who have aſſerted the *Incorruptibility of the Heavens, & quoad partes, & totum*, introduceth *Ferdinand. Quirinus de Salazar.* a Jeſuit, in his *Comment* upon 27. *verſ. of the* 8. *chap. of the Proverbs of Salomon*, delivering his opinion derived from others, together with reaſons to ſupport it; that there muſt be a *Tehom Rabba*, or *Abyſs of Waters* above the *Firmament*, or betwixt the 8th. ſphear and the

the *Shecinah*, or dwelling place of God. The Texts of Scripture, upon which this opinion is ſupported, are (1) the 7. *verſ.* of the 1. *Chap. of Geneſ.* where the Author of that book deſcribing the ſeveral piles or ſtories of this great building, ſaith thus; and *God made the Firmament, and divided the Waters which were under the Firmament, from the waters which were above the firmament, &c.* (2) that of *David* (*Pſalm* 33. *verſ.* 7.) *he layd up the depth in ſtorehouſes.* (3) that of the Angel to *Eſdras* (2. *ch.* 4. *verſ.* 7.) propoſing queſtions to puzle weak but proud mortality; *How many Springs are above the Firmament, or which are the outgoings of Paradiſe?* (4) that expreſſion of the greateſt Naturaliſt, *Salomon*; *and Wiſdome ſaw him ſet his compaſs upon the face of the depth* (which the *Septuagint, plus de ſententia, quam de ſingulis vocibus ſoliciti*, have rendred, *aderam cum ſecerneret ſedem ſuper ventos.*) (5) that alſo of the Pſalmiſt (*Pſal.* 104. *verſ.* 3.) *who hath layd the beams of his chambers in the Waters.*

Upon theſe and the like perſwaſions many of the moſt learned *Rabbines*, and after them not a few of our modern *Divines*, have concluded; that at the Deluge the Floudgates of this *Tehom Rabba*, were unlockt, and the waters being ſhowred down in Cataracts upon the earth, ſwell'd the deluge above the mountains. This, indeed, ſeemed ſmooth and plauſible to my firſt apprehenſions, and promiſed not only to ſatisfy, but compenſate my former anxious diſquiſition: but when I had a little recovered my thoughts out of the pleaſant ſurpriſe of the novelty, and caſt about, by what conveyances or *Aquæducts* the tides of this *Superceleſtiall Ocean* might be tranſmitted through ſo many *Orbs* (which not a few great *Clerks* have affirmed to be *Solid*) without diſlocation of any one, at leaſt without interrupting or confounding their regular Circumvolutions; which happend not, for the ſtars kept on their Courſes, as the retrograde Calculations of their ſeverall Periods will ſoon evince: as alſo, if they were tranſfuſed, *what became of them afterward*, when the fourty days were over? For either they muſt be returned from whence they came, to repleniſh that monſtrous *Vacuity*, their abſence had made betwixt the 8th. orb, and the Empyreum; or elſe continue

heer below, and so perpetuate the Inundation, and so put God to the exigent of making a new supply of Waters above the firmament. When, I say, I had abated the edge of my Credulity with these occurring difficulties, I sadly relapsed into my former incertitude. Not but that I am almost perswaded, from the literal sense of those Texts, that betwixt the *Shecinah* or paradise of God and his blessed retinue, and the 8th. orb, there is a *Tehom Rabba*; for I do not see how those places can be otherwise, if rightly, interpreted: but that I cannot yet drive my beleif beyond those two objections, and find it more ready to incline to this Conjecture (for tis yet gone no farther) of my own; *That God miraculously created a sufficient supply of Waters purposely for the Deluge, and afterwards adnihilated them again.* This I am sure, was as easy to him, as any other Course imaginable; less injurious to and inconsistent with the works of the former Creation; and renders the wonder most familiar to our Comprehension. If it be objected upon me, that God put a period to all *Creation* after the first Hexameron or six days; I shall defend my self, with the barrel of Meal, and cruise of Oyle, that sustaind the Widow and her son in the famin of Zarephath; wherein there was a fresh Creation of two several *substances*, with all their specifical *Accidents* about them every day; or a transmutation of Aer into Meal and Oyle, which was equivalent. And as for the other harsh term of Adnihilation, I say tis equally facil to him, to reduce any thing to, as to educe it from Nothing. But this might well have bin spared, it being my proper business to prove that the Deluge was *not Naturall*; not to digress into a disquisition how or by what cryptick means twas *supernatural*.

Article 12. That the Cessation of Pagan Oracles, upon the incarnation of God, was an effect meerly supernatural; comprobated uncontrollably.

That the Cessation, or (rather) *Intercision of Oracles*, was an Atcheivem too difficult for the single arm of Nature; I conceive few will dispute, but such ridiculous Ignorants in the Metaphysicks of *Spirits*, or Scale of *Creatures*, as endevour to indubitate the very *Existence* of *Evil Angels*, and refuse to be perswaded, that there is any such real *Entity* as a *Devil*, without a Demonstration from Sense, and the conviction of an *Apparition*. But if any shall, the best advice my haste can at this time afford them,

them, is this; that they would weave their long clue of thoughts into this ſhort and plain *Dilemma*.

We muſt grant, either that that black Prophet, *Satan*, made a *voluntary* or ſpontaneous reſignation of his uſurped Divinity, at the nativity of the *Prince of Peace*; and of his own accord grew ſilent, upon the Advent of the *Word of Life*: or els, that by a Power infinitely more abſolute and ſoveraign then his own, he was *compelled* to confeſs the decay of his tyranny by an Exile from his Altars, and himſelf ſtrucken with an *Aphonia*, or Palſy in his double tongue, ſo that all he could utter, was, that he could no longer ſpeak; for one of theſe two Propoſitions muſt be true.

The *Firſt* cannot; ſince to make a *Voluntary* Confeſſion of his *Ignorance*, *Impotency*, and *ſubjection*, in the face of the World, and eſpecially in thoſe places, where for ſo many Ages together he had ſolemnly pretended to *Omniſcience*, *Omnipotence*, and *Supremacy*; is wholly repugnant to Satans *Pride*: nor would that ſtrong *Ambition*, which even in the purity of his nature ſpurred him beyond the ken of his Angelical wiſdome, up to an Attempt of the higheſt impoſſibility, (*viz.* to make himſelf equal to that *Eſſence*, which made him what he was) ſuffer him to proclaim himſelf to be leſs, then what he had made himſelf appear to be in the eſteem of his infatuated Votaries. For notwithſtanding the hand of *Divine Vengeance* had hurled him, (like a prodigious *Meteor* that durſt outface the brighter *Sun*, from which its ſplendor was aſſumed) from the higheſt heaven into the loweſt hell; and degraded him from the moſt glorious order of Creatures to the moſt vile, accurſed and deſpicable: yet is his ſtomach as great, as when he aſpired to the throne of *Unity*; nor hath the *ignis rota*, or reverberated flames of hell ever ſince, bin able to conſume that humor of *Competition* in him. Witneſs his ſeveral impudent invaſions of the prerogative of God, by arrogating to himſelf the tribute of *Divine Adoration* from his ſuperior, man; nay even from the Sonne of God, when yet he more then ſuſpected his Divinity. Beſides, as it ſeems a manifeſt Contradiction, that the *Author* of *Pride* ſhould freely detect his own *ſhame*: ſo alſo, that the *Father of lies* ſhould voluntarily broach a *Truth*, and ſuch a one as once received muſt openly impeach him of Deluſion,

and diſcover his Indivinity; cannot but ſound a very great improbability at leaſt. For how unlikely is it, that that ſophiſtical *Spirit*, whoſe Tyranny was founded, ſupported, and continued ſolely by his cunning promotion of *Error*, and his ſubtil workings upon the deceptible Condition of man; ſhould willingly depoſe himſelf, diſmantle his ſtrongeſt holds, proclaim the impoſtures of his Amphibologies, and divulge his ruine, by rectifying the ſeduced judgements of his greateſt Favourites, and declaring a *Verity* that muſt diſprove all that ever he ſayd before? How diſſimilar to Reaſon, that he who durſt adventure upon the higheſt falſhood in the world, to make himſelf *God*: ſhould ſo far forget the maximes of his black Art, as of his own accord to confeſs himſelf to be the baſeſt of *Entities*, a *Devil*? How remote from all the ways of perſwaſion, that he who had boaſted himſelf *Ubiquitary*, uſurped by a counterfeit title the *Monarchy* of the World, and given out, that the *Preſcience* of Future Events was not only the natural annex of his *Omniſcience*, but the *Preordination* and diſpoſal of them the adjunct of his *Providence*: ſhould, without the impulſion of a ſuperior, betray himſelf *chained to utter darkneſſe*, to be but a *Slave*, that there was a ſetled law of *Fate* above his comptroll, as in his excuſe to *Cræſus* ruined by his Amphibologie, and that his *Providence* was at beſt but *Præſagition* from the concurrent inclinations of ſecond Cauſes, nor his *Predictions* of things to come, other then artificial *Conjectures*? To conclude, no man, I ſuppoſe, will be able to remember any other Inſtance of the Devils *Fidelity* and *Veracity* (thoſe Confeſſions of *Chriſts Divinity*, and that in the preſence of *Truth* it ſelf, that he came from compaſſing the earth in queſt of whom he might devour, mentioned in holy Writ, excepted;) or produce one ſentence of truth ever ſpoken by him to his own diſadvantage, beſides this one; *that he was commanded to ſhut up his Oracles, by a Power, which he could never contradict*: And therefore the *Second Propoſition* muſt be *true* and *evident*: viz. that his Oracles were ſilenced by the immediate hand of that *Cauſe*, whoſe *Activity* is ſo far above the *Power* of either *Satan* or *Nature*, taken either ſingly, or combined together, (for the Former is but a languid Agent, if you deny him the auxiliatory concurrence of the

the Latter) as *Infinitude* is above *Limitation*, *Almightiness* above *Impotency*, or *Omniscience* above *Ignorance*.

Now to me, this process of Argumentation seems so smooth, familiar and customary, and the whole series of Inductions so obvious to a dialectical consideration; that, when I reflect upon the facility of their occurence to our thoughts, I cannot but extremely wonder, how so many profound and circumspect Philosophers, and those whose threads of life were unraveld in the eager pursuit of knowledge, could referre the cessation of Oracles to *Natural necessities*, and acquiesce in a confidence of those weak, remote, inconsistent, impertinent and so contemptible *reasons*, urged by *Plutarch*, &c. to salve the difficulty of this accident, and serve as a specious *Asylum* for their puzled curiosities to retreat to.

Article 13. That the Eclips of the Sun, at the death of Christ, was purely *Metaphysical*, irrefutably demonstrated.

Lastly, that that generally confest *Eclipse of the Sun*, (and, indeed, the only one this great Luminary did ever suffer; since we may with more propriety call all others but *Partial Interceptions* of his light, by the lesser body of the Moon interposed in a straight line to some part of the Terrestrial Globe) which happened at the *Death of Christ*, was above, nay against the fundamental constitutions of Nature; is manifest from hence, that on the third of *April*, or *Feria sexta*, being the Passion day, in the year *Æræ Christi nati* 33. (which is synchronical to the 78. of the *Julian* account) the Sun and Moon were then in *opposition diametrical*, and the *Moon* her self totally eclipsed in *Libra* to the *Antipodes* of *Jerusalem*: as may be certified to any man that can read the *Celestial Ephemerides* backward, *i. e.* recalculate the periodical *Conjunctions* and *Oppositions* of those two great *Lights* of heaven, by the Tables of Astronomy. For those *Characters of time* being punctually restrained to set & certain periods, the Astronomer may as easily attain to the minute of any eclipse *in præterito*, as to the prescience of any *in futuro*; provided that his *Hypothesis* be sound, and his *Schemes* erected with exactness correspondent: nay such is the certitude of this rule, as to the strict decision of time, that though the Astronomer may chance to learn of the Historian, that there hath bin an eclipse; yet for the determination of its precise *time* & *place*, *history* must go to school to *Astronomy*, as *Scaliger* (*de Emendat.*

Emendat. tempor.) hath obſerved to our hands. Thus when *Euſebius* and *Dio* had recorded an Eclipſe of the Sun to have falne out a little before the death of *Auguſtus*, and ſo to have been a kind of prodigy portending the fall of ſo bright a Star; the Aſtronomers coming after to examine the ſynchroniſme, by their retrograde calculations, found the Hiſtorians in a double error: that Eclipſe being not of the *Sun*, but the *Moon*; and not *preceding*, but *ſucceeding* his funerals.

To aſſure the miracle yet nearer, let us look back to the *Elements of Aſtronomy*. The Eclipſe of the Moon is cauſed by the *Intervention* (for ſo tis according to the moſt probable *Hypotheſis* of *Copernicus*) of the opac body of the earth, between her and the original of her light, the Sun; and the Eclipſe of the Sun, by the interpoſition of the Moon betwixt him and the earth: and therefore the Sun cannot be eclipſed, but when he is in *Conjunction* with the Moon; nor the Moon, but when ſhe is in *oppoſition* to the Sun. Yet notwithſtanding doth not every monthly conjunction and oppoſition of theſe two lights produce an eclipſe to one of the two; but only that *Conjunction* and *Oppoſition* which is *Diametrical*: *i. e.* when the Central point of the Sun faceth the Central point of the Moon, and that again confronteth the centre of the earth, ſo directly, that an arrow ſhot in a ſtreight line from the circumference of the Sun through its Centre, would alſo perpendicularly transfix the Centers of the other two orbs. And this falls out only when the Moons *Eccentrick* tranſecteth the Suns, in that line, which is for that reaſon called the *Ecliptick*; nor this in more then two points, called by *Ptolemy*, the *Nodi*, or knots, and by the *Arabians*, the *Head and Taile of the Dragon*.

Again, theſe *Interſections* are not conſtant to one certain point, or place, but circumgyrated by a ſlow motion, make a circle of 18 years complete; and therefore every 18th year the Moon muſt be eclipſed in the ſame degree of the ſame ſigne in the Zodiack, infallibly to the end of the world: which is the rule by which every common Almanack maker doth calculate his predictions of Lunar Eclipſes.

Now this being excogitated, and the eclipſes retrived back as high as the ἄξιε, or foot of the Julian compute, by revolving the leaves

leaves of the Celestial Volume; we discover that the Moon indeed, was naturally eclipsed on the self same day, whereon the Sun prodigiously suffered together with its Author, in the 1 *deg. of Libra*, the opacity beginning to the horizon of *Jerusalem* some few minutes before six in the evening: so that the Sun was no sooner set in the West, but the Moon appeared in the East deprived of more then half her light; the *Calculation* and *figure* of which *Lunar eclipse*, are largely set down by *Sethus Calvisius*, to the 3 of *April*, in the 33 year of the Nativity, under *Tiberius Cæsar*, and by *Henricus Buntingius*, *in Chronologia Catholic. fol.* 337. And thereupon we may safely conclude, that the *Defection of the Moon*, on the Passion day, being meerly *Natural*; that of the Sun on the same day must be *Supernatural*; it being impossible for the Moon to keep two different stations, or to possess those two opposite points of heaven, which define the Conjunction and Opposition, at one and the same time. This *S. Aug.* (3. *de Civit. Dei cap.* 15.) had respect unto, when he said; *Quam solis obscurationem, non ex canonico syderum cursu accidisse ostenditur, quod tunc erat Pascha Judæorum.*

Twas a *Dismal* day that same, though the *King of Terrors* was then vanquisht; for *Darkness* was not only *upon*, but *under* the earth, the miraculous obscuration of the Sun in our Hemisphere, of necessity causing a defection of the Moon in the subterraneous one, and so making it more then midnight to the *Antipodes*: and a second *natural eclipse* of the Moon succeeding within six hours after; nay, more then all this, *Saturn* (the signifier of *Darkness*) aggravated this horrid opacity, for at the same time rising from the *Horoscope*, he beheld both eclipses in a square malignant aspect.

But though this eclipse was *Unnatural* to the *Sun, per περίστασιν*: yet twas purely *Natural per συμπάθειαν*, it being requisite, nay necessary for a *stream* or reflex of *Light* to suffer a *defection*, when the *Fountain of Light* was under a cloud; proper for the *Creature* to sympathize with the *Creator*. And therefore, though twas a *miracle*, yet twas no *wonder*. The wonder was in the reverse part of the accident; that the most glorious *Sun of Righteousness* should suffer a dark and unnatural eclipse, to expiate

piate our deeds of darkneſs. Nor was that a wonder neither, now I think ont; for twas the *natural effect* of his infinite *love* to mankind.

Article 14. The Adequation of all to the verification of the Authors third Poſition.

And this, I preſume, the moſt ſtubborn and prejudicate Atheiſt will admit, as evidence both ſtrong and clear enough, to evince the verity of our *Minor Propoſition*; viz. *that God hath, in times prelapſed, frequently manifeſted his prerogative of cauſing effects not only ſuperior, but alſo contradictory to the ordinary and eſtabliſht Laws of Nature, his ordinary inſtrument, when ſuch effects ſeemed either neceſſary, or expedient to his Providence:* and therefore our *Concluſion*, viz. *that his arme is not ſhortned, and he can doe the like in the future, upon any occaſional emergency deſigned by his ſecret counſel*; comes not much ſhort of perfectly *Apodictical.*

Sect. VI.

Article 1. *Lucretius* his blaſphemy, that mans ignorance of the energy of *Natural Cauſes*, is the ſole baſis of the opinion of an *Univerſal Providence.*

WE have now brought our ſelves to the laſt *Objection* urged againſt Univerſal Providence; namely, *the unequal diſtribution of good and evil*, or the frequent occurence of events which carry too much appearance of *Temerity*, to be interpreted the mature *deſignes* of an *infinite Wiſdome*; and ſeem too oblique and deflecting towards *Partiality*, to ſtand in a right line with the hand of *divine Juſtice*, which muſt be conceived to diſcriminate betwixt the *Pious* and *Impious* in the Conſignation of *Happineſs* and *Miſery*, and accordingly to diſtribute its benefits in ſome proportion to the merits, at leaſt the worthy ſuſceptibility of the receivers: this is a member belonging to another head, and falls more properly under the contents of our next Chapter, of the *Special or Particular Providence of God*; and therefore we ſhall thither transfer the plenary refutation thereof, making it the ſubject of this laſt ſection, to blow off thoſe light and cobweb *ſcruples*, that were ſpun by that Spider, *Lucretius*, when he compoſed

compoſed theſe verſes to alienate mens minds from the fear of an *Univerſal Moderator.*

Cætera, quæ fieri in terris, cœloque tuentur
Mortales, pavidis quom pendent mentibus ſæpe,
Efficiunt animos humileis formidine divûm,
Depreſſoſque premunt ad terram; propterea quod
Ignorantia cauſſarum conferre deorum
Cogit ad imperium res, & concedere regnum, &
Quorum operum cauſas nulla ratione videre
Poſſunt; hæc fieri divino Numine rentur, &c. lib. 6to.

Thoſe bug-bear *Meteors*, which the tim'rous eyes
Of pavid *Mortals* wonder at i'th skies;
And thoſe unfrequent *Prodigies*, that appear,
On earth (while their weak ſouls are fool'd by *Fear*)
Are the ſole charms, that emaſculate,
And cheat mens minds to a beleif of *Fate*,
And ſome *vindictive Numen*. For, becauſe
Men underſtand not *Natures* cryptick Laws,
Nor her occult *Efficiency*; they fly,
(To ſalve their *Ign'rance*) to *Divinity*:
And idly reſt in this; what ere befall,
Twas caus'd by *Providence*, that diſpoſeth all.

The Redargution.

Article 2. The redarguti-on thereof.

True it is, indeed, nor will any thing but ignorance deny that *Phyſiology*, or the ſpeculation of Natural Cauſes hath a power to raiſe the mind of man to a generous height, from whence it may ſecurely, and without that vertigo or giddineſs, which uſually turnes the brains of the multitude, behold the moſt prodigious meteors; and look in the threatning face of Lightning without growing pale, while thoſe that ſtand below become convulſt with needleſs horror, and are ready to be ſhook to duſt with ſuperſtitious fear.

True it is alſo, as *Lucretius* would have it, that tis unworthy

the constancy and setled courage of a *Philosopher*, when he sees a bearded comet, hears a loud crack of Thunder, or feels the earth unhinged (all which Natural events common eyes gaze upon as horrid Portents, and dangerous agonies of Nature) instantly to forget his Principles, and run to consult with the superstitious books of the Hetrurians, and other pusillanimous Comments on those pageants, or necessary Phænomenas, whose Causalities are established, and their precise contingencies presageable by the easie prognosticks of meteorology.

But however, though this ought to prevent our fears: yet it cannot be extended to the extinction of our devotion. Though it may commend our knowledge, to smile when the heavens frown: yet it more commends it, if we look above them, and through those visible operations of Nature discover that invisible cause, that made, conserves, and regulates her. Though it demonstrate our skill in Physicks, to stand unmoved, when the ground trembles: yet will it detect our ignorance in the Metaphysicks, not to fall prostrate in an humble reverence to that awfull *majesty, that stretched out the North over the empty place, and hanged the earth upon nothing.* And though it be an honour to our Reason, to explore the Abstrusities of Nature, and readily refer her most admirable effects to their proper efficients: yet, at the same time, not to confess that omnipotent Agent, which is the soul of all energy, and the highest link in the Chain of Causes; dishonours it even to the most odious shame of Atheisme, which is the greatest ignorance.

Article 3. Magnanimity the proper effect of Religion.

Nor is it *Religion* that makes men *Cowards*; for the best way to harden the *Spirit* of man, is first to soften it with the *Fear of God*: and the noblest Tincture of magnanimity is extracted out of an humble apprehension, and fiduciary acknowledgement of an *all observant Deity*. This the wise *Father* well understood, when refuting that impious error of the Poet, *Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor*, he writ this golden Aphorisme; *Qui Deum non agnoscit, is non Dominum excutit superbum, sed aversatur optimum Parentem; cujus respectu Animus fit non formidine humilis, sed reverentia fiducia plenus.*

Again,

Again, when we aſcribe the Monarchy of the World to one ſupreme Cauſe, we do not derogate a jot from the Power of ſecond Cauſes; but rather confirme and ſubſcribe the Charter of their deputations: ſince we thereby inferre an aſſurance, that thoſe Cauſes are really ſuch as he was pleaſed to conſtitute them, that their activities are but emanations of his omnipotence; and their effects the appointments of his Wiſdome. And upon this meditation is it, that when we obſerve unfrequent wildfires in the Clouds, ſhaggy Meteors in the aer, Trepidations in the earth, and other the like admirable effects reſulting from the concourſe and conſpiracy of potent Natural agents; we doe not inſtantly quench our wonder and check our curioſity, by aſcribing the production of them to God, ſo as if he were the ſole and immediate *Author* of them, and that no other *Natural Cauſe* intervened betwixt his *Volition* and their *Contingency*: but by ſuppoſing him to be the *Firſt* and *General Cauſe* aſwell of that particular one, as of all others in the World; and that beſides the *Firſt* there is required a *Second Particular* one, whoſe indagation will fully compenſate the ſweat and oyle of our ſtudy, and which we muſt not *deny*, though we cannot *diſcover*, but acknowledge it to be a Natural one, however to obſcure for the invention of our perſpicacity.

Article 4. The opinion of a *General Providence*, conſiſtent with *Phyſiology*.

To conclude, out of this one Fountain may be derived ſtreams enough to rince away all thoſe feculent *Scruples*, which the polluted wit of *Lucretius* hath ſcraped off the *Thunderbolt*, to obſtruct the current of *Providence*. For the *Principles* of that affrighting Meteor are comprehended under that ſeries of *Natural Cauſes* which *God* permits to act their appointed parts, on the theatre of this ſublunary Globe; nor doth he force them from the ordinary road of their eſſential and proper Activities, upon any extraordinary or new way of violence: and therefore tis as natural an event if this Granado of the clouds fall on the head of an *Innocent*, as if it fell on the head of the moſt *guilty* perſon; as regular for it to ſtrike the ſacred batlements of a *Temple*, as to light upon an unhallowed roof; and as conſonant to the rules of its projection or

Article 5. *Lucretius* his ſcruples concerning the ſeemingly temerarious effects of the *Thunderbolt*; ſingularly reſolved.

explosion, to be shot point blanck at any mark on *land*, as to be discharged at randome on the *Sea*.

But here some have, by way of objection, enquired; *Why did not God, that he might leave nothing to Chance, at his first institution of the Laws of Nature, ordain such a series of Causes, both for the Generation and Explosion of the Thunderbolt, and limit their operations to such a certainty of events, as that it should never come to pass, that this Fireball should destroy the Good, and miss the Impious?*

This itch of ignorant, and therefore bold, curiosity may easily be mortified by applying this euporiston or obvious *solution*; that the *ends* or *designes* of *Particular Providence*, in these or the like occurrences, are full of *Prudence*, as to the intention of *God*; though full of obscurity, as to the investigation of our unequal *Understandings*: and therefore for us, when we cannot find out these imperceptible ends, therefore to conclude that those *Accidents*, are *meer accidents*, and have no ends at all; is not to palliate, but aggravate our ignorance, since tis a rash and open delusion of the judgment of man, to presume that he is acquainted with the secret Counsels of God; a madness beyond the severity of *Bethlem*, for mortality to pretend ability to read those *Arcana Imperii*, or mystical decrees of Fate, written in invisible Hieroglyphicks, which are too hard for the intuition of Angels.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

The especial Providence of God Demonstrated.

Sect. I.

HAving sayled over the immens Ocean of *Gods General Providence*, by the direction of our own congenial Cynosure, the *Light of Nature*; our next voyage ought to be up the channel of his *Particular* or *Special*: which being the golden River, that constantly invirons the Microcosme, or *Isle of Man*, and imports all the advantages and mutations of *Happiness* and *Misery*, that occurre to humanity during the trade of life; is that point we have thus long coasted about to discover. But before we put into the mouth of this *Euphrates* *, we conceive it necessary first to sound, and send out our Pilot Reason, to detect those *Shelves* and *Rocks* cast up by the common Adversary of mankind; upon which many weak vessels have founderd, sprung dangerous leaks of Atheisme, and so sunk down right into that *Barathrum* of *sorrow*, which knowes no exhaustion, and admits of no regression.

Article 1. The introduction, intimating the neer cognation betwixt this *present*, and the *precedent* Theme: and the necessity of the Authors beginning at the Atheists *Objections*.

* *Ab εὐφραίνειν, quod agrum lætum fecundumque reddat.*

Article 2. The firſt objection, deſumed from the *Apathie* of the *Divine Nature.*

The *Firſt* of thoſe, we finde to be that contraprovidential Argument of that Secretary of Hell, *Epicurus*; *Quod beatum eſt, ac immortale, id neque ira, neque gratia tangi*: that thoſe *Paſſions* of *Anger* and *Love* are inconſiſtent with the conſtant and immutable condition of that *Nature*, whoſe ſimple eſſence is compounded of *Immortality* and *Beatitude*; and therefore, as *Buſineſs* and *Cares* muſt deſtroy the *Tranquillity*, ſo the affections of *Indignation* and *Placability* muſt ſubvert the *Conſtancy*, or eternal *Sameneſs* of divinity; and upon inference, that neither our moſt fervent *Impieties* can accend, nor our penitential *Tears* extinguiſh the *Wrath* of *God.*

Article 3. The ſame excogitated by *Epicurus*: and promoted by *Lucretius.*

That this poyſonous Grape grew upon that wild Vine, *Epicurus* (that we may not ſeem to belie the Devill) is not only colligible from its ſtinking odour, and affinity of taſte, that it bears to that deteſtable deſign of his (*in Epiſt. ad Herodotum*) to eraſe out of the mind of man all the impreſſions of Religion, by the induction of a beleif, that God doth not obſerve the good and evil actions of men, in this life, and by conſequence ſhall not compenſate them with Felicity, or miſery, after death: but manifeſt upon the aſſeveration of three judicious and conſcientious witneſſes, *Seneca*, *Cicero*, and *Lactantius*. For the *Firſt* chargeth it upon him in theſe words; (4. *de Benefic.* 4.) *Deus, inquit Epicurus, nihil agit, nec magis illum beneficia, quàm injuria tangunt*: The *Second* in theſe; *Dii, inquit Epicurus, neque propitii cuiquam eſſe ſolent, neque irati*, (3. *de Nat. Deor.*) the *Third*, in theſe; *De ſchola Epicuri eſt, ſicut iram in Deo non eſſe, ita nec gratiam quidem; nam cum putat Epicurus, alienum eſſe à Deo malum facere, atque nocere, quod ex affectu iracundiæ plerumq; naſcitur, ademit ei etiam beneficentiam, quoniam videbat conſequens eſſe, ut ſi iram habeat Deus, habeat & gratiam. Itaque ne vitiam concederet, etiam virtutis fecit expertem.* Which argument his diſciple *Lucretius* (who, as *Theſeus*, ſcorned to forſake his Maſter, though he led him into hell) hath contracted into this Triſtich:

Nam

Nam privata dolore omni, privata periclis,
Ipsa suis pollens opibus, nihil indiga nostri,
Nec bene promeritis capitur, neque tangitur ira.

Th' Immortal Nature, placed above the sense
Of sorrow, danger, and all indigence,
Rich in its own *Perfections*; neither can
Smile at the *Good*, nor frown at'h *Ill* of *Man*.

The import of all which amounts to no higher a sum of reason, then only this; that the *Supreme Nature*, being wholly imployed in a blisfull vacancy, and entirely taken up with the superlatively-pleasant contemplation of its own excellencies, hath cast the rains upon our own necks, committed the managery of all our affairs to our own providence, and hears neither the clamours of our profane impieties, nor the sighes of our supplications, but stands as unconcerned in, so unregardant of all our actions. *Sic enim sese res habet, ut ad prosperam, adversamve fortunam qualis sis, aut quemadmodum vixeris, nihil interfit*; as *Cotta*, personated by *Cicero* (3. *de Nat. Deor.*) or as *Cæsar* in *Lucan*,

——— *Nunquam se cura Deorum*
Sic premit, ut vestræ vitæ, vestræque saluti
Fata vacent ———

The *Gods* are never subject to a *Care*;
Nor doe the *Fates* look how you *Mortals* fare.

Article 4. The second objection, extorted from mans being obnoxious to the hostility of many other Nature.

The *Second*, objected frequently against the *Stoicks*, by the *Academicks*, as that incomparable Atheomastix, *Lactantius*, hath observed (*de ira Dei, cap.* 13.) is this; *Cur, si Deus omnia hominum caussâ fecerit, etiam multa contraria, & inimica, & pestifera nobis reperiantur, tam in mari, quam in terra?* If man be the chief object of *Gods* love, and his welfare the grand intention of his Providence; why then did he create so many powerfull and malicious enemies against him, in all elements, and still expose him to encounter more dangers then his dayes, nay then

then his haires can number? If God be an indulgent *Father*, how dares *Nature* prove her ſelf ſo cruel a *Stepmother* to man? If his *Creator* intended him for a *Favorite*, and made him the centre in which all the lines of his bleſſings ſhould convene to make up a full and conſtant felicity; how comes it to paſs, that the vileſt of *Creatures* inſult over him, and make him the point at which all their darts of hoſtility are levelled, ſo that his life is made a full and conſtant infelicity?

Article 5. The laſt objection, of the *Adverſity* of the *Pious* and *Proſperity* of the *Impious*, in this life.

The *Laſt*, and indeed the moſt dangerous rock, againſt which innumerable numbers not only of unhappy *Ethnicks*, that wanted the Compaſs of true *Religion*, and ſo were forced to ſteer by the imperfect *Chart* of their own *natural judgment*; but alſo of *Chriſtians*, who had the ineſtimable advantage of the *Scriptures* (the only Loadſtone that never deflects from the point or unity of truth) have ſuffered ſhipwrack; is this: *The calamitous condition of the Virtuous, and the proſperous eſtate of the Vitious, in this life.*

The moſt full and accurate deſcription of this Scylla we can meet with amongſt many of thoſe venerable Fathers, who with as much profound learning, as ſtrenuous induſtry, have attempted the remove of it; is given us by *Lactantius* (*lib.* 3. *cap.* 17.) in theſe words: *Videbat Epicurus bonis adverſa ſemper accidere, paupertatem, labores, exilia, carorum amiſſiones: malos contrà beatos eſſe, augeri potentia, honoribus affici. Videbat innocentiam minus tutam, ſcelera impune committi. Videbat ſine delectu morum, ſine ordine, ac diſcrimine annorum, ſævire mortem: ſed alios ad ſenectutem pervenire, alios infantes rapi, alios jam robuſtos interire, alios in primo adoleſcentiæ flore immaturis funeribus extingui. In bellis potius meliores & vinci, & perire, maxime autem commovebat, homines imprimis religioſos malis affici; iis autem, qui aut Deos omninò negligerent, aut minus piè colerent, vel minora incommoda evenire, vel nulla.* To the obſervation of *Epicurus* it appeared, that unjuſt *Fortune*, not the diſcriminating hand of *Divine Providence*, had the diſpenſation of *Happineſs* and *Miſery*: for *Adverſity* is the common cognizance of *Honeſty*, and poverty, unceſſant and unſucceſsfull

ceſſull labours, baniſhment, loſs of friends, and the like dolefull accidents are alwaies in the lots of *Good men*: but on the contrary, *Proſperity* is frequently the pathognomonick of *Villainy*, and increaſe of power, accumulation of honours, and other blandiſhments of fortune are the portion of *Wicked men*. That the ready way to *danger*, was to be *innocent*; and to be extremely *nefarious* the only hopefull means to attain *impunity*. That death, like an inconſiderate Tyrant, ſpares none upon the exceptions of age, ſex, dignities, or merits; but, raging in an arbitrary way of cruelty, ſuffers ſome to unravell their clue of life to the laſt minute of old age, while he cuts off the threads of others more hopefull in the firſt rundle of infancy. That he extinguiſheth the vital lamp of ſome, in their brighteſt and ſtrongeſt luſtre; of others before they are well and throughly kindled; and permits others to ſhine till they have conſumed their laſt drop of oyle. That the ſword of war both conquers and cuts off the moſt noble and valiant heads: while the degenerous and cowardly eſcape unwounded. And, what with the greateſt violence ſwayed him from the beleif of Particular Providence, that the moſt *religious* had, for the moſt part, the moſt *afflictions*; but thoſe, who either contemned, or neglected, or but coldly affected the worſhip of the Gods, had either leſs & lighter misfortunes, or none at all.

Nor did the impiety of *Epicurus* reſt here, but, as if this objection, though fine enough to entangle the phanſies of vulgar flies, were yet too looſly woven to enſnare the judgments of more deciſive and penetrating heads; proceeds to reduce it to more cloſeneſs and ſtrength, by ſuperadding theſe ſophiſtical knots. *Aut Deus vult tollere mala, & non poteſt; aut poteſt, & non vult; aut neque vult, neque poteſt; aut & vult, & poteſt. Si vult, & non poteſt, imbecillis eſt, ideoque non Deus; ſi poteſt, & non vult, invidus eſt, quod æque alienum à Deo; ſi neque vult, neque poteſt, & invidus & imbecillis eſt, ideoque neque Deus; ſi vult & poteſt, quod ſolum Deo convenit, unde ergo mala? aut cur illa non tollit?*

Either God is willing to amove thoſe evils from good men, but cannot; or can, and will not; or neither can, nor will; or both will and can. If he hath a will, but not a power, then is

he impotent, and ſo no God. If he hath a power, but not a will, then is he malevolent and envious, and ſo no God: for malice and weakneſs are equally incompetent to the divine Nature. If he want both will and Power, then is he both malevolent and impotent; and by conſequence no God. If he want neither, as he muſt not if he be God: whence come thoſe evils? or why doth he not amove them?

Article 6. The ſporadical diffuſion thereof upon *Ethnicks*, *Hebrews* and *Chriſtians*: and the probability of their opinion, who hold the book of *Job*, to be a Treatiſe concerning the ſame ſubject, inſinuated.

And too far did this deſigne of his ſucceed; for the contagion of this peſtiferous error became ſo Epidemical, as that it diffuſed it ſelf not only upon his ſchool, and there corrupted the brains of *Philoſophers*; but dilated even to the infection of the more remote and groſſer mindes of *Women* and *Poets* (both which *Imitation* makes eaſily ſubject to any impreſſion of *falſhood*) that lived many ages after him. For *Women*, witneſs that relation, aſſured by the records of *Athenæus* (lib. 13.) of one *Danae*, daughter to *Leontius* of the Epicurean ſect; who being on her way towards the place appointed for her execution, in the bitterneſs of her ſpirit, ejaculated this deſpetate blaſphemy: *Non injuriâ Deos à multis contemni; nam quod meum maritum ſervavi, hanc mihi gratiam rependunt Dii; Laodice autem, quod maritum ſuum interfecerit, maximo in honore eſt.* With very good reaſon are the Gods contemned by many; for that I have faithfully preſerved my husband from an immature death, do the Gods thus ungratefully gratifie me with this my own unjuſt and violent one: but *Laodice*, becauſe ſhe hath perfidiouſly deſtroyed hers, doth now live, flouriſh, and hath her guilty head incircled with a wreath of the moſt refulgent honours. Whether the crime, for which ſhe was ſentenced, might deſerve ſo ſevere a doom, as death; I dare not determine, our Author being not poſitive, nor open in that particular: but this I am ſure of, that ſhe ſuffered juſtly; and therefore though I cannot acquit her *Judges*, I may her *Executioners*. For *Poets*, witneſs that confeſſion of *Ovid*.

Cum rapiant mala Fata bonos, ignoſcite faſſo,
Sollicitor nullos eſſe putare Deos.

When

When I ſee *Good men* by *ill Fates* to fall,
(Forgive't) I think there are no *Gods* at all.

Nay the ſober *Claudian* profeſſeth, that the *Felicity* of the moſt *impious* and unjuſt, and the ſmart *Afflictions* of the *Pious* and juſt perſons, here on earth, had often ſtaggered his confidence of *Divine Providence*, and more then inclined him to become an Apoſtate from all Religion, and declare himſelf on the ſide of *Epicurus*.

Sæpe mihi dubiam traxit ſententia mentem,
Curarent ſuperi terras; an nullus ineſſet
Rector, & incerto fluerent mortalia caſu?
Sed cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
Adſpicerem, lætoſque diu florere nocentes,
Vexarique pios: rurſus labefacta cadebat
Religio, cauſaque viam non ſponte ſequebar
Alterius vacuo quæ currere ſemina motu
Adfirmat, magnumque novas per Inane figuras
Fortuna, non arte regi, quæ Numina ſenſu
Ambiguo vel nulla putat, vel neſcia noſtri.

Lib. 1. in Rufinum, ſub init.

Oft hath my dubious mind ſeem'd well aſſur'd,
That *Gods* above th' affairs on earth procur'd;
That one wiſe *Rector* all events did guide;
Nor *Good*, nor *Ill* from *Fortunes* wheel could ſlide.
But when I ſaw the *Chaos* of mens *Fates*,
The *Guilty* flouriſh long in ſmooth eſtates,
And *Innocence* afflicted; was the heart
Of my *Religion* ſtab'd, forc'd to take part
With the adverſe opinion: which concludes
That an immenſe *Vacuity* includes
The *Principles* of all; in that vaſt range
Fortune, not *Art*, doth their old *Figures* change;
Gods there are none, or ſuch as doe not know
What parts ſelf-ruling *Mortals* act below.

Concerning this eminent Poet, *Claudian*, there hath been old

hacking and ſlaſhing among Antiquaries, whether he lived in the owle light of *Paganiſme*, or the illuminating day of *Chriſtianiſme*; S^t. *Auguſtine*, *P. Oroſius*, and *Paul the Diacon* (the two former whereof flouriſhed not long after he was withered) deſcribing him to be *à Chriſti nomine alienus*, and *paganus pervicaciſſimus*; and *Franc. Petrarcha* and *Landinus* having adopted him for a Proſelyte, and affirming himſelf to be not only *Chriſtianæ pietati addictus*, but alſo to have bin the compoſer of this devout Epigram:

Chriſte potens rerum, redeuntis conditor ævi,
Vox ſummi, ſenſuſque Dei: quem fundit ab alta
Mente Pater, &c.

But if he were a *Chriſtian*, yet could he not want the excuſe of very holy Precedents even of that profeſſion, who had frequently ſtumbled at the ſame ſtone. For the *Royall Hebrew*, whoſe *Muſe* was the *Holy Ghoſt*, though a man after Gods own heart, a Chriſtian by the baptiſme of his prophetique faith, and one who had frequently inſtructed his harp to echo forth Panegyricks of the ſpeciall Providence of the great preſerver of men; had yet his confidence ſometimes damp't, and judgement eclipſed by the ſame fogg of error, exhaled from his experience of the proſperity of Libertines. Nor was the ſhock of this temptation eaſily withſtood by ſo ſtrong a Champion; for it made him reel again, as he thus confeſſeth: *My feet were almoſt gone, my ſteps had welnigh ſlipt. For I was envious at the proſperity of the wicked. They are not in trouble, neither are they plagued like other men. Their eyes ſtand out with fatneſſe: they have more then their heart could wiſh. They are corrupt, and ſpeak wickedly concerning oppreſſion: they ſpeak loftily. They ſet their mouth againſt the heavens: and their tongue walketh through the earth. Behold, theſe are the ungodly, who proſper in the world: they increaſe in riches. Verily, I have cleanſed my heart in vain: and waſhed my hands in innocency. For all the day long have I bin plagued, and chaſtened every morning, &c.* (*Pſalm.* 73.) To which we may annex that blunt and emphatical leſſon of *Jeſus ben Syrach* (*Eccleſiaſtic.* 2.) *My ſon, if thou come to ſerve*

ſerve the Lord, prepare thy ſoul for temptation: the concernment of which every man underſtands to be this: *The more righteous, the more afflicted.* Here alſo is a convenient place for their opinion, who affirme the *Book* of *Job* to have bin intended as no hiſtory (though they conced him to have bin no faigned perſon, from *Ezek.* 14. 14. and *James* 5. 2. but a real example of both Fortunes, in an exceeding meaſure) but a grave Treatiſe concerning this ſubject, viz. *the proſperity of the impious, and conſtant adverſity of the pious*, comprehending the arguments of both the *Opponent* and *Defendant* of *Divine Providence.* Which is grounded upon ſtrong probability, ſince, as S^t. *Ierom* hath obſerved and atteſted, in the original Hebrew, from the beginning of the book to the 3 verſe of the 3 chapter, where the complaint of *Iob* begins, all is written in *Proſe*, and thenceforward, during the whole diſpute, to the 6th. verſe of the laſt chapter all in *Hexameter verſe*, where the compoſer again let looſe his pen into proſe, whereby it is manifeſt that the *Proſe* was deſtined for a *Prologue* and an *Epilogue* to the conteſt in *verſe*. Now every man knows the ſorrows and ſickneſs of *Iob* to have bin too intenſe and urgent, to endure the calme and leaſure requiring humor of *Poetry* either in himſelf or his friends: and therefore muſt the book be compoſed by ſome Perſon not moleſted with either of thoſe two impediments, but of ſerene thoughts, and acquainted with the antient cuſtome of diſpoſing their Moral Philoſophy into verſe.

And there are *inſtances* enough to illuſtrate both the contumacy and large diffuſion of this *objection.* I might have ſayd *more then enough*; the ſtrongeſt and moſt military *Faith* among us, though aſſiſted by the moſt evident and firm *reaſon*, being hardly able juſtly to boaſt an abſolute conqueſt of, and conſtant immunity from the ſharpe clandeſtine aſſaults of the ſame *ſcruple:* and ſo no man needing other example to evince the frequent prevalency of it, but what his retired meditations may find alleaged in the inventory of his own frailties, lapſes, and temptations; (all which are punctually and orderly regiſtred by that recorder of his ſoul, which the Divine call's Συνείδησις, or *Conſcience*) eſpecially in theſe evil times, wherein *Piety, Wiſedom, Iuſtice, Temperance, Fortitude, Innocence*, and all other *Graces* and *Virtues* are

depoſed, and onely their *Contraries* advanced; in a word, *wherein nothing can make a man temporally miſerable, but the ſevere profeſſion of Goodneſs.*

Sect. II.

Article 1. That man is the ſole object of Gods ſpecial *Providence*, argued from hence; that he is the principal object of his (extrinſecal) *love*: and that inferred from hence, (1) that God hath impreſſed upon the mind of man a greater knowledg of his Divinity, then upon any other Creature, Angels only excluded: (2) that man is only qualified to ſpeculate, admire, and laud the *pulchritude* of Nature.

THat God extends the right hand of his Providence upon the head of man (the *Heir* of all his *bleſsings*, though the *youngeſt* of his *Creatures*) ordering the occurrences of his life, nay the manner and moment of his death, by a paternal and ſpecial care, more excellent then that whereby he is pleaſed to regulate and diſpoſe the operations of all other Entities in the Republique of the World; is amply manifeſt from hence, *Quod majorem ſui hominibus, quam cæteris rebus notitiam impreſsit*, that he hath impreſſed upon the mind of man a knowledg of his Divinity more cleare and diſtinct, then upon any created natures beſide, *Angelical* and *intuitively intellectual ſpirits* only excepted.

For though all the works of God carry, in the front of their diſtinct Forms, ſome certain Signatures or Characters, that undeniably atteſt their Creation by an Efficient infinite in Power and Wiſedom; and in that reſpect may be properly enough ſaid, to ſhew forth the glory of their Maker: and though all *Animals* do, by a kind of tacit homage, confeſs their origination from, and conſtant dependence on one *Eternal* and *Omnipotent Cauſe*; yet are they induced, excited, or rather impelled thereunto, *inſtinctu ſolum quodam cæco*, only by a blind and confuſed inſtinct, of which themſelves have no poſſible notion. But as for the *Favorite*, *man*, he holds a clear and diſtinct *idea* of the Nature of God, as hath formerly bin demonſtrated; and hath therefore a Logical, aſſured, and expreſs cognition of his *Creator* and *Conſervator*, and that ſo *radically* united, or identified to his eſſence, that it can be no Paradox to averr, that this ſcience is part of his ſoul, though that be a ſimple, pure, homogeneal, and

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so indivisible substance: nay some modern Enquirers into the nature of the soul, have described it to be, *Actus simplex Cognitionis omnium, quæ cognosci possint*, a simple Act, or present Cognition of all things intelligible, *i. e.* of *God*, and consequently, tis not in the power of the most desperate and obdurate Atheist, to erase this idea out of his mind, no more then to change, meliorate, or adnihilate his essence, or prevent the stroke of Death. Now, what could be the *Motive*, that induced God to ennoble man by the prerogative of this excellent Idea, or representation of himself, other then the reflex act of his own infinite Goodness; which in the language of mortality, is *Free Love*, that flowed in a fuller and richer stream upon man, then upon all the World beside? And what can be the *End* of this implantate and coessential Knowledg in man, other then this; that he should constantly contemplate, admire, and laud the Perfections of the *Donor* thereof, and more particularly that concerned *Attribute*, which moved him to the free *Donation*, namely his immense *Beneficence?* This being conceded, it remains a plain and perpendicular *Inference*; that since between God and man there is a greater relation, or *Communion* (so the learned *Gassendus* calls it, *in Animadvers. in lib.* 10. *Diogen. Laert: de physiolog. Epicuri. pag.* 744.) then betwixt God and any other of his Creatures: therefore also must there be a greater measure of *Providence* in God for man, then for any other; it being necessary that the *Providence* of God should hold exact proportion, and be æquilibrated to his *Love*. This necessity of a parity or *æquipondium* betwixt *Love* and *Providence Divine*, may be conveniently exemplified in our selves; for by how much the more we love our Friends, Wives or Children, by so much the more carefull and provident are we for their conservation and welfare.

Again, our own Experience is both argument and testimony sufficient, that the perscrutation of the mysteries of Nature, and the contemplation of sublime and celestial objects, is proper only to man; no other Animal being constituted in a capacity to rival him in those noble operations. And if so, undoubtedly he must violently stifle the conviction of his experience in this particular, who

who dares deny, that thoſe heavenly beauties, and all the peices of Nature beſide were created principally for the uſe of man, inſomuch as man was created principally to declare the Glory of the Creator. *Ad quid enim tantus decor univerſi, niſi eſſet homo, qui conſideraret, ipſoque perſpecto hymnum Authori caneret?* Tis an Axiome of conſtant Verity, *that Nature makes nothing in vain*; and this rule, doubtleſs, ſhe learned from that *Wiſdome*, which determineth all its actions to certain, adequate, and proper Ends: now we muſt grant, either that God adorned the Univerſe with ſuch exquiſite pulchritude, and admirable imbelliſhment of Art, to no purpoſe at all; and ſo was more vain and improvident then his inſtrument, Nature: or elſe, that he conferred that elegancy and amiable decorament upon it, to this end, that the curious Cogitations of man might be entertained, exerciſed, and delighted in the ſpeculation and admiration thereof, and through that maze of pleaſant wonder be conducted to the true Elyzium, the contemplation of the *Fountain* of *Pulchritude*, and *entelechia* of Excellencies, *God*. For there is no *medium* between theſe two Contraries, nor any hope of evading the rigour of this *Dilemma*, upon pretence of neutrality: ſince God had no other end, wherefore he beautified the World, but his own Glory in chief, and the excitement of the Admiration and Magnificat of man, as ſubſervient thereunto; nor doth the World contain any other Nature, but Man, that is qualified with Faculties requiſite to the ſatisfaction of that end. *Quis enim aliquam aliam unquam invenit naturam, qua ædificium hoc tantum conſpiciens, in Architecti ſapientiſſimi admirationem perinde rapiatur?* We well know, that *Relatives* (*ſecundum eſſe*) poſitively neceſſitate the exiſtence each of other; and therefore to allow (what cannot be diſallowed, but by incurring a more dangerous abſurdity) that God made, and exhibited the *Beauty* of the World, *tanquam admirandum ſpectaculum*, as a ſpectacle that cannot but excite *Admiration* in the *ſpeculator*; and yet to deny that he provided a fit and reſpective *ſpectator*, ſuch whoſe *Senſe* ſhould tranſmit the *idea* of that *Pulchritude* to the judicature of a higher *Faculty*, and that again be thereby impregnated with *Admiration* (which is nothing but our Reaſons being at a ſtand at the *novelty*

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or *excellence* of an object occurring to our ſenſe; for what is either frequent, or manifeſt to our cognition, we never admire: and that's the cauſe, why this *Affection* of the mind as it is the firſt of *Paſsions*, ſo it is the only one that wants a *Contrary*, as the unimitable *Des Cartes* hath diſcovered to us, *in lib. de paſſion. part.* 1. *articl.* 54.) is not only an impious derogation to the wiſdome of God, but alſo a manifeſt Contradiction to our own reaſon, which from the exiſtence of the *Relatum*, a *ſpectacle*, immediately concludes the neceſſary exiſtence of the *Correlatum*, a *ſpectator*. And that this Spectator can be no other Animal, but man; is too bright a truth to need any other illuſtration, but what is reflected from it ſelf.

To which Argument, of the Creators adopting man to be his Darling and intimate Favorite, the Logick of every man may ſuperadd many others of equivalent importance, drawn from the conſideration of thoſe *Præeminences and Prærogatives*, wherewith his Munificence hath bin pleaſed to ennoble his nature, and exalt him to a neerer Cognation or Affinity to his own glorious Eſſence, then any other Creature in the Univerſe; as the excellent contexture and majeſtique *Figure* of his *Body*; the ſemi-divine *Faculties* of his *Soul*; his *Monarchy*, domination, or royalty over all other ſublunary natures, *Omnia enim ſibi ſubmittit, dum omnia quæ in mundo ſunt, vel ad uſus vitæ neceſſarios refert, vel ad varia genera voluptatum*; and laſtly that ineſtimable propriety, the *Immortality* of his Soul.

Now to direct all this to the mark; ſince God hath thus proclaimed Man to be, next to his own *Glory* (which is the *laſt* of *Ends*, as his *Will* is the *firſt* of *Cauſes*) the grand and principal ſcope of his mighty work of Creation; and that he made all things, in order to his accommodation and well-being in this life, and allurement, nay manuduction or conduct to immarceſcible beatitude after Death: and ſince his Act of Providence, or the conſtant Conſervation of all things, in the primitive perfection, diſtinction and order of their Natures, is nothing but his act of Creation prolonged, or ſpun out through all the independent Atoms, or ſucceſſive particles of time, as hath bin more then once intimated; beyond all diſpute, the *Product* muſt be the ſame

with our *Theſis*, viz. *That Man is the object of Gods ſpecial Providence*, and by conſequence, *that all occurrences of his life are punctually predetermined, ordered, and brought to paſs by the ſame.*

Article 2. That the ſoul of man contains a proleptical notion of Gods ſpecial Providence.

As every man brings into the World with him a certain *Prolepticall*, or *Anticipated Cognition* of a *Deity*, or *Firſt Cauſe* of all things, deeply and indelebly ſtamp'd upon his *mind*; as hath bin formerly demonſtrated: ſo alſo holds he, as an *Adjunct*, or rather a *part* thereof, a coeſſentiall *Prenotion*, that this *Firſt Cauſe*, or *Supreme Nature*, is the *Fountain* from whence thoſe two different ſtreams of *Happineſs* and *Miſery*, or *Good* and *Evil*, the former by *Condonation*, the other by *Permiſsion*, are conſtantly derived: and upon conſequence, that all *Occurrences* of his life, are the juſt and prudent *Deſignations* of its *ſpecial Providence.*

That every man, in whom the *Light of Nature* is not damp't by *Fatuity*, either native and temperamental, or caſually ſupervenient, hath this Ἔννοια, or *impreſs* of an *eſpecial Providence*, decreeing and diſpoſing all events, that have, do, or ſhall befall him; is manifeſt from hence, that no man, though educated in the wildeſt ignorance, or higheſt barbariſme imaginable, but was naturally, and by the adviſoes of his inteſtine *Dictator*, inclined either to conceive, or imbrace ſome kind of *Religion*, as an homage or fealty due from him to that *Supreme Power*, in whoſe hands he apprehended the rains of Good and Evil to be held, and whoſe favour and benigne aſpect he thought procurable, and anger attoneable by the ſeaſonable addreſſes of *Invocation* and *Sacrifice.*

Article 3. That this proleptical notion is the baſis of Religion.

And in truth, to him, whoſe meditations ſhall ſink deep enough, it will ſoon appear, that this *Anticipation is the very root of Religion*; for though man ſtood fully perſwaded of the *Exiſtence* of *God*, yet would not that alone be argument ſufficient to convince him into the neceſſity of a devout *Adoration* of him, unleſs his mind were alſo poſſeſſed with a firme beleif of this proper *Attribute* of his Nature, which ſo neerly concerns his felicity or infelicity, viz. his *ſpecial Providence*, which regulates all the affaires, and appoints all the Contingencies of every individual

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mans life. For tis the ſenſe of our own *Defects*, *Imperfections*, and *Dependency*, that firſt leads us to the knowledg of his *Allſufficiency*, *Perfections*, and *Self-ſubſiſtence*; the apprehenſion of our *Neceſſities*, is the ſchool wherein we firſt learned our *Orizons*, and the hope of obtaining *Bleſſings* from his immenſe Bounty, is both the excitement and encouragement of our *Devotion*: and therefore the *Devil* ſpake profoundly and to the purpoſe, in his expoſtulation with God concerning the cauſe of *Iobs* integrity, *Doth Iob ſerve God for nought?* This being duely perpended, I hope I ſhall not offend Theology, if I affirme, that ſince to love God aright, is to love him purely and ſolely becauſe he is God, *i. e.* all that's truely Good and Amiable; *tis impoſsible for the ſoul of man, in this life, to love God as ſhe ought to doe*: becauſe impoſſible for her, before her refinement by Glorification, ſo to caſt off all *ſelf-intereſt*, as to love him without reflexions upon her ſelf, *i. e.* without the hopes of being made eternally happy by that love. If this reaſon bear not out my paradox, I dare any man to the bar of Experience, and boldly appeal to the *Conſcience* of any the moſt mortified Chriſtian, whether in his moſt pure, abſtracted, and holy raptures of *Divine love*, he did not always perceive a conſiderable mixture, and weighty alloy of *Ipſeity* or *Selfneſs*.

That the Conceſſion of an *Eſpecial Providence* in the *Supreme Being*, whereby he conſtantly moderateth and diſpoſeth the operations and products of Second Cauſes for the induction of *Good* on the heads of thoſe, whoſe Virtuous inclinations may, in ſome latitude of *Worthyneſs*, ſeem to prepare and qualify them for the grateſull *Acceptance*, and genuine *uſe* thereof; and of *Evil* on thoſe whoſe *Vitioſities* and habitual Depravities ſeem, by the importunity or violence of demerit, to extort it from the *Juſtice* of his *Indignation*: that this inbred *perſwaſion*, I ſay, is the ſpark, at which all the Tapors of *Religion* were firſt kindled, the very *Ethnicks* themſelves, while groping in the Chaos of Idolatry, have long ſince diſcovered. Witneſs their Magnificent Temples, coſtly Hecatombs, human Holocauſts, and frequent ſolemne Invocations; all which kinds of addreſſes they generally made uſe of, and obliged themſelves unto, as the only hopefull means as well to atone the diſpleaſure, as conciliate the favour of that *Power*,

in whoſe hands they conceived the book of *Fate* to be kept, and who had the *Gardianſhip* or *Adminiſtration* of the *Fortunes* not only of Cities, nations, and families, but even of every individual Perſon. Witneſs alſo, that Glorious Pagan, *Cicero*, who deriving the pedegree of *Religion*, fathers it immediately upon the *perſwaſion of an Eſpecial Providence*, (1. *de nat. Deor.*) in theſe words; *Sunt Philoſophi, & fuerunt, qui omnino nullam habere cenſerent humanarum rerum procurationem Deos. Quorum ſi vera eſt ſententia, quæ poteſt eſſe Pietas? quæ Religio? Hæc enim omnia purè ac caſtè tribuenda Deorum numini ita ſunt, ſi animadvertuntur ab his, & ſi eſt aliquid à Diis immortalibus hominum generi tributum. Sin autem Dii neque poſſunt, nec volunt nos juvare, nec curant omnino, nec quid agamus animadvertant, nec eſt quod ab his ad hominum vitam permanare poſsit: quid eſt, quod ullos Diis immortalibus cultus, honores, preces adhibeamus? In ſpecie autem fictæ ſimulationis, ſicut reliquæ virtutes, ita pietas ineſſe non poteſt, cum qua ſimul & ſanctitatem, & religionem tolli neceſſe eſt. Quibus ſublatis, perturbatio vitæ ſequitur, & magna confuſio.*

Article 4. That Man brings into the world with him, an irreſiſtible propenſion to Religion.

That no man ever entred upon the theatre of the World, but he acted ſome one *Religious* part, bringing along with him an irreſiſtible propenſion to revere and adore that *Nature*, which he conceived ſuperior to his own, and all others; cannot be obſcure to any, whom either *Peregrinations*, or *Books* have acquainted with the religious Cuſtomes and practiſes of forreign *Nations*, either *Ancient* or *Modern*. For read we the voluminous monuments of Antiquity, erected by the noble induſtry of *Herodotus*, *Diodorus*, *Strabo*, *Ptolome*, *Mela*, *Pliny*, *Solinus*, *Iuſtine*, and other *ſenior Hiſtoriographers*; read we *Munſter's Coſmography*, *Ortelius* his *Theatrum Orbis*, the *Hiſtories* of *Braſile*, written by the judicious pens of *Guilelm. Piſo*, the Hollander and Phyſician to the States Fleet, of *Georg. Marcgravus* the German, and *Iohan. de Laet* of *Antwerp*; and in our Mother tongue, *Grimſtones Eſtates* and *Empires*, *Purchas his Pilgrimage* (a work that ſpeaks its venerable Compiler, to have bin a man of many Languages, indefatigable ſtudy, vaſt readings, large

large rhapſodies, and ſtrong judgement,) *Hackluit's Collection of Engliſh Voyages*, the ſeveral Deſcriptions of *America*, together with the manners of its various Inhabitants; and other Works of the *Neotericks* (in all which we find not only the *Chorography* and *Topography*, but alſo the faithfull *Morography* of all the known parts of the World) I ſay, read we all theſe, and we ſhall find them unanimouſly poſitive in this point, *That there is no Nation but hath its Religion.* And therefore, with *Arnobius* (*lib.* 1. *contr. Gent. pag.* 476.) I am bold to demand of the whole world; *Quiſquamne eſt hominum, qui non cum iſtius Principis notione, diem primæ nativitatis intraverit? Cui non ſit ingenitum, imo affixum, & pene in genitalibus matris non impreſſum, non inſitum; eſſe Regem ac Dominum cunctorum, quæcunque ſunt, Moderatorem?*

Article 5. An objection, that the *Calaici* were abſolute Atheiſts, refuted.

If any ſhall pull me by the eare, and here object out of *Strabo* (*lib.* 13. *pag.* 382.) that the *Calaici*, a rude and ſavage people of old *Spain*, were abſolute *Atheiſts*, and worſhiped no Gods at all; I anſwer, that *Strabo* wrote this particular with no more authenticall a quill, but what he found drop't from the wings of *Fame*, himſelf inſinuating as much: for his words are, *Calaicis Deum nullum eſſe, quidam ajunt*; there is a certain rumor, or traditional report, raiſed, diſperſed and authorized, where, when, upon what grounds, or by whom, I know not, that the *Calaici* had no religion among them. And if a *quidam ſic ajunt*, be proof enough to ratifie any hiſtoricall poſition, or aſſertion; then may *Fame* aſpire to the throne of *Truth*, *Fables* become *Hiſtories*, and ſtrangers may beleive that we *Chriſtians* are the moſt *abſolute Atheiſts*. For *Cæcilius* hath reported of us, that we doe *templa deſpicere, & Deos deſpuere:* both deſpiſe the temples, and deſpite the Gods; as *Arnobius* (*lib.* 8. *cont. Gent. pag.* 748.) hath informed us.

Article 6. A ſecond objection, that the *Maſſagetæ* and *Scythians* were devoyd of all Religion, prevented.

Nor have I forgotten, that the two fierce Nations, the *Maſſagetæ* and *Scythians*, (whoſe *rudeneſs* and want of Civility, the indiſcretion or ſeverity of ſome hath aggravated into an *Atheiſtical Barbariſme*, and want of all *Religion*) have bin ſtigmatiz'd with

with the ſame infamous brand; and therefore to anticipate this exception, I refer the doubting Reader to the teſtimonies of *Herodotus* and *Lucian*: the former (*lib. 4. pag. 278. & 279.*) at large expunging that fabulous aſperſion, and proving them ſtrict, ſolemne, and ceremonious Votaries to all the Gods of Greece: the latter (*lib. de ſacrificiis. p. 57.*) deriding them for their ſuperſtition, nay ſuch immoderate and frantique zeal, towards the honour of their principal Deity, *Diana*, as made them embrace the flames, and offer themſelves as holocauſts unto her.

Article 7. That it is not in the power of man, totally to eradicate this plant of Religion, or notion of ſpecial Providence Divine, out of his mind; evinced from hence, that the moſt contumacious Atheiſts have, at ſome time or other, acknowledged it: as

Moreover, as this inoppugnable propenſity to *Religion* is a *Cyence* of *Gods* own ingraffing on the mind of man; ſo alſo is it not in the power of any man, though aſſiſted by all the ſtratagems and legions of Hell, totally to *eradicate* it thence.

This is a truth confirmed by the *Experience* of all Ages. For, notwithſtanding the inſolent pretences, and blaſphemous Rhodomontadoes of many miſcreants, who have gloried in the moſt execrable cognomen of Ἄθεοι, and ſtudied to advance their names to the higheſt pinacle of Fame, by being accounted men of ſuch abſolute and fearleſs Spirits, as that they ſcorned to own any *Being ſuperior* to their own, to which they ſhould be accountable for their actions: yet have they bin compelled (ſo violent are the ſecret touches of that hand, which converts all things into demoſtrations of his own Glory) either by the ſcourge of ſome ſharp calamity, or the rack of ſome excruciating diſeaſe, in their lives, to recant; or at the neer approach of that King of terrors, Death, to confeſs this their horrid impiety.

Article 8. *Pharaoh.*

Thus the proud and Adamant-hearted *Pharaoh*, who deriding the Divine Embaſſy of *Moſes*, in an imperious ſtrain of Scorn, and expoſtulatory bravado, demanded of him; *Quis eſt Jehovah, cujus voci auſcultem, dimittendo Iſraelem? non novi Jehovam, &c.* did yet, when the *Violentum* of Divine Vengeance by heavy judgements had convinced him; when the true and real Miracles of *Moſes* had won the garland from thoſe weak Deluſions and preſtigions impoſtures of his *Magicians*, and he beheld their black Art fooled in their vain attempts to imitate

imitate *Moſes* in the viſible transformation of Duſt into Lice; when the tangible darkneſs that benegroed the horizon of *Ægypt*, and ſo made it more then midnight to the eye of his body, had illuminated that of his Soul; and when the frozen Granadoes of the clouds had broke open the iron door of his Conſcience; then ſends he poſt for thoſe, whom he had barbarouſly exiled from his preſence, humbles himſelf before them, and howles out this *Palinodia*; *Peccavi hac vice: Jehovah juſtiſſimus, ego vero & populus meus ſumus improbiſſimi.*

Article 9. *Herod Agrippa.*

Thus *Herod Agrippa*, who, in the morne, to enhance the eſtimate of majeſty, and ſtroke that vertiginous and admiring beaſt, the multitude, had arrayed him in his brighteſt ornaments of State, thickly imbrodered with plates of Oriental Gold, and ſtudded with Diamonds and all other reſplendent Gemms, ſo that the incident Sun beams ſeemed to have acquired a greater luſtre by reflexion from him, and who by the blaſt of popular Euges had the wings of his Pride fanned up to ſo ſublime a pitch, that he loſt ſight of his own Humanity, and vainly conceived the adulatory Hyperbole of his Auditors to be but their juſt acknowledgement of his Divinity: being wounded by the inviſible ſword of a revenging Angel, before Sun ſet, by a fatal experiment confuted both his own and his flatterers blaſphemy, and with the hoarſe groans of a tortured wretch, cryed out; *En ille Ego, veſtra appellatione Deus, vitam relinquere jubeor; fatali neceſſitate mendacium veſtrum coarguente: & quem immortalem ſalutaſtis, ad mortem rapior. Sed ferenda eſt voluntas cæleſtis Numinis.* (*Joſeph.* 19. *Antiquit. p.* 565.)

Article 10. *Antiochus Epiphanes.*

Thus that real *Lycaon*, *Antiochus Epiphanes*, who had not only denied, but being enraged by a malitious Phrenſy beyond that of *Lucifer* newly degraded, publickly deſpited and reviled the *Almighty Patron* of the Jews, blaſphemed his moſt ſacred name, demoliſhed his temples, profaned his conſecrated Utenſils, violated his religious inſtitutions, and perſecuted his worſhipers with all the moſt bloody cruelties, that the wit of an exalted malice could invent, or inflict: being put upon the rack of a ſore

sore and mortal disease (which some have conjectured, and not without good warrant from probability, to have bin a *Cancer* in his bowells, introduced *mediately* by *Divine Justice, immediately* by a fix't *melancholy* generated by the unceſſant ſtings and convulſions of his guilty Conſcience, as by its *procatarctick Cauſe*,) and deſpairing of any eaſe or cure but from his injured enemy, God; he ſighes out his Confeſſion. *The ſleep is gon from my eyes, and my heart faileth for very Care. And I thought with my ſelf, into what tribulation am I come, and how great a floud of miſery is it, wherein I now am? But now I remember the evills that I did at Jeruſalem, and that I took all the veſſels of Gold and Silver that were therein, and ſent to deſtroy the inhabitants without a Cauſe. I perceive therefore, that for this cauſe, theſe troubles are come upon me &c. It is meet to be ſubject unto God, and that a man who is mortal, ſhould not think himſelf equal unto God through pride.* (*Maccab.* 1. *chap.* 6. *verſ.* 9, 10, 11.)

Article 11. *Maximinus.* Thus the Giant Emperour, *Maximinus*, as inſatiate a Blood-hound to the *Chriſtians*, as *Antiochus* had bin to the *Jews*, *novorum ſuppliciorum inventione ſeſe inſolenter efferens*, boaſting the acuteneſs of his wit by the invention of new ways of tortures for thoſe patient martyrs, as *Euſebius* (*lib.* 1. *de vita Conſtant. cap.* 51.) hath deſcribed him; and advancing the Roman *Eagle* in defiance of thoſe who fought under the ſanguine ſtandard of the *Croſs*; nay ſo infatuated with the confidence of his own Greatneſs and perſonal ſtrength, that he entertained a conceit, that *Death* durſt not adventure to encounter him, for feare of having his javelin broke about his own crazy skull, and all his skeleton of bones rattled to duſt, as *Capitolinus* tells us: notwithſtanding when he felt himſelf invaded with a *Verminous Ulcer*, or *Fiſtula*, *in mediis corporis arcanis*, which did *letificum fœtorem exhalare, ut medicorum aliqui incredibilem fœtorem ferre non valentes, occiderentur*, evaporate ſo contagious and peſtilential a ſtench, that ſome of his Phyſicians, not able to endure that mephitis or ſteam of intenſe corruption, fell down dead; and underſtood the ſame to be *ſupplicium Divinitus illatum*, a judgement

ment ſent from God to retaliate upon him thoſe tortures, which he had cauſed in the bowells and ſecret parts of many innocents; then did his flinty heart melt within him, and *tandem ſentire cœpit, quæ contra pios Dei cultores impiè geſſerat, & hac ſe propter inſaniam contra Chriſtum præſumptam, merito & ultionis vice, perpeti confeſſus eſt*, and in the midſt of theſe confeſſions of his own *Guilt*, and *Gods juſtice*, breathed out his execrable ſoul from a gangrenous and loathſome body. (*Euſebius, lib.* 8. *Hiſtor. Eccleſ. cap.* 17.)

Article 12. *Julian Apoſtata.*

Thus alſo that notorious *Apoſtate, Julian*, who had not only renounced the faith of *Chriſt*, but proclaimed open and implacable hoſtility againſt him, and to quench the thirſt of his diabolical malice, drank whole Tuns of the pretious blood of his *Members*; being defeated and mortally wounded in a battaile fought againſt the Perſians: he inſtantly learned of his awaked Conſcience, that the Cauſe of his preſent overthrow was his former impiety, and rightly aſcribing the Victory to the revenging finger of that God, whoſe Divinity he had abjured, rather then to the arme of fleſh, he threw up his blood into the aer, and together with his black Soul, gaſped out this deſperate ejaculation; *Viciſti Galilæe, viciſti!* Thou haſt overcome me, oh! thou *Jeſus of Galile*, thou haſt overcome me: *ſimul confeſſus & victoriam, & blaſphemiam*, at once confeſſing both Chriſts conqueſt and his own deteſtable blaſphemy; as *Theodoret* (*lib.* 3. *Hiſtor. Eccleſ. cap.* 20.) hath deſcanted upon thoſe his laſt (but trueſt) words.

Article 13. *Tullus Hoſtilius.*

And thus alſo *Tullus Hoſtilius* (a *Cognomen* exactly accommodated to his fierce *nature*,) immediate ſucceſſor to *Numa Pompilius* in his throne, though not in his manſuete and pious inclinations; being a man of ſo rough and martial a temper, that he held *Religion* to be but a kind of *Emollient Cataplaſme*, preſcribed by *State Policy* to ſoften and emaſculate the minds of men, as *Plutarch* (*in vita Numæ pag.* 158.) hath noted of him; and thereupon in his proſperity neither acknowledging, nor ſacrificing unto any *Deity*, but his *Ferreus Acinaces*, or old ſword: when caſt upon the thorny bed of ſickneſs, he ſoon

diſcovered, retracted, and renounced his *Atheiſme*. (which remarkable mutation of his judgement, *Livie* (*lib.* 1. *pag.* 12.) hath both amply and elegantly deſcribed thus, *Adeo fracti ſimul cum corpore ſunt ſpiritus illi feroces, ut qui nihil antea ratus eſſet minus regium, quam ſacris dedere animum; repente omnibus magnis parviſque ſuperſtitionibus obnoxius degeret, religionibuſque populum impleret.* I ſayd *Mutation* of his judgement, not *Rectification*; nor can I properly allow him ſo much: ſince he that runs from one extreme of *Atheiſme* to the other of *Polytheiſme*, ſhall find himſelf in the ſame point of *Error*, from whence he ſet forth. For to beleive, that there are more Gods then one, in ſtrictneſs of truth is to beleive there is none at all; *Unity* being the eſſential and inſeparable Attribute of the *Deity*. And therefore we may allow him to have bin *ſuperſtitious*, but never truely *religious*. Nor did the *Judge of all hearts* accept of this *Change* for a *Converſion*; for the records both of *Livy* and *Entropius* concur in this; *Fulmine ictus, cum tota domo ſua, conflagravit*: he, his houſe, and family were conſumed by Lightning. A puniſhment ſo proportionate to the rules of *Divine Juſtice*, that we may therein give a faire conjecture of his guilt: and that which all Atheiſts have ſtood convulſt at.

Iuvenal. Satyr. 13.

Hi ſunt, qui trepidant, & ad omnia fulgura pallent,
Cum tonat, exanimes, primo quoque murmure cœli.

Such *Villains* quake at *Thunder*, and each flaſh
Of *Lightning* doth their *Souls* with *Terror quaſh*.

Article 14. *Bion Boryſthenites.*

A like example of the impoſſibility of extinguiſhing this ſpark of Religion, which the Creator hath kindled in the breaſt of every man, doth *Diogenes Laertius* afford us (*in vit. Bionis*) in the recantation of *Bion* of *Boryſthenes*. Who continuing (or rather only pretending to continue) in profeſt Atheiſme, till he was arreſted by ſickneſs, that rough Serjeant of Death, and then affrighed into an acknowledgement of that truth, he had ſo long ſtifled: *inductus eſt pœnitentiam agere ſuper iis, quæ peccarat in Deum*, was induced to become a penitentiary for thoſe offences he had prepetrated againſt the ſacred majeſty of God.

To

To conclude therefore; as *Lucilius* ſayd of *Homer*, *Nemo qui culpat Homerum, perpetuo culpat*; ſo may we more truely ſay of *God*, *Nemo qui Deum negat, perpetuo negat*, no man who denys God, doth conſtantly deny him. For all men have confuted, diſavowed, or repented that impiety at or before their death, which they ſeemed with ſo much impudence and pride, to cheriſh in their lives. This the ſweet-tongued *Tertullian* (*Apolog. cap.* 17.) profoundly obſerved, when he diſtilled the quinteſſence or ſpirit of all we have ſayd, concerning this aſſertion, into this ſhort ſentence: *Anima, licet carcere corporis preſſa, licet inſtitutionibus pravis circumſcripta, licet libidinibus & concupiſcentiis evigorata, licet falſis Diis exancillata, cum tamen reſipiſcit, ut ex crapula, ut ex ſomno, ut ex aliqua valetudine, & ſanitatem ſuam patitur, Deum nominat.*

Article 15. The poſſibility of the *obſcuration* of the impreſs of ſpecial Providence Divine, *pro tempore*, conceded: and the impoſſibility of the total *Deletion* thereof, briefly proved.

I ſhall not gainſay, but that 'tis *poſſible* (I am ſorry, I might have ſayd, too *frequent*) to have this ingravement of Divinity on the mind of man, obſcured, and buried under the duſt raiſed in the ſummer of *Proſperity*; for as *Lactantius* (*lib.* 2. *cap.* 1.) moſt ſolidly, *tum maxime Deus ex hominum memoria elabitur, cum beneficiis ejus fruentes honorem dare Divinæ indulgentiæ deberent*, men are then moſt prone to forget God, when being ſated with the accumulations of his immenſe bounty, they have the greateſt reaſon to remember him: yet I ſhall confidently affirme, that the leaſt guſt of Affliction, in the winter of *Adverſity*, ſoon blows that duſt off again, and renders the Characters faire and legible to the firſt reflexive or inward glance of the ſoul. *Si qua enim neceſſitas gravis preſſerit, tum demum recordantur; ſi belli terror infremuerit, ſi alimenta frugibus longa ſiccitas denegaverit, ſi ſæva tempeſtas, ſi grando ingruerit: ad Deum protinus confugiunt, à Deo petitur auxilium, Deus, ut ſubveniat, oratur; ſi quis in mari vento ſæviente jactatur, hunc invocat; ſi quis aliquo vi afflictatur, hunc protinus implorat, &c.* as the ſame *Lactantius*.

Article 16. The reduction of all, to a conciſe and memorable demonſtration; that the occurrences of every mans life are the conſignations of ſpecial Providence

Now to abſtract all this to a ſmaller bulk, ſuch as may be no burthen to the weakeſt memory, and reduce our Argument into a ſharper point, ſo that it may, with the greater facility, ſink into the thickeſt skull; If *Religion* be a *Plant* radicated in the ſoul of man, ſo deeply and firmely, that though the damp of a *barbarous education* may for a while *retard*, or the rankneſs of thoſe Weeds of Senſuality, the *Honours* and *Delights* of this World, *conceal* the *germination* of it: yet will it, at ſome time or other, early or late, and always in the Winter of *Calamity*, ſhoot up and bud forth into an abſolute *Demonſtration* of the dependence of our *Happineſs* and *Miſery* on the *Will* of the *Supreme Being*: and if the πληροφορία, or full *Perſwaſion* of an *Eſpecial Providence*, as a relative *Attribute* of the *Supreme Being*, whereby all the various Occurrences of every individual mans life are predetermined and diſpoſed, bee the *Seed* from whence this *Plant* of *Religion* hath its root; both which *Propoſitions* we conceive ſufficiently proved: then doe not I ſee, how the ſubtileſt Wit can evade the rigour of the *Inference*, or *Concluſion*, viz. *That all the affaires of man are regulated by the Special Providence of God.*

Sect. III.

Article 1. The Atheiſts firſt objection, confuted: and the Divine Nature demonſtrated both *iraſcible* and *placable*, (anthropopathically.)

THus far have we Demoſtrated the *Neceſsity of Gods Special Providence*; and our next buſineſs is to remove thoſe *Rocks* caſt up by the Pioners of Satan, to obſtruct the Current of mans cleare and full beleif thereof.

As for the *Firſt*, *Deum neque ira, neque gratia tangi*; this may without much difficulty be dejected, by anſwering, that it can no way infringe the *Immutability* or conſtant *Sameneſs* of the *Divine Nature*, to affirme it to be capable of *Anger* and *Placability*: provided that we underſtand neither of theſe as a *Paſsion*,

Paſſion, but (as the *Schoolemen* preciſely ſpeak) *in effectu exequutionem, potius quàm in Affectu perturbationem*, rather an execution in *Effect*, then a Perturbation in *Affect*. As for *Anger*; if a *Wiſe-man* can ſo conſerve the ſerenity and tranquillity of his mind, as to chaſtiſe or ſeverely puniſh his diſobedient ſervant, without any paſſion or internal commotion at all: 'tis very hard, if *God*, the *Fountain of Wiſdome*, cannot be admitted to conſerve the conſtant and immutable peace or calme of his Beatitude, when he puniſheth the improbous actions of men. For *Juſtice* is a *virtue*, which to ſpeak ſtrictly, cannot frown, which abhor's the ſociety of a *Paſſion*, and only actuates the mind into a noble and commendable *Zeal*, not an illiberall or rough *Perturbation*. And upon the conſideration of this was it, that the firſt *Preſervers of Equity*, knowing it not to be impoſſible for the breaſt of a *Magiſtrate* to be inflamed, beyond this moderate heat, into an exceſs of Indignation againſt a *Malefactor*; therefore wiſely provided, that the *Judge* ſhould ſquare his *Sentence* by the direct and impartial rule of the *Law*; which ſome Civilians have therefore wittily defined to be *Ira ſedata*, Anger without Choler, Indignation refracted, or the ſword of Vengeance put in the hand of Mercy. As for the Contrary to *Anger*, viz. *Grace*, or *Placability*; why this alſo may not be adſcribed to God, as fully conſiſtent to the Eternal plenitude and immu tability of the *Divine Beatitude*, I cannot underſtand: provided that we accept it *abſque geſtiente lætitia*, and as an effect infinitely remote from that kind of *Paſſionate Joy*, which tickles the heart of man into a ſuddain paroxyſme of delight, upon the apprehenſion of a gratefull and pleaſing Object, either in the anticipation of Hope, or actual fruition. The *Reaſon* is the immenſe *Goodneſs* of his *Nature*, which being in perpetual *Effuſion*, without poſſibility of exhauſtion, or an Ocean that repleniſheth all things with *Amability*, yet ſuffers no diminution of its own fulneſs; doth more then incline him to be pleaſed with, or accept of as gratefull, that in man, which is originally but an *Extract* of his own *Delightfulneſs*, or himſelf gratefully returned to himſelf by reflexion from us. This the *Schoolemen* moſt judiciouſly pondered, when they eſtabliſht as Canonical, *Deum*

exercere gratiam, ea naturæ ſinceritate, qua Bonus eſt. Nor are we to deny this *Placency* or *Delight* to *God*, ſince it is ſo far from *infringing* this conſtant and equall tenor of his eſſential *Felicity*, that in ſome ſort it mainly conduceth to the *Conſervation* thereof; inſomuch as to be unceſſantly exerciſed in a liberal *Benefaction* to other Natures, is to doe what is moſt conſentaneous and genuine to the ſwindge or *Verticity* of his own: and ſo to do, all men, doubtleſs, will allow to be the higheſt and moſt permanent Delight in the World.

Nor is it a legal proceſs in the common Pleas of *Reaſon*, to argue thus; God hath left us to act our own parts, in the world, therefore he takes no farther care of us, and therefore all the *Occurrences* of our lives are either the neceſſary *ſubſequents*, or collaterall *Adjuncts* of our own either *natural*, or *moral Actions*: for though it be moſt true, that he hath endowed us with an abſolute *Freedom* of our *Wills* (an evidence of his exceeding *Grace* and *Benignity*,) and that, indeed, which ſupports the neceſſity of our *Rationality*; for if our *Wills* were ſubject to compulſion, undoubtedly we ſhould have little or no uſe at all of our *Reaſon*, ſince then our *Objects* would be both *judged* of and *elected* to our hands) and ſo permitted us the enjoyment of our own intire liberty: yet hath he, out of a compaſſionate prenotion of the *Deceptibility* of our *judgement*, preſcribed us rules, whereby our *Underſtanding* may be directed in the *ſelection* of *Good*, and *devitation* of *evill*.

To ſpeak more expreſly; he hath ſet on our right hand *real* and *true Good*, on our left only *ſpecious* and *apparent*: the Election of either is dependent on our *Will*, our *Will* is guided by our *Judgement*, and our *Judgement* is the *Determination* or reſolve of our *Intellect* (for, without diſpute, though common Phyſiology hath founded this *Liberty* on the indifferency of the *Will*; yet is it radicated in the indifferency of the *Intellect*, or *Cognoſcent Faculty*, primarily, and in the *Will* only ſecondarily, inſomuch as that ever follows the manuduction of the *Intellect*,) but yet that he might in a manner direct us in our choyce, he hath annexed *Happineſs* as a *reward* to invite us to the one, and *Miſery* as a *puniſhment* to deter us from the other: and therefore

tis

tis manifeſt, that God wills the felicity of all men, more then themſelves can deſire it.

And hence comes it to be a truth, that on one ſide *Fortune* (*reſpectu noſtri*) frequently puts in for a ſhare in the playing of our Cards; but yet ſtill the *Special Providence* of God ſupervilés her hand, and manageth the whole game: and on the other, that our own *Prudence* doth many times conduce to our winning of the ſtake; but yet ſtill 'twas the *Goodneſs* of *God* that gave us that *Prudence*, and takes great delight to ſee us uſe it, as we ought to do, to our own advantage.

Article 2. The Atheiſts ſcruple, of Gods inauditi-on of the pray-ers of good men, or not conceſſion of their petitions ſatisfied.

Doth he ſo, ſayth the *Atheiſt*, how comes it about then, that he frequently turnes a deaf eare to our moſt earneſt *Prayers*, and but rarely grants our *Petitions*? For how few barren wombs have bin cured of their ſterility, by the fumes of ſacrifices? and how few Mariners preſerved from naufrage, by the appenſion of their Votive tables? or who hath obſerved ſuch holy magick in the periſhing Seamans pious ſighes, as to have huſht the dreadfull ſcolding of the waves and winds? For anſwer let us return,

That the moſt indulgent *Father* doth not always condeſcend to the importunate deſires of his child: that as well *Pious*, as *Impious* men may be included in the ſame ſhip, that's banded up and down by the wanton Billows of the Sea; that the Good may be loſt, and the Bad eſcape the fury of the tempeſt: and all this conſiſt both with the *Goodneſs* and righteous *Providence* of God. The *Reaſon* in brief (for the full ſolution of this *Paralaxis* of *Juſtice* doth more properly belong to our refutation of the laſt *Objection*, concerning the apparent Proſperity of the Vitious, and the calamitous condition of the Virtuous, in this life) is this; *God in his Wiſdome knows our real neceſſities, and underſtands what's moſt convenient for us.* This the acute *Satyriſt* handſomly expreſſeth thus;

——*Si Conſilium vis,* *Juven.*
Permittes ipſis expendere Numinibus, quid *Sat.* 10.
Conveniat nobis rebuſque ſit utile noſtris:
Nam pro jucundis aptiſſima quæque dabunt Dii.

Carior

Carior eſt illis Homo, quàm ſibi. Nos animorum
Impulſu, & magna, cæcaque cupidine ducti
Conjugium petimus, partumque Uxoris, at illi
Norunt qui Pueri, qualiſque futura ſit Uxor. &c.

Would'ſt be adviſ'd to chooſe the beſt? refer
That choyce unto the *Gods*, who cannot err.
For better then our ſelves our wants they know:
And will *true joys*, for *falſe delights*, beſtow.
Their love to us tranſcends our own. By blind
Affections ſpur'd, and fury of the mind,
We *Wife* and *Sons* deſire; the *Gods* above
Know what that *Wife*, and how thoſe *Sons* will prove.

Article 3. The Atheiſts ſecond Argument againſt Special Providence divine, diſſolved: and the neceſſitie of Objects hoſtile, and deleterious to the life of man, demonſtrated.

As for the *ſecond Rock*, *Cur ſi Deus omnia hominum cauſſa fecerit, etiam multa contraria, imò & peſtifera nobis reperiantur, tam in mari quàm in terra?* this alſo may eaſily be removed, by digeſting our meditations into this ſhort reply.

The *Creator*, having formed the machine of mans body into a Figure fit to receive the majeſtick charagme of Divinity, as the laſt act of his hand, and the accompletion of his moſt exquiſite Artifice, breathed into him a *Wiſe*, *intelligent*, or *cognoſcent Soul*; that by the tranſcendent operations thereof, man might juſtly intitle himſelf to the Empire of the Creatures, ſubjugate them to the dominion of his unconfined Will, and accommodate all things either to the reliefe of his *Neceſsities*, or the promotion of his *Delights*. This done, he ſet before him *Good* and *Evill*; and this upon the higheſt reaſon: becauſe he had endowed him with *Sapience*, whoſe baſis is founded in the actual diſcernement of thoſe two Contraries For no man can make an election of the *Better*, and know what's really *Good*, unleſs at the ſame time he know alſo what's really *Evill*, and how to reject and avoyd the *Worſe*. Thoſe two *objects*, though abſolute *Contraries*, are yet perfect *Relatives*; though irreconcileable Enemies, are yet coſubſiſtent Twins, and live ſo connexed hand in hand, that the ablation of the one neceſſitates the ablation of the other. *Good* and *Evill* therefore being thus blended together, and

and in this miſcellany propoſed to man; then begins that *Criterion*, *Wiſdome* to exerciſe its Faculties, diſplay its diſcretive energy, and immediately exploring the difference, *affects* the *Good* for *Utility*, but *rejects* the *Evill* for *Safety*. As therefore there are innumerable *Goods* offered to the judgement of man, which he may with happineſs enjoy; ſo alſo are there as many *Evills*, which he may with caution abhor. For if there were nothing evill, nothing dangerous, in ſhort, nothing hurtfull to man; pray, what ſtead could his *Reaſon* ſtand him in? And hence is it manifeſt, that whoever ſtrikes at the neceſſity of *Evill*, at the ſame time cuts off the neceſſity of *Wiſdome*, and downright adnulls the uſe of the *Intellect*: ſince if *God* had created nothing that might prove noxious to man, to what purpoſe would his *Cogitation*, *Intellect*, *Science* and *Reaſon* have ſerved? For then to what object ſoever he had extended his hand, though at adventure; yet would that have bin by nature fit and commodious for him.

Article 4. The ſame illuſtrated, by a correſpondent *Simile*.

To illuſtrate this by a familiar, yet in all points reſpondent *Example*; if any man make a feaſt for a company of *Infants*, and prepare a liberal table of many both pleaſant and wholſom meats for them; though they are not wiſe enough to make their own choyce, by *rational judgement*, but purſue the inclination of their *Senſual Appetite*: yet can they not chooſe amiſs, all things good and gratefull being prælected to their hands. And if ſo, of what diſadvantage is their *Ignorance*, or of what advantage could their *Intelligence*, were they arrived at ſo much maturity, be unto them? Truely, none at all; for as they could know no want of the one, ſo could they receive no damage by the continuation of the other. But if among thoſe many pleaſant and nutritive diſhes the maſter ſhould mingle as many either *bitter* and diſtaſtfull, or *poyſonous*; then doubtleſs muſt the greedy Wretches be deceived through their ignorance of Good and Evill, unleſs *Wiſdome* ſtep in to their protection, and informe them what is ſafe, and what deſtructive, and ſo direct them in the *Delection* of the one and *Refuſall* of the other. Now clearly the Caſe is the ſame, in all particulars, twixt God and Man, as to

the point of Good and Evill: and therefore we may conclude, with *Lactantius*; *Propter mala opus nobis eſſe ſapientia, qua niſi fuiſſent propoſita, rationale Animal non eſſemus*: had there bin no evill for man to avoyd, he never had bin endowed with a rational Soul.

Article 5. The Atheiſts laſt and grand objection, of the proſperity of the Vitious, and adverſity of the Virtuous, redargued: and the nature of the *Goods* of *Fortune* profounded.

The laſt, and greateſt *Rock*, upon whoſe ſhelves Myriads have bin ſplit and ſhipwrackt in their judgements, our memory tells us is this; πῶς δὲ ἔιτερ τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ φρονήσει τὰ καλὰ ἀνθρώπων οἰκονομεῖται, τὸ μὲν κίβδηλον ἐυτυχεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τἀνάντια πάσχει; *Qua ratione, ſi curæ Deo res humanæ ſunt, malis eſt bene, & bonis male?*

This, I confeſs, to the firſt and ſuperficial ſurvey of my meditations, appeared montainous and flinty, and ſuch as might require both a larger Current of acuteneſs to diſſolve it, then what runs in the ſhallow chanel of my braines; and a greater ſtrength of Argument to diſlodge and crane it up piece after piece, then the lax and feeble nerves of my Reaſon could afford: but to my ſecond and penetrating thoughts, it diſcovered it ſelf to be, like thoſe objects we look upon through the magnifying glaſs of Fear, great only at a diſtance, and devoyd of all Solidity, nay in reality no more then a heap of mud heaved up by the back of that ſubterraneous Mole, the *Devil*. For though Experience aſſures us, that this field of the World hath a ſtrange and prepoſterous ſoyle, wherein *Weeds* moſt commonly proſper, and uſefull *Plants* wither: yet a profound ſcrutiny into the buſineſs, ſhall ſoon detect, that there is an *admirable Providence* in the diſtribution of *Good* and *Evill*, or *Proſperity* and *Adverſity*.

Firſt therefore, let us ſeriouſly examine the inſide of thoſe *Good* things, that are ſhowred down on the laps of Evill men, and make their tides of Fortune high and ſmooth; while the ſtreams of Good mens lives ſeem to run low, ſink down to the loweſt ebbs, and are conſtantly ruffled by the contrary guſts of Afflictions. Certain it is, that nothing can be affirmed to be *really Good*, but only *Virtue*, or at leaſt that, which being contempered, impregnated and qualifyed by Virtue, doth poſitively conduce to our *Well-being*: and as certain it is, that Evill men want this

this *Universal Ferment*, or *Elixir*, *Virtue*, which only hath a power to convert all things into Good; and therefore cannot they either receive, or use those things called the *Goods of Fortune*, with that temper and moderation of mind, which is requisite to the perfect assimilation of them into their well-being; and upon consequence, those abused Goods instantly alter their Property, and degenerate into *Evils*, *Vice*, like a depraved stomach, having a power to corrupt the best things into the worst. And this the reason is, why those *Blessings*, which the bounty of *Providence* hath ordained for our refreshment and consolation in this tedious pilgrimage on earth, and furtherances or contributions towards our easier purchase of immarcescible Felicity in heaven, when Death shall have evacuated our Faith; such as *Vigor*, *health*, and *beauty* of Body, *ingenuity of disposition*, *longevity*, *multitude of Friends*, *equality in marriage*, *fertility of issue*, *education in civility and learning*, *science*, *wealth*, *nobility of blood*, *absoluteness in power and government*, *&c.* when they come into the polluting hands of *Vitious* men, they instantly suffer a total castration of their *Goodness*, a depravation of their *benignity*, and putrify into perfect *Curses*: the possession of them raising uncessant tempests and distracting storms of *Passions* in the obnubilated region of their minds; nor permitting that comfortable sun of true *Content* to shine clearly forth, and make one faire day, during their whole lives.

For though the Mole-eyed multitude, whose sight is always terminated in the gawdy outsight, admire even to envy the lustre of splendid *Vice*, cry up the happiness of wealth, and beleive that the Rich man, though nere so unjust and sinfull, doth every moment surfeit with variety of Delights: yet if his *Conscience* were strictly examined, twould soon confess, that all his luxurious *Viands* are but *Pils of Coloqyntida* neatly gilded, or *Apples of Sodom*, whose Vermilian rind doth emulate the blushes of Aurora, but are within nothing but sulphureous dust; that his magnificent *Buildings* are but a more strong and spatious *Prison*; his numerous *Attendants*, but so many *plummets* superadded to that oppressing weight of cares, which keeps his mind in the perpetual motion of inquietude; his troop of *Adulators*, but a swarme of

hungry *Fleas* that moleſt him by ſucking, or a neſt of *Tarantula's*, whoſe titillations prove venenate and poyſon his ſobriety into a phrenſy of deadly jollity; that his *bed of down* growes every night more full of *thorns*; that his *baggs* of treaſure, like the maſſy ſtatue of *Jupiter* on the Aſſe's back, *oppreſs* and gall him; in ſhort, that he never taſted any one ſincere and limpid drop of pleaſure in his life.

And this one truth brancheth it ſelf into the manifeſtation of *two* others;

Firſt, that thoſe golden ſhowers which *Providence* raineth into the boſomes of Vitious men, are no more then *Bona fucata*, real Evils couched under the ſpecious hatchment of apparent Goods; fruit whoſe Cortex is ſweet and beautifull, but Kernels full of amaritude and loathſom venom; and all the magnified preſents of Fortune, like *Pandora's* Box, have glorious outſides, but contain millions of infections and peſtilential Evils.

Secondly, that the *Poſſeſſors* of them, by reaſon of the exorbitances, and habitual depravities of their minds, ſeem uncapable and therefore, in the judgement of the Supreme Wiſdome, abſolutely unworthy of more ſolid and ſubſtantial Goods; *Providence* dealing with theſe, as a Wiſe *General* with *Comards*, who are aſſigned to the ſordid offices of common Sutlers, and Baggage-Carriers, while the generous and heroical are appointed to Arms, difficulties, and encounters. *Cum videris bonos acceptoſque Diis viros, laborare, ſudare, per arduum aſcendere; malos autem laſcivientes & voluptatibus fluere: Cogita, filiorum nos modeſtia delectari, Vernularum licentia; illos diſciplina triſtiori cohiberi, horum ali audaciam. Idem tibi de Deo liqueat, bonum virum in deliciis non habet; experitur, indurat, ſibi illum præparat.* Seneca (*de Providentia.*)

Nay, more then all this, ſhould we grant that the *Cornu Copiæ*, or affluence of the Goods of Fortune makes one ſtep, or gradation in the aſcent to the Palace of *Temporal Happineſs*: yet can we not infer, that Vitious men are therefore neerer to the top, then thoſe indigent and tatterd *Lazaruſſe's*, that ly groveling below, becauſe they are mounted thereon; ſince, as *Iamblicus* (*in Protrept.*) hath moſt prudently obſerved, Malice ever drinks the

the greateſt part of her own poyſon; ſince the continually excruciating torture, reſulting from the ſenſe of their own impiety, ten times more dejects them, towards the abyſs of miſery, then the fruition of thoſe goods can advance them; ſince that ſharp-beaked Vultur, an Evil Conſcience, never ceaſeth day nor night to dilacerate their hearts, but racks them into a moſt ſevere condemnation of themſelves, which doubtleſs is the keeneſt arrow in the quiver of Divine Revenge, and that affliction which beſt defines the terrible eſſence of Hell.

To all which we may juſtly ſuperadd this, that the brighteſt and longeſt days of *Fortune* have ever cloſed in the blackeſt and moſt tragical nights of *Sorrow*; that the *Plays* of *Libertines* have always proved *Come-tragedies*, and their pompous Masks finiſhed in diſmal Cataſtrophes; nor can the records of the whole world produce one Example of *Sinfull Greatneſs*, that hath not, either before, or at his eternal Adieu, by woefull experiment manifeſted the truth of this maxime; *That none can ever arrive at the Elizium of true Felicity, who conſtantly purſue it through the gardens of Senſuality: that the Roſe of happineſs grows on the prickly ſtem of Virtue: and that the juſt diſcharge of our duties to God and Man, in all things, to the utmoſt of our abilities, is the only means of acquiring that Philoſophers ſtone*, Content, *the only* Summum Bonum *in nature.*

Article 6. The Reaſon, wherefore Divine Providence conſers Good things on Evil men.

Laſtly, as to that ſeeming Ἀφροσύνια that the hand of Gods *Bounty* is obſerved to be extended early and long on the heads of Impious men; but, on the contrary, that of *Juſtice* either late, or not at all, in this life: though we grant the *Queſtion*, yet ſhall we ſoon ſalve the *ſcruple*, by conſidering, that his *Providence* obſerves this method, for two important Reaſons: *Firſt* in reſpect of themſelves, and *Secondly* in reſpect of the Virtuous. (1.) *Of themſelves*; God, in order to the manifeſtation of his infinite *Goodneſs*, therefore conferr's a plentifull portion of his benefits upon them, that by the blandiſhments of their ſenſe he might allure them to a deſire of thoſe delights, whoſe pleaſantneſs conſiſts in this, that they infinitely tranſcend the apprehenſion of Senſe; and that the fragrant odor of his temporal Mercies

might attract their minds to the affectation of Virtue, and thence lead their thoughts on to a gratefull and reverentiall Contemplation of him, that both made them out of nothing, and beſtowed them freely, upon no motive of worthineſs in the receivers: and in order to the manifeſtation of his *Longanimity*, and *Clemency*, he therefore ſuſpends their puniſhment, *ut tempus habeant, quo in ſe deſcendant, atque reſipiſcant*, as the holy Father expreſſeth it, that they may have both time enough to diſcover, and opportunities to repent and reforme their heynous enormities. (2.) *Of the Virtuous*, in a threefold reſpect; *firſt*, that he might become an Exemplar of manſuetude, patience, and longſuffering to them; *ſecondly*, that the tyranny and oppreſſion of Ungodly men might ſerve to actuate and exerciſe thoſe Virtues in them, which otherwiſe had wanted an opportunity to diſplay their Soveraign and all-conquering efficacy: and *thirdly*, that they might extract to themſelves a Cordial out of the poyſonous Fate of others: *i. e.* when they ſhall obſerve thoſe, who dayly bathed themſelves in rivers of Voluptuouſneſs, to be by Divine revenge on a ſuddain precipitated into the black Sea of miſery, they may recruite their Confidence, that the ſame Juſtice will, in his own appointed time, more then compenſate their momentany objections, and convert their night of obſcurity and trouble into a glorious day of interminable Delectation.

Article 7. Thoſe *apparent Evils*, which Providence Divine conſignes to Virtuous men, anatomized; and found to be *real Goods* intrinſecally.

Having thus preciſely diſſected the *Apparent Good*, which Divine Providence allots to *Evil men*, as their portion to this life; and found it to be, as painted fire, bright but comfortleſs, or ſuch at beſt, whoſe Abuſe aggravates the Guilt, and upon conſequence, the miſery of the receivers: it will no leſs conduce to the rectification of our diſtorted judgements, and ſo to the cure of our depraved Affections, to anatomize alſo the other Ventricle in the heart of the objection, viz. the *Apparent Evil* frequently aſſigned to *Good men*.

If *Felicity* be the Daughter of *Virtue*, as the *Philoſopher* moſt judiciouſly, τῆς γὰρ τελείας ἀρετῆς ἡ ἐνέργεια, εὐδαιμονία, *perfectæ virtutis actio eſt beatitudo* (*magn. Moral. lib.* 1. *cap.* 4.) and *Virtue* the daughter of *Wiſdome*, as the ſame, γίνονται δὲ ἀρεταὶ

ἀρεταὶ καθ' ἕνων ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ τῆς ψυχῆς μορίῳ, *Virtutes omnes, in Animæ parte rationali ſint, neceſſe eſt,* (*lib. ejuſd. cap.* 1.) and if the *Wiſdome of God* be infinitely more perfect then the Wiſdome of man, as all juſtly confeſs; then aſſuredly can they only be *happy, who conform their Wills to the Will of the Higheſt Wiſdome*: now *Good men*, in all conditions of their lives, and all the changes of Fortune, ſtill ſubmit their deſires and affections to the Will of *Divine Providence*; therefore are they conſtantly happy, and conſequently thoſe *ſeeming Evils*, which befall them, prove real Goods, that implicite reſignation of themſelves, and that equanimity wherewith they entertain thoſe *External Evils*, inſtantly altering their malignity, dulcifying their amaritude, and converting them unto *Intrinſick Bleſſings*.

Article 8. The Authors *Sanctuary* wherein he ſecured his mind from diſcontent, in all thoſe ſtormes of Calamities, which our late Civil war ſhowred upon him.

This Argument (without oſtentation, I profeſs it) was the ground upon which I erected me a Sanctuary to ſecure my judgement in, when the multiplied ſtormes of Adverſity, raiſed by the impetuous winds of our Civil Wars, had beaten me from all other probability of ſhelter. For taking this for my *Hypotheſis*, *that man, in this life, wants only ſo much of Happineſs, as he doth of Obedience, ſo much of Content, as he doth of abſolute Conformity to the good will of Providence*; I inferred, that no man can be truely miſerable, but he that makes himſelf ſo, nor any man really happy, but he that hath pared off the bias of Affection from his mind, and fitted it to run ſmooth and even in the levell of Indifferency, as to the Goods of Fortune, having no other mark, but *Fiat Voluntas Dei*. And, having firſt humbly implored the aſſiſtance of *Divine Grace* to enable me to reduce this excellent leſſon into practice, I wore it as a ſacred charme or *Pentacle* on my breaſt, and thereby become Shot-free from all the bullets of an angry Fortune: nor did I feel that to be a conſiderable *loſs*, which the conqueſt and rapine of an inſulting Enemy called my totall *ruine*; but could with more conſtant and internal alacrity ſing Pæans to Heaven, for this victory over my *Puſillanimity*, then did the triumphant Foe, for his, over my *Royal Maſter* and his *loyal Armies*.

Let

Article 9. *Virtue*, a meer *Chimera*, without the occurſion of thoſe things, which *Senſuality* calls *Evil*.

Let us take away thoſe things, which the deluſion of Senſuality call's *Evils*, and *Virtue* muſt then be, what the miſtaken Libertine will have it, a *bare Notion*, or *empty Terme*, as neer of kin to a Chimera, as one of *Plato's* Ideas: For what would become of *Magnanimity*, if there were no *danger?* what of *Patience*, if there were no *ſufferings*, *&c. Marcet ſine adverſario virtus*, and every man knows that the *Inſignia*, or Coat-arms of a gallant mind, is a *Palme* tree, that thrives by oppreſſion, with an orient *Pyropus*, or *Carbuncle* ſuſpended on its trunk, which deradiates the moſt refulgent ſplendor in the darkeſt night, as S^t *Auſtin* (*lib. 2. de doctrina Chriſtiana, cap. 16.*) out of ancient Lapidaries hath affirmed, and *Bernhard. Cæſius* (*de mineral. p. 556.*) on the teſtimonies of many modern Mineralogiſts, aſſerted. This the *Orator* glanced at, when in deriſion of their ignorant Malice, who had attempted to blaſt the Laurel on *Cato's* front; he ſmiles out this character of a well-ordered Mind: *At etiam eo negotio M. Catonis ſplendorem maculare voluerunt, ignari quid gravitas, quid integritas, quid magnitudo animi, quid denique Virtus valeret; quæ in tempeſtate ſæva quieta eſt, & lucet in tenebris, & pulſa loco manet tamen, atque hæret in patria, ſplendetque per ſe ſemper, neque alienis unquam ſordibus obſoleſcit.* (*orat. pro P. Sextio.*)

Article 10. The *Senſe*, no competent *Criterion* of the Good or Evil of the mind.

I ſayd, *thoſe things which the deluſion of Senſuality call's Evils*; for tis no Kenodox or novelty of my own, that the *palate* of the *body* is no competent judge of the *ſweets* of the *Soul*; that the bittereſt *Potions*, are the moſt magiſterial Julebs to extinguiſh the fevers of *Luſt*; and the abſtinence of *Poverty*, the ſureſt prophylactick to prevent the *Tumors* and *Inflammations* of the mind; that a wiſe man is ſenſible of more true delight, in one *Affliction*, then *Nero* or *Lucullus* ever felt in all the pompous and ſtudied *luxury* of their lives; and that the tears of *ſorrow* are not half ſo Salt, nor corroding, as thoſe expreſſed by immoderate *Laughter*. This thoſe *Heroes* well experimented, who even in the Calmes of their ſtate, have voluntarily caſt all the *Goods of Fortune* over board; as unneceſſary luggage, that might hazard

hazard sinking of their vessels, in a storme, but could never pass for currant merchandise on the exchange of Happiness. What a voluminous *Legend* could a good *Collector* make of those *Princes*, who have gladly resigned their imperial *Scepters*, for a more portable and smoother *Shepheards staff?* of those *Potentates*, who have with smiles quitted the noyse and tumult of their magnificent *Palaces*, for the soft murmurs of a *Wilderness?* of those *Crœsusses*, who have cut off the ponderous bunches of Wealth from their own wearied backs, and reduced their spacious *Treasuries* to a *scrip* and *bottle?* of those holy *Prelates*, who have relinquished their *Episcopia*, or ample *Sees*, and retired themselves to some coole and silent *Hermitage?* How many victorious *Generals* have thrown down their leading staves, in the heads of their mighty and obedient *Armies*, and withdrawn into obscure *Cottages*, there to learn a nobler militia of conquering their rebellious *Passions?* How many *Noble Persons*, as high in Honour and Power, as Ambition it self could wish, have chearfully torn off their venerable *Purple*, and disguised themselves in contemptible *raggs*; changed their august and Dithyrambick *Titles* into a vulgar and easy *Monosyllable*; and left their *native soyle* for a contemplative recess in some empty *Island?* in fine, of those *Worthies*, who in their spring of life, their caniculat days of pleasure, the Jubile of unphysick't *Health*, the Zenith of *Riches* and *Honour*; have contentedly shook hands with all this *vexatious Vanity*, and fervently courted not only the loathsome solitude of *Prison*, but even that affrighting Sceleton, *Death*: as those things which promised more real content, then all their former enjoyments? And since they did all this upon no necessity, but that compulsion of their own rectified *Wills:* what reason have we to account *Poverty*, *Exile*, *Sorrow*, *obscurity*, *sickness*, *Imprisonment*, nay *Death* it self, such absolute *Evils* of themselves, as never to be alienated from their malignity, and converted into *Goods*, by the Chymistry of a Virtuous mind? What reason have we to conceive, that those *Generous Spirits* would have complained of the injustice of Gods Providence; if he had bin pleased to have allotted them the same apparent Evils, and consigned them to the same sufferings?

The *Wiſeman* conſiders, that if the rapine of his Enemies, the oppreſſion of Tyranny, the devouring jaws of Fire, or other ſiniſter Accident deprive him of his *eſtate*; yet notwithſtanding he loſeth nothing, that was *properly his own*: if he be tormented in his *body*; that his raggs of *Fleſh* are torn off, his mud-walled Cottage ſhattered, but that impatible Tenant, his *Soul*, remains whole and invulnerable. In a word, as the tall *Olympus* advanceth his intemerated head above the clouds, and with a ſmooth front looks down upon the pageantry of Thunder, and other vaporing Meteors of the Aer: ſo doth the head of a *Virtuous Perſon* ſtand above the Clouds of Misfortunes, and with a magnanimous bravery bid defiance to Adverſity, in all the Foggs of trouble ſtill conſerving the ſerenity of his mind imperturbed. *Nihil accidere bono viro mali poteſt. Non miſcentur Contraria. Quemadmodum tot amnes tantum ſupernè dejectorum imbrium, tanta medicatorum vis fontium, non mutant ſaporem maris, nec remittunt quidem: ita adverſarum rerum impetus viri fortis non vertit animum, manet in ſtatu, & quicquid evenit, in ſuum colorem trahit. Eſt enim omnibus externis potentior. Nec hoc dico, non ſentit illa, ſed vincit, & alioquin quictus placiduſque contra incurrentia attollitur: Omnia adverſa, exercitationes putat, &c.* ſayth the grave *Seneca* (*lib. de Providentia.*) Who having tuned his meditations to this heigh Key, falls not only into a profuſe Encomium of that ſaying of his admired Cynick, *Demetrius*; *Nihil mihi videtur infelicius eo, cui nil unquam evenit adverſi*, nothing in my judgement can be more unhappy, then he who never taſted of Adverſity: but into this *Parodox* alſo, that the condition of *Regulus*, in his nayled barrel, was as far from real *Infelicity*, as that of the great *Mecanas* ſolacing his pamperd limbs on a couch of down. For weighing the conſtant and invincible *Patience* of the one, againſt the perpetual *Anxiety* or civil war in the breaſt of the other, he concludes, *quod dubium ſit, an electione Fati data, plures Reguli naſci, quàm Mecænates velint*; that it may be diſputed whether or no, if men might elect their own Fates, the greater number would not rather chooſe to be born under the angry ſtarrs of the *former*, then the flattering conſtellation of the *latter*:

ἔλεγε ἀλυχῆ, τὸν ἀλυχέα μὴ φέρονλα. *Bias.*

ſo

ſo indifferent are thoſe things to a Wiſe man, which the judgement of the *Senſe* hath denominated *Good* and *Evil.*

Article 11. The Atheiſts objection, that God ought, in juſtice, always to preſerve Good men from ſuffering Evil, expunged.

This magnanimous temper of a Virtuous Mind, thoſe Ideots never ſo much as heard of, who have objected; *that it would have bin more conſiſtent with the juſtice* of Divine Providence, *rather conſtantly to have preſerved* Good men *from affliction, then to ſubject them to the malice and oppreſſion of Evil* men, *and afterward ſeem to vindicate their integrity, and compenſate their ſufferings, by a late remuneration of* happineſs, and *the puniſhment of their* Oppreſſors.

For even Good men themſelves eſteem thoſe acute *Afflictions*, as a *Diploma* or Teſtimonial of their genuine Education in the Academy of *Virtue*, and, like Veteran Souldiers, produce the ſcars of their wounds, as ſo many indeleble characters of *Valour*, and conſequently of *Honour.* They look upon their ſmarteſt ſtripes, as the faire impreſſes of Gods *paternal Affection*; and return him a patient ſubmiſſion to his frequent chaſtiſements, as the moſt gratefull ſacrifice of Gratitude, their frail and indigent condition can afford. They account their temporal *Dejections*, not only an undeniable *ſymbol* of his *Special Favour*, in this military ſtate; ſince they manifeſt them to be elected by him, *non ad mollitiem, ſed ad tolerantiam*, not to dull and inglorious effeminacy, but honourable hardſhip, and maſculine atchievments: but alſo as an Ἀρραβών, or *Earneſt* of their eternal advancement, in the Jubile, when he ſhall diſtribute his triumphant wreaths of Laurel, ſuch whoſe Verdure ſhall know no decay, till the impoſſible period of Eternity. Thus the *Valiant*, with noble emulation, contend for priority in enterpriſes of the higheſt difficulty and moſt eminent danger; and then think themſelves in moſt grace and reputation with their General, when he vouchſafes them the honour of the Forlorn Hope, and conſignes them to encounter a whole Hoſt of Deaths. Thus the *Lacedemonian* yongſters meaſured the affection of their *Parents*, and *Tutors*, not by their *indulgence*; but the ſeverity of their *chaſtiſements*: and embraced their ſmarteſt flagellations as welcome opportunities to experiment their *Conſtancy.* And thus the *Wives* of *Ruſcia*

eſtimate their Husbands love, not by the frequency of their *Conjugall Embraces*, but of their *Caſtigations*: and then bewaile themſelves as more then halfe repudiated, when their matrimonial Lords neglect to afford them the benevolence of the *Laſh*. And yet for all this ſhall man, noble man, who is the *Souldier*, *Sonne*, and *ſpouſe* of *Providence*, ſo far forget his *courage*, *conſtancy*, and *duety*, as to repine againſt thoſe things as *Evil*; which are, by the *Supreme Wiſdome*, intended for his *Good*, nay which a mind, imbued with the ſoveraigne Tincture of *Virtue*, hath a power, were they real Evils, to convert into ineſtimable *Benefits*?

Article 12. The *Summum bonum* of this life, conſiſtent in a full conformity of our wills to the Divine will.

I doe not only aſſent unto, but gratefully applaud their judgements, who have defined the eſſence of *Good* and *Evil*, in this life, by the *Truth* or *Falſhood* of *Opinion*; experience informing me, that the *Senſual Appetite* of ſome apprehendeth many things under the title of abſolute and tranſcendent *Goods*, which the *Rational Appetites* of others abhorr, as poſitive and deteſtable Evils.

And therefore, when the ſoul ſits in conſult upon the Election of *Good*, ſhe ought firſt to wipe her eyes from all the duſt of *Senſual Prejudice*, and reſolve that the Vote of *Temporal intereſt* ſhall goe for nothing, but diſturbance and ſeduction; fixing her Cogitations only upon that pathognomonick, or proper and inſeparable, and therefore infallible ſigne, by which the Wiſdome of God hath deſcribed what's really Good; and that is, an *indifferency to all objects but himſelf*, or *a free and totall reſignation of our Wills to his*, or more preciſely, *if he hath appointed it*.

Article 13. An excellent meditation of *Marcus Antoninus*, concerning the Good and Evil occurrent to man in this life.

This moſt excellent leſſon, that Stoical Emperor, *Marcus Antoninus* had often read by the meer *light of Nature*, and endevouring to reduce it into practice, whiſpers this maxime to himſelf: Τὸ ὑπόληψιν, ἢ ὡς ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν, μὴ παρεισδέχου τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἕξ ἀυτῶ; *opinioni autem mali aut boni adſentire mens*

non

non debet (*lib. de ſeipſo* 5. *numer.* 18.) and in one ſhort meditation ſtates the whole Controverſie concerning the good and evill occurrences to man; which for that reaſon, I heer preſent to the Reader. *Dicit aliquis: infelicem me, cui hoc acciderit! quinimo, felicem me, qui hunc caſum ſine dolore perferam, & nec præſentibus frangar, nec futura extimeſcam! Nam unicuique tale quid potuit accidere: at non cujuſvis erat, ſine dolore eum caſum excipere. Cur igitur illud potius infortunio, quàm hoc felicitati adſcribis? Aut cur id infelicitatem hominis appellas, in quo nihil mali paſſa eſt hominis natura? An verò tibi humanæ naturæ damnum videri poteſt id, quod non eſt contra propoſitum naturæ ejus? Quod ergo naturæ propoſitum eſſe didiciſti? Num caſus iſte efficere poterit, quo minus ſis juſtus, magnanimus, temperans, prudens, circumſpectus, tutus ab errore, verecundus, liber? aut adimere omninò quicquam eorum, quæ hominis naturæ ſunt propria? Proinde quoties inciderit quicquam quod ad dolorem te provocet; recordare hujus præcepti: non illud quod accidit infortunium verè eſſe, ſed quòd fortiter illud feras, id felicitati tribuendum eſſe.* (*lib.* 4. *numero* 31.)

« Some man [perchance] ſays, that I am unhappy, to « whom this infortune hath hapned! Nay, rather may he ſay, « that I am happy, who can endure this misfortune without grief; « and am neither dejected with the preſent, nor afraid of future « Accidents. For the like might have befalne any other man: « but 'twas not in the power of every one to ſuſtain that mis- « fortune without grief. Why, therefore, doe you aſcribe that « rather to misfortune, then this to Felicity? or why account « that to be an infelicity of man, wherein the Nature of man « hath ſuffered nothing of Evil? Can that ſeem to you to be an « Injury to Humane Nature, which is not contrary to the in- « tention thereof? What, therefore, haſt thou learned the « Intention of Nature to be? Can this misfortune effect, that « thou mayeſt be leſs juſt, magnanimous, temperate, prudent, « circumſpect, ſuperior to error, modeſt, free? Or can it take « from thee any of thoſe things, which are proper to the Nature « of man? So often, therefore, as any Accident ſhall occur,

« which may provoke thee to grief ; remember this Precept : « that what happens, is not truely Misfortune ; but that thou « canſt bear it nobly, is a Happineſs.

More then this, I can not, need not ſay, in order to the refutation of this Objection : and therefore I remit the *unſatisfied* to the more profound, elegant, and ample diſcourſe of the learned *Mornæus Du Pleſsis* (*lib. de veritate Chriſtianæ Religionis, cap.* 12.) on the ſame ſubject ; and leave the *ſatisfied* to the calme enjoyment of their perſwaſion.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

The Mobility of the Terme of Mans Life, asserted.

SECT. I.

Article 1. The Affinity of this Theorem to the precedent, intimated: and the necessary division thereof into a *specifical* and *individual* consideration.

HAving thus by Apodictical and uncontrollable Reasons made it manifest, that all things in the Universe, as well Generals, as Particulars, Contingents as Necessaries, are in the means, manner, opportunity and finality of their Operations, precisely predetermined, disposed, and procured by the General Providence of God; that all Occurrences of every individual mans life, are the prescripts and consignations or allotments of his Special and Paternal Providence; and by the meer Light of Nature dispelled all those clouds, which either ancient Ethnicisme, or modern Atheisme hath exhaled from the abyss of Hell, to obscure the splendor of both those excellent truths: it remains only, that we deduce the influence of Divine Providence down to the *Catastrophe*, or *Exit* of life, or prove the extension of it to the point of *Death*; and endevour a compendious and plain decision of that tedious and enigmatical Controversie, *An terminus Vitæ humanæ sit immobilis? Whether the period of every individual mans life be so immoveably fixt by the Special Providence of God, that it can be neither by any negligence, immoderate and inordinate*

inordinate use of those things Physicians call the Six Nonnaturals, or suddain Casualities, anticipated or abbreviated; nor by prudence, temperance, convenient Medicaments, or caution, prolated or prolonged?

For the first; viz.

Article 2. The reasons of the Authors concise tractation of the first part.

That God is the sole *Moderator*, though not the *Author* of *Death* (for reason will not endure that we conceive him to have created a *Privation*;) or, more plainly, that the hand of his Providence guides the dart of that inevitable and victorious Enemy to life; this is a position so frequently and amply illustrated by the pens of many the most learned and judicious men of all ages, religions, and professions; and so genuinely and directly inferrible from the Context and importance of those Arguments formerly introduced, in order to the Demonstration of the interest of Providence, even in the smallest interludes of Nature, and most apparently fortuitous effects of all subordinate Causes: that, should we run out into any profuse probation thereof, in this place, the most patient and candid Reader could not but frown at the attempt, and justly censure it, non only as unnecessary and supererogatory, but also as scandalous and derogatory to his own Dialectical and Collective habilities. And therefore humbly referring him as well to his own easy recognition of notions formerly collected from the lecture of other more mature and nervous Discourses on the same Theorem; as his familiar Inductions upon many propositions insperst upon the leaves of this our cold and dull Decembers Exercise: I shall, in avoydance of an undecent Chasme, or Vacuity, insert only two concise and obvious Arguments, as *Corollaries*, or annexes inservient to the same perswasion.

Article 3. The moderatiō of Death by *Special Providence Divine*, argued from the impossibility of the moderation thereof by any other power.

Argument 1.

The life, and consequently the Death of every man necessarily depends upon the absolute *Will* of the *Creator*, and so upon the *Decrees* or resolves of his *Providence*; or upon some other *Principle* extraneous, alien, and superior to the nature of man;

Or

or upon *man himself.* Not upon any *Third* or *Neutral Principle*; for that must be either the Epicureans *Fortune*; or the Stoicks *Anus Fatidica* or Fate; or *Homers Lottery*; or *Pythagoras* his Συστοιχειάσεις, mentioned by *Plutarch* (*de placit.* 1.) or the Jews *Angelus mortis*, or their terrible she Devil *Zilith* described by our many-tongued *Gregory* (*in tract. de Episcopo puerorum*, out of the *Glossa Talmud. in Nidda, fol.* 24.) and erroneously conceived, by *Gaffarel* (*Unheard of Curiosities, pag.* 317.) to be the same with *Lucina* of the Romans, for the one was thought propitious to parturient women, the other so hostile and malignant, that the Hebrew Wives, so soon as they fell in travel, caused this proscription to be written on the doore of their bed-chamber, *Adim, Chavah, chouts Lilith*; *Adam, Eve*, keep out *Lilith*; or the Astrologers *Helec* and *Alcocoden*, and the like σχέσεις & διαθέσεις of the Planets called χρονοκρατορίαι or *Fridariæ*, derided by *Archangelus a Burgo novo* (*in Comment. in dogmat. Cabalist.*) and *Scalger* (*in Comment. in Manilium*) or the *Numbers, Ideas*, or *grand Revolution* of *Plato*; or the *Malus Deus* of the Manachees; or *Helena*, aliàs *Selene*, of *Simon Magus*; or Hesiods *Pandora*; or the great Beldam *Mylitta*, aliàs *Alytta*, of the Ethnicks; or the Turks *Nassub*, aliàs *Ctusura*, which signifies the Goddess *Fortune*; or *Paracelsus* his *Anima mundi Platonica*, or rather the Macrocosmical Harmony of the Universe, and the Microcosmical Concordance with the invisible signatures of the Ascendent; or that *Hermetico-magical Lamp of life and death*, lately invented and cryed up by *Ernestus Burchgravius*, but most judiciously extinguisht by *Sennertus* (*de Consensu Chymicorum cum Galen. cap.* 18.) or that Internal man of *Paracelsus*, named *Ens syderium, Olympicum, Gabalim, &c.* by that vaine admirer and promoter of Hermetical Follies, *Oswaldus Crollius* (*in Basil. Chym. præfat. admonit. p.* 6. 4. & 65.) or the implacable *Strix*, or *Erinnys* of the Gentiles; or, finally, some such fantastique Hobgoblin, that hath no more of reality, then what it borrows from the confused and obscure idea of it self, conceived in the luxuriant womb of a perturbed or deluded Imagination: but every sober man already knows, that all these are absolute *Chi-*

mara's, hatched in the adled brains of mad men, Poets, and idolatrous Pagans; and ſo below our laughter, much more our ſerious Confutation. Not upon *Man himſelf*, or any domeſtick Conſervatory eſſentially inherent to his Nature. For that abſurdity once conceded, entangles our reaſon in two the higheſt Impoſſibilities imaginable; (1) it confounds the Relative Maximes of Nature, breaks her chain of Dependence, and inferrs a ſecond *Self-exiſtence* beſide Divinity; for, dreaming that a Principiate Entity actually exiſtent, gave to it ſelf exiſtence; that a Future ſomething derives its μελλουσίαν, or *Futurition* immediately and ſolely from it ſelf; and that nothing can, by its own power, attaine to be ſomething, *i. e.* that which is neither *Potentia*, nor *Actus*, can endow it ſelf with the perfection of both *Power* and *Act*; we muſt be carried upon this rock, that there is in the World a ſecond ſomething ἀναρχον, ἀναίτιον καὶ ἄυλαυλον, *Non principiate*, *Cauſeleſs*, and *Self-ſufficient*, beſides *God*; which is a falſhood far beyond the *two Principles of all things* imagined by the *Manichees*, and more ridiculous then the Devils promiſe to make our *Saviour* Monarch of the World. (2) It imports an abſolute power in man to make himſelf *immortal*; a Deluſion that never found entertainement in the brain of the moſt deſperate Hypochondriack, nor durſt the Father of lies ever ſuggeſt it to his moſt credulous vaſſals. It follows therefore of pure neceſſity, that as *God* is the *Author of life*; ſo alſo can he alone *diſpoſe of the iſſues of Death*, and that the *end*, as well as the *beginning* and *mutations* of all things are ſubject to the moderation of his *Providence*.

Article 4. The ſame demonſtrated, from the neceſſary dependence of all natural motion in its beginning, continuation, and period, on the will of the *Firſt Mover*.

Argument 2.

A confeſt Verity it is, that all *Natural Motion* muſt proceed from one *Firſt Motor*, which can be no other but *God*, untill we can find out ſomething coequal to him in *Eternity*; and a poſition never yet diſputed, that the *life* of man is a *Natural Motion*, to which the *Apoſtle* ſeemes to allude in his ſacred axiome, ἐν αὐτῷ ζῶμεν, καὶ κινούμεθα, καὶ ἐσμὲν, *in God we live, move and have our being* (*Act.* 17. *ver.* 28.) and of parallel certainty

it

it is, that every motion hath its determinate *beginning*, *duration*, and *period*, dependent on the *Will* of the *First Mover*: therefore must the end as necessarily as the beginning and continuation of mans *life*, his *Death* as well as his conception, nativity, and maturity be certainly commensurated, defined, and limited by the *Special Providence of God*. Frequent glimpses of this Argument have I perceived in the monuments of the most *Ethnical Philosophers*; nor shall our thoughts want the patronage of great probability, if we conjecture, that our Patriarch, *Galen* (in most other things, but weakly armed against their censure, who have assaulted his memory with the detestable Epithite, Ἀθεολογαλατος, an Atheist of the highest Classis) had his mind touched with the same Magnet, at that time, when he wheeled about from his old position of a meer *Naturalist*, and pointed directly at the pole of *Divine Providence*, in these words, δρᾶσαι πάντα ὅσα προείλετο (2. *de usu part.*) *God hath done all things, that he had formerly decreed to doe.*

Sect. II.

For the second;

Article 1. A transient discovery of the almost insuperable *Difficulties* to be encountred in the worthy and satisfactory solution of this problem, *whether the Term of mans life be Moveable, or Fatal*; premised by way of Apology for the Authors unequal judgement: and his purpose of taking a midle way between the absolute *Fatality* of the *Stoick*, and the meer *Fortune* of the *Epicurean*.

MOre then sufficient reason had I, to call it a *Tedious* and *Ænigmatical* Controversie. For, first, the obscurity of the Subject (being such whose clear imperceptibility hath worthily lifted it among the θαυμαστὰ, or secrets of Gods Councel, proposed rather to excite and entertain our reverential *Wonder*, then exercise our sawcy *Curiosity*) hath unhinged the brains of most, who have essayd to explain it, and lost their judgements in a wilderness of various opinions, discrepant ὅσον ὀρανὸς ἐς ἀπὸ γαίης, as far as heaven and earth each from other, and left future enquiry instructed rather what to *avoyd*, then what to *follow*: insomuch that the learned and profound *Joh. Beverovicius*, whose flame of scrutiny had kindled the most erudite and heroical Wits, on this side the line, into a desire and attempt to afford him satisfaction in this particular; when he had received, perused and indifferently perpended their severall *Epistolical responses*, found himself still perplex't with his former tremor of Scepticisme, and therefore confessed; *super hac re nuper plures consului, qui an sibi ipsis satisfecerint nescio, mihi certè penitùs satisfacere non potuerunt; in tanta itaque opinionum varietate equidem ferè dixerim cum* Xenophonte *apud* Varronem, *Hominis est hæc opinari, Dei scire.* And again, whosoever deserves the Laurel at this Olympick exercise, by deciding the quæstion on the side of Truth; must first reconcile those inveterate Antipathies between *absolute Fate* and mans *Freewill*: must clearly distinguish between the certain *Prescience*, and immutable *Predestination*, or *Predetermination*, of the *Divine Intellect* and *Will*, (a task not to be undertaken after dinner, nor performed upon one legg; as must soon

soon appear to him, who sufficiently excogitates, how hardly the blunt edge of mans understanding can divide betwixt the *Providence* of *God*, and his positive *Decrees* setled from all eternity: since *Cognition*, *Election*, *Volition*, and *Decretion* make but one simple and entire act in his *Intellect*; nor can reason make out, how God can *Foresee* meer *Contingents*, while they are yet in the nothing of *Futurity*, unless because he hath preordained the means, place, time, and other circumstantial requisites to their respective Contingencies) must determine that troublesome Doubt of the Schoolemen, whether any of Gods *Decrees* are *Hypothetical* or *Conditionate*, and so subject to mutation upon mans observation, or non-observation of the Condition, or proviso on his part to be performed? and, lastly, must solve that Scruple, *An Scientia conditionata certam ponit futurorum scientiam*, or, *An conditionata Dei voluntas ullum faciat decretum de futurorum eventu?* Whether the hypothetical or conditionate Will of God (if any such there be) doth import an absolute and immutable Decree, concerning the event of things to come? *Problems*, about which not only the graveſt *Philosophers* have stretched the membranes of their brains, and with great anxiety hack't and slash't for many ages together; but even the *Church* her self hath disputed so hotly, that she hath rent her seamless coate of *Faith* into such numerous and wide *Schismes*, that we her sonnes may sooner expect the conversion of the *Jews*, then a full reconciliation and reunion of all her Sects. Nor am I subject to so uncurable a Phrensy of Vanity, as not to know how immense a disproportion lyeth betwixt the utmost extent of my short judgement, and the center of the neerest of these Abstrusities; but acknowledging the decision of any one of them as far above my *Presumption*, as *Capacity*, I think it both honour and satisfaction enough for me, to have collected so much light from the beams of *Mersennus*, *Episcopius* and others, as may serve to conduct the mind of the ingenious Reader into a midle way betwixt the *Absolute Fatality* of the *Stoicks*, on one extreme; and the absolute *Fortune* of the *Epicureans*, on the other. The *First* whereof strains the cord of *Predestination* up to the height of *inevitable Necessity*; and so

leaves nothing in the power either of Mans *Free-will*, or the conspiracies of *Second Causes*; nay chain's up the hands of the *First Cause* in fetters of Adamant, according to that of the *Poet*.

Fatis agimur, cedite fatis.
Non sollicitæ possunt curæ
Mutare rati stamina fusi.
Quicquid patimur mortale genus,
Quicquid agimus, venit ex alto.
Non illa Deo vertisse licet
Quæ nexa suis currunt Causis.

By *Fate* we are impell'd; submit
To what the *Destinies* think fit.
That thread, by 'th *Fatal Damsels* spun,
By our *Cares* can nere b' undone.
What we *act*, what *undergoe*,
From their fixt *Decrees* doth flow.
Jove himself cannot controll
What doe's from linked *Causes* rowl.

As also that of *Seneca* (*de providentia*, where he had the reason to speak it:) *Quicquid est, quod nos sic vivere jussit, sic mori: eadem necessitate & Deos alligat. irrevocabilis humana pariter ac divina cursus vehit, ille ipse omnium Conditor ac Rector scripsit quidem Fata, sed sequitur. semper paret: semel jussit.* The *Others* cut it quite asunder, and so relaxing the ligaments of *Providence Divine*, leave all Events to the loose and undetermined results or hits of meer *Chance:* but both concurring in the most bloody Error of *Irreligion*. But the concernment of our present Theme will lead us into a more particular, express, and ample enquiry, how that long Civil war betwixt these three different *Notions* of *Fate*, *Fortune*, and *Free-will*, may be conciliated and brought to a full Combination and Consistence with *Divine Providence*.

In

In the meane time, that we may, both with more decent Method, and perspicuity, attain to some verisimilous (at least) solution of our present Problem, viz. *Whether the Term of mans life (in individuo) be so immoveably prefixt by the Decrees of Divine Providence, as that neither temperance or care on mans part can extend, nor the violence of second Causes, situate without the orb of his moderation, accelerate it?* Necessary it is, that we seriously examine and search into the marrow of two things conductive to the right stating, and consequently the right understanding of the Question: (1) *What we are to understand by the Term of Life:* (2) *In what sense we are to understand this Term to be fixt, or moveable.*

Article 2. Two prævious considerable, necessary to the right understanding and consequent discussion of the question.

What we are to understand by the Term of Life.

Concerning the *First*; obvious it is, that all things, or causes inservient both to the Conservation of life and the adduction of its period, Death, fall under the contents of *three General heads*; for either they must refer to those that are *Necessary*, or such as, by the ordinary course of Nature, no man can subsist without, to which classis belong our Aliment, Aer, sleep, &c. or (2) *Non necessary* or *Fortuitous*, which no way conduce to the Fomentation or fewel of our Vital Flame, but point blank to the Extinction of it; and therefore the instinct of nature perswades every man to avoyd them; such are Shipwracks, stabbs, shots, precipices, halters, &c. causes of immature, suddain and violent deaths: or (3) *Meerely Supernatural*, or the Will of God, which as it is impossible (without Special Divine Revelation) for us to foreknow, so also to alter, or prevent. Upon these three pillars was it, that *Laurentius Joubertus* erected his *triple Difference* of the *Term of mans life*; making one *Supernatural*, such as the Breath of our nostrils was pleased to assign to most of the Antediluvian Patriarchs, or Seminaries of Humanity, either in order to the more expedite multiplication of mankind, to the more advantageous invention and propagation of Arts and Sciences, or for some other considerable respect, at which our ignorance

Article 3. The necessary relation of all Causes both of life and death, to three Generall heads, viz. *Necessary, Fortuitous, Supernatural*; supports the discrimination of the *Term* of life into *Supernatural, Natural, & Accidentary:* & the impertinency of the consideration of the *Supernatural Term*, to the present scope.

ignorance can only squint by conjecture: which being long since cancelled, Art sits down in a contented despaire to renovate, nor can the records of the world afford us the story of any impudence, that durst rant so high, as to promise it, except that of a certain Mountebanck *Greek*, derided by *Galen*, and our late Nugipolyloquides, *Paracelsus*; both which experimentally confuted their own unpardonable Arrogance, before their sands had run out 50 years. Another *Natural*, which Physiologie defines by that space of time, during which our radical Balsam, or the oleaginous Fewel of our vital Lamp, maintains the innate Heate, or Flame of life, untill the total exhaustion of the one, causeth a total privation of the other; or, more plainly, that circle of time, which comprehends the *seven* Segments or *Ages* of man; which, though prestitute and limited, by the Governour of Nature, according to the compute of the *Psalmist*, to 80. years, of *Plato* to 81. of the *Ægyptians* to 100. (*Calius Rodiginus*, 19. *antiq. Lect. cap.* 21. *& Ioh. Langius*, *lib.* 1. *Epist. Medicinal.* 79.) of the best of the *Sibylls* to a 100. as is expresst in those 2. verses corrected by the incomparable *Salmasius* (*Pliniarum observat. pag.* 77.)

Ἀλλ ὁπόταν μήκιστος ἐὼν χρόνος ἀνθρώποισι
Ζωῆς, εἰς ἑπτὰν ἐκγονίδα κύκλον ὀδεύσας;

And of the ancient *Jews*, to 120. (*Ioseph. Antiq. Iudaic. lib.* 1.) is yet left to some considerable latitude, and hath more or less of Duration, respective to the more or less durability of the Principles of life, *i. e.* the *Eucrasy*, or *Dyscrasy* of the body, in every individual; provided that neither the oyle be inquinated by crude, or putrid Supplies, nor prodigally depredated by immoderate intension of its consumer, the Flame, nor that immaturely either suffocated, or wasted by Diseases, or suddainly extinguished by violent *Accidents*; which make the third *Difference*, or *Accidentary Term of life*.

But as for the first branch of this Ternary, the *Metaphysical, or Supernatural Term of mans life*, dependent on the *Divine Will* immediately; since according to the doctrine of *Nicholaus Florentinus* (*in Serm.*) the *Conciliator* (*in different. Medicis*) and

and *Joubertus* (*in Errorib. popular.*) it concerns only the *first Age* of the World: this place may very conveniently want any farther consideration thereof; nor can it much avail to the atchievement of our design, to insist upon more then the *two last*.

Article 4. The proper import of the *Natural* Term of mans life: and also of the *Accidental*.

By the *Term of life*, therefore, we ought to understand either (1) that period of every individual mans days, which is caused by a sensible decay, and total dissolution of the ligaments, which chain the Soul to the Body; or, more expresly, by an extinction of his *Vital Flame*, naturally succeeding upon a consumption of its *Pabulum*, or fewel, the *Radical Moysture*, when both those Principles of life are permitted to their natural and proper tenor, *i. e.* when no *Preternatural Cause* intervenes, and by Corruption anticipates the dissolution of that Disposition or Temperament of the Elements of the body, upon which the subsistence of life doth necessarily depend: or (2) the end of every mans life, in general, whensoever, and by what means soever, either Diseases, or violent and unexpected Accidents, introduced; without any respect to the gradual and successive declination, and consequent cessation of the Natural Temperament, in the *marasmus* of old age.

Now from the acceptation of the Term of Life, in the *First* signification, there genuinly emerge *Two Questions:*

Article 5. The result of our acceptation of the *Term* of life, in the *first* signification.

First, Whether this Term of life, which is circumscribed, *per ipsius temperamenti defluxum & decursum*, by the natural *Defluxe*, or wearing out of the requisite Temperament of the body, and which we may, without impropriety, call a kind of *mature*, easy and spontaneous falling asunder of the Ligaments of life; be absolutely and definitely fixt, so that *God* hath constituted to leave the nature of every Individual to its own moderation, nor by any means to interrupt or alter its course prescribed: *i. e.* not by any means to procure, that this Deflux of the Temperament should have more or less duration, then what may naturally be expected from the more or less durability thereof, dependent on the more or less perfect proportion, that the *Passive*

and Active Principles hold each to other; or, more plainly, that the *Renitency* or *Resistence* of the *Oyle* holds to the depredatory and consumptive *Activity* of the *Flame*.

Secondly, if this Term of life be thus Fixt, and that God indeed hath decreed not to intend or prolong that Deflux of the Temperament, beyond the point of its natural Durability; whether yet notwithstanding, without alteration of his Decree of committing Nature to its own establish't course, he may not, being thereunto moved by our repentance, prayers, and piety, correct those depravities, and repaire those violent decays of that our temperamental Constitution, occasioned by intemperance, diseases, extraneous Accidents, or other means whatever; and so hinder the otherwise impendent immature Collabascence, and precipitous Dissolution thereof? In a word; Whether, though God hath predetermined, that no man shall exceed that Term of life, to which the Durability of his individual Temperament, or the strength of his particular Constitution may, in probability, be extended; his Special Providence doth not yet suffer, that, by reason of putrefactive and destructive Preter-natural Causes occurrent, the temperament may be vitiated, impaired, and ruined: and so not hold out to that point of time, to which otherwise, in respect of its primigenious and native condition, it might have lasted?

Article 6. The consequence of our understanding the *Term* of life, in the *second* signification.

But if we understand the Term of life in the *second signification*; then the *Question* must be: Whether the immature or *preternatural Period* of every individual mans life, by what means soever, either disease, famine, war, wounds, naufrage, decollation, suspension, suffocation, luxury, drunkeness, sollicitude, grief, &c. occasioned, be so precisely fixt by Destiny; that no prudence or caution on his part can transpose, nor danger of fortuitous Accidents invading, accelerate or prevert it? In short; Whether the Catastrophe of every mans life be prescribed in the book of Fate.

In

In what ſenſe we are to underſtand the Term of Mans Life to be Fixt *or* Moveable.

As for the Second *Preconſiderable*; the Term of life may be ſayd to be *Fixt* in a *twofold ſenſe*: (1) in reſpect to ſome *poſitive Divine Decree*, antegredient or precedent not only to all conſpiracies, but alſo the Preſcience of all Secondary or Inſtrumental Cauſes; whereby God hath ſo preciſely fixt and limited a certain ſpace, or time of life to every ſingle man, together with all relative Circumſtances, as place, manner, or kind, and cauſe of Death: that it is abſolutely impoſſible to man, what means ſoever he ſhall uſe to the contrary, in order to his preſervation, or what dangers ſoever he ſhall have formerly expoſed himſelf unto, notwithſtanding, either to prolong his life beyond, or to fall before that Fatal Term. (2) In reſpect not to ſome Abſolute, but *Hypothetical*, or *Conditionate Decree* of God: *i. e.* ſuch whoſe mutation or accompliſhment is ſuſpended on the liberty, or *Free Election* of mans Will, according as that, either being conducted by the manuduction of Light Supernatural, or *Divine Grace*, ſhall purſue the real and true Good; or being ſeduced by the deluſion of its own ſenſual judgements, ſhall wander in the devious tracts of Error, and ſo hunt after only apparent and falſe Good. Now whether we underſtand this *Conditionate Decree* to be made and grounded upon a certain and infallible *prenotion* of all concomitant things, circumſtances, manners, cauſes, and finally of mans election of and adherence unto *Good*, or *Evil* objects, and his conſequent *Virtuous* or *vicious* courſe of life: or whether we underſtand it to be made without any ſuch certain *Prenotion*, or *Volition* of Prenotion at all; but yet with a deliberate and poſitive *Sentence* certainly to be pronounced and executed in the fulneſs of time, or opportunity, when the right uſe, or abuſe of this Prerogative or *Freedome* of the *Will*, ſhall be in actual determination, *i. e.* ſhall ripen the *Suppoſitionality* of the decree into *Abſoluteneſs*, and reduce the *Poſſibility* thereof into actual *Neceſſity*: the diſtinction is not Material. For it can be of no conſiderable advantage to our preſent

Article 7. The *Fixation* of the Term of life, acceptable in a double intereſt; *viz.* (1) in reſpect to ſome *Abſolute* Divine Decree, precedent even to Gods Preſcience of al Secondary or inſtrumental Cauſes; (2) to ſome *Hypothetical* Divine Decree, whoſe mutability is ſuſpended on the liberty of mans Will. And the *indifferency* of either branch of the diſtinction to our inſtant deſigne.

present attempt, whether of these two *Notions* we prefer; and that the reason is, why we here omit to enquire, whether holds the neerest Cognation to truth.

Article 8. Three different opinions vulgarly extracted from the precedent Distinction.

From these premises hath the judgement of man extracted three different opinions.

The *First*, of those, who hold it as point of faith, that the Term of every mans life, together with all means or Causes, immediate, mediate, remote, circumstantial and corollary, or in any relation whatever pertinent thereto, is absolutely immoveable and Fatal; being precisely decreed by the immutable and irresistible law of the Divine Will.

The *Second*, of those, who averre the absolute *Fatality*, or *Fixation* of every individual mans Term of life, *à Posteriori*: but decline it *à Priori*, *i. e.* they concede, that in truth the term of every mans life is appointed by the irrevocable decree of Fate, in this respect, that it can never be *extended* or spun out to the duration of one moment beyond that, to which the natural condition of his particular Temperament promises him to attain: but not in this respect, that it admits no possibility of *Contraction* or *Abbreviation*.

The *Third*, of those, who allow the Term of life to be *Fatal* indeed; yet upon no higher a *Necessity*, then that of Gods meer *Prenotion*, or *hypothetical determination*, respective to mans right use, or abuse of the Liberty of his Will: and therefore not so fixt, but that it may be not only *abbreviated* but also *prolonged*; *non præsuppositâ istâ aut prænotione, aut hypothesi citra prænotionem*.

Article 9. The convenient reduction of them to Two only.

And this is the most passant Division of mens dissenting opinions concerning this intricate Subject; but if we come with naked minds to examine the state of the difference between the *last* and the *second*, we shall find them concentral in the point of *Mutability* or *Mobility*: and therefore both perspicuity and brevity perswade, that we gratefully adhere to that more convenient reduction of all opinions concerning this Theorem, to *two only*, offered by *Joh. Beverovicius* (*Epist. ad Simon. Episcopium*)

scopium) in words of this importance: Some maintain the Term of mans life to be fixt by the eternal and immutable law of Destiny; and on the contrary, others contend that it is not so fixt, but that it remains moveable as well forwards as backwards, not only obnoxious to *Decurtation* or *Anticipation*, by depravities and exorbitances of the *Six Non-naturals*, by Epidemical Diseases, or by a thousand unexpected Knocks of unconstant Fortune; but also capable of *Production* or *Postposition* by a temperate, anticachectical and cautious course of life.

Article 10. The *First* opinion declared; and the principal *Abettors* thereof mentioned.

Now as for the *First* of these Opinions; 'tis generally known to have bin Canonical among the *Stoicks*, who bound up the efficiency of all things in the Universe, in the iron chaines of Fate; beleiving all events subject to so uncontrollable a necessity, that their prevention, suspension, or alteration is not only above the hopes of man (whose virtuous endeavours, piety, and prayers must therefore prove as fruitless and ineffectual towards the Aversion; as vitiosities, impiety and profaneness towards the Attraction or Acceleration of any misfortune predecreed) but even of God himself: whom though they allow to have bin the Author of that sempiternal and irrepealable law of Destiny, yet they deny him to have reserved to himself the prerogative of exemption from the obligation thereof. This was the Creed of *Philetas*, when he sayd.

Ἰσχυρὰ γὰρ ἐπίκρατκῖ ἀνδρὸς ἀνάγκη,
Ἥρ' οὐδ' ἄθανάτους ὑποδείδειν, οἵτ' ἐν ὀλύμπῳ
Ἔκτοσθεν χαλεπῶν ἀχέων οἴκους ἐκάμοντο.

——*Mortales superat quodcunque necesse est,*
Vi solida; quia nec superos reveretur, in almis
Qui Cœli spatiis degunt sine luctibus ævum.

Of that old *Poet*, quoted by *Cicero* (*de Fato*) who sayd, *quod fore paratum est, id summum exuperat Jovem*: and of that renowned Captain, *Hector*, when being importuned by his wife not to hazard himself in a salley upon the Græcian trenches, he

conjured her fond fears into a resolved confidence, that no sword could reach his heart, but that of Fate, by this spell;

Parce, precor, nimio miſera indulgere dolori;
Nam quis me, Fatis invitis, mittet ad Orcum?
Nullum equidem vitaſſe hominum dico ultima Fata.

Prithee, forbeare thy needleſs grief; and know,
No hand can send me to the shades below,
Without the *Fates* assent. I hold it true,
What Fate hath destin'd, no man can eschew.

As also of those *Military* men, mentioned by *P. Gregorius Tholosanus* (*lib.* 21. *de republ. cap.* 8.) whose minds being seasoned with the same perswasion, that the manner and moment of every mans Death is appointed by the immutable law of Fate, and his lot inscribed in invisible Characters on his forehead; became of so hard a temper, as to be wholly insensible of the threats of that terrible Giant, Danger: nor did they account it other then a vanity, resulting from the cowardize of Ignorance, to provide against the blows of War either by caution, or defensive armes; urging the examples of many valiant Soldiers, who have bin observed to have confronted whole showers of levelled bullets, shot from the neer engines of the advancing Foe, without a wound; and yet at last have fallen by some petite and unexpected peble thrown from the sure sling of Destiny, even then, when they seemed immured in the secure Cittadel of Peace, and thought their triumphant Lawrels armour of proof even against thunder.

Occidis, Argivæ quem non potuere phalanges
Sternere, nec Priami regnorum everſor Achilles.
Hic tibi mortis erant meta, &c. Virg. 12. *Æneid.*

But, alas! 'tis not the Academy of the *Stoicks* alone, that affords patronage to this Error of *Absolute Fatality*; nor the *Camp* that only contends for the propagation thereof; nor the politick

politick institutions of that Secretary of Hell, *Mahomet*, in his absurd *Alcoran* (*cap.* 6.) that only countenance the diffusion thereof in these our days: for even the *Schools* of *Christianity*, in some parts, have advanced the reputation thereof to so unreasonable and dangerous a height, as to make it an Article of Faith, if not absolutely necessary, yet at least collaterally conductive to Salvation; and this by Auctority of the *Councel* of *Dort*, which ratified the doctrine of their Apostle, *Calvin*, concerning *Absolute Predestination*, and enjoyned the publick Assertion thereof to most of their Divines of the last reformation.

Article 11. The *Stoical* Fate; and the *Calvinists* Predestination, fully defined.

I sayd, the *Doctrine of Calvin concerning Absolute Predestination*; thereby, though tacitly, intimating my knowledge of the no small *Disparity* between the *Fate* of *the Stoicks*, and that propugned by many *Christian Divines*. The *one* being, as *Chrysippus* hath defined it, *Sempiterna & indeclinabilis series rerum, & catena, quæ seipsam volvit, & perpetuò implicat, per æternos consequentiæ ordines, ex quibus connexa est*; A sempiternal and indeclinable series, syntax, or chaine of Causes, whose turnings, convolutions and perpetual implications are dependent on it self, by those eternal orders of consequence, of which it is made up and connected: the *other*, as the best of School men hath defined it, *Pendens à Divino Consilio series, ordoque causarum*; a series, or successive complexion and order of Causes, dependent on the Will of God. From the just Collation of which two Definitions, our first thoughts may collect, that the *Difference* between the *Stoical* and *Theological Fate*, may be thus stated.

Article 12. A full and clear discrimination of the *Stoical*, from the *Theological* Fate.

The *Former*, in some things, excludes *Divinity* from that round or Circle of Causes, referring all events, as well general, as particular, to the meer subsequence of Naturall Actives operating upon capable Passives, subordinately connected unto, and so by successive influx necessarily disposing each other to the production of those particular Effects, to the Causation whereof their Natural Faculties were at first determinately accommodated: and, in others, includes Divinity within it, *i. e.* confines his Power

Power and Will to that rigid and infringible Law of Neceſſity, excogitated by his Wiſdom from all eternity, and eſtabliſhed by his Decree, at the inauguration of Nature to Exiſtence. The *Later* makes the Will of God to be the firſt link in the chain of Cauſes, and ſo ſuperior to the reſtriction of natural neceſſity dependent thereon. The *Stoick*, being a declared Enemy to the *Arbitrary Prerogative* of *God*, adligeth the Energie of the *Firſt* and *Infinite* Cauſe to the capacity of *Secondary* and *Finite*; and, upon conſequence, doth acknowledge neither the *Liberty* of his *Will*, nor the *Abſoluteneſs* of his *Power*, or *Omnipotency*. But, on the Contrary, the *Chriſtian* look's up to heaven, as the Councel-houſe, where the Inſtruments, opportunity, place and ſucceſs of every Action receive their Specification to this or that determinate purpoſe; to the *Arbitrary Reſolve* of *God*, as the *Definite Sentence* or *Injunction*; and on all *Second Cauſes*, but as ſubordinate, and ſubalternally inſtrumental to the punctual execution and accompliſhment of the ſame: and, upon legal conſequence, concludes, that the *Divine* Will is abſolutely *Free*, knowing no circumſcription, but that of the *Divine Wiſdome*; that the meer *Fiat* of that Councel, is the *Director*, and *Spring* in the Engine of the World; and that the *Author of Nature* hath reſerved to himſelf the *Privilege* of adding unto, detracting from, intending, remitting, inverting, tranſcending, or adnulling the fundamental Conſtitutions of Nature, and ſo breaking that Concatenation of Cauſalities, or the *Chain of Fate*, at pleaſure. The *Heathen* abſurdly dream't that all effects are inevitably produced by the conſpiracy and coefficiency of natural Cauſes, reſpectively qualified; or that all Accidents ſpring up from the proper tendency of their particular Efficients, without the influence, direction, or moderation of any other Virtue, beſides their own native and Congenial Faculties. The more intelligent *Chriſtian* proves, that all natural Cauſes doe not produce their reſpective Effects κατὰ τὴν εἱμαρμένην, *ex inevitabili neceſſitate*, by the abſolute and never-failing power of their Eſſential Qualities, or inherent endowments; but κατὰ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, *quatenus fieri licuit*, or according to the poſſibility of their Contingency: and therefore, though he con-

feſſeth

feſſeth that all Events are foreknown and preordained in the eternal Councel of God; yet he ſtands aſſured, as well upon the ground of Reaſon, as Faith, that the preciſe and opportune contingency of every individual Event proceeds from the influence of this *Providence*, which diſpoſeth and conjoyneth ſome certain convenient Cauſes to the production of this or that determinate Effect, in ſome ſort reſpecting the laſt of Ends, his own *Glory*. To conclude, the *Stoick* hath clip't the immenſe and towering wings of *mans Will*, and allows it no wider range, then what the line of *Fate* affords: while the ſublimer *Chriſtian* ſcornes to ſtoop to the Lure of any *Neceſsity*, beſides the ſpecial *Decrees* of the Divine Councel; not conceiving his will ſubject to the *inclination*, much leſs the *compulſion*, of any force below that of him, who conferred that infinite liberty upon it. For *he*, indeed, holds the rains of our *Wills*, and can bend them: yet *non coactione violenta, ſed leni ſuavique influxu*, not by violent *Coaction*, but gentle and ſweet *Invitation*, as the *Schoolmen* diſtinguiſh.

Article 13. A liſt of the execrable *Abſurdities* impendent on the opinion of *Abſolute Fatality*; ſo accepted, as the *Stoick* propoſeth it.

Now if we conſider *Fate* in the notion of the *Stoicks*; 'twill be no eaſy wonder, if any man, though his reaſon be never ſo much hoodwinckt with the veile of Prejudice, ſhall not at firſt glance diſcover it to be an opinion *Blaſphemous in reſpect to God*; inſomuch as it ſtrikes at no leſs then the cardinal and inſeparable Attribute of his Nature, *Omnipotence*, by coercing his infinite and arbitrary Activity with the definite laws of ſecond Cauſes, and denying him the prerogative of abſolute ſuperiority to his mechanique Vicegerent, or (rather) Inſtrument, Nature: and, *in reſpect of man*, *intolerably Abſurd*; ſince it ſubverts the Liberty of all humane actions, and leaves nothing in the power of mans Will either to elect, or avoide. For whoever conced's that the mind of man is ſubject to the compulſive regiment of Fatal Neceſſity, and ſo that all the actions of our lives are but the accompliſhments of ſo many ineluctable, immoveable, and inevitable Decrees, from the birth of time enrolled in the Ephimerides of Deſtiny; muſt alſo concede, upon clear inference, that our Creator endowed us with the Semi-divine

Faculty of Rationality, either to no purpose at all, or at best to facilitate our betraying our selves into the snares of ruine and misery beyond possibility of reparation or redemption; Must induce, that the Will being deposed from her arbitrary throne, the judgement seate of Reason must fall to the ground; nor can there be any room left for *Consultation* to sit and determine the debates of the Soul concerning the good or Evil of her objects: since notwithstanding all our most profound, serious, and prudent *Deliberation*, the success of our actions, as well as the results of our councels, would then be no other, but what hath bin resolved on and predecreed by Fate; and then, to conceive our selves obnoxious to punishment, for incurring those sins, which are imposed upon our wills by a necessity beyond our controll, is an open derogation to the equity and *Justice* of the Divine Nature, and to ascribe our *Evil* to that, which is by essence *superlatively Good*. That *Prudence*, is miserable *Folly*; the study of *Wisdome*, laborious *Vanity*; and all our ancient *Lawmakers*, either ridiculous *Fools*, or detestable *Tyrants*: since they prescribe and enjoyne those things, which either we must have done, had not they injoyned them, or are restrained from doing, in spite of our own conformable inclinations, by the contrary impulsion or seduction of Destiny. And, finally, that all Divine and Human *Exhortation* to Good, and *Dehortation* from evil, are unnecessary and superfluous. Thus shall *Virtue* and *Vice* vanish into meer and empty notions; and *Religion* become, what Libertines would have it, a mysterious and well contrived invention to support temporall Greatness, and fright vulgar minds into a tame submission to the arbitrary dictates of their imperious Lords: nor shall there be a *Heaven* to compensate suffering *Piety*, or a *Hell* for the punition of *Villainy*; because as the Good man could not but live honestly and religiously, whether he would or no; so must it not be in the power of the Wicked man, to abstain from doing Evil. Thus shall *Love* and *Hatred*, the two most usefull Affections of our Souls, be robbed of their proper Objects, *Amiable* and *Detestable*: nor shall *Justice* find convenient subjects, whereon to place *Laudation* and *Vituperation*; since Praise only belongs to those, who have chosen

sen to do Good, when 'twas in their power to have done Evil and Dispraise is the due guerdon of those, who choose to do Evil, when twas in their power to have done Good. And thus shall all our *Prayers* be fruitless, our *vowes* hopeless, our *Sacrifices* unprofitable, and all other acts of *Devotion* desperate Vanity. The least of which and of a myriade of other equivalent Absurdities, Incongruities, and oblique, or appendent and inferrible Blasphemies, shooting up from this one poysonous root of Absolute Fatality; is more then enough inconsistent to the fundamentals both of Reason and Religion, to deterr even Heathens from approaching, much more embracing and defending it.

But as for *Theological Fate*, or *Predestination*; if accepted in the legitimate sense of the *Primitive Church*, and not in that rigorous and inflexible notion of the *German Calvinist*: I conceive it fully concordant not only to many *Texts* of Sacred writ, but even conciliable to mans *Free will*, notwithstanding the apparent repugnancy betwixt them; as I shall endevour to prove singularly in an ensuing chapter.

Sect. III.

Article 1. The Authors adhesion to the *Second* opinion, justified by two important reasons.

AS for the *Second Opinion*, viz. that the Term of mans Life is not fixt beyond possibility of either *Anticipation*, or *Postposition*; this, I profess, my judgement inclines me to prefer, as that which seem's to be drawn in the directest line from the point of Truth; and that for two mighty Reasons.

1. *First*, because there are very few places, or testimonies of Scripture, which may be thought to advantage the doctrine of *Absolute Fatality*; but, on the contrary, very many allegable in defence of this.

2. *Secondly*, because those *Texts*, which make for this, have their importance so perpendicular, that nothing but a violent

perversion can wrest, so perspicuous, that nothing but obscure interpretations can darken, so soft and easy, that nothing but over nice and unnatural Exceptions can harden it. And Justice will frown on that stupid partiality, that shall prefer paucity to multitude, obscurity to clarity, and difficult to genuine and familiar solutions.

Article 2. The great obscurity, & small validity of some *Texts* of holy writ, alleged by the Defendants of Fatality to warrant their opinion, detected.

To explain and justify this by *Instance*; the *Hercules*, or most champion Text usually brought into the field to assert the opinion of *Absolute Fatality*, in the precise manner and time of every mans *Dissolution* into his first matter, is that of *Job*; *Definiti sunt dies ejus, & numerus mensium ejus tecum est; statuta ejus fecisti, & non præteribit:* His days are determined, "the number of his moneths are with thee; thou hast appoin-"ted his bounds, that he cannot pass. (*chap.* 14. *vers.* 5.)

Now this place hath much of *obscurity*, and little of strength for the supportation of their opinion, more then ours. (1) *Much of obscurity*; since, though racked to the highest extension of its importance, no Logique can extort any other Conclusion from it, but this, that the Term of mans Life is fixt by God, so that impossible it is for man to remove it forwards to a greater *longitude*; the concession whereof no way infringeth our assertion. For hence it follows not, that tis impossible for man, by intemperance, by the temerarious obtrusion of himself upon the jaws of danger, or other means whatever, to *Anticipate* that Term, or remove it backwards to a greater *Brevity*. Again, I have yet met with no substantial reason, that may countermand our construction of these words, *ἐν πλάτει*, or in the latitude of Generality; and therefore may safely understand them, as an expression of the brevity of mans life, *in specie*, not *in individuo*; their whole Mass weighing no more then this: that the life of man, being included within a certain Circle, or round of days and moneths, and circumscribed by a short succession of minutes flowing into a stream of Time, cannot possibly be extended to a longer duration then what our Creator hath prefixt to all mankind: *i. e.* then that moment to which he hath determined and adapted the durability of mans specifical Temperament, or Principles,

Principles of Vitality. And thus interpreted, this place runs parallel to that of *Moses* (*Psalm. 90. vers. 10.*) *Dies nostræ vitæ septuaginta anni, & si in fortitudinibus sit, octoginta anni, & fortitudo eorum molestia ac labor, quoniam recedit citò & avolamus*: as also that of *David* (*Psalm. 39. vers. 5.*) *Ecce, ut palmos posuisti dies meos, & avum meum tanquam nihil coram te; profectò universa Vanitas est omnis homo stans*; Behold, thou hast made my days as a hands breadth, and mine age is nothing before thee: every man, verily, at his best state is altogether Vanity.

Article 3. The *Natural* Causes (proximè) of the *Longitude* and *Brevity* of mans life: and the Authors private conjecture of the cause of *Longevity* in the first age of the world.

True it is (nor have I heard many, besides *Helmont*, and a Fanatique Brother or two of the mystical Order of the *Rosy Cross*, impugne it) that the *Life* of Man doth consist in a *Peacefull Discord* maintained between the 4 *First Qualities* (I understand them, according to the Physiology of *Epicurus*, and *Carteſius*, as certain *Modifications of Matter*, or *Quantity*) arising from the commixture of them in a proportionate *Dose*, or commensurate symmetry, respective to the *Activity* of some and *Patability* of others; and proximly, in a requisite harmony, of the *Primigenious Heat* and *Radical Moysture*: which harmony being more or less durable according to the more or less exquisite temperament of body assigned to each single person, by the free dispensation of the *Divine Will*; it follows, unavoidably, that the *Longitude* or *Brevity* of every mans life must naturally depend upon the *perfection*, or *imperfection* of his *Idiosyncrasy*, or individual Constitution.

Nor doth it carry less semblance of truth, that by the decrees of that Councel, which is all *Wisdome*, and can therefore *will* nothing but what is superlatively *Good*, it was enacted, that the ordinary Duration of this Humane Temperament should be circumscribed and limited to some certain general, though not precisely adstrict, term or space of years, conceive of 70. 80. 90. or 100. over or under: and that our *ingenerated Protogenitors*, even before the depravation of their Vital Principles by their παράπτωμα or precipitous Fall, held their lives by the same common lease; for manifest it is, that the *Tree of Life* was

planted in Paradise to this purpose, that the fruit thereof being frequently eaten might *instaurate* the *vital Balsam* of man as fast as it suffered *exhaustion* from the depredatory operation of his *Implantate Spirit*, and by a continual refocillation of impaired nature keep her up fresh and vigorous to longevity. To which I ask leave, with due submission to the correction of maturer judgements, to tender my private conception; that the like *extraordinary* means of making the sands of life run slowly and long in the glass of Time, was by the special indulgence of the great *Preserver* of men, permitted to *Methusalem* and other μακρόβιοι of the worlds youth; whose registers amounted to more *Centuries* of years, then ours usually to *Decads*, and who outlived all the titles of *Consanguinity*.

Article 4. The injustice of our Adversaries title of patronage from the forementioned text of *Job*, further manifested.

(2) *Little of strength* for the supportation of their opinion, more then of ours; for though we should concede, what these eager Patrons of Fatality principally insist upon, viz. that the sense of these words of *Job* is restrained only to that precise Term, or prestitute Date appointed by God to the life of every *individual* man: yet notwithstanding can they not from this concession extort more advantage to their plea, then what doth naturally result from thence towards the justification of ours. For *Job* doth not so much as tacitly insinuate, by what kind of *Decree*, manner of institution, or computation that Definition or Circumscription of daies and moneths was made by God: nor is there ought to hinder us from affirming, that the tenor of his words remains sincere and inviolate, when we understand that kind of statute, concerning the circumscription of mans life to belong to that Classis of Decrees, which God, either upon his own infallible *Previdence* of the future demeanour of every man, or upon the *Hypothesis* of mans good or evil use of the liberty of his will, hath made, or may occasionally make. Besides all this our equitable conference of many other *Texts* of Scripture, which we shall have occasion, in the remaining dilucidation of this Theorem, to alleadge, with this of *Job*; will plainly, and almost unavoydably ascertain us, that his words are to be interpreted in our sense, *de specie*, and not *de individuo*.

But,

But, in the present, it is sufficient for us to have declared, that from that place of such reputed validity amongst the Defendants of Destiny, no firme Argument can be extracted to protect them, or impugne us.

Article 5. Seven testimonies, out of holy writ, supporting the mobility of the Term of mans life, *in individuo.*

And therefore I find my self at liberty to discharge my proper duty, viz. the Confession of those *Reasons*, which charmed my judgement to an adherence to their perswasion, who contend for the *Mobility* of the Term of mans Life.

The *First* of those is desumed from the *Testimonies* of the Oracle of Truth, the *Book of God*; and in our list of those Testimonies, those deserve to stand in the front, which in ample, elegant, and expres terms warrant our Assertion, *that the life of man hath bin, and may be, both Abbreviated and Prolonged.*

The Coryphæus, or leading Text is that of the Wise King (*Proverb.* 10. *vers.* 27.) *Timor Domini apponit (aut prolongat) dies; anni verò impiorum abbreviantur: the Fear of the Lord prolongeth daies; but the years of the wicked shall be shortned.* Then which nothing can be more expres, perspicuous, and positive; and so nothing les subject to detorsion or altercation.

The Lievtenant, or second to that, is the gracious encouragement to filial reverence and obedience annexed to the 5th. *Precept* in the *Decalogue*; *Honora Patrem tuum, & matrem tuam, ut prolongentur dies tui super terram quam Jehovah Deus tuus dat tibi:* which the Apostle of the Gentiles (*in Epist. ad Ephes.* 6. *ver.* 2.) call's the first (understand it of the second table) Commandement with promise, viz. of a singular reward; or the first with a peculiar promise, and such as hath ever bin held distinct from the promise made in the second Precept of the Decalogue, insomuch as that is common and universal, comprehending all kinds of Blessings, but this only peculiar and determined to that of diuturnous subsistence, or Longevity. In *Exhod.* 24. *ver.* 25. and many other places, the Pen-man of God earnestly inculcates the benefit of the Fear of God, by this forcible impulsive; that he would crown them with length, health, and serenity of days, who should revere his most sacred name and conscientiously observe

obserue his laws. *Si colatis Deum vestrum, benedicet pani vestro, & aquis vestris, auferetque infirmitatem è medio vestri, non erit abortiens aut sterilis in terra vestra: numerum dierum in terra vestra complebo.* Which importune incitement to piety, those Commentators have no way enlarged, who have extended it to this just height of intention; that to those happy Sonnes of Israel, who subjugated their Wills to the written Will of God, and cherished no desires so much, as those of cordial obedience to the rules of his Law, demeaning themselves reverently towards their Maker, and righteously toward their Neighbour; to these God would vouchsafe, not only that they should accomplish that lease of life, which they held by the grant of Nature, or the condition of each mans *Idiosyncrasy*; but even that their Temperament should be meliorated, made more symmetrical, compact, tenacious and consequently more durable, as well by the soveraign, balsamical, and restorative Faculties of their Aliment, impregnated or inriched by the tincture of his continual Benediction, as by the benigne and salutiferous disposition of the Aer, and propitious influences of the Host of Heaven, which otherwise are wont to induce sensible Exorbitances and Anomalies upon the blood, spirits, and solid parts of mans body, and from those seeds of morbosities produce various both Acute and Chronique Diseases, which either consume, or corrupt the Vital Nectar, and accelerate the execution of that Sentence, *Pulvis es, & Pulvis eris.* So that of infirme, languid, and valetudinarious persons, they should be made robust, athletical, and longevous; no less then the *Barren* should be made *Fertil*: the one by the *Conservatory*, the other by the *Prolifical* vertue of *Gods special Grace.* The same promise we read frequently repeated by God, in most of his Embassies delivered by his Secretary, *Moses*, to his People; and more particularly in *Deuteron. 4. vers. 40. and chap. 30. vers. 20.* And as he proposeth *length of days* for the desiderable *reward* of obedience: so, on the contrary, he makes *Immaturity of Death*, the affrighting *penalty* of Disobedience. For (*Deuteron. 30. vers. 19. and 28. vers. 20.*) contain a large Catalogue of infirmities, diseases, and corporal calamities feircely comminated

to

to the immorigerous and disobedient: and *in vers. 62.* tis emphatically sayd of *Transgressors, ye shall be left few in number, whereas you were as the starrs of heaven for multitude; because thou wouldst not obey the voyce of the Lord, thy God.*

A Third egregious text, is that where God, gratefully resenting *Salomons* Election of Wisdome before all other Accomplishments temporal set before him, supererogates to his vote, by the additional concession of long life (*2 Kings 3. 14.*) *And if thou wilt walk in my wayes, to keep my Statutes and commandements, as thy Father David did; then will I lengthen thy days.*

A fourth, is that definitive sentence of *David* (*Psalm. 55. vers. ult.*) *Bloody and deceitfull men shall not live out half their days.*

A Fifth, that of the same *Author* (*Psalm. 102. vers. 25.*) *O my God take me not away in the midst of my days:* and in like manner, (*Psalm. 6. and 30. and 88. and 111.*) he with fervent importunity supplicates, that God would be pleased not to cut off the thread of his life, while he was then in the spring and vigour of his age, but restore him from that languor and marcid Consumption, introduced by his grievous disease, to his pristine sanity, that he might thereby be enabled to chant his praises in the Sanctuary, and do good to the children of Sion.

A Sixth, that remarkable Precedent of the prolongation of life beyond the term prefixt, King *Ezechias* (*Esai. 38: vers. 10.*) who being infested with the most mortiferous of diseases, the Plague, and convulst with the horror of death, denounced by the thundering Prophet; in the intervalls betwixt the showers of heavy tears, he sighes out this lamentation: *in the cutting off my days I shall go to the gates of death; I am deprived of the residue of my years. Mine age is departed, and is removed from me as a shephards tent: I have cut off like a weaver my life* (*vitam meam veluti textoris telam præcidi*, as some read it) *he will cut me off with pining sickness.* Which signifies as much as this, that he was adjudged to dye before his time. But this night of sorrow was dispelled by a comfortable morn, caused by the light of that Sun, which riseth with healing in his wings;

for immediately after, his contrition, ſincere reſipiſcence, and earneſt ſupplications obtaining a repreive from the mercifull hands of him, who deſireth not the death of a ſinner, the execution of that fatal ſentence was ſuſpended, and a paroll leaſe of 15. years ſupernumerary annexed to that old one of his life, fully, to ſome few anxious minutes, expired. And can any Prejudice be ſo inflexible, as not to ſtoop to the converſion of this pregnant Example, which on one ſide, teſtifies the poſſibility of the *Decurtation* of the Term of mans Life, by any mortal diſeaſe; and, on the other, manifeſteth the poſſibility of the *Prolongation* of the ſame, by the ſeaſonable and right uſe of the means conductive thereunto, viz. remorſe of Conſcience, repentance, ſupplication, and medical remedies. For, preſcribed it was by *Iſaiah*, thus: *Let them take a Bunch of Figgs, and lay it for a plaiſter upon the boyle* (or Carbuncle) *and he ſhall recover.*

And, to bring up the reare of theſe Sacred Arguments, militant on our ſide, let us inſtance in the ſemblably pertinent ſtory of the *Ninivites*; who, by the counter-violence of thoſe holy ſpells, *Penitence*, ſevere *Humiliation* as well of the outward, as of the inward man, and *Prayer* diſtracted with nought but tears and groans, ſeem to have abrogated the Decree of Deſtiny. For the Bowels of *Divinity* yearning with paternal compaſſion towards ſo populous a City; wherein though all were guilty, yet many millions muſt have bin blended in the chaos of common ruine, who were yet too young to ſhare in the *actual* Depravities; ſmoothed the brow of his *Juſtice*, and prevailed with him to interpret their univerſal mortification of *Impiety*, as an Allegorical accompletion of his reſolve concerning the general devaſtation and mortality denounced againſt their *Perſons* and *Habitations*; to accept the flames of their thick *ſacrifices* as Expiatory and preventive to the impendent Combuſtion of their City; and heighten the wholſome virtue of their *Abſtinence*, obſerved in the ſtrict Faſt, to a generous *Prophylactique* or Preſervative againſt the *Peſtilence* now ready to be kindled by the breath of his Indignation.

Nor are we deſtitute of *Inſtances*, in holy Chronicles, to teſtify

testify the *Reverse* part of our assertion, viz. That the Term of mans life hath bin *Abbreviated.* For who can read the story of the *General Deluge*, and not observe, that the whole stock of Humanity (except 8. beleivers, who committed themselves prisoners to the Ark of Preservation) was immaturely extinguished, and by the most proper and expedite way of corruption, resolved into its *Hyle*, or Watery Principle? Who can rehearse *Moses* his relation of those many thousands of incredulous and murmuring *Israelites*, buried in the wilderness, to whom God had promised, may sworn to give them possession of the land of Canaan; and not be satisfied, that their Rebellion and Infidelity anticipated their funerals? and who examine the fate of those *Cowards*, who being sent to explore the fertility of the promised Land, and the forces of the *Amalekites*, returned a discouraging answer to their brethren, and were therefore cut down by the revenging sword of the Lord of Hosts, in the noon of their lives; and not be convicted, that the *Wages of Sin is Death*, and may be paied as justly, though not so naturally, in the morn, or noon, as evening of life?

Now so fiduciary are these *Testimonies*, that whoever shall justly compute their *Number*, perpend their *Gravity*, and clearly discern their *Perspicuity*; must confess it no less then open injustice to all the Inducements of beleife, to debase them so much as to a Competition for the priority of perswasion, with those *Few*, *Light*, and *Obscure* Allegations, upon whose Credit the Factors of *Immoveable Destiny* have adventured to take up their opinion. However, that we may add a brighter polish to this our Gold, by scouring off the rust of all *Exceptions* made against it: it deserves our time, and sweat to dispossess our Adversaries of all their pretended interest in the importance of *Three* the chiefest of our *Testimonies*.

Article 6. A full vindication of the *Fourth Testimony*, from the several *Exceptions* made against the appropriation thereof to our scope, by the patrons of Fatality.

First they attempt to infirme our title to that definitive and emphatical sentence of the *Psalmist*, *The bloody and deceitfull men shall not live out half their days*; and this under the pretext of several perverse *Interpretations*: as (1) by understanding the place thus; *Impii & sanguinarii non dimidiabunt*

negotia sua, they shall not accomplish half their *Designes*, or, contrary to their expectation they shall fall before they have brought the ir evil Purposes to pass.

To this unlawfull Construction we reply, that this subterfuge was contrived by that profest Libertine of Christianity, *Luther*, to the end he might support his doctrine of *Absolute Fate*, which with so much Ardor and Pertinacy he had once maintained against that ornament not only of *Germany*, but of *Europe* also, *Erasmus*. But the Connexion of these with the former words, manifestly prohibite any such Comment. *Thou, O God* (sayth *David*) *shalt bring them down into the pit of destruction*, i. e. thou shalt irretiate or insnare them, and suddainly precipitate them into the same pit, which they have digged for me, thy servant; or thou shalt, according to the concernment of the *Hebrew* phrase, destroy them *subita præmatura morte*, by a suddain premature death; that from the experiment of their unexpected ruine, the world may learn thy justice, and be satisfied of thy favour and indulgence to the pious, and thy hatred and indignation to the impious. For if we accommodate this text meerly to the Natural expiration of the term of life, which is appointed as well to the Righteous as to the Reprobate, and generally to all men: pray, what *Energy* or *Emphasis* can remain to that saying of *David, Tu facies eos descendere in puteum fovea*; for then we shall reduce all the meaning only to this, *illi morientur statuto suo tempore, sicut mortales alii omnes*, they shall dye in their appointed time, as all other mortal men: and if so, who might not have justly made this retort upon *David*; *& te etiam tuo tempore, sive cum finis vitæ tuæ præstitutus aderit, Deus faciet descendere in puteum fovea*, and thee also, when thy appointed time shall come, or when the temperamental lease of thy life shall be worn out, shall God bring into the pit of destruction.

Again, if we exchange *Negotia* for *Dies*; then must we renounce the appropriation of the sense to the Wicked, and make it common also to the Godly. For, who ever lived to accomplish all his purposes? But the expression sufficiently illustrates the intention; for it exactly responds to many other phrases used by

by the Holy Spirit to the same scope, as, *They shall not fulfill the number of their days, their days shall be abbreviated &c.*

(2) By Translating the Text thus; *Non dimidiabunt dies suos*, (i. e.) *peribunt antequàm sperent*: they shall perish in the immaturity of their *Hopes*, not of their *Lives*. For the sensuall *Affections* of their earthly minds having determined their judgements only to the expectation of enjoying blessings inservient to the satisfaction of their domineering Concupiscence, make them promise to themselves long subsistence in this their paradise; nay extend their vain projects as far as the impossible period of Eternity: so though they survive even life it self, by dwindling out their bedrid days; till the *marasmus* of extream old age hath embalmed them before-hand, pined them into perfect Skeletons, and so defrauded their hungry Creditors, the Wormes; yet since they drop away full of youthfull and green hopes, their departure is premature and inopine; and so they may be sayd, not to dimidiate their days.

We return that this illegitimate *Desoant* ought to be rejected for 4, considerable *Causes*. (1) Because it cannot be justly charged upon the words, no not in the greatest latitude of Construction. For tis not there sayd, the Wicked shall dye sooner then they expect; but positively and expresly, they shall not dimidiate their days: now every Ideot can tell, that it is one thing, not to live out half their days, and another, not to beleive they shall live out half their days. (2) because it argues the sacred *Psalmist* of a manifest *Falsity*. For when the ungodly expire, they do not only *Dimidiate* their days, but *Accomplish* them, *Death* being at any time the *December* of life. (3) Because it imports a double repugnancy to Truth. For first, now there are, and in all ages, since the first experiment of death, have bin millions of *Vicious* men, who even in the wildest paroxysme of their Vanity, and highest orgasme of their Pride and Ambition, have still cooled themselves with Εἷς μόρος, εἷς θάνατος πᾶσιν ἐπεχόμενος, and felt a dejecting horror from within, at the remembrance of that Motto, *Statutum est omnibus semel mori*; so far is our Nature from entertaining any hopes of Immortality, though but in a dreame, or melancholy depravation of Phansy.

And, again, no Chronicle is barren in the stories of prosperous Libertines, who have wanted nothing but some *Cross* to indeare the Felicity of their lives, have unravelled their vital web in the highest blandishments of Sense, attained to miraculous Longevity, and being sated with the profuse treatments of Fortune, have outlived their own large stock of Hopes; so that a Poet might take the Liberty to say of them, they dyed for grief, that they had nothing left to wish for, which they had not already surfetted in the fruition of. (4) Because the admission thereof loseth the *Singularity* or *Determination* of *Davids* speech to *Sanguinary* and *Nefarious* Persons. For, if to *Dimidiate* their days, import no more then to dye by the same common kind of Death, and at the same period of their Temperamental Lease, when, by the ineluctable laws of Destiny, it is enacted that all men shall revert to Dust: certainly, there can remain no reason why Impious men, so dying, should be thought more unhappy, because they were Cruent and Unjust, then others. To conclude; of all those just Persons mentioned in the old Testament, who were translated from this Vale of tears to the Celestial Hils of permanent delight, by early and premature deaths (amongst whom the *Apostle* (*Heb.* 11. *vers.* 38.) hath accounted some so excellent above the common rate of humanity, that *the world was not worthy of them*) of such, I say, 'twas true, according to this erroneous paraphrase, that they did not *Dimidiate* their days, because they dyed sooner then they expected. For they did not only hope, but upon the faithfull promise of God even assure themselves of a longer continuation heer below to do him further service. And confidently to expect, nay by a lively hope to anticipate the fruition of a promised blessing; is a privilege peculiar only to those, to whom the promise doth properly and solely belong: but the blessing of Longevity was only then promised to the pious observers of the Divine laws; as is manifest from the places formerly cited.

(3) By fixing the scope of the Text only upon that *mature Term* of life, to which many ordinarily attain, viz. to 60. 70. 80. 90. years, more or less, according to the respective Duration of every individual Constitution; and so concluding the verity of

of *Davids* speech only in this respect. For (say they) the Annales of *Impious* men seldome arise to so large an account; because either the sword of war, or justice, or some Accident occasioned by their Villanies takes them off, before the completion of their natural Term of years.

But this siniſter *Detorſion* of the Text ought also to be repudiated for *two Reasons*.

(1) In regard tis manifestly *heterodox, and dissimilar to the expreſs ſenſe of the words*; since they say not, Wicked men shall not live out half the days of *Others*, but their *own*. Now the days of their lives amount not to so many years, as are required to the commensuration of the natural space betwixt the Animation and Disanimation of the posterity of *Adam*, prefixt by the decree of him, who is the *Breath of our noſtrils*: and therefore, when they fully and wholly accompliſh that common compute, with what semblance of truth can they be sayd to *Dimidiate* their days? Moreover, if those *Sanguinary Miſcreants*, against whom *David* directly denounceth this judgement of *Premature Mortality*, be sayd not to dimidiate their days, only in this respect, that they seldome arrive at that provect and silver-headed Age, wherein the Tapor of life, by the ordinary deflux of Nature, burns dim and languid, and at last, for want of oyle, winks out into pepetual night: then with equal right may it be affirmed also of many *Holy and Juſt* persons, that they do not dimidiate theirs; nay tis a question not easily answered, whether the same may not be asserted of *theſe*, with more justice then of *thoſe*. For, how rarely doe we observe the pulse of *Pious* men to beate, till their Arteries grow hard from the Hectick distemper of old age? How small a manual would the Legends of all those Saints, whose names and stories yet survive, make, who have lived till the Almond tree hath budded and flouriſhed: and how vast a volume would theirs make, who have bin gathered green into the Granary of God, and never lived to see one revolution of Saturn about the solary Orbe? and how frequently have we occasion to comfort our selves, after the transplantation of *Junior Virtue*, with that adage, ὃν φιλοῦ θεὸς ἀποθνήσκει νέος? Nor hath *Piety* always proved a Coat of maile

against

againſt the danger of *Malice*; or the *Panoplie* of a Chriſtian, defence againſt the ſword of war; or perfect *Charity*, an Antidote to *Poyſon*; or *Temperance*, an Alexipharmacon againſt the *Peſtilence*; or religious *Abſtinence*, a Preſervative againſt *Famine*; or *Innocence* awarded the ſtroke of the *Executioner*: in ſhort, as to the time of Death, in this concernement, *there is one event to the Righteous, and to the Wicked, to the clean, and to the unclean, to him that ſacrificeth, and to him that ſacrificeth not; as dies the Good, ſo dies the Sinner, and he that ſweareth, as he that feareth an oath.*

(2) In reſpect it *diſarmes the Text of all its Force and Purpoſe.* For to what end could *David* ſay, they ſhould not dimidiate their days, if thereby he intended no more then this, that they ſhould not run over half their ſtage of life, or ſubſiſt untill grey haires; unleſs the *ground* or *reaſon* thereof be alſo ſubjoyned, viz. becauſe of their *impious and bloody Inclinations and Practiſes*: and ſo conſequently our preſent opinion be admitted? For if he beleived it conſtituted by the immutable law of *Fate*, that ſuch ſhould then, and at no other time be taken off; without any relation at all to the contracting and anticipating merit of their *Impiety*: what makes it to the principal ſcope, that he ſayd, they ſhall not dimidiate their days? ſince, according to this inconvenient interpretation, they do not only not Dimidiate their days, but fully Accompliſh them, as any the moſt mortified and conſcientious obſervers of Gods ſacred laws: and ſo neither *Piety* ſhall retain its attribute of having the power to *prolong*, nor its *Contrary* longer weare the juſt imputation of having the power to *abbreviate* the Term of Life. To which we may add, that *David* could not, without *ſpecial Revelation* from that *omniſcient Light*, that penetrates the darkneſs of *Futurity*, deliver this certain Prognoſtick concerning the non-dimidiation of their days. For ſince he could not but have obſerved that many the moſt accurſed Vaſſals of Satan, (the *Providence* of God ſo permitting, for conſiderations privy onely to his Wiſdome) attained to extreme old age: whence could he acquire that prophetique knowledge, that thoſe particular Villaines, whom he levelled at, ſhould be taken in their own ſnares,

and

and perish immaturely in the nonage of their lives? Undoubtedly, he could desume that prediction from no oracle less prescient, then that *Spirit*, whose Essence is Truth, and to whose cognition all things are actually present: but who can, though but with a specious or verisimilous argument, prove that *David* received any such special Revelation? Wherefore Reason adviseth that we acquiesce in the judgement of most of the *Fathers*, who unanimously resolve, that *David* reflected his thoughts upon that positive sentence in the *Levitical Law*, which (ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον) for the major part, comminates a short and calamitous life, and a repentine and miserable death to the Ungodly; but, on the contrary, promiseth longevous and peaceable days, to those, who should revere the sacred Majesty, and observe the wholsome ordinances of *Jehovah*: and upon the general infallibility of that Sentence, erected his particular prediction; that those *Sanguinary* traytors who had with so much detestable policy prepared stratagems to ensnare his feet walking in the ways of innocence and charity, should be entangled in their own mischievous wiles, and stumble into their graves in the midle of their race. To which we may accommodate that of *Juvenal*,

Ad Generum Cereris, sine cede ac sanguine pauci
Descendunt Reges, & sicca morte Tyranni.

Few *Tyrants* goe late to th' infernal flood;
But sink betimes in Cataracts of *blood*.

Article 7. The *second Testimony* vindicated from several *Exceptions*.

The *second place* they endeavour to betray out of our possession, is that promission of *Longevity*, whereby the *Father of all things* was pleased to invite *Children* to a due *Veneration* of their *Parents*: which they corrupt with this dangerous glose. This (say they) was spoken *Anthropopathically*, or *ad captum hominis*, by the *Holy Spirit*, who frequently hath descended to discourse in the stammering and imperfect dialect of mortality; so that the days of obsequious children are said to be prolonged, then when they are blessed with diuturnity, tranquillity and sanity of life, which as it immediately depends on the immutable decree

of God, so cannot one moment be superadded thereunto beyond the term prefixt, unless we infer a manifest *Inconstancy* upon that immutable *Essence*, παρ᾽ ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι παραλλαγὴ, ἢ τροπῆς ἀποσκίασμα, *with whom is no variableness nor shadow of turning*. But that the *Ancient of days* had determined, that such should live to wear the honourable badge of Antiquity, who should constantly beare a venerable regard toward those, from whom, under God, they had derived their being: yet so, that if any obedient Child should chance to be snatched away by the tallons of that sarcophagous Vultur, Death, before time had reduced his haires to the same colour with his skull; which is no rarity; yet notwithstanding doth God in no respect deflect from the point of his general determination, but persevere in the accomplishment of his promise, no less then a Prince, who bestows a million of crowns upon that servant, to whom he had promised only a hundred. For this life is no *Mansion*, but a narrow and incommodious *Inne*, standing in the way to a better, whose *Term* is *Eternity*: and therfore, *ter felix ille, cui ante lassitudinem peractum est iter*, thrice happy he, who arrives at his journies end, before he is weary of travell. And our Grandfathers tell us, that old Age is but the magazine of sorrows, the sowre Dreggs of life, the Portal to the Nosocomie or Hospital of Diseases, and indeed a kind of living-Death, wherein men only *Breath* and *Doate*; which though all men wish for, yet no man delights in when it comes: *optima cum expectatur, cum advenit, onerosa sibi, aliis molesta*; good only when expected, evil when enjoyed, because burdensome to it self, and troublesome to others. So that those Saturnine minds, which were most ambitious to wear the silver Crown of old Age; when they had obtained it, found it to gall their feeble temples, and enervate all their limbs: nor did they appear other then weatherbeaten and mouldring statues of their former selves, Human-Grashoppers, or Ghosts walking in Skeletons. In fine, that the whole concernment of this encouragement to Filial Duty, doth consist only in this; that *Vivacity* in this transitory World is promised unto morigerous Children, only in this capacity, that it is a *Benediction* of God: and a Benediction only in this respect

ſpect, that it is a *Document of Divine Grace*, or an Evidence of Gods ſingular love toward them; which he doth infinitely more teſtify unto them by a timous and early delivery of them from this calamitous priſon of Mortality into the glorious Liberty of the Sonnes of God.

We reply, that this plea of Exception againſt our lawfull right to the place, is not only frivolous and dilute; but even derogatory as well to the Sanction, as *Excellence* of the *Promiſe*. For, to tranſmute the *ſerious and faithfull promiſe of* him, whoſe words are *yea and amen*, into an *Anthropopathical Sophiſme*, or affected expreſſion in the ſtammering Dialect of Humanity; is frivolous, and not only to ſtagger, but ſubvert the *Fidelity* thereof, and ſo demoliſh the comfortable hopes of *Filial Piety*, nay, what's a degree of *Blaſphemy*, to inſimulate *Truth* it ſelf of *Impoſture*. For, to promiſe *Longevity* to morigerous Children, when formerly and without any reſpect to their previſed obedience, God hath prefixt unto them an *Intranſible Term* of life: what els can it be, but to make him promiſe that, which cannot be promiſed *Hypothetically*, or upon condition; unleſs that which was *Abſolutely* decreed long before the promiſe was made, be violently cancelled and altered. And ſo much the more intolerable indignity to the ſacred majeſty of God, doth this abſurd Exception infer; by how much the more both of *Imprudence* and *Inconſtancy* it muſt import, to play the uncircumſpect Sophiſter with thoſe, who (as our Adverſaries themſelves affirme) ſtood poſſeſſed with a full perſwaſion, that the Term of every mans life was abſolutely, and without any reſpect to his future piety, or Impiety, predetermined. I profeſs ſincerely, I am yet to be perſwaded, that any Credulity can be ſo pedantique and ſlaviſh, as to entertain a beleif; that even *Man* (I forbear to ſay, God) can thus openly and detectibly diſſimulate with any the moſt ſtupid and indiſcreet perſon alive; unleſs he be firſt reſolved to expoſe himſelf to the juſt ſcorn and deriſion of all men, and by this looſe and childiſh jugling forfeit that reputation, which he had acquired by his former grave and oraculous treaties, and the juſt performance of all Articles, to which he had ſubſcribed. 'Tis *one thing* to admit, that the *Holy*

Ghost doth sometimes descend to discourse in the stammering and amphibological Phrase of man, when he is pleased to hint unto us those Ἄρρητα, or *ineffable Mysteries*, which are too fine to be spun into words by the gross fingers of flesh, and are notions reserved to entertain the Soul, when enfranchized from the bonds of Corporeity; such are those glances, whereby he affords us a dark landskip of the *New Jerusalem*, and allegorical description of the joyes and glories of the *Eternal Life*, an idea of the majesty of his incomprehensible *Essence*, and three distinct *Subsistences* in one indivisible *Existence*, &c. and a *far different*, nay contrary, to say, that he doth speak Anthropopathically and conform to our unequall capacities, when he promiseth those things, which do not only not transcend our faculties of comprehension; but are familiar to our knowledg, nay such as the neerest concernment of our nature requires us fully and perspicuously to know. And such is the quality of those *Blessings*, which the Bounty of *Providence* hath by promise assured unto the *Virtuous*, in order to the demulsion and dulcification of the sharp condition of this life; and particularly that of *longevous subsistence* upon earth. To conclude; the *Spirit* or *Form* of a *Promise* doth consist in this, that they, to whom the promise is made, do understand the good therein specified, to be *really*, *bona fide*, *& in specie*, intended to be performed by him, who made the promise. Now, if there arise any doubt, whether or no that promise be repugnant to a verity formerly declared; then doth the force and sanction, together with the Dignity thereof, totally vanish and become voyd.

Our *Adversaries* have rejoyned, that God doth therefore promise *Longevity* to obsequious Children, because he hath formerly decreed to qualifie their particular Constitutions with respective *Durability*.

But, alas! this subterfuge neither dissolves the Difficulty, nor prevents the Doubt. For if his Decree, concerning their Longevity, be *Absolute*, devoyd of all Suppositionality, and suspended upon no respect to his Prevision of their obedience: no reason can discover what *Force* or *Energy* the promise can pretend unto from the performance of the *Condition* required. Again, how can that

that Promise, by way of *invitation* or allurement, affect those, who are already confirmed, that what the promise imports, is formerly, by the *positive* and non-conditionate *Will* of *God*, made *inevitable*, and hath the *Possibility* of its *Futurition* determined to precise *Necessity*? In fine, the *Postulation* of that Condition can neither consist with the Eternal *Identity* of God that promises; nor effectually move those, to whom he makes the promise, to endeavour the Consequution of that ample reward of filial obedience: for his *Decree*, concerning the Term of their life, doth and shall forever stand firm and immote, whether the Condition be performed, or not.

Article 8. The *sixth Testimony* cleared from 4. *Exceptions.*

The last *Testimony* they have essayed to extort from us, is the *Instance of Ezekiah*; and this by a *Fourfold* Cavillation.

(1) By this Excuse, *Singulare aliquod Exemplum non evertere regulam*, that one single enormous Example is not sufficient to evert the general obligation of a law; or one swallow makes no summer.

This Exception, I confess, might have had some colour, or slender pretext of Validity; had not our Opponents themselves totally excluded it, by asserting that the immutable law of Destiny was *equally extended to all* and every individual person from *Adam* down to us. For most certain it is, that *God* never limited his free *Omnipotence*, by any fixt law, or bound up his own hands with the same setled Constitutions, whereby he circumscribed the definite activity and duration of his Creatures: it being the Prerogative of his Nature, *to know no Impossibility*, but to be able to act either above, or against the statutes of his Deputy, whensoever, and upon what subject, and to what end soever he pleases. But I have no warrant to beleive, that among the Propugnators of Fate, any one hath deviated into so remote an *Alogie*, as to opinion, that the Lots of all men are not delivered out of one and the same common urne; but that the Decrees concerning the Destinies of some particular persons, are not so definitive, precise, and immoveable, as those of all others in generall.

(2) By this Responſe, that under the ſeeming *Abſoluteneſs* of the Prophets Sentence, *Morieris, Thou ſhalt dye*; there lay concealed a tacite *Hypotheſis*, which was this: *Niſi ſeria pœnitudine te ad Deum convertas*, unleſs by ſerious and profound repentance thou ſhalt mortify the old man of ſin, and apply thy ſelf wholly to the Mercies of God.

Againſt this miſtaken plea our defence ſhall be, that it wants the principal inducement to beleif, and ſo can afford no ſatisfaction at all. For, (beſides this, that it quadrates neither to their *Firſt Exception*, nor their *Theſis* concerning the *Immobility* of *Deſtiny*) what Logick can tolerate the induction of an *Hypothetical* upon a *Categorical* Propoſition? or, more expreſly, how can any *Condition* be comprehended under that meſſage, which by a *definitive and peremptory decree*, and ſuch as carried no reſpect to the performance, or non-performance of any condition whatever, tels the K. in down right terms, that the date of his life was now expired, and that the ſevere Publican, Death, ſtood ready at the door of his chamber, within ſome few hours to exact from him the common tribute of Nature? *Subordinata non pugnant*, is an Axiome I well know, and am ready to receive a challenge from any ſingularity, that dares queſtion the univerſality of its truth; but, *that a condiitional Decree can be ſubordinate to an Abſolute*, I am bold to deny, nor need I goe far for an Argument to prove the impoſſibility thereof; the very *Antitheſis* of thoſe notions, *Abſolute* and *Conditional* ſufficiently declaring as much. To take the juſt dimenſions of this Cloud; every Condition is moveable upon the hinge of Indefinity or Uncertainty, as being ſuſpended upon an uncertain and mutable Cauſe, viz. the Arbitrary Election of mans Free will: inſomuch, that the Event thereof cannot be known, nay not unto the Omniſcience of God, who is the only *Cardiognoſtes*, and ſees beyond our very Eſſences, ſo long as it hangs in ſuſpence or indeciſion, by reaſon of the Indifferency, or non-determination of its Cauſe, *i. e.* while it is not determined to either part by the Actual Volition of mans will. But as for an *Abſolute decree*; that cannot but be *Certain* and *Immutable*; as being conſtitute without, and antecedent to any *Previſion* of a *Condition*, that is to be, or

or hath bin performed, or is not to be, or hath not bin performed.

(3) By insinuating, that God made use of this sharp *Commination*, in order to the more Expedite and effectual reduction of the K. to *Penitence*.

But, alas! this also is a broken reed, and he shall fall into the ditch of Error, who relies thereon. For who can be perswaded, that this *Commination* could be *serious* and in earnest, that must not at the same time dissolve the rigour and *immutability* of Gods decree concerning the fatal Term of the K^s. life? or how could it be serious, if it were fully constituted from all Eternity that the K. should not die, till full 15. years after the Sentence? This is a pure ἀκατάληπτον, and something that no man can comprehend. For, to comminate suddain death to him, whom our Adversaries acknowledge reserved by the law of Destiny till the complete expiration of his prefixt Term of life: is not to comminate in *earnest*, but in *jest*, and argue the *God of Truth*, of *Dissimulation*. Again, what *Efficacy* or inforcing Virtue could that Commination have over the *Affections* of *Ezekiah*, if he firmly beleived, that he should not, could not dye before the precise term of his life constituted and made intransible from Eternity? Assuredly, if so; he had no just cause either to *complain* of, or *fear* the abscission of his days.

(4) By recurring to this their last refuge, *Deum hac ratione palam facere voluisse, quam Regi ab æterno designarat* μακροβιότητα, that God was pleased to take this course for the promulgation of that *Longevity*, which he had from eternity designed to *Ezekiah*.

This is more impertinent, and less satisfactory then any of the precedent Exceptions. For extremely ridiculous it is, to opinion, that God would by a Commination suspended on a condition, or by a hypothetical decree, make that known; which long before he had, by an Absolute Decree, without any condition, or prevision of any condition, constituted firme and immoveable. Unworthy and disparaging thoughts both of the *Wisdome* and *Justice* of the *Supreme Being* doth that unhappy man entertain, who ascribes unto it the making of *Decrees subordi-*

ſubordinate, *diſparate*, and *irreconcileable*. That Sacred, omniſcient, omnipotent Agent, as himſelf makes nothing in vaine; ſo would he have us make him our Exemplar, and doe no action, but what points at ſome certain end, and conduces both to our benefit, and the laſt of ends, his Glory. But *in vain* had he promiſed, in vain threatned, had he either promiſed or threatned thoſe things, which his own irrevocable Decree had formerly made immutable, which muſt of neceſſity, had they never bin promiſed or threatned, have come to paſs in their predetermined opportunity: or ſuch, to whoſe Exiſtence it was wholly and abſolutely neceſſary, that that very thing, under which the promiſe or commination was made, ſhould be effected by ſuch a power, to which no other power can reſiſt.

And this (we hope at leaſt) is ſufficient to the ample juſtification of our opinions right to thoſe *Three appropriate and Convincing Teſtimonies*, of the Mobility of the Term of mans life, deſumed from *holy Writ*. ¶.

Sect. IV.

Article 1. The neceſſity of our enquiry into the myſtery of *Predeſtination*, in order to the ſolution of the preſent difficulty: and the Faults grand Argument.

IT remains only that we endeavour to wind our reaſon out of that profound abyſs of *Predeſtination* (of which the *Apoſtle*, though he had the advantage of all other men in this; that he had the eye of his Soul illuminated by beams deradiated immediately from the Soul of Light: did yet excuſe himſelf for his non-comprehenſion, with Ὦ βάθος πλούτου καὶ σοφίας καὶ γνώσεως θεοῦ, ὡς ἀνεξιχνίαστοι αἱ ὁδοὶ αὐτοῦ.) into which the ſolution of this grand difficulty hath unavoidably precipitated it: for the ſtrongeſt hold, which the Defendants of *Abſolute Fatality* have left them to retreat unto, is erected upon this Foundation.

It makes no materiall difference (ſay they) *whether the Preſcience of God be conceived precedent to his Preordination of any future Event, and ſo Predeſtination be founded upon Previſion; or,*

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on the contrary, this Præordination precedent to his Præſcience, and ſo Prædeſtination be the baſis of Pærviſion: for, from the conceſſion of either, it follows of abſolute neceſsity that the Term of mans life (in individuo) muſt be fixt and intranſible.

We anſwer,

Article 2. The refutation thereof, by the conciliation of the infallibility of Gods *Prænotion*, to the indeterminati-on of mans *free will* to the actual election of Good or Evil.

That the *Conſequence*, indeed, ought to be admitted as firme and impregnable. For this *Præſcience*, whether it præced, or ſucced *Divine Prædeſtination*, is and muſt be ever certain, præciſe, and infallible; or ſo ſuppoſed to be, at leaſt: and therefore muſt the *Term* of mans life be conſtituted certain, preciſe, and immutable, *ex neceſsitate ſi non conſequentis, ſaltem conſequentiæ*, by neceſſity if not of the *Conſequent*, yet of the *conſequence*; *i. e.* if not from the *Virtue* or *Efficiency*, yet from the *Hypotheſis*, or *Conditionality* of that *Præſcience*. For no Sceptick can diſallow of this Conſequence; if God doth infallibly foreknow, that this and no other ſhall be the Term of my life: *ergo* this and no other ſhall be the Term of my life.

But this is not the point, at which our inquiry is levelled. Manifeſt it is, aſwell from our precedent diſcourſe, as from the Condition of the ſubject, that theſe two Propoſitions are not repugnant each to other; viz. The Term of mans life is fixt and immutable in reſpect to the infallibility of Gods Præſcience: and the Term of mans life is moveable in reſpect to our right uſe, or abuſe of the Liberty of our Will. Though, I confeſs, with the great *Merſennus*, that the apparent diſcord betwixt the infallibility of Gods Prenotion, and the indetermination of mans Free Will to the actual election of good or evil; hath bin the rock, againſt which many the greateſt wits of all Ages and Religions have bin ſhipwrackt, in their perſwaſions of the irreſiſtible enforcement of Deſtiny.

To extricate our judgements out of this maze, let us remember and adhære unto that excellent Axiome of the moſt and moſt learned of the School-men; *Præviſionem Dei nihil influere in noſtras actiones*, that the Prævifion of God hath no influence upon the actions of man, nor upon the operation of the remedies applyed by the Phyſician to the cure of diſeaſes: but preſup-

poſeth both the one and the other. For, in truth, God cannot foreknow the future actions of man, or the effects of remedies adminiſtred, otherwiſe then becauſe of their neceſſary Futurity. Since, if we take away the *Futurition* of events, we neceſſarily deſtroy the *Prenotion* of God.

Which *Abſtruſity* that we may the better comprehend, let us begg the liberty, to ſuppoſe ſome *Momenta rationis*, or *ſucceſsive minutes in Eternity* (which, though in reality impoſſible, *Eternity* being one permanent τὸ νῦν, or *inſtance*, as uncapable of *diviſion*, as *ceſsation*; may yet ſerve, as an excellent Perſpective, to our weak-ſighted reaſon in its inſpection of many ſublime *Phænomena* in *Theology*,) and humbly conceive; that in the *Firſt Moment* of Eternity, God ſaw, and only ſaw, without any relation at all to his future decrees, all things to come, as well Ἐσόμενα, or ſuch whoſe futurity is neceſſary from the condition of their Nature, or impuls of their proper Cauſes; as Μέλλοντα, or *Futura Contingentia*, which hang ſuſpended *in æquilibrio* upon the Free Will of their Efficients, ſo that they may, or may not ſucceed, whether they be Abſolute, or Conditionate: in which Firſt moment had God acquieſced, and proceeded no farther, then only to foreſee the Neceſſity and Poſſibility of their Futurition; then nothing ſhould have bin to come. That in the *Second Moment*, God ſaw, and only ſaw, that this or that event was in *Poſsibility* of Futurition, in the life of this or that particular man, if ſuch or ſuch things were done, in this or that time, with this or that Temperament of body, and other reſpective Circumſtances: but yet did neither determine any thing to abſolute *Neceſsity* of Futurition, and therefore nothing could be ſaid to depend upon the Præordination of God, though all things ſhould come to paſs in the ſame manner, as he foreſaw them, whenſoever the *Fiat* of his *Will* ſhould bring them into *actual exiſtence*, or educe them *extra ſuas cauſas*; nor did he ſee, that they would ſo and no otherwiſe come to paſs, from hence that he would they ſhould ſo and no otherwiſe come to paſs; ſince this *Præviſion* anteceeds all *Volition*. That, therefore, in the *Third Moment* of Eternity, God decreed, that he would make *Future* not all thoſe *Poſsible* Effects, whether

whether Absolute or Conditionate, but only some particulars, as, for example, that he would make *Alexander*, or *Plato*, of this or that individual temperament of body, in this or that climate and country, of this or that particular cours of life, with all conspiring Circumstances; to whom all things should happen according to the *possibility* of their Futurition, wherein God beheld them before the conception or pronunciation of his *Decree*; so that by this influence of God's *definitive Will*, those Events are no more then deduced into *actual existence*, which formerly were only in δυνάμει, or in the womb of their *Causes*.

Now, upon this *Hypothesis* our understanding is advanced to this manifest *Conclusion*, *That the Prescience of God doth nothing conduce ad rem existentem*, nor to the *Actions* or *Passions* thereof; since it is not the cause of their *Inference*: nor doe his *Decrees*, that are subsequent unto, and in a manner grounded upon his *Prevision*, work any the least mutation at all in the natures of his Creatures, or by violence pervert their Virtues to the production of any Effects, to which, by their primitive Constitution and individuation, they were not precisely adapted and accommodated. Since, in so doing, he must take away from his Creatures those peculiar Faculties, which he at their creation freely conferred upon their severall natures; and innovate the fundamental laws of Nature.

Article 3. The diametral Disparity between that *Divine Prænotion* which is *antecedent* to *Divine Prædordination*; and that which is *subsequent*; amply declared.

Now this dark shadow of that darker mystery of Predestination, how obscurely soever presented, doth yet sufficiently commonstrate how vast and diametral a *disparity* is between that *Divine Prenotion*, which is *Antecedent*; and that which is *subsequent* to *Divine Prædordination*. For that *Prascience*, which hath for its object a thing to come, without any prævious and prædeterminant Decree; supposeth that particular thing to come, together with the whole *series* or concatenation of its proper *Causes*, and method or manner of its Futurition: the *Modus Futuritionis* being, as the Schoolemen well define, *Id quod futurum est, sive quod ad rei, quæ futura præscitur, futuritionem quolibet modo pertinet*. This that Rabbin *Isac bar Sesat*, quoted by *Menasseth Ben Israel* (*de termino vitæ. pag.* 116.) seems well

well to have understood, when he said; *Deus ab æterno disposuit totius mundi negotia, & divina sua sapientia, ac perspicacia, vidit omnes effectus, qui in tempore futuri essent: qui licet pendeant (loquor enim de actionibus humanis) a libero hominis arbitrio, ut fiant aut non fiant; nihilominus tamen Deus certò & infallibiliter eos prævidit, ac præscivit. Neque tamen ideo quicquam in tempore facit homo, quia Deus ea facturum præscivit: sed è contrà, quia homo in tempore hoc vel illud facit, aut operatur, ideo Deus ab æterno illud scivit.*

But on the Contrary, that *Præscience*, which follows upon the *Predetermination of* the *Divine Will*, hath, indeed, for its object a thing to come, and also presupposeth it as fully as the former; but so that it comprehends the order and manner of its futurition as fixt and *immutable*, being so constituted by virtue of the antecedent *Prædestination*.

For the further inculcation of this *Distinction*, let us make use of an *Example* most familiar, and pertinent to the difficulty in hand.

Article 4. A second illustration of the same difference by a pertinent Instance, or exemplification.

That *Divine Præscience*, which hath no dependence on a predeterminant decree, let us suppose it to be a *Præscience* of the *life* and *death*, of the health and sickness, of the good or evil use of the Free will, of *Peter*, *John*, and every individual man in the world: and is twofold.

First *Conditionate*; if *Peter*, or *John*, being born of a sound and durable constitution, shall choose such a course of life, as that he shall observe the wholsome Aphorisms of Temperance in his use of the Six nonnaturals, shall opportunely, in all distempers introduced by the inclemency of the aer, the malignant impressions of the Stars, epidemick contagions, or other undeclinable Accidents, recur to the use of such convenient remedies, as both reason and experience prescribe for the preservation or restauration of health; then I foreknow that he shall live healthy and long: but if, on the contrary; then I foreknow, that he shall be infested with frequent diseases, and die immaturely.

Second *Absolute*; I foreknow that *Peter* or *John* shall choose a prudent course of life, convenient both to his Genius, and tempera-

temperament; ſhall ſedulouſly endevour the preſervation of his health, by moderation in diet and other nonnaturals, and the reſtauration of the ſame, when impaired by any diſtemper, by rational and approved medicaments; and ſhall therefore enjoy health, and attain to longævity. On the *Contrary*, I foreknow, that he ſhall lead a diſorderly and luxurious courſe of life, accelerate the diſſolution of his temperament, by the immoderate, præmature, or unſeaſonable uſe of Wine, Woemen, Paſſions &c. and when aſſaulted by any diſeaſe, chronique or acute, ſhall either omit to conſult learned, judicious and experienced Phyſitians, or diſobey their pharmaceutical or diætetical præſcripts, drinke wine in a Fever, cold water in a Critical ſweat, ſalt, ſharp, acid or corroding liquors in a Dyſentery, eate Aſtringents in obſtructions, frigid, crude and dyſpeptical fruits in an imbecillity of the ſtomach, &c. and ſhall therefore ruine his health and drop into the grave before hee's ripe.

Now take which *Præſcience* you pleaſe, and either hath for its object, the præciſe Term of *Peter* or *Johns* life, as a thing to come; and fully and punctually preſuppoſeth the ſame: but ſo, that together with that fixt Term it comprehends alſo all the *order* and *manner* of its *Futurition*, or all the antecedent and conſpiring cauſes; amongſt which the principal and moſt energetical is the right *uſe* or *abuſe* of his own *Free will*, in whoſe power it was to move that Term either forwards or backwards, (*i. e.*) either to *adduce*, or *produce* it.

So far, therefore, is this *Præviſion* of God from *excluding* the neceſſity of *Medical Remedies*, as the Defendants of Fate would impoſe, according to that of *Solon* in *Stobæus*

——Fato quæcunque manet ſors;
Non hanc avertet victima, ſed nec aves,
Nec qui Pæonias ægris mortalibus herbas
Sæpe erraturam ferre laborat opem.

That it totally *includes*, nay preſuppoſeth it ſo neceſſarily, that if we take away from man the *Liberty* of his *Will*, and the opportunity of uſing either prophylactical, or therapeutical means, in order to the prolongation of his life; we muſt alſo ſubmove

the *Certainty* of *Gods Præscience*: since that determineth nothing, but only præsupposeth all things; nor doth God, by a decree subsequent to that Prescience, prædain that this or that individual man shall recover of such or such a disease, unless by virtue of such or such appropriate remedies, which the Physician shall in the opportunity præscribe.

Nor is it a more justifiable plea at the bar of reason, to argue thus; if the Term of mans life be certainly and precisely foreknown to God, then must it, together with the order and manner of its Futurition, be fixt and immutable: then to argue thus; if God hath a certain and precise cognition of any thing *already past*, as of the Creation of the world; therefore could that thing have come to pass no otherwise, nor at any other time, then it did; therefore was the world created by God, *non liberè sed necessariò*, not by an *Arbitrary*, but *Necessary* and restrained activity. For, as *Science*, having for its *object* a thing *Præterite*, doth infer no necessity upon that thing præterite, that it should have bin so and no otherwise effected: so doth *Præscience*, having for its object a thing *Future*, infer no necessity upon its futurition; each being an *Immanent Action* in God, *& extra rem*, or having no compulsive influence at all upon that particular thing, or its Causes: and *Futurum esse* imports no other thing, but an *object* of *Præscience*; nor *Præteritum esse*, any thing but an *object* of *Science*, or *Memorie*. *Science* is the *perfection* of the *Subject*, or thing knowing; not of the *object*, or thing known: much less the *destruction* of the thing known. For necessary it is to *perfect Science*, that it agree in all points with the nature of its object.

But wholly Antarctical to this, is that *Præscience* which is grounded upon *Divine Prædestination*, whereby not only the Term of every individuals life, together with the whole order and manner of its Futurition, is præfixt; but also all those Causes, whose *refractary* or *counter-activity* might in any respect hinder the precise accompletion of that prefixt Term, are prævented or prædetermined to invalidity, lest the Præscience become uncertain or dubious: whether that *Prædetermination* dispose *per modum Causæ Efficientis*, by a certain *Physical* and really effective

effective action, or impression upon the will of man, enforcing it to the election of such a course of life, as may conduce to his punctual pervention to that præstitute Term; or *per modum Causæ Deficientis* by nonconcurrent, but only *permissive* influence (by some called *Permissio simplex*, Simple Permission: by others, *Permissio efficax*, efficacious permission,) since that rule amongst Philosophers *Causa Deficiens in necessariis reducitur ad Efficientem*, doth warrant the *Indifferency*. For this *Decretory Præscience*, though it agree with the precedent *simple Præscience* in this, that it hath for its object *rem futuram*, includeth in its circle the whole order and manner of its Futurition, and presupposeth both the end, and respective means fully and absolutely; yet it clearly and irreconcilably differs from it in this, that the precedent *Prescience* presupposeth the *liberty* of mans *Will*, and the use thereof not only incoacted, and without irrefragable impuls, but absolutely free and arbitrary: but this wholly destroys the arbitrary monarchy of the Will, by importing that the influence of the *Decree* not only inclineth by soft and gentle flexure or perswasion, but by an irresistible violence forceth it upon the election and pursuit of those means, which in a direct and natural line lead to the accomplishment thereof; and this left the *Certitude* or Infallibility of the *Divine Præscience* be infirmed and staggered.

Article 5. A third illustration of the same Difference, by conceiving the *Divine Decrees*, in the same *subordinate series*, which the *Fatists* have imagined.

To discriminate this *Later* from that *Former* Præscience yet more fully: and so insinuate the result of the Distinction, by the most intelligible and concise way of argumentation: it will be necessary for us to conceive the *Decrees* of God in the same method of *subordination*, wherein they, who found the infallibility of his Prævision upon the necessity of his Prædestination and Prædetermination, have bin, by the obscurity of the Subject, compelled to range their thoughts, in the declarement of their opinion.

The *first Decree* of God runs thus; I will, that *Peter* live till the expiration of the natural or temperamental lease of his life; conceive it to be till his glass hath run 50. 60. 70. or 80. year: but that *John* wither before hee's ripe, and fall in the

June

June of his age; conceive it to be in the 20. 30. or 40. year from his birth.

The *Second* thus; I will præserve *Peter* from this or that sickness, defend him from this or that knock of misfortune, conserve him in, or restore him from this or that dangerous disease; lest he expire before the præstitute Term of his life: but for *John*, he shall be invaded by such or such a mortal disease, receive such or such a wound incurable, or perish by this or that fatal Accident; so that he may verify my prognostick in dying at the hour appointed.

The *Third* thus; lest *Peter* laps into such or such a mortal disease, I will that he be provided of an industrious and prudent Physician to prescribe unto him rational, generous, and effectual prophylactical means; or, if surprised therewith, that he use convenient and victorious therapeutical medicaments, in order to the expulsion of the same; that so the number of his days be not shortned: but, on the contrary, that *John* shall fall into such or such a dangerous sickness, and want Physicians, medicaments, and all other Conservatives whatever; lest he survive beyond the moment præfixt.

The *Fourth* thus; that *Peter* may not, by the abuse of his Arbitrary prerogative, become insensible, incurious, or negligent of the means ordained to conserve health, and run into the perpetration of such sins, as may be injurious to the temperament of his body, as well as the peace of his mind; I will, by the powerfull influence of my Special Grace, so prepare and dispose his Will, that he shall lead a temperate, circumspect and virtuous life, and so subsist till the period of his days præfixt. On the contrary, that *John* may not, by the right use of that Elective Liberty conferred upon his Will, and by a desire of attaining to longævity, endevour the conservation of his health, by diætetical or pharmaceutical observations; I will, that he want that ingenuity, that prudence, that advice, and those prescripts, conducible to the prolongation of his life, and finally that assistance of *Divine Grace*, without which it is not only probable, but necessary, that he should resign up the rains of his Will to Sensuality, and so either by the prodigal effusion of his Vital

Vital oyle in the immodest and destructive rites of Venus, or the extinction of his implantate heat by the frantique sacrifices of Bacchus, or other exorbitances, decurtate the temperamental lease of his life; and so confess Corruption in the moment prefixt.

Or, in a higher key of Fatality, thus; though *Peter*, by the abuse of his Will, rashly expose himself to the fury of the most dangerous Enemies to life, and by gluttony, ebriosity, vindictive anger, salacity, &c. render himself both unfit, and unworthy longer to inspire the common aer; I will notwithstanding all this again repaire the breaches of his constitution, protect him from the malice of danger, and conserve him till the moment predestined, nor shall he be taken off by any other means, but what my Will hath predetermined. Contrary; though *John*, by the right use of the liberty of his will, shall constantly and severely practise all the hard lessons of Virtue, subdue the impetuous and forcible Temptations of Sensuality, lead a life more impassionate then the most rigid of the Stoicks ever professed, more chast then aged Hermits, more abstinent then *Lessius*, more peaceable then Charity her self, and so deserve to become the greatest Example of Longevity: I will notwithstanding, that the appointed Term of his life remain fixt and intransible beyond that point, which my will hath from all Eternity decreed to be the *Ne Ultra* of his subsistence.

On these, or the like Decrees, must the *Certitude* and infallibility of the *Divine Prescience* be erected by any; who subordinate Gods *Prescience* to his *Predestination* of the end, and *predetermination* of the means.

Now, to use all this; so many, so great, and so intolerable are the *Incongruities*, and *Inconveniences*, which necessarily depend on this *Decretory Prescience*; that we need no other argument to evince the weakness of their judgements, who have laboured in its defence, but only to select and consider the *chiefest* and most *obvious* of them.

Article 6. The first *Absurdity* impendent on the opinion of a *Decretory Prescience* of God, as to the Actions of man.

First, this opinion, *that, all the actions of man, and their Events, are Fatally predetermined by the Decretory Prescience of God*; doth not only enervate and scandal, nay destroy the *sincerity*

of those many *Divine Precepts*, enjoyning man to endevour, to the utmost of his knowledg and power, the conservation of his health, and the prolongation of his life, by temperance and all other lawfull means; of those many *Promises* made to encourage him to a strict observance; of those many *Comminations* annexed, to deter him from the neglect of those Precepts; but also, upon inference, dissolves the *obligation* to all serious study and sollicitude to explore, procure, prepare, and use all convenient remedies, in order to the expulsion of diseases, and the revocation of health, on the part of the *Sick man*; and on the part of the *Physician*, to be industrious, carefull, vigilant, and conscientious, in the exercise of his Profession.

That the *Patient* is hereby disobliged from the duty of Self-conservation, may be thus manifested. If it be, *ex Decreto Divino*, fixt and immutable, that such a man shall lead a peaceable, healthfull, and blisfull life, and do all things that are either necessary or conductive to the procurement and continuation of that happy estate; or on the *Contrary*, that such a man shall eate the bread of sorrow, drink the bitter waters of Affliction, and unravell his tedious days in poverty, contention, valetude, or crazinefs of body, anxiety of mind, &c. and therefore take no care at all to do those actions, which might be necessary or conductive to the amendment of his miserable condition, by reason he wants the assistance, counsel, and manuduction of *Divine Grace*: then doth it unavoidably follow, that the *labour* and *sollicitude* of the one is *superfluous*, and of the other *unsuccessfull*, nay *impossible*. For whatever the one, or the other shall do, and however live; yet still the success shall be no other, but what God hath predestined, and though the intention of either be levelled at an end quite contrary to what is designed by the Volition of the *Predestinant*; yet shall the *Force* of the *Decree* either pervert, or render it ineffectual: and if we grant, that the *Happy* man did take care to conserve his health and life; we must also grant, that he could not but take that care; and that the *Miserable* man did take none to preserve either, because it was not in the power of his *Wil* to determine on that care. And thus, what either shall do, can be neither *Care*, nor *Negligence*, strictly

strictly and properly so called: but a meer *Necessity* of Caring, or not Caring.

On the part of the *Physician*, the Reason is the same; for, if this doctrine of Fatality be true, well may he be excused, nay thought the wiser man, if he shut up his books, forget his Aphorismes, deliver out his Prescripts *per Sortilegium* (a course, as I have bin ascertained by the testimony of a judicious and faithfull observer thereof, not long since taken up and constantly practised by a Devout Impostor, whose counterfeit zeal to the Cause had advanced him to the trust of a Physician in that Army, which gathered the first flowers of its triumphant wreath in Naseby Feild) and supinely give Coloquyntida, or Scammony in a Dysentery, Antimony in the Iliaca Passio, Opium in a Crisis, Aqua Fortis for a Julep &c. since no Art can supersede, nor Poyson accelerate his departure, whose time of transition to the invisible world Destiny hath limited to a moment; *Et cum Fata volunt, bina Venena juvant.* Nor can it be rightly esteemed a *Virtue* in the Physician, to be studious and solicitous; or a *Vice* to be debaucht, ignorant, and negligent of the safety of his Client: if it be only the irresistible *Impulse* of *Fate*, which forceth his *Will* to the election of either, in order to the precise accomplishment of its Decree: or, more plainly, if the Care or Negligence of the Physician be but the *Medium*, whereby Fate brings about its end concerning the dissolution of the Patient. And if so, what *Moral* obligation remains upon the conscience of the Physician? Assuredly none at all. Which every moderate judgement will soon detect to import so manifest, dangerous, and detestable an *Absurdity*; that of it self tis able not only to discredit the opinion of Fatality, but also to accuse and convict the Abettors thereof of unpardonable Inconsideration, Stupidity, and Irreligion.

Article 7. A Second *Absurdity* connected to the same.

The *Second Inconvenience*, or rather *Absurdity*, inseparably conjoyned to this opinion of a *Decretory Prescience* in God; is this: Whoever shall grant, that all the means or remedies, and so the sedulity or negligence as well of the Sick, as the Physician, are subordinately predetermined by the Decree of

Fate; must also, by the necessity of natural consequence, be compelled to grant, that to allow the merit of *Praise* or *Dispraise*, *Commendation* or *Reprehension* unto either, is open *Injustice*. For by what pretext of Equity can a Sick man challenge to himself the honor of having done a praise-worthy action, in endevouring to preserve himself both by observing a course of Diet contrary to his disease, and seasonable consulting with and strictly conforming unto the advice of a learned and judicious Physician; or the Physician for the full discharge of his duty in regulating the sick according to the most profound and salutiferous maximes of his Art: if the obedience of the one, and the care of the other be not Arbitrary, but coacted or necessitated by the Force of the complex Decree of Fate, as instrumental to the subsistence of the sick man till the predestined term of his life? *Ubi mera necessitas locum habet, ibi laudem exulare necesse est*: where meer *Necessity* is admitted, thence all *Laudation* is excluded. And with what justice can we reprehend the sick man, for being incurious in the disquisition, or irregular in, and averse from the use of the means prescribed for his restauration: if that his supinity, irregularity, and aversion be imposed upon his Will by the impuls of Destiny, and predetermined as a necessary Medium to accomplish the Decree of his immature death? or the Physician either for his neglect, or ignorant and inartificial tractation of his Client; if twere decreed he should be so, to the end the client might expire according to the decree? *Persuasum est omnibus* (saith *Menasseh Ben Israel, de Termino Vitæ. pag.* 205.) *nec laudandum, nec arguendum quemquam, nisi qui libero arbitrio & consulto benè agit, aut delinquit; adeo ut nullus suasioni, consiliis, redargutioni, præmio aut pœnæ locus sit, si homo non est liber in actionibus suis.*

Article 8. Two *Subterfuges* of the *Fatists*, precluded.

From this distress our *Opponents* have promised themselves an easy evasion, by replying; that both *Patient and Physician are wholly ignorant of the Decree*, the Opticks of Mortality being too weak and remote to read the lines in the Book of Fate, without the perspicill of *Divine Revelation*.

But

But this way of *Subterfuge* may be blockt up, by rejoyning; that though the *Decree* be known to neither, yet tis sufficiently manifest to both, from the Hypothesis of this opinion, that not only their *Actions*, but also the *Successes* thereof are the prescripts and consignations of Fate; and so can be no other then what is included in, and necessitated by the Decree: and consequently that there can remain no just Cause of *reprehension* on either side.

Should they insist yet further upon the same plea, and urge; that tis part of the Decree, that either the Physician, or Patient, or both should be negligent, and so become *Culpable*: we may soon exped this obstruction only by demanding, what *reason* or *equity* can be found to justify such an accusation and respective punition, where the Will of the delinquent is controlled, inflected, nay impelled upon the commission of a crime, or omission of a duty, by a power infinitely superior to his reluctancy; and not only the act, but time, place, instruments, means, &c. conspiring circumstances, precisely preordained by a decree of that *Will*, which is *Omnipotence? Reprehension* imports not only an *Act* of the *Reprehendent*, but also the *Guilt* or *Culpability* of the *Reprehended*: otherwise it cannot be *just*. To the legality, therefore, of a reprehension it is undeniably necessary, that the ground or cause thereof be a *real* and *proper Guilt* in the person reprehended. Now *Guilt* can have no place, where that which is impeached cannot be a *Voluntary Agent*, but a *Medium*, or *Instrument* ordained, and actuated by an irresistible Power to the execution of an infallible Decree.

Article 9. A third *Absurdity* inseparable from the hypothesis of a *Decretory Prescience Divine.*

The *Third* and last *Absurdity* imports no less then the subversion of the very fundamental *Principle*, or basis of all *Moral Virtues*, and *Christian Graces*; by inferring a deniall of *Justice* in the *reward* of *Good*, and *punishment* of *Evil*, either before, or after death. For, tis the *Liberty of the Will* only that supports the *Equity* of *Compensation*: and therefore he, who doth a good action, when twas not in the election of his Will to have omitted that good action, or to have done it otherwise then he did; hath but a weak claim to a *reward*; nor hath he, who

commits a sin, which is not in his power to leave uncommitted, more reason to feare a *punishment* from the even hand of *Divine Justice*.

To conclude, therefore; since these are the *Absurdities*, which every mans Logick may perceive necessarily and immediately to flow from the doctrine of *Decretory Prescience*, or such as is subsequent to *Divine Predetermination*; and since the same, nor any others of equal danger to the Principles of our Knowledge, and Articles of the Christian Faith, can ever be deduced from the hypothesis of that *Simple Prevision* or *unactive Prescience*, which we have allowed of as consistent to the *justice* of God, because consistent to the *Arbitrary freedome* of mans *Will*: tis no hard task to determine, in which opinion our judgements may with more safety and permanent satisfaction aquiesce.

Article 10. The reduction of the whole dissertation to 4 *Conclusions*, genuinely extracted from the Premises.

Now, that we may relieve the Memory of our patient Reader, from the oppression of our (not well to be avoyded) precedent prolixity; we conceive our selves in gratitude obliged, to tender him a Recapitulation, or reducement of all this tedious discourse, concerning the Mobility of mans term of life, in *Fower Conclusions*, naturally resulting from the Premises.

The First Conclusion.

That God hath circumscribed the duration of mans life, with a certain Circle or round of time, conceive it to be of 70. 80. 90. or 100. years, more or less: but yet hath reserved to himself, as *jus supremæ Majestatis*, the prerogative power of extending the term of any individual mans life beyond the limits of that sphear, so far as it shall seem convenient to the Wisdome of his Will. ¶.

The Second Conclusion.

That God, who loves justice more then man, and man only for Justice sake; and hates Injustice more then man, and man only

only for Injuſtice ſake (for *Sin*, unravelled to the botome, will be found to be nothing but *Injuſtice*) is willing, in reſpect of the object of his Love, or in conſideration of mans juſtice, to prolong; or, on the contrary, in reſpect of the object of his Hate, or in conſideration of mans Injuſtice, to abbreviate the term of mans life, included within that determinate Circle of time: reſerving ſtill to himſelf an arbitrary power of acting the quite contrary; (*i. e.*) of abbreviating the life of the juſt, and prolonging the life of the unjuſt, upon the perſwaſion of reaſons either manifeſt to us, or private to himſelf. ¶.

The Third Concluſion.

That God, when he is pleaſed to condeſcend to the prolongation of the life of a Juſt perſon, doth procure the ſame, either by means conforme to the ordinary and ſetled Conſtitutions, or, Canons of Nature; or by means Supernatural. The *Former*, when bearing a reſpect to the native Durability of his individua Temperament, he aſſiſts to the duration thereof untill the natural Period, or laſt moment of this ſphear of time; wherewith the life of man (*in ſpecie*) is circumſcribed: and this either by conſerving his Temperament in its decent tenor, and requiſite Vigor; or by prohibiting and preventing the invaſion of thoſe known Enemies to longevity, which might any way conduce to the denormation, and conſequently the premature diſſolution of its harmony. The *Later*, when bearing no reſpect to the native durability of his individual Temperament, he meliorateth, exalteth, and by the ſecret immiſſion of ſome ſpecial *Athanaſia*, or Antidote againſt early death, corroborateth the ſame, ſo that it doth laſt longer, then otherwiſe, *pro vi ſua nativa*, it could poſſibly have laſted, had it never bin impaired by any diſtemper. And this when God doth, then is he properly ſayd, *to prolong the life, or fulfill the number of the years of the Juſt.* But the Contrary effect he procures by contrary Cauſes; (*i. e.*) he abbreviates the life of an unjuſt Perſon, either by an immature turbation and diſſolution of his temperament, by its native diſpoſition ſufficiently tenacious and durable to extreme old age: or by not prohibiting, (*i. e.*) permitting and ſo procuring the violent

lent and preternatural diſſolution thereof by the deſtructive ſurpriſall of any Accident whatever. And in this caſe properly are the Unjuſt ſayd, *not to Dimidiate their days.* ¶.

The Fourth Concluſion.

That a juſt Perſon, who, ſo much as in him lies, fixeth all the Affections of his Soul upon the Fear of God, and the avoydance of Evil; if he chance, through the frailty of his nature, or the force of temptation, to fall into ſome Capital Sin, which according to the penalty annexed to its prohibition, deſerves to be puniſhed by the *Abbreviation* of his life: may notwithſtanding *ſometimes*, his remorſe of Conſcience, profound ſorrow, fervent prayer, religious faſting, and other duties requiſite to true and perfect repentance, effectually exciting the Mercies of God, obtain from him a full and abſolute remiſſion not only of the ſin, but alſo of the temporal puniſhment due thereunto; and moreover a reſtauration of his Temperament to its native vigor, from which it was alienated by former infirmities, or corrupted by the dyſcratical or diſtempering contagion of ſin. And *ſometimes not*; and this chiefly, when it hath ſeemed convenient to the moſt wiſe and juſt God to pronounce the fatal and irrepealable ſentence of Death upon him: for in ſuch a caſe, I beleive the ſin committed, to belong to that black order of *Sins unto Death*; by contradiſtinction thereof from that Sin, which is *not* unto Death, or upon which the irrevocable Sentence of Death is not yet pronounced; which no man can certainly know without ſpecial revelation. ¶.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Liberty Elective of Mans Will.

SECT. I.

Article 1, The Parity of Absurdities resulting from those two Antagonistical Hypotheses, of *Absolute Fatality*, and meer *Contingency*; as to the Actions of man.

IN our enumeration of the Venenate *Absurdities*, which naturaly grow upon that inflexible stock of *Absolute Fatality*, or, more expresly, upon that execrable *Hypothesis* of the *Stoicks* (that we may be charitable in forgetting there are any *Christians* of that irreligious perswasion) that all the Actions of every individual man are prædestined, and the whole order and manner of their Futurition præcisely præordained by the invariable decrees of that *Supreme Power*, against which the coacted and limited *Will* of man can make no effectual resistance; we well remember, we specified the total sublation of all *Virtue* and *Vice*; the abnegation of *Justice* either *Divine* or *Human*, in the compensation of *Piety* and *Impiety*; the adnihilation of the use and efficacy of *Lawes* to coerce from Evil, of *Precepts* and *Adhortations* to elect and prosecute good; in a word, the subversion of all *Religion* and *Morality*, and consequently the necessary resignation and rendition of the minde of man to receive all the destructive *Impressions* of *Hell*. And no less, nor fewer *Absurdities* may the reason of every man discover emergent from the *Anthesis* or contrary Assertion, that all the Actions of man, and their particular Events or Successes, are

neither the prædeterminations of Fate, nor the occasional designations of Providence Divine, nor fully the arbitrary elections of mans will, but the meer unpræmeditate, and temerarious *Hits* of *Chance*: since, in pure Justice, those actions onely are *Laudable*, or *Vituperable*, which are done *Deliberato & liberè ratione Agentis*, upon a deliberation of the *Intellect*, and an arbitrary election of the *Will* subsequent to that deliberation; and not those which are meerly *Fortuitous*, and result from the indeliberate or blind activity of *Fortune*.

Article 2. Those 2 contrarie streams found to have bin derived from one and the same poysonous Fountain; viz. a subterfuge of man to evade *Culpability*.

When first I tasted the odious bitterness of these two streams, whereof most of the ancient *Greeks*, many of the noblest *Romans*, and (I fear at least) not a few of the professors of *Christianity* have drank too liberally, even to the infatuation of their *reason*; I must confess, I conceived them to have bin derived from two *different fountains*, or *interests* as irreconcileable as *Light* to *Darkness*: but when I had, by the continued travail of my thoughts, traced them up to their original, I found them to be effused from *one and the same vein*; viz. *the propensity of Human nature depraved, to attempt by all means imaginable the Excusation or Extenuation of the Guilt of its defections from its proper object real good, by charging it wholly, or in part, upon some external influence prevalent over mans Will.* For man, having from the *Light of Nature* learned this as an Axiome; that the *Justice* of *Reprehension* and *Punition* is radically consistent in the intire *Freedome* of the Delinquents Will; or, more plainly, in this, that the Delinquent chose to do ill, when 'twas absolutely in his power to have done well; not in this, that either his Will was enforced by a *Necessity* that admits of no repugnancy, first to the *Volition* and after to the actual *prosecution* of that ill; or that he was onely a meer *illiberal, incogitant, & fortuitous Agent*: 'twas obvious for him to conclude, that if he could incriminate either upon an ineluctable *Necessity*, or simple and meer *Chance*, then he might with equal facility, discharge himself of the *Culpability*, or *Guilt*, and consequently of the *punishment* due thereunto.

Now,

Article 3. The Authors Incitements, here to enquire profoundly into the Natures of *Free-will*, *Fortune*, and *Fate*

Now, though our pen hath drop't, on the præcedent leaves, frequent and cursary Detections of the grosse and ruinous Absurdities of both these *subterfuges*, so that a rational consideration may, from those transient glances or hints, collect Arguments more then enough for the total *Demolition* of them: yet, since those notions of *Fate*, *Fortune* and *Free-will* are subject to *Æquivocation*, some men understanding them as *positive Causes*, others as *Modi agendi Causarum*, certain manners of Causes operating, and others as *Vana Nomina*, meer *Terms*, which in Logical verity respond by way of adæquation to no real Entities; and since the difficulty of the subject encouraged us to promise a full *Reconciliation* of all their apparent *Antipathies*, or *Inconsistencies*, and also a perfect *Accommodation* of them all to the *Special Providence* of God (the onely cause of their continuity and connexion to the present clue of our thoughts) we esteemed it not onely a pardonable, but a laudable design to attempt by a singular discourse the manifestation of their *particular Natures*, or, more plainly, what we are to understand by *Fate*, what by *Fortune*, and what by *Free Will*. Which that we may atchieve with the more familiarity to common Apprehension, both method and perspicuity command us to consider the *last* in the first place.

Article 4. What is intended properly by the *Liberty* of mans Will.

By the *Liberty* or *Freedome* of mans Will (that we may maturely prævent all Logomachy or Sophistical contention impendent from the ambiguous sense of that term) we intend not that Freedome, which being called by the Græcian Ἐλευθερία, defined by *Cicero*, *Potestas vivendi ut velit quilibet*, and by the Civil Law Ἐξουσία ἀυτοπραγίας, the Power of leading the life of a *Freeman*, is the contrary to *Servitude*; since that concernes onely the *Civil* or *Political* state of Man; but that which by a proper elegancy the Græcian defines τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν, or τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς, the Latines *Id quod in nobis seu penes nos*, *nostrove in arbitrio*, *potestatique situm est*, and the Divines commonly name *Liberum Arbitrium* an Absolute power of electing what objects we please, Good or Evil, whereon to fix our Affections; since

ſince that concernes only the *natural* ſtate of man, and is that alone which can juſtify the *Equity* of the reward of Piety or Virtue, and the puniſhment of Impiety or Vice, by God, or Man.

Article 5. The ſeveral ſubordinate Actions of the Mind, exerciſed about its objects: and the reſpective ſcholaſtick *Terms*, by which Philoſophers have adæquately expreſſed them.

For more then one reſpect did the Ancients ſelect and fix on this word *Arbitrium*; For, whether we would intimate that *Action* of the Rational Faculty, whereby man gives judgement in any matter that ſeemed dubious; as we uſe to ſay, that for the Deciſion of any caſe, whoſe obſcure æquity either our own imprudence, or intereſt makes us unfit to determine, we ought to referre our ſelves to the *Arbitration* of ſome judicious and impartial perſon, who is thence moſt accommodately called an *Arbiter*: or the *Rational Faculty* it ſelf exiſtent within us, from which the action of Judication or Arbitration it ſelfe doth proceed, the word ſignifying the *Action* being transferred upon the *Agent*; we can hardly be furniſhed with a more adæquate and ſignificant Appellation. But, to trace the thoughts of the firſt Imponents up to the original, in reſpect the *rational faculty*, being the ſame with the *Mind* or *Intellect*, is converſant and exerciſed about not onely things that belong meerly to *ſpeculation*, but alſo ſuch as are reducible into *Action* or *Praxiſe*; therefore doth the term *Arbitrium* ſeem to be appropriated to the *Faculty*, chiefly in reſpect of things to be *done*, inaſmuch as it is occupied in the expenſion or dijudication of the conſequent good of thoſe actions, and ſits as it were an abſolute Arbiter to determine, whether they ſhall be done, or no.

And hence is it that when the rational faculty having perpended the convenience and inconvenience, or good and evil of its objects, and ended its act of *Deliberation*, adhæres unto, or fixes upon one as more convenient then the others; this ſecond act or *Adheſion* may be in the general (*i. e.* in reſpect of things both ſpeculable and practical) called συγκατάθεσις, an *Aſſent* or *Approbation*; but in particular (*i. e.* in reſpect only to thoſe things that fall under action) προαίρεσις, an *Election* or Choice: ſince it ſuppoſeth the prælation of that particular thing to be put in execution, to all others objected. And in this diſtinct

distinct relation was it that *Aristotle* (*Ethicor.* 3. *cap.* 3. *in fine*) styles the object elected, τὸ προαιρετὸν, *id quod cæteris propositis, & postpositis, amplectendum nobis proponimus*, or, *id quod sub delectum cadit*. This the *Latines* most frequently render *Consilium*, as in those phrases, *capere consilium*, *sequi rationis consilium*, *nescire quid sit alicujus consilium*, &c. and *Propositum*, as in those, *adhærere*, *stare*, *manere in proposito*, *à proposito revocare*, *propositi esse tenacem*, &c. and we translate into *Resolution*, or *Determination*.

Again, so soon as the *Mind*, its act of *Consultation* or *Deliberation* being finished, hath præferred one thing to all others, in the præsent, and determined it for the greater good, or more convenient; then immediately superveneth the *function* of the *Appetite*, whereby the mind is carried on towards the *Amplectence*, or *fruition* of the Good apparent therein: and this third action the Greeks call βούλησις, the Latines *Voluntas* and *Volitio* indifferently, and the English the *Will* or Act of *Volition*. Which we glance at *per transennum*, because vulgarly, by the word *Voluntas*, men understand rather the *Appetite* (rational and proper only to Man) it self, then the *Function* or operation thereof: for which consideration, we shall in all our subsequent discourse conforme to custome, in using the terms *Will* and *Appetite* indiscriminatim, as Synonymas implying one and the same thing.

Moreover, in regard, that upon the Appetition of the Will, which is properly the actual prosecution of the good apparent in the object, there immediately succeeds the action of the *Motive Faculty*, therefore is the action consequent to that appetition justly called *Voluntary*, as having bin deliberated and undertaken *ex consilio*, upon consultation and election, and respondent to that which the Græcian calls πρᾶξις. For that is it, whose beginning *Aristotle* hath decreed to be Election, in his Aphorisme, πρᾶξις οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως, which was the ground of *Ciceros* Paradox, *non esse actionem in rebus inanimis*, that there could be no action in Inanimate things, since they are devoid of the power of *Election*, *Assent*, or *Approbation*: and of *Aristotles* also, when he contended that this kind of πρᾶξις

or action, could not rightly, and in distinct truth, be attributed to *Brute Animals*, nay higher yet, not to *children*, for the same reason, though he willingly conceded to both τὸ ἑκούσιον, *spontaneous motion.* Not but that by τὸ ἑκούσιον, he sometimes signifies *motionem appetitus spontaneam*, the spontaneous motion of the *Appetite Rational*, or the *Will* it self, as (*in* 3. *Ethic. cap.* 4.) where he constitutes this difference betwixt *Volition* and *Election*; that βούλησις, or *Voluntas*, is chiefly the *end*, and προαίρεσις the Election of the *means* conducing to that end, as in this instance, We *will* health, and then *elect* the means which in probability may officiate either to the conservation or restitution thereof. But when he draws his thoughts into a sharper angle, and speaks more præcisely, he allowes not every *appetition*, to be the *Will*, but only that which follows a serious deliberation, approbation and election, and is grounded upon reason, which therefore he most judiciously defines to be μετὰ λόγου ὄρεξις ἀγαθοῦ, *boni cum ratione appetitio*, an Appetition of Good with Reason.

Nor doth he always restrain the word ὄρεξις to that Action which proceeds from the *Will*, or election of the *Rational Appetite*: but many times lets it loose to the expression of those inconsiderate actions, which result from the impulse of the Sensual; as in these words (1. *Rhetor. cap.* 10.) *Omnia quæ homines agunt, aut per se agunt, aut non per se. Quæ per se quidem, aut consuetudine, aut appetitione, & ipsa quidem aut rationali, quæ sit Voluntas, aut irrationali, quæ sit Cupiditas & Ira; non verò per se trifariam, quatenus aut natura, aut vi, aut ex necessitate agunt.* And thus much by way of Introduction concerning the several *Terms*, by which both ancient and modern Philosophers have most properly denoted the several successive or subordinate actions of the Mind exercised about its objects. We now convert our thoughts to explore the *Quiddity* or *Essence* of that we call *Liberum Arbitrium*, and wherein it doth radically and principally consist.

SECT.

Sect. II.

Article 1. The Essence of mans Liberty Elective, consistent primarily in the *Indifferency* of the *Intellect*; and in the *will* only dependently.

FAmiliar it is to the Apprehension of every one, that Man is affirmed to possess a *Free-Will*, for this reason; that amongst many divers objects occurring to, and falling under the deliberation of the *Cognoscent Faculty*, or *Intellect*, he is not obliged to make his election of any one more then the others, nor doth he so elect any one, as that it doth not still remain in his power to refuse that again and elect the contrary. *This Liberty* of election some men have founded only in the *Will*, and others in the *Rational Faculty*; to whose opinion reason adviseth us to adhære. For doubtless the *Will*, considered *per se* is a blind and undiscerning *Faculty*, or *Power*, which can make no progress, nor find the way towards convenient objects without the manuduction of the *Intellect*, which as it were lights the torch unto, and as a knowing guide conducts the Will: so that since it is the proper office of the Intellect to informe and conduct the Will, and the proper office of the Will to follow the direction and guidance of the Intellect; it is not only manifest, that the Will cannot deflect from the right way, towards the amplectence and fruition of Good, unless by the mistaking Intellect it be seduced into the devious paths of Evil; but also, that the *Liberty* of election is consistent in the *Intellect primarily*, and in the *Will* onely at the *second hand*, or by way of *dependence*. To speak yet more expressly, the nature of this Liberty Elective seems radically to consist in that *Indifferency*, in respect whereof the Faculty called free, may or may not be carried on towards any particular object, which the Schoolmen call the Liberty of *Contradiction*; or be so carried on towards one object, as that it may at pleasure renege that Election, and make a new one of the quite contrary, which they call the Liberty of *Contrariety*. Assuredly, since no man can understand

understand how there can be a Liberty, without a Faculty of Election; it is evident that the Election can be only there, where is the *Indifferency*: in regard that either where one single object is proposed, or the faculty restrained and determined to the election and prosecution of any one single object; there can be no free election, since election præsupposeth a variety of objects, and is nothing but the præferring one to all the rest, or, if there be but two, the choyce of one and the refusal of the other.

Article 2. An egregious Error of some Divines, that the *Liberty* of the Will doth consummate ly consist in its immoveable *Fixation* on real Good.

Some there have bin, and those no mean *Clerks*, who have affirmed the Will to be then most free, when it is so determined to, and fixt upon one object, grant it to be the *Summum bonum* or chiefest Good, that it cannot be deflected to its contrary Evil; and the reason they give is this; that since the Dilection, prosecution and fruition of that Good is highly *Voluntary*, it ought therefore to be accounted highly *free*.

Article 3. Their inadvertency of the real Difference betwen a *Spontaneous*, & *Arbitrary* action; the occasion of that Error.

But we have just ground to doubt, that the Authors of this Paradox did not either clearly understand, or at least sufficiently consider the real difference betwixt a *Spontaneous* and an *Arbitrary* action; while they contended that because either may be said to be Voluntary, therfore they are one and the same originally. For indeed a Spontaneous action, though when men discourse at randome and in the general, it may seem to comprehend an Arbitrary one, yet in præcise and distinct reasoning, it sounds no more then a certain blind impulse of nature grounded upon no præcedent ratiocination; when an Arbitrary action properly so called, depends upon a prævious ratiocination, examination, dijudication, and election.

Article 4. That a *Spontaneous* action, and an indeliberate *Impulse* of Nature, are homologous or identical.

That a Spontaneous action is no more then an indiscreet impulse of nature, devoid of all deliberation, is manifest from hence; that not onely Infants and Brutes (to neither of which a Philosopher will allow either use of Reason or Liberty of Will) may do many things spontaneously, but even Inanimates have their Spontaneous motions, as Fire ascends spontaneously, and all

all bodies endowed with gravity deſcend ſpontaneouſly: ſo that in truth, to act by the impulſe of nature, and to act ſpontaneouſly appear to be one and the ſame thing diverſly phraſed. And this makes it the leſs wonder, if ſince every appetite be *ex ſuâ naturâ* by the tendency of its own nature, carried on towards Good, it may be ſaid to be carried on towards Good of its own accord or ſpontaneouſly; and ſo indeed that as a ſtone becauſe by naturall tendency it falls downward, cannot again change that tendency and aſcend upward, ſo likewiſe the Appetite becauſe it is determined only to Good, wants an Indifferency of tending towards Evil: and as a ſtone by reaſon of its want of Indifferency to upward and downward, is ſaid to be moved downward Spontaneouſly, but not Arbitrarily, ſo the Appetite by reaſon of its defect of Indifferency to Good and Evil may be ſaid to tend towards Good in general Spontaneouſly, but not Arbitrarily. And hence comes it, that if you pleaſe to ſuppoſe the Will to be determined to any one particular Good, grant it to be the *Summum Bonum*, ſo that it cannot relinquiſh that, and with æqual appetition proſecute any other Good, real, or only apparent, then indeed you may juſtly enough affirm the Will to tend towards that *Summum Bonum ſpontaneouſly*, ſince 'tis moſt natural to the Will to proſecute that which is the chiefeſt of Goods (for it would not proſecute the ſame above all others, if it were dimoved to the proſecution of leſs Good) but not *Arbitrarily*, ſince it wants an Indifferency of tending to another Good as well as that, or to ſpeak more plainly, ſince it is not in its power at pleaſure to deſert that chiefeſt Good, and addreſs it ſelf to the purſuit of a leſs Good.

Article 5. The Divines objection, that the Tendency of the Will is *Volent*, and therefore *Free*; prævented, by a diſtinction of *Libency* and *Liberty*.

Nor can this truth be ſtaggered by that objection, that this tendency of the Will is *Volent*, ſince that *Volency* (I ask leave to uſe that word untill I can find another more adæquate to my notion) imports not a Liberty but a meer *Libency*, that is a Complacency, or Collubeſcence, and ſo an excluſion of all coaction, violence, renitence, or impoſition: and from hence that the Dilection, Proſecution, and Fruition of ſuch a Good may be properly enough accounted Voluntary; no man can

rightly inferre that tis therefore highly *Arbitrary*, but only that tis highly *Libent* or Complacent; for there may be a *Libency* we confeſs, and yet no *Liberty*, becauſe no *Indifferency*.

Article 6. Their Superſtructure, that the *Perfection* of the Wills Liberty, is its conſtant Adhæſion to, and inſeparability from real Good demoliſhed by two reaſons: (1) that this Perfection imagined is not of the Liberty, but the Will it ſelf; (2) that it belongs only to ſeparated Souls, in the ſtate of *Glorification*.

Again, whereas they have added, that the *Perfection* of the Liberty of the Will doth conſiſt in this, *ſo to adhære to Good as not to be capable of dimotion or diverſion from it*; we may not unjuſtly ſuſpect them of inadvertency in that they did not diſcover this Perfection which they ſo much magnify to be not of the Liberty it ſelfe, bnt of the *Will* or *Appetite*, which being *Imperfect* only in this reſpect, that at pleaſure it may deſert and abandon real and true Good, and convert to the Affectation and proſecution of ſpecious and counterfeit; muſt acquire its *perfection* from hence, that quitting that native Indifferency or Liberty, it ſo firmely and inſeparably adhære to real and true Good, that nothing can divorce it from thence and alienate it to the proſecution of counterfeit. Beſides, we conceive ſuch a perfection of the Will to be above the ſober hopes of mortality, as being reſerved to make no ſmall part of the Souls Beatitude in her ſtate of Glorification, when ſhe ſhall have no other object but the real *Summum Bonum*, and no other Appetite but a fixt dilection thereof. For, had fleſh and blood bin capable of ſo great and divine an Excellency, as the deveſting the Will of that Indifferency to Good and Evil, and the conſtant determination of it only to real Good; doubtleſs St *Paul*, a man of the moſt mortified affections to the ſpecious Goods of this life, and of the moſt fervent deſires towards the ſubſtantial and eternal of the next, had never with ſo many tears lamented his being ſubject to that inevitable and implacable *Pſychomachy* and civil war betwixt his Rational and Senſual Appetites, nor in the height of deſpaire to conquer thoſe rebellious inclinations to evil, cried out, Ταλαίπωρος ἐγὼ ἄνθρωπος, τίς με ῥύσεται ἐκ τοῦ σώματος τοῦ θανάτου τούτου; *Miſerable man that I am! who ſhall deliver me out of this body of death?*

But

But this miſtake hath proved of no ſmall advantage to the inveſtigation of the truth, for from this which they concede, *viz.* it is impoſſible for the Will, which is once fixt upon the dilection and fruition of the *Chiefeſt Good*, really and clearly ſo underſtood (which is the prerogative only of thoſe *Sainted Minds*, which the kindneſs of Death hath made ſuperior to the ſeducements of Senſe) ever to revolt from it, and deflect to the queſt of a leſs Good: we may receive ſome aſſiſtance to our meditations, and the more eaſily underſtand what kind of *Indifferency* that is, wherein the nature of this *Liberty Elective* doth conſiſt, during our ſouls obligations to corporeity. In our præcedent lines we affirmed, that the *Intellect* is guide, and doth hold the torch, or give light to the Will; and manifeſt it is that this *Light* which the Intellect holds forth to the Will, is no other but that *Judgement*, which the Intellect delivers concerning the Good and evil of objects, *i. e.* that this object is good, and that evil; or among ſeveral different goods, that this is more, and that leſs good: ſo that when the Will is ſaid to be averted from one object and converted to another, that mutation proceeds from hence, that the Judgement of the Intellect is now for one thing and anon for another, and the inflexion of the Will is dependent on the inflexion of the Intellect. Since, therefore, the *Flexility* of the Will is ſubſequent and conform to the Flexility of the Intellect, which conſiſts in the mutability of its Judgements: we are upon that conſideration to obſerve, that the Intellect makes uſe of certain *Notions*, or as common Phyſiology calls them, *Simple Apprehenſions* of things, in order to its own information, and ſucceeding pronunciation of Judgement concerning their natures. For neceſſary it is, that the Mind have a *Prænotion* what the Sun is and what *Light* is, that ſo it may judge afterwards that Light is in the Sun, or that the Sun is a Lucid Body; as alſo what Hony and what Sweetneſs is, that it may afterwards pronounce Hony to be Sweet. But in reſpect that in objects which fall under *Speculation*, the Intellect doth acquieſce in ſuch a ſimple Judgement, nor can inferre anything further by neceſſity of conſequence: therefore in objects reducible to *action*, it hath a certain compound Notion

Article 7. What kind of *Indifferency* that is, wherein the Liberty Elective is eſtabliſhed.

called a *Propoſition* or *Enunciation*, which by reaſon of another common Notion congenial and implantate in the mind of every Man from its firſt exiſtence, is immediately annexed to the former ſimple notion, and ſuperadded thereunto as a Concluſion, which is really that which we call *Judicium Practicum*, Practical Judgement. For inſtance, the Intellect having judged that the Sun is a Lucid Body, may therein acquieſce and proceed to no further inference; but ſo ſoon as it judgeth hony to be ſweet, becauſe it holds as implantate a ſecond complex notion, that what is ſweet is to be taſted, therefore it inſtantly pronounceth this concluſion, that Hony is to be taſted. And becauſe practicable objects are not *Vniverſals*, but *Singulars*; and for inſtance, the Intellect doth not give judgement concerning Hony in general, but of this objected Hony that it is ſweet; therefore to this judgement, this Hony is ſweet, inſtantly coheres and is ſuperadded that ſecond judgement, this Hony is to be taſted. Nor that only, but ſuch is the nature of this judgement, that without any delay, if nothing countermand, ſucceeds the *Execution* thereof, as in this caſe the actual Deguſtation of Hony. And upon the conſideration of the immediate ſupervention of the Execution upon a practical judgement, was it that *Ariſtotle* (*de Animalium motu cap.* 7.) would allow no diſtinction between an *Action* and a *Concluſion*, for ſaith he, ἐκ τῶν δύο προτάσεων τὸ συμπέρασμα γίνεται πρᾶξις, *that Concluſion which follows upon two propoſitions, is the very action it ſelf:* which he moſt conveniently illuſtrateth by ſeveral *Examples*, the præſent omiſſion whereof we hope either the memory or lecture of our competent Reader will ſupply. And this juſtifies their knowledge, who firſt denominated ſuch a concluſion which is the Action it ſelf (or to which at leaſt the Execution doth individually cohære) a *Practical Judgement*.

Article 8. That to every *Judgement* of the *Intellect*, is immediately and neceſſarily conjoyned an *Appetition* or *Averſation* of the *will*; reſpective to the Good, or Evil nunciated.

We are moreover to obſerve, that ſince the action or Execution of a Judgement cannot ſucceed, unleſs the function of the *Appetite* or *Will* intervene between the Judgement and Execution; therefore muſt every Judgement or Notion of Good have adjoyned unto it an *Appetition* of that Good, as every Judge-

ment

ment of Evil hath adjoyned unto it an *Averſion* from that Evil: ſo that the Intellect cannot pronounce this judgement, that what is ſweet is to be taſted, but inſtantly riſeth up the *Appetite* and wills the taſting of the Sweet; nor (to deſcend to ſingulars) enunciate this ſweet is to be taſted, but immediately the Will is on edge to taſt this Sweet. And hence it comes, that no concluſion can be extracted, nor Execution thereof ſucceed; but onely becauſe together with the Judgement the function of the Appetite hath præceded. For the reaſon why the Concluſion of a *Practical* Syllogiſme hath always the Execution or action coherent to it, but the Concluſion of a *Speculative* hath not; is no other then this, that the function of the Will or Appetite is always aſſociated to the præmiſes or judgements of the Intellect in one, and not in the other. And therefore ſo often as the Intellect gives Judgement of Good; which is the proper object of the Will; as often is the Will excited ſo neceſſarily, that its function or deſire of fruition follows upon the heeles of the Judgement, as cloſely as a ſhadow attends a body in Sunſhine; ſo that if the Intellect judge any thing to be good, the Will immediately deſires that good; as on the contrary, if the Intellect judge any thing to be evil, the Will immediately abhors that evil.

Article 9. The *Inſtability* of the Will, in its *Appetitions*; neceſſarily cauſed by the *Inſtability* of the Intellect, in its *Judgements*.

This is an excellent Axiome, *that one truth can never be clearely underſtood, but it leads on to the diſcovery of another*; and here we have experience of it: for from the præmiſes it reſults a perſpicuous verity, that becauſe the Intellect is for the moſt part fickle and inconſtant in its *judgements*; therefore muſt the Will be as wavering and unſtable in its *Appetitions*: and when the Intellect to day judges any object to be good, but to morrow judges it to be evil; then doth this Pædantique faculty the Will affect that object to day, and hate it again to morrow: and when the Intellect to day declares that ſuch an object is to be affected and proſecuted becauſe 'tis good, but to morrow faceth about to a ſecond object, and apprehending it to be better then the firſt, judges that to be proſecuted rather of the two; then is the Will to day carried on to the firſt object, and to morrow

averted from it to the Second. In a word, the *Proſecution* and *Averſion* of the Will is dependent on, and conforme to thoſe Notions and Judgements which the Intellect delivers concerning the more or leſs good, or good and evil of objects.

Article 10. The *Deluſion* of the Intellect, in its *Judgements*; neceſſitateth the *Deluſion* of the Will in its dependent *Appetitions*.

Further, in reſpect that amonſt good objects, one is *really and truly good*, another only *apparent and counterfeit*; and likewiſe among evil objects (for too frequently good is diſguiſed under the uncomely vizard of evil, and evil again guilded over with the ſpecious and alluring hatchment of Good, and then what is realy good ſeems either to be abſolute evil, or a leſs good comparatively, and what is really evil ſeems either to be abſolute good, or a leſs evil comparatively) hence comes it we ſay, that as the Intellect is frequently *deluded* in its *judgements*, as being invited by the *Apparence* of Good, it judgeth a guilded evil to be a real good, or offended at the Apparence of evil, judgeth that diſguiſed good to be a real evil; ſo muſt the Will of neceſſity be *deluded* in its dependent *Appetitions*, and proſecuting an apparent good, obtain a real evil, and avoyding a ſeeming evil, be fruſtrated of a real good; or certainly as the Intellect enunciates a leſs good to be a greater, or a leſs evil to be a greater; ſo muſt the Will, proſecuting a greater good, obtain a leſs, and avoyding a leſs evil, fall upon a greater.

Article 11. That the *Indifferency* of the Will, is but the ſhadow, or repreſentative of that Indifferency in the Intellect: and the *Determination* of this, neceſſitates the Determination of that.

On the demonſtration of this grand-father Truth, *viz.* that the Will is but the *Needle*, and the Intellect the *Magnet*, by whoſe verticity it is impregnated with an affectation of lying parallel to the point of good, real or apparent, (for evil as evil, *i. e.* preſented naked and without diſguiſe, is not the proper object of either) or, more conſimilar, that the Will is the *Mariner*, and the Intellect the *Compaſs* by which he ſteeres; depends alſo the diſcovery of another Abſtruſity, *viz.* that the *Indifferency* found in the Will is but the *Counterfeit* or *Repreſentative* of that Indifferency which is congenial to the Intellect, and conſequently, that the *determination* of that Indifferency in the *Miſtreſs* cauſeth the determination of the like Indifferency in the *Handmayd*, to this or that particular object. Now the

Indifferency

Indifferency of the Intellect ſeems eſſentially to conſiſt in this, that it is not ſo adliged to adhærence, to its own judgement concerning the good of any thing objected, as that it may not alter its judgement, and if the apparence of good ſeems greater in another object, apoſtate from the firſt, and as vigorouſly, and confidently convert to the ſecond. For the Intellect is not of the Number of thoſe faculties, which by theſe fundamental conſtitutions of their Eſſence are determined only to *one* certain motion, as Gravity in bodies devoid of animation, the Generative virtue in Animals, &c. but is by nature ſo *Flexile*, that having truth or good for its object, it may one while judge this and another while that, and perhaps the quite contrary of one and the ſame, and now affect an object under the notion of true and good, and within an houre, nay poſſibly in a moment, revoke that judgement, and again diſlike it under the notion of falſe or evil, or at leaſt, of leſs true, or leſs good.

Article 12. The Analogie betwixt the Intellect, and a Balance.

This conſtant Inconſtancy of the Intellect, the moſt happy Wit of *Cicero* deſcanting upon, moſt conveniently compares it to a *Balance* (4 *Academic*:) for, in troth, no *ſimile* in the world, at leaſt, that ever paſſed our obſervation, can be more quadrant, or hold a neerer reſemblance, in all points: ſince, as a Balance, if geometrically adjuſted by dimidiation, is of it ſelf indifferent to be depreſſed at either extreme, and is ſo forced from its æquipondium, or depreſſed at that end, on which the greater weight is ſuſpended; as that the contrary end may be immediately depreſſed, if a greater weight then the former be ſuſpended thereon: exactly ſo is the Intellect of its ſelf indifferent, as to inclinations, and is ſo inflected to that object, whereto the greater apparence of truth or good (which is the weight that ſways it down to determination from Indifferency) is adhærent, that it can upon the appenſion of a greater apparence of good be reflected to a ſecond object.

For

Article 13. That the Intellect doth naturally conform to the attraction of the greater *Verisimility*: and the reason of its *Fluctuation*.

For it is not much below Uncontrollable Necessity, that the Intellect should thither convert, and there fix, where is the greatest *semblance* of *good*: and therefore its native *Indifferency* is not such, as that abandoning an object, whose good is more perspicuous, it can affect another, whose good is less perspicuous; or, rejecting a judgement which appeares more true, court and embrace another which appeares less true: because, as the beam of a balance, being depressed on one extreme by a greater weight imposed, is never elevated by the imposition of a less weight on the contrary extreme, but of a greater; so likewise can it not be, that that assent of the Intellect, which is caused by the perspicuity of Experience, or some prævalent reason, should be removed to another object, unless by the attraction of an Experience of greater moment, or a reason whose validity and importance is more perspicuous. And, for the eviction of this natural conformity of the Intellect to the attraction of the more ponderous Verisimility of its objects, we need no other argument but this; that many times we find our minds æquilibrated betwixt two judgements, or wavering in suspence between two objects equally attractive; which *Fluctuation* or Doubting ariseth of necessity from hence, that the moments of verity, or weights of reason are equal on either side, and so exactly counterpoise each other, that the mind can acquiesce in the election of neither; as a paire of scales charged with two equal weights cannot be swayd from an æquilibrium.

Article 14. That the *Determination* of the Intellect to one or two objects, is caused either by the more ponderous Apparence of Verity therein, or the minds greater *Attention* to the moments of reason apparent on that side, then to those on the other.

Again, that it seems during this Fluctuation, one while to incline to the one part, and instantly to be counter-inclined to the other, and then again to revert to the former, and so to be agitated by the inquietude of suspence; hath no other reason but this, that one while it is more *attentive* to the perpension of reason in the first object, and anon more Attentive to that in the second; and so long doth it remain inclined to the invitement of the one, as it apprehends the good thereof more apparent then of the other, and no longer; after the same manner as if when a paire of scales are æquilibrated by two æqual weights,

you

you ſhall ſuperadd to either end of the balance but a few grains more, that end muſt be depreſſed, and upon the ſhifting of thoſe grains to the other end the former again elevated. So that when the Intellect doth at laſt deflect to one part, this *Determination* muſt proceed from hence; that either the Apparence of verity is ſomewhat more ponderous on that part, or at leaſt that the more conſtant *Attention* to the Veriſimility of that part, conjoyned to the minds *impatience*, (which too frequently helps to turn the Scales, and therefore ought to be allowed for) ſupplying the defect of weight, makes it ſeem ſo.

Article 15. That the *Apparence* of *Truth* is always the cauſe of the Intellects inclination.

Moſt certain it is, we confeſs, that the Intellect frequently doth, retracting that judgement which of its ſelf, *i. e.* in the ſimplicity of its nature, is either more good, or abſolutely good, adhære to a ſecond judgement, which of its ſelf is either leſs good, or abſolutely evil: but yet notwithſtanding that in the object, which affects and inclines the Intellect, is always *ipſa veri ſpecies*, the Apparence of Truth, which it obſerves and is attentive to. And becauſe that ſpecies of Truth may be either real or counterfeit; therefore may that which is in its own nature really true, be preſented under the diſguiſe of an abſolute falſhood or leſs Truth, and that which is in its own nature really falſe, be preſented likewiſe under the diſguiſe of an abſolute truth, or leſs falſhood: and ſo the Intellect becoming ſubject to deception in the point of judicature, may be allected to the proſecution of an abſolute falſhood, or leſs truth, while the object remains obvelated under the deluſive vizard of an abſolute truth or a leſs falſhood, *& è contra*.

Article 16. Three conſiderable *Inferences* from the præmiſes.

This ſeriouſly conſidered ſupports three excellent *Conſequences*; (1) that as often as the Intellect, having adhæred to a true judgement, quits and purſues a falſe one, ſo often of neceſſity doth ſomething intervene which detracts the genuine or natural Apparence from the good object, and impoſes a counterfeit Apparence upon the evil one, and by that means cauſes a mutation of the Intellects aſſent, or judgement: and therefore (2) that the commutation of the ſpecies or Apparence of the object is the ſole

immediate cauſe of the Commutation of the Intellects judgement and aſſent: and therefore (3) that ſince the Will is obliged, by that neceſſity formerly declared, to conforme to the conduct and directions of its Guide, the Intellect; it is in vain therefore to hope or attempt that the Will ſhould change its Appetition, unleſs care be firſt taken, that the Intellect change its judgement, or, that the Will ſhould be conſtant to its Appetition, unleſs we provide that the Intellect be conſtant to its judgement. And, therefore, that Mind, which having diſcovered the incomparable beauties of virtue is become enamoured on her, and ſtands reſolved to court no other Miſtreſs but her, ought to be exceeding circumſpect and cautious in this particular, that it ſubmit to the allurement of no object, untill it hath profoundly examined whether that ſpecies of Good therein preſented, be really true, or only ſuperficial and counterfeit, that ſo it may render its ſelf ſuperiour to the deluſion of painted *Vice*.

Article 17. *Carteſius* his general Præſervative againſt the exceſſes of *Paſſions*.

The admirable *Des Cartes* (*in 3. part. paſſion. artic.* 22.) præſenting a general præſervative againſt all the exceſſes and exorbitancies of our paſſions, gives us this excellent advice, that having learned firſt to diſtinguiſh betwixt thoſe motions or Affections which are terminated in the *Soul*, and thoſe which are terminated only in the *Body*, we ſhould, when we feel our blood and ſpirits agitated by any affection which concernes only the body, reflect upon this as a general Maxime; that all things which offer themſelves to the imagination, do tend to no other purpoſe but to the deception of the Soul, and to perſwade the rational and judicative Faculty, that thoſe reaſons inſervient to the *Commendation* of the object of that paſſion, are far more ſolid, firme and worthy our aſſent then really they are, and, on the contrary, that thoſe reaſons inſervient to the *Improbation* or diſallowance of the object, are far more trivial, infirme and leſs worthy our aſſent, then really they are. That when the paſſion perſwades to thoſe things, whoſe execution may admit ſuſpenſion or delay; we abſtain from paſſing our verdict too haſtily upon them, and divert our cogitations to the ſerious examen of the inconveniences impendent on their purſuit and execution: or, at leaſt,

leaſt, to ſome other object, till time and ſleep ſhall have calmed the impetuous commotions of the blood and ſpirits, which the ſeeming good of the object hath excited. And that when the Paſſion incites to thoſe actions, whoſe fleet occaſion gives the ſoul little or no time to conſult and deliberate; we always endevour to convert our Underſtanding to the perpenſion, and our Will to the proſecution of thoſe reaſons, which are conttary to thoſe inferred and urged by that paſſion; notwithſtanding they ſhall, at the firſt view, appear leſs valid and ponderous: for thereby we ſhall mainly refract and abate the violence of the paſſion.

Article 18. General Rules præſcribed by the Author, how to prævent the *Deluſion* of the *Underſtanding*, and dependent *ſeduction* of the *Will* by *Evil* diſguiſed under the ſimilitude of Good.

Now, this may be our *Exemplar* in ordering our advice, how to prevent the Deluſion of our Underſtanding, and the ſeduction of our Will by Evil diſguiſed under the ſimilitude of Good. Firſt, we ought to learn the diſcrimination of the goods of the *Mind*, from thoſe pertinent only to the *Body*: and then, when we meet with any object apparently good, abſtractly to examine, whether that good concerns either the body alone, or the mind alone, or both body and mind equally, or more the body then the mind, or more the mind then the body. *If only the body*, we are to convert our cogitations upon the reaſons which diſſwade, more intently then upon the reaſons which perſwade the election of and adhærence to it, that ſo we may, if there be any, detect the Evil couched under that verniſh of good, and alſo conquer the Minds *impatience*, which too often beares a large ſhare in our deceptions. *If only the Mind*, in that caſe we are to bring it to the touchſtone of the *Divine Will*: *i. e.* examine whether thoſe reaſons whereby it perſwades our Intellect to an Approbation, and conſequently our Will to an affectation and proſecution of it, are correſpondent to that inſeparable or proper ſign, or mark of true Good, *Conformity to the Will of God*, or not; for the very Soul, or quinteſſence of virtue doth radically conſiſt in this; that man without all hæſitancy, murmur, diffidence, and reluctancy, conforme his Will to the indeceptible Divine Will, as being aſcertained, that he can will nothing more excellent in its ſelf, nor convenient to him, then what God hath willed before.

If both body, and mind equally, then to abstract those reasons which insinuate the interest of Sense, and insist only upon those which præfer it to the mind: for, if they shall be found worthy of assent, we need the Authority of no other to justify our election of that object. *If more the body then the mind*, then we ought to æstimate the convenience of it by that lesser relation it holds to the mind, and not by that greater it holds to the body. And finally, *if more the mind then the body*, since the interest of the mind is infinitely to be præferred to that of the body, where the reasons are equall on each part: tis manifest, we may safely acquiesce in that judgement, and embrace the object. But, in case the object seem *dubious*, and such whose Verity or Falsity is not easily discoverable, then the only way of avoyding Errour in our judgements, is *cohibere assensum*, to suspend our approbation of, and assent to the Apparences, or species on each part offered. And by this power of withholding our assent does *Des Cartes* endevour to establish the Liberty of the Will. (*Princip. Philosoph. part.* 1. *Sect.* 6.) This in generall, we conceive to be the Art of rectifying the Will by the prævious information of the Intellect; and that thrice happy Soul that hath learned it, hath anticipated one degree of that Perfection, which is one moity of that State of immortal Beatitude, which we are confident that knowing Soul of *Des Cartes* once aimed at, and now enjoyes, without that nothing of measure.

But alas! while we dwell in the Courts of Vanity, walk amongst the snares of Satan, and carry in our very nature whole legions of frailties, the least of which too strongly inclines us to the delusions of Vice, if presented in the colours of Virtue; tis a Province above the power of meer Humanity to acquire such anhabitual *Constancy* of our Intellect to its judgement, and of our Will to its Appetition of real Good, as that neither can be divorced from it, and alienated to the embracements of specious or splendid Evils, and therefore we must indefatigably endevour to conquer part of this inhærent Indifferency upon our knees, humbly and fervently imploring the assistance and continual manuduction of *divine Grace*, that supernatural Light; whereby

whereby the Intellect may be illuminated to a clarity, that ſhall transfix and diſpel all the thickeſt clouds of Error and falſhood, wherein the opticks of Senſe are uſually terminated; and modeſtly ſuſpend our hopes of a totall and indiſſoluble union with Verity, untill our Souls ſhall have abandoned this body of ſin to corruption, and entered the new Hieruſalem, where there is no Indifferency, but an eternal determination of the Mind and all its Faculties to the Supreme Good, where nothing ſhall occur to either Intellect, or Will, but that Supreme Good, and (in a word) where that *Libency* of the Will, which ſome Divines calls the *Perfection* of its Liberty, ſhall become a pure and ineluctable *Neceſſity*.

Sect. III.

Article 1. An objection, that *Ignorance* is the mother of ſin.

HAving made it ſufficiently manifeſt, that the *Liberty* of mans *Will* doth radically conſiſt in the *Indifferency* of the *Intellect* to its judicature; and amply explained the nature of that Indifferency: it remains only that we expede that proverbial *objection*, whereby the beſt of us are too prone to palliate our delinquency and excuſe our offences; *viz. Omnis peccans eſt ignorans*, Ignorance is the mother of all Sin. This *Ariſtotle* doubtleſs alluded to when he ſayd, *Quî fieri poſſit, ut qui de rebus rectè æſtimat, incontinens ſit?* and *Socrates* alſo when he ſaid, *Fieri non poſſe, ut in quo ſit Scientia, in eo aliud quid dominetur, atque adeo ut qui de rebus rectè æſtimat, non id quod eſt optimum agat; cum ſi id agat, neceſſe ſit* (διʼ ἀγνοιαν) *ob ignorantiam id fieri.*

Article 2. The ſame expeded, by a Diſtinction of *Science* into *Habitual*, and *Actual*.

Out of this Labyrinth we may ſoon extricate our thoughts by making uſe of that Clue of a Diſtinction between Science in *Habit*, and Science in *Act*; For, a man may have a knowledge, and yet neglect to make uſe of it, as when he diverts his mind more

more intently to ſome thing, then to that which he doth know; or hath the clarity of his Underſtanding benighted with ſleep, madneſs, wine, &c. and a man may have a knowledge and reduce it to practiſe, as when he converts his mind unto, and fixes it upon that only which he doth know. Now if a man *Actually* know, or hath not the acies of his mind levelled at any other thing but what he doth know; in this caſe, we confeſs it impoſſible, that he ſhould do an action contrary to his knowledge: and conſequently, that holding a clear and perfect knowledge of the decorum or pulchritude of Virtue, and contrariwiſe of the turpitude or deformity of Vice, he ſhould forſake the former to court the later. But if he know only *Habitually*, or hath his cogitations more attent to another thing, then that of which he hath a clear and indubitate knowledge; ſince his *neglect* to uſe it is æquivalent to the total *want* of that knowledge; we have no reaſon to deny, that he may do what is point-blanck repugnant to his knowledge; and conſequently, though he poſſeſs a clear theory of the lovelineſs of Virtue, and contrariwiſe of the uglineſs of Vice, that he may notwithſtanding abandon the former and embrace the later.

Article 3. A *reply*, that the reluctancy of every Delinquents Conſcience, doth evidence the poſſibility of mans doing an Act repugnant to his *Actual* Science.

To this ſome have inconſiderately replyed; that a man may do a thing repugnant to his *Actual* knowledge; why? becauſe for the moſt part every Delinquent ſo ſoon as he hath acted amiſs, and moſt commonly at the ſame inſtant, feels himſelf ſurpriſed with a certain horror, ſecret regret, reluctancy and conturbation of mind, called by Divines *remorſe of Conſcience*: which muſt of neceſſity proceed from his cognition of the amiableneſs of Virtue which he hath repudiated, and of the odiouſneſs of Vice which he hath embraced; ſince if he wanted this, he muſt alſo have wanted that.

Here

Here *Ariſtotle* hath prævented our *Rejoynder* by retorting; that every ſuch Delinquent acts the ſame part with vinolent *Rhapſodiſts*, who, by the habitual exerciſe of their memory, uſe ex tempore to rehearſe a whole ſheet of *Empedocles* moral verſes, of which they underſtand little, and practiſe leſs; or *Schoolboys*, who diſtinctly read what their underſtanding doth not comprehend; or *Stage-players*, who can gracefully perſonate the moſt magnanimous Heroes; but themſelves ſtill continue moſt abject and ſuperlative Cowards. For in him who commits a vicious Act, there always is excited ſome *Paſſion*, either of Pleaſure, or Anger, or Ambition, or Avarice, which raiſeth a tempeſt in his mind, and ſo perturbeth, perverteth, and drowneth that habitual Science; inſomuch, that what ever of good is in virtue, and what ever of evil is in vice, becomes thereby obnubilated, and darkened; and on the contrary, whatever of difficulty ſeems to be in virtue, and what ever of pleaſantneſs in vice, becomes thereby more conſpicuous and illuſtrated: *i. e. Paſſion* is a Perſpective, which repreſenteth as well the difficulty of virtue, as the complacence of vice, in magnified dimenſions; and on the contrary diminiſheth the good of the one, and the evil of the other. And hence comes it, that the real good of virtue attracteth the mind more weakly, and the ſeeming Good of vice more ſtrongly; and on the contrary, the real evil of vice averteth or diſguſteth the mind more weakly, and the ſeeming evil of good more ſtrongly. So he that offends, may, we confeſs, with *Ovid*, ſay, *Video meliora, probóque, deteriora ſequor*, that he knows thoſe things which he rejecteth to be the better, and thoſe things which he electeth to be the worſe; but yet, this muſt be referred unto ſome other time, when he recognizes his habitual Science, and calls to mind, that once he had other judgements of thoſe things: for he cannot juſtly ſay ſo of that time wherein he offended, ſince then he judged thoſe things he purſued to be the better, and thoſe he deſerted to be the worſe.

Article 4. The *Rejoynder*, that the Habitual Science of every Delinquent, is perturbed and obnubilated by ſome *Paſſion*, excited in him: and that the Remors of Conſcience proceeds from the ſenſe of the *Loſs of Good*.

Now as for that internal *regret*, *contriſtation*, and pœnitence, which invades the mind of every Delinquent immediately after, and

and moſt frequently in the ſame moment of the perpetration of his offence; this proceeds from his animadverſion that he ſuffers ſome *loſs of good*. But ſince this his apprehenſion of the loſs of good, and that reluctancy of mind attendant thereupon is but dull and weak, in compariſon of that complacency he is affected withall by the ſeeming good or pleaſure of evil, which ſubdues his judgement to an approbation of it: hence it is manifeſt, that he conſiders and perpends the impendent omiſſion of Good, and the incurſion of evil, not *ſeriouſly* and *profoundly* as he ought, but only *perfunctorily* and *ſlightly*. For, were the puniſhment, ſorrow, ignominy, and other evils, which he only lightly and confuſedly apprehends, and fears, profoundly examined and lookt into by him, not as abſent, not as future, not as uncertain, and avoidable, but as impendent, preſent, certain, and inevitable; without all doubt the ſmalleſt glimpſe of reaſon would be ſufficient to let him ſee thoſe forcible determents, nor could he be ſo mad as from the rock of knowledge to precipitate himſelf into the moſt horrid gulph of vice. And therefore albeit an offender may ſay that he ſaw and approved the Good, but embraced the Evil, yet is that *Inconſideration* or *Non-advertency*, by reaſon whereof he doth not ſufficiently diſcover all the qualities and circumſtances of the evil object, and what and how great miſchiefs muſt neceſſarily enſue upon his actual proſecution thereof, a kind of Ignorance. And in this ſenſe only can we allow *Ignorance to be the mother of Sin*; for had man ſufficiently underſtood the evil thereof, he had never bin vicious.

Article 5. What kind of *Ignorance* that is, which may, in ſome degree *excuſe* a Delinquent.

To conclude therefore, this Ignorance muſt prove but an invalid and ridiculous plea at the judicious Tribunal of Juſtice, nor ought a Delinquent to flatter himſelf with the vain hopes of impunity by ſuch an excuſe; that he ſinned for want of knowledge, that he proſecuted the apparent Good he ſaw in the object, that it was above his power to prevent the deluſion of his underſtanding by Evil præſented under the ſpecies of Good (τῆς γὰρ φαντασίας ὐ κύριοι, we cannot countermand *Apparences*) that no man is vicious with his own conſent, nor happy againſt his will, according to that Proverb, *Nemo malus ultrò eſt, neque beatus non volens*,

volens, and that he wanted an ability of Judgement to do otherwiſe: this we ſay cannot extenuate his guilt, and conſequently not avert the puniſhment due thereunto. For, that Ignorance which excuſeth, is of another nature; ſuch as we may more properly call *Inſcientia mera*, meer *Neſcience*, *Ignorantia pura ac invincibilis*, pure and invincible Ignorance; ſuch as that of *Cephalus*, when miſtaking her to have bin a wild beaſt couchant in a brake he diſcharged his dart at his beloved wife *Procris*, and unfortunately ſlew her; and that of the conſtant *Deianira* when ſhe poyſoned *Hercules* with a ſhirt dipt in *Neſſus* the Centaures gore, which ſhe intended for a Philtre to revoke his affections from *Iole*; and that alſo of the fatal handed Gentleman, who ſhooting at a Deer in New-Foreſt, killed *William Rufus*: but that Ignorance, of which we here diſcourſe, is in proper truth Ἀμάθεια, *Incuria*, *vel Negligentia mera*, meer *Negligence*, *Inadvertency*, or *Heedleſneſs*, and is therefore for diſtinctions ſake denominated *Ignorantia craſſa*, *affectata*, *ſupina*, groſs, affected, ſupine ignorance.

To underſtand the nature of this *Non-excuſing Ignorance* the more diſtinctly, let us obſerve, that every Delinquent muſt in juſtice charge the Ignorance he prætends, upon one of theſe two Cauſes; either *that himſelf was to himſelf the cauſe of his ignorance*: or *that he neglected the means and advantages of acquiring knowledge*, *i. e.* that he did not imploy his *Cognoſcent Faculty* on the examination and conſideration of the real good or evil of his action, with that care, ſeriouſneſs, and ſedulity, which was requiſite.

To the *Firſt* of theſe Cauſes belongs the ignorance of a *Drunkard*; for in being the Cauſe of his *Ebriety*, he is alſo the Cauſe of his *Ignorance*; and 'twas in his power to have prævented *this*, by the præcaution of *that*: and therefore his Ignorance is ſo far ſhort of extenuating, that it naturally aggravates his culpability; and he, if *Ariſtotle* may be judge, deſerves a double puniſhment, one for making himſelf drunk, another for the crime committed in his Drunkenneſs. Hither alſo we are to refer his Ignorance, who reſiſteth not the force of a *Paſſion* or perturbation of his mind in the firſt motion or beginning thereof,

while 'tis yet but weak, and to be ſuppreſt by a ſmall oppoſition of reaſon; but permits it to acquire more violence, and gain upon him by degrees, till its impulſe grow impetuous, and more inoppugnable: as alſo his, who ſuffers a vicious *Inclination*, which he might without any conſiderable difficulty have at firſt refracted and totally extinguiſhed, to grow into a ſetled *Habit*, which pleading præſcription and poſſeſſion, is hardly ejected, but plays the abſolute Tyrant ore the mind, and holds the Scepter of both Underſtanding and Will by the ineluctable title of Conqueſt. Thus if a man, who having a rare Bird in his hand, willingly lets it fly, ſhould complain that he cannot recover it again; tis not to be expected that any rational perſon ſhould pity him for his loſs, but rather deride his folly, in that he manumitted it when twas in his power to have kept it: and if a man contract ſome dangerous diſeaſe by intemperance, who can afford him half ſo much compaſſion, ſince twas in his power not to have bin intemperate, as if he had bin invaded by ſome impartial Epidemick Contagion, againſt which none the greateſt temperance is an infallible præſervative? To this purpoſe were theſe words of *Ariſtotle* intended; *Nemo enim caecitatem, quam natura, morbus, ictus fecerit, exprobret, ſed caeci potius miſereatur; at ſi illam aut ebrioſitas, aut intemperantia alia fecerit, non id opprobrio ducat?* (*in* 3. *Ethic. cap.* 7.)

Article 6. Four weighty *Reaſons*, convincing, that man hath an *Abſolute Power* in himſelf to controll the temptations of Evil.

To the other belongs his ignorance, who being hurried on to the proſecution of Evil, by the impetuous rapt or ſwindge of *Paſſion*, can yet ſay *Video meliora probóque*: for in this caſe alſo was it in his power to have more ſeriouſly and ſeduloufly examined, ſifted, and præconſidered the evils impendent on that action, and ſo to have avoided it; We ſay, *abſolutely in his power*, for four weighty reſpects. (1) Becauſe we frequently obſerve, that if in the ſame moment, when we are prepared to commit a ſin, and already entered upon the execution, there chance to come in ſome grave and virtuous Perſon, whom we revere, or ſome Magiſtrate, whoſe revenging ſword we fear, intervene: we inſtantly become conſcious of our wicked intentions, and deſiſt from the perpetration of it. (2) Becauſe there

there are many Virtuous Perſons, who having learned and practiſed that nobleſt militia of conquering themſelves, can command themſelves even in the higheſt orgaſmus and fervour of their paſſions; holding it moſt baſe and unworthy the dignity of a generous mind, to be ſurprized with the ſubtleſt Ambuſhes of Vice, and led captive by the Pygmie armies of ſenſual Temptations. (3) Becauſe tis not in vain that God, compaſſionating the frailties and deceptibility of humane nature, hath vouchſafed to accommodate our underſtanding with thoſe faithful and powerful auxiliaries, *Laws*, *Precepts*, *Exhortations* and pious *Precedents*, to which we may, in the hotteſt charges of vicious temptations, with ſafety and aſſured Conqueſt recurre; and upon which if with ſufficient attention we reflect the eye of our mind, we ſhall become τῆς φανλασίας κύριοι, *ejus domini, quod res eſſe apparet*, Lords Comptrollers of *Apparences*, *i. e.* detect the frauds and impoſtures of Evil, though dreſt in all the glorious ornaments of *Good*. (4) Becauſe no man endevoring to excuſe his offence, can truly ſay *Video meliora proboque*; but he doth manifeſtly grant the action he doth to be *Deliberate*, and *Præcogitate*; which is as much as this, twas abſolutely in my power to have omitted the doing of it, and to have done the contrary good. For none can ſay ſo of an indeliberate action, as when he feels a commotion of his blood and ſpirits at the firſt touch of Anger; which is the reaſon of *Seneca* his affirmation (2 *de Ira* 3) *quod primus motus non ſit voluntarius*, that the firſt motion which an object excites in the mind is involuntary, and the ground of that Maxime *Primi motus non ſunt in noſtra poteſtate.*

Article 7. What thoſe *Firſt Motions* are, which objects inevitably excite in the Mind: and that the *Conſequences* of thoſe motions are præventible.

What theſe *Firſt Motions*, which objects, their ſpecies being by the mediation of the nerves and ſpirits tranſmitted to the mind, excite therein, are in the general; though *Epictetus* hath furniſhed us with a convenient brief deſcription of them, in theſe words, *Primus motus eſt quem creant viſa animi* (φαντασίας *appellant Philoſophi*) *quibus mens hominis prima ſtatim ſpecie accidentis ad animum rei, pellitur, non voluntatis ſunt, neque arbitrariæ, ſed vi quadam ſuâ ſeſe inferunt*

hominibus noſcitandæ: yet the moſt appoſite and moſt familiar way of explaining their nature and extent, which our meditations could find out, is to *exemplify* them in ſome one particular beginning *Paſsion*, and chiefly in that of *Anger*, where theſe Impulſes or motions are moſt ſenſible, becauſe moſt forcible. Which that we may the more worthily performe, let us, with *Des Cartes*, concede two diſtinct ſpecies of Anger, (1) one cauſed in a moment, which invading with ſome violence, cannot be concealed; but diſcovers it ſelf for the moſt part by colouring the face with a Vermilion, or Aurora tincture on a ſuddain; but performes little, and is eaſily and ſoon calmed. (2) Another, which invading with leſs violence, is not to be diſcovered, unleſs rarely by inducing paleneſs upon the Countenance, by any ſignes in the beginning; but being of a leſs diffuſive condition, doth more corrode and gall the heart, and conſequently produce more dangerous effects. To the firſt of theſe, they are moſt obnoxious, who have the moſt of Love, Nobleneſs or ſweetneſs of diſpoſition habited in them. For it ariſeth not from any profound *hatred*, but from a ſuddain *Averſation*, repentinely ſurpriſing the Mind: and becauſe loving, good, and Heroick minds are always propenſe to imagine, that all things ought to proceed in that manner or courſe which they judge to be the beſt, therefore ſo ſoon as they diſcover any thing to be carried on in a contrary courſe to Good, they inſtantly make a ſtand in their thoughts, become offended at it, and grow angry; yea many times when the matter concerns not them in ſpecial; for ſince they love much, they take to heart, (as the vulgar phraſe it) reſent, and appropriate the Cauſe of them they love, as neerly as if it were their own, inſomuch as what would have bin no more then matter of *Indignation* to others, proves matter of *Anger* to them. And becauſe that Inclination, whereby they become poſſeſt with a conſtant propenſity to love, doth effect, that they have always much of heat, becauſe much of blood in and about their Heart; therefore that repentine Averſion, which ſuddainly ſurpriſeth them, cannot but propell ſome ſmall quantity of Choler (the Tinder whereon the ſparks of this Paſſion fix and foment) to the Heart; nor that little of Choler

Choler but be accended, and excite, in an inſtant, a great commotion, and effervescence of the blood thither propelled. But this Commotion laſteth but a ſmall ſpace of time, becauſe the impulſe or force of the unexpected Averſation is of no continuance; and ſo ſoon as they deprehend the matter for which they were angry, to be of no moment, and ſuch as ought not to have commoved them to that height; they becalme themſelves, conjure down their ſpirits, and become affected with a reluctancy againſt and a pœnitence for that Paſſion, and ſo deſtroy it in the Embryo or ſhell. With the *other*, weak, abject, and ingenerous minds are moſt tranſported. For though it ſeldome diſcover it ſelf in the beginning, unleſs by ſome paleneſs in the face; yet is its force by degrees increaſed by reaſon of that agitation which the fervent deſire of Revenge exciteth in the blood, which being permixed with that Choler propelled to the heart from the inferior part of the Liver and Spleen, kindles therein a ſharp, pungent, and corroding Heat. And as thoſe minds are moſt generous, and noble, which are moſt inclined to *Gratitude*; ſo are thoſe the moſt proud, abject and baſe, which ſuffer themſelves the moſt to be tranſported with this kind of ignoble *Anger*. For by ſo much the greater do Injuries appear to be, by how much the greater value Pride makes a man put upon himſelf, and by how much the greater æſtimation is ſet upon thoſe Goods which are taken away by that Injury: and by ſo much a higher rate are thoſe goods prized at, by how much the more weak, abject, and ignoble the mind of him is that æſtimates them, becauſe in truth they are dependent upon others pleaſure; nor doth a well ordered mind loſe any part of its happineſs by being deprived of them. Now, having duly præconſidered all things occurrent in this pregnant example, we may not only without difficulty underſtand what thoſe *firſt motions* or *incitements* are, which objects exciting in the mind thereby obtrude themſelves upon the Intellect, or rather compell the Intellect to apprehend them under that ſpecies in which they præſent themſelves; but alſo that, though thoſe motions are not in our power, yet the *Conſequents* or *Actions* to which they provoke us, are ſubject to our *Deliberation*, Examination, and Arbitrary *Election*, or

Rejection; since every Action, is the Concluſion of a Practical Syllogiſme, and every Concluſion præſuppoſeth two præcedent Propoſitions, and theſe again præſuppoſe Deliberation, and conſequently that who ever committing an Evil Action, doth yet ſay *Videóque meliora proboque*, doth in that confeſs his Action to be *Deliberate* and *Arbitrary*, which is as much as to confeſs that twas abſolutely in his own power not to have done it.

And as for that proverbiall ſubterfuge οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν πονηρὸς, οὐδ' ἄκων μακάριος, *Nemo malus ultro eſt, neque beatus non volens*; *Ariſtotle* hath long ſince ſubverted it by anſwering, That though it be *true* in the *later* part, inſomuch as *no man can be happy, becauſe not virtuous, againſt his will*, yet tis *falſe* in the *former*, inſomuch *as vice, whereby man becomes Evil, is voluntary* (οὐδὲ μοχθηρία ἑκούσιον) whereupon *M. Anton.* ſaid τὸν δὲ τοῖς τῆς ἰδίας ψυχῆς κινήμασι μὴ παρακολουθοῦντας, ἀναγκη κακοδαιμονεῖν: *qui verò ſui ipſius animi motus certa ratione conſilióque non gubernat, neceſſariò miſer eſt.* (*lib.* 2. *num.* 5.) And therefore though many have thought to palliate their vitioſities, by affirming that no man doth commit a ſin *voluntarily*, but being compelled thereunto by the impulſe of ſome *perturbation*: yet tis manifeſt, ſince every Delinquent gives either occaſion or way to that perturbation, and ſuffers himſelf to be tranſported by the impulſe thereof, beyond the ſphære of reaſon, that no *coaction* can intevene.

Article 8. *Neceſsity*, and *Fear* conceded to be, in ſome meaſure, Excuſes; and what are the *objects* of Excuſing Fear.

To conclude, we are ready to confeſs, that among thoſe many excuſes, which the Sophiſtry of the Advocates of vice hath alledged for the extenuation of its Culpability, the moſt weighty and conſiderable is the violence of *Neceſsity* and *Fear*. But, all *violence* muſt proceed from an *external* Principle, and is not admitted without ſome *Renitency* in the thing that ſuffers it; and that *Neceſsity*, whereby any man is coacted, muſt proceed from an *external* and *preſent* Cauſe; and *fear* is an internal Paſſion, though excited by an external Cauſe, *viz.* a future Evill; and differeth from *Cupidity* in this, that this, though it be excited by an external cauſe alſo, *viz.* a future Good, yet it

it is joyned always with a *Libency* or *Willingneſs*, but Fear with a *Renitency* or *Unwillingneſs*. Upon which conſideration was it, that *Ariſtotle* concluded him exceeding ſtupid and ridiculous, who, having vitiated his friends wife, ſhould for excuſe pretend, that he was conſtrained to that perfidious and immodeſt action by the violent temptation of *pleaſure*; but holds him excuſable who is compelled to omit an office of friendſhip by the prævention of ſome more conſiderable incommodity impendent upon himſelf, ſince the Neceſſity of the one is more violent and urgent, then the obligation of the other. For the more eaſy deciſion of all diſputes concerning the more or leſs preſſure of theſe kinds of Neceſſity, *Cicero* puts this Caſe. *Si conſtitueris te cupiam advocatum in rem præſentem eſſe venturum; atque interim graviter ægrotare filius cœperit, non ſit contra officium non facere quod dixeris; magiſque ille cui promiſſum ſit, ab officio diſcedat ſi ſe deſtitutum queratur.*

This præmiſed, we may ſafely conclude, that a *ſmall* and *light fear* is not to be accounted ſufficient to excuſe a malefaction; becauſe it cannot uſurp upon and countermand the Liberty of the Mind; nay not a *great and ſtrong fear* (which is therefore allowed by ſome great Clerks for an excuſe, becauſe it may ſometimes invade and ſtagger a mind in other things conſtant and generous) ſince it cannot ſo oppoſe the Liberty Elective, as not to leave the mind poſſeſt with ſome *Libency*. And this is to be underſtood, not in reſpect to that Evil, which is ſuſtained or undergone in the præſent, but to that far greater one, which is avoided, and in compariſon of which the leſs Evil hath indeed the reaſon of Good; becauſe it is as it were the *means* whereby the greater Evil is averted or prevented, as when Merchants throw their treaſure overboard, for fear of drowning, and a Traveller delivers his purſe to Robbers for fear of having his throate cut. Now, how far this kind of fear, which ſeems to neceſſitate the commiſſion of a ſmall Evil for the probable prævention of a greater, may be extended by way of Excuſation; as alſo of what ſorts thoſe evils muſt be which juſtify this fear; the exacteſt and profoundeſt of *Moraliſts* have found it no eaſy matter præciſely to determine; chiefly becauſe according to the

variety

variety of mens Temperaments, ages, ſexes, Educations, Habits &c. what is but a weak and light fear to one, may be great and potent to another; but all conſent that we are to underſtand it to be a fear of no leſs then Death, Mutilation, torment, ſervitude, long exile, tædious impriſonment, æternal diſhonour or ignominy, privation of all, or the greateſt part of ones eſtate, or livelyhood (and in this particular, not in reſpect of a mans ſelf only, but alſo for thoſe who depend upon him for temporal ſubſiſtence, as wife, children, parents &c.) as alſo that kind of fear which is a ſpecies of *Reverence*, and ſuch as may be in a ſubject, in reſpect of his Prince, in a child in reſpect of his Father, in a wife in reſpect of her husband &c. We ſaid that fear which *ſeems* to neceſſitate the commiſſion of a ſmall evil &c. thereby inſinuating, that it only *ſeems* ſo to do. For, *Truth* its ſelf hath taught us, that we ought not to do evil, though never ſo ſmall, for prevention of another evil, though ne'r ſo great; and every man knows that *Fear* (unleſs of doing Evil) is wholly excluded the ſociety of *virtue*. Which our late *Salomon* (whom we can hardly think upon, without a devout *Adoration* of his *deified* part) reflected upon, when he affirmed for a Maxime of general truth, *That a Coward can hardly be an honeſt man*. And this we deſire our Reader candidly to accept, as a ſufficient enquiry into the nature of mans *Free-Will*.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Of Fortune.

THat this *Phantſme*, though of no great antiquity (comparatively) hath under the diſguiſe of a *Reality*, ſo long and ſo univerſally poſſeſſed the heads not only of the *Vulgar* (whoſe rank and muddy brains are ever more fertile in the production, and more favourable to the conſervation of *Monſters*, then *Nilus* and all *Affrica*) but even of ſome of thoſe more cultivated *Explorators* of truth, who well knew the abſurdity of *Multiplying Entities*, and pretended to examine every *Idea* occurring to the mind, whether it had an exemplar, or prototype in real Exiſtence; that ſo, though they could not attain to a full cognition of the diſtinct *Eſſences*, or ſimple *Forms* of Objects, they might at leſt acquire an aſſurance of their *Reality*, or *Being in rerum natura*: this, we ſay, ſeems to us no contemptible Argument, that the Venome of the Forbidden Fruit hath a ſtronger and more infatuating operation upon the poſterity of *Adam*, in the old age of the world, then it had in its youth and midle age; and that the *ſun* in the *Microcoſme* hath ſufferd a greater and more demonſtrable decay of Splendor, Clarity, and Influence, then *Bodin* (*method. Hiſtor. cap.* 8.) out of *Copernicus*, *Reinaldus*, and *Stadius*, hath affirmed that in the *Macrocoſme* to have ſuſtained, and confeſſed by its neerer approach to the Earth, and more Southerly inclination, ſince the daies of *Ptolomie*. For (firſt) though *Simplicius* (2. *phyſic. comment.* 39.) hath a certain obſcure tradition, that *Orpheus* ingaged in the expedition of the Argonauts, compoſed a votive Hymne to this Fairy Queen, which was afterward inſerted into the idolatrous Liturgie of the

Article 1. The Antiquity and Genealogy of Fortune.

Delphian *Apollo*, together with whom ſhe was ſolemnly invocated: yet hath, *Macrobius*, much the better Antiquary of the two, faithfully obſerved (5. *Saturn. ib.*) that ſhe was, if not unborn, yet unnamed in *Homers* time; ſubjoyning as a reaſon thereof, *quod priſcis illis temporibus omnia, quæ fierent, referri ad Deos Authores ſolerent*; that more ſimple and intelligent Antiquity uſed to referre all events to the wiſe procuration of the Gods. Which is evidence ſufficient, that *Fortune* could not mount up to an *Apotheoſis*, till the world grew into its *Dotage*, and man ſunk a whole ſphear below that of his Anceſtors ſimplicity and knowledge. And (2) that, whenever ſhe was borne, and whoever was her Father, yet *Ignorance was her Mother*; beſides the convincing Authority of our own *Reaſon*, we have that of the impartial *Cicero*, in theſe words: *Stultitia, Error, Cæcitas & Ignoratio rerum atque cauſarum, Fortunæ nomen primò induxiſſe, certum eſt.* And ſo much the more of weight may this Argument bear, by how much the more manifeſt a Contradiction they incurr, who have either defended, or advanced her reputation; for though no one among thoſe many Writers, who have profeſſedly treated of her Nature and Power, hath denyed her extraction from, and neceſſary dependence upon that accurſed Beldam, *Ignorance*: yet have moſt agreed, that ſhe is ſomthing more then *Nomen inane*, a meer and empty *Name*, or *Chimæra*; and ſome allowed her the dignity of a conſiderable *Influence* upon the actions of Man; nay, others have gon ſo farr as to exalt her virtue to a competition with *Providence Divine*, and conſigned her a throne among the *Cœleſtial Deities*, as is intimated in that verſe of *Juvenal* (*Satyr.* 14.)

——————*ſed te*

Nos facimus Fortuna Deam, cœloque locamus. And this briefly concerning the *Antiquity* and *Genealogie* of this *Nothing*.

As

As for the full deſcription of her *Nature*, or more properly, what Kind of *Activity* the chiefeſt *Philoſophers* have allowed her, and to what order of *Cauſes* referred her; this we cannot ſo ſatisfactorily preſent by any other way, as by a ſhort Commemoration, and æquitable Collation of their ſeveral *Definitions* of her.

Article 2. *Plato* and *Ariſt.* their Deſcriptions of Fortune, examined, and illuſtrated: and 3 Concluſions inferred thereupon.

Plutarch (1. *placit.* 29.) makes *Plato* to have defined her thus; *Fortuna eſt cauſa ex accidenti, & conſequens inopinato in iis, quæ conſilio fiunt*, Fortune is a Cauſe by Accident, and unexpectedly ſupervenient in thoſe actions, which are deliberately and upon conſultation performed: and *Ariſtotle* thus; *Fortuna eſt cauſſa per accidens in iis, quæ rei alicujus gratiâ, appetitu movente, fiunt, eáque incerta & inſtabilis*; Fortune is an Accidental (yea and an uncertain and inſtable) cauſe, intereſting it ſelf in thoſe actions, which are done by an Agent, upon the incitement of its Appetite, in order to its conſequution of an object. Which words, indeed, ſeem to comprehend, in Epitomy, all that the *Philoſopher* (*in* 2. *phyſic. cap.* 5.) intended in his more prolix deſcription of Fortune; abating only this, that he there confines her concernment only τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις, *rebus Contingentibus*, to Effects purely *Contingent*, i.e. ſuch as may, or may not come to paſs, and are therefore of dubious or uncertain event. To explain this, they *exemplify* in him, who digging in the earth, with no other deſigne, but to plant a tree, found a great Treaſure, of which he never thought: for (ſay they) the Invention of the Treaſure is an effect by Accident, i.e. evenient above the hopes and beſides the intention of him that digged; and ſo the Digger inſomuch as he is *Cauſa per ſe* of the digging, is alſo *Cauſa per accidens* of the invention of the Treaſure. Such an *Accidental Cauſe*, therefore, doe our Philoſophers call *Fortune*: and the *Event* it ſelf, viz. the invention of the treaſure, they call *Rem fortuitam*, a *Fortuitous Effect*. But whereas *Ariſt.* hath frequently advertiſed, that *Fortune* (ἡ τύχη) and *Chance* (τὸ αὐτόματον) are different each from other in this, that *Fortune* is proper only to things done by Cauſes, whoſe activity is *Arbitrary*; and *Chance* common both to ſuch, and alſo *Inanimate* or meer

Spontaneous Cauſes (as when a ſtool falls, and breaks a Glaſs.) & conſequently that all Fortune is Chance, but not every Chance Fortune: hence may we obſerve, that he would have aſwell Fortune, as Chance to belong to the claſſis of *Contingents*, and that all Contingents belong to the claſſis of *Poſſibles*. More expreſsly, that ſince among *Poſſibles* ſome are ſuch, as that their Event cannot be interdicted, impeded, or countermanded, as this, *the ſun cannot be hindred from riſing again to morrow morn*; and others ſuch, whoſe event is not neceſſary, as this, *tis not neceſſary, though poſſible, that it ſhould raine to morrow at ſun riſing*; therfore is it manifeſt, that a *Poſſible* of the *firſt* ſort, is the ſame with that which is called *Neceſſarium*, abſolutely Neceſſary, or ſuch whoſe Contrary is purely Impoſſible; and of the *ſecond* ſort, the ſame with that which is called *Contingens*, meerly Contingent, or of an uncertain event, ſuch whoſe Contrary is æqually poſſible. Further, in reſpect that the meer *Contingency*, or *Ambiguity* of any Event muſt be founded on this, that either ſome *Liberty* interveneth, by reaſon whereof that which otherwiſe would come to paſs, doth not; or that which otherwiſe would not have come to paſs, doth; or ſome *other Cauſe* interpoſeth, which beſides its proper deſtination and the unpræmeditated concurſe of certain other things, effecteth that ſome event, which, otherwiſe would, doth not come to paſs, or that ſome event, which otherwiſe would not, doth come to paſs: hence is it manifeſt, that this *Poſterior* kind of Contingency, is in the general that, wch men call *Chance*; and if it be eſpecially in *Man*, beſides or beyond whoſe intention any Effect eveneth, then is it what they call *Fortune*: unleſs that ſomtimes they confound both theſe, and then 'tis indifferent whether the event be referred either to Fortune, or Chance.

However, we perceive (reflecting upon the former Example) ſince the Double Effect, viz. the digging of the earth, and the invention of the treaſure, had but one ſingle Cauſe, viz. the man that digged: that, for this reaſon, the Digger may juſtly enough be ſayd to be *Cauſa per ſe*, in reſpect of the one, and *per accidens* in reſpect of the other. To which we may add this, that ſince in Effects meerly Natural, one and the ſame thing may be both

Fortune

Fortune and *Nature*, or a Natural Cauſe: therefore *Gaſſendus* had very good reaſon to juſtifie *Epicurus* in this particular, that he made Fortune and Nature no more then *ſynonoma's*, ſignifying one and the ſame thing in Reality.

Article 3. Their Anatomy of her *Nature*, deficient: & a more perfect one præſented.

Now though common Enquirie may goe away ſatisfied with this pauſible *Adumbration* of Fortune; yet cannot a profound and more ocular Scrutiny be terminated therein: for the *Example* introduced to explain it, comes largely ſhort of a requiſite *Adequation*; inſomuch as no rational man can appoſitely enough accept either *him* that digged, or his *Action* of digging, for all that's comprehended under that obſcure notion of Fortune. Wherefore, omitting the conſideration of *Res Fortuita*, or the Event, which is moſt frequently apprehended for Fortune it ſelf, or the cauſe of that inſperate event; let us underſtand Fortune to be, *ſuch a concurſe of various Cauſes, made without all mutual conſultation, or præcogitate conſpiracy betwixt them, as that from thence doth follow an Event, or fortuitous Effect, which neither all the Cauſes concurrent, nor ſome of them, nor eſpecialy he to whom the Event happens, ever in the leaſt meaſure intended, or could expect.* Now, according to the tenor of this Definition, in regard to the fortuitous Invention of a treaſure, is required not only the Perſon, who digg's and finds it; but alſo he, who firſt digg'd and hid it: it is no obſcure nor controvertible truth, that Fortune, or the Cauſe by Accident of the invention of the treaſure, is the Concurſe both of the Occultation and Effoſſion thereof, in that particular place. We ſayd, *without mutual Conſultation, and beſides the intention of any or all the Cauſes concurrent*; thereby intimating, that though one or more of the Cauſes may have haply intended that event: yet nevertheleſs tis properly and abſolutely Fortune, in relation to that Cauſe, which intended it not. Thus if any man, who foreknowes, or at leaſt conjectures, that ſuch a Perſon will come and digg in ſuch a place, doth there hide treaſure, to the end that the other may find it: in this caſe, in reſpect to him that hid it, the Invention of the treaſure is not a Fortuitous Effect; but in reſpect to him, who unexpectedly finds it, it is. Thus was it not altogether *Fortuitous*

tuitous in reſpect of *Nitocris*, what hapned at the Violation of his Tomb; in regard he præſumed that, in proceſs of time, there would be ſome King or other, who invited by this promiſing Inſcription [*If any of my Succeſſors, the Kings of Babylon, ſhall want mony, let him break open this Sepulchre, and thence take what may ſupply his wants; but on no condition, unleſs his wants be real, let him attempt it: for it ſhall redound to his no ſmale detriment.*] would open it: but yet, in reſpect to *Darius*, that in ſtead of mony he therein found this deriding Engravement [*Had'ſt not thou bin inſatiable with riches, and covetous of ſordid lucre; thou wouldſt not have thus prophaned the Aſhes of thy Prædeceſſors, and ranſack't the ſacred Dormitory of the Dead,*] this was meerly *Fortuitous*. And thus alſo, though *Democritus* hath pleaded hard to free Fortune from having any hand in the incomparable Death of good old *Æſchylus*; why becauſe his bald pate, being miſtaken by a volant Eagle for a white ſtone in the field, was the cauſe why the Eagle drop't a Tortois perpendicular thereupon: yet, had we bin of the Jury, we ſhould have found her guilty of the Murder; (1) in reſpect of the *Poet*, ſince that ſad event was beſides his intention, he at the ſame time having withdrawn himſelf from the Town, for fear of being deſtroyed (according to the tenor of the Aſtrologers prædiction) by the fall of an houſe, nor could he poſſibly foreſee that prodigious miſchance impendent: (2) in reſpect of the Eagle, who drop't not the Tortois with purpoſe to brain the Poet, but to break its ſhell, that ſo he might come at his prey, the fleſh thereof. However, we are willing, becauſe, in truth, we ought to acknowledge, that if we regard the height or punctilio of her *Propriety*, *Fortune* is chiefly, *when among all thoſe ſeveral Cauſes, which concurr, no one either principally, or collaterally intends or aimes at that Event, which unexpectedly ſucceeds upon that their concurſe*: of which we have a moſt illuſtrious and competent *Example* in the Dilatation of the death of *Socrates*, a day beyond the time præfixt by his Judges, for the Execution of their Sentence upon him; as *Plutarch* (*de Fato*) hath præciſely obſerved.

We

We have it from the pen of that oraculous Secretary of Nature, Dr *Harvey*, that he never diſſected any Animal, but he always diſcoverd ſomthing or other more then he expected, nay then ever he thought on before; ſo uſeful & infinite in variety is the *Magna Charta* of *Nature*: and perhaps ſome of our Readers may here have occaſion to ſay as much of this our Diſſection of *Fortune*; for while we have exerciſed our thoughts in the exploration of her Nature, we have unexpectedly found that, if conſidered *per ſe & revera*, ſhe hath no nature at all, i.e. that *in Reality ſhe is nothing*. For, when we have abſtracted all thoſe Cauſes in the Concurſe, which act *per ſe*, or by natural virtue; there remains no more but a meer *Privation* or *Negation* of all Prænotion in the concurrent Cauſes of that particular Concurſe, and alſo of the intention and expectation of the ſubſequent Event: nor can that unpræmeditate Concurſe of Cauſes be rightly accounted the Cauſe of the Fortuitous Event, by any nearer relation then that which Philoſophers have termed *Conditio ſine qua non*. Since, as the *Admotion* of any combuſtible body to Fire, may be ſayd to be the Cauſe of its combuſtion, in this reſpect only, that it was *Conditio ſine qua non*, or, if that Admotion had not præceded, the combuſtion had not ſucceded: ſo alſo cannot that Concurſe of Cauſes, from which any Fortuitous Event doth reſult unexpectedly, be ſayd to be the Cauſe thereof, in any other reſpect but this, that it was *Conditio ſine qua non*, i. e. if that Concurſe of Cauſes had not præceded, that Event had not ſucceded, though not one of thoſe Cauſes in the ſingle energy of its nature, nor all in confederacy ever any way intended it; the Analogy betwixt theſe two caſes ſtanding faire and full in all points.

Article 4. Fortune, nothing but a meer *Negation* of all Prænotion in a Concurſe of natural Cauſes, reſpective to a fortuitous Event.

Again, foraſmuch as this indeliberate Syndrome or Combination of Cauſes, is alwayes *uncertain* and various, the Cauſes being neither elected, nor connected, nor managed by any Providence of their own: we cannot in juſtice but applaud the wary judgment of *Epicurus* in this, that he called Fortune, ἀσύστατον αἰτίαν προσώποις, χρόνοις, τρόποις· *a Cauſe inſtable in Perſons, Times, and Manners*; which is æquivalent to this, that ſince ſhe is

Article 5. *Epicurus* commended, for illuſtrating the *inſtability* and *uncertainty* of Fortune.

is a Cauſe of uncertain and indeterminate influence, none but Fools can hope that this Chamæleon ſhould conſtantly appear in the ſame colours, or wear the ſame Countenance.

Article 6. Her *Indivinity* manifeſted: & how ſhe came by her *Deification.*

Nor is he leſs to be commended for his, Φῂς τύχῃ ὅτι Θεὸν, *Cave ne habeas Fortunam Deam (apud Diogen. Laert. Epiſt. 3. Epicuro conſcripta.)* endeavours to degrade Fortune from her imaginary *Divinity*, and deride the egregious folly of her ſolemne Worſhip; for ſo great is the imbecillity of vulgar minds, that what they doe not well comprehend, they not only immoderately admire, but ſuperſtitiouſly revere, as ſomthing wholly Divine, and as farr above Nature, as it ſeems above their Capacity: and undoubtedly mans *Ignorance* of the prævious Conſpiracy of Accidentaly concurrent Cauſes, from which any Event extraordinary and ſuperintentional doth emerge; firſt prævailed upon him to inveſt Fortune in ſuch a ſpecious diſguiſe, under which he might, with leſs diſhonour to his owne Intellectuals, advance her to the reputation of a *Deity*, and adore her. Tis more then probable, that men did not, at her firſt Canonization, either much care for, or enquire into the condition and extent of her Power; and evident, that when ſhe began to be cryed up for producing ſtrange Effects in the tranſactions of the world, and by a kind of imperveſtigable ſuperintendency to diſpoſe the activity of Natural Cauſes to the induction of Events above or beſide their proper and Cuſtomary Deſtinations: then began the Vulgar to think themſelves concerned in the conciliation of her favour, and early atonement of her diſpleaſure; and ſo by thoſe, to whom ſhe ſeemed friendly and proſperous, was ſhe accounted a *Good* and *Propitious Numen*, and to thoſe, to whom ſhe appeared Inclement and Adverſe, an *Evil* and *Malevolent* one. And hence (the Error, like Rivers, ſtill enlarging) were ſtately and magnificent *Temples* erected for her popular and ſolemne Adoration, and ſeveral *Inſcriptions* reſpective to that particular *Attribute*, which her fond Votaries conceived moſt eminent in her, or moſt advantagious to themſelves, ingraven in capital letters on their Porches; ſuch as Ἀγαθῇ τύχῃ (one of which I have ſeen at the houſe of that ingenious Benefactor to Antiquaries, Mr *Vernon*, in *Eſſex*

in *Eſſex*, with no ſmall coſt and difficulty digged up in a field neer Smyrna, and together with many other very antique Monuments brought by him into England) *Malæ Fortunæ, Averruncæ, Blandæ, Calvæ, Vitreæ, Equeſtri, Fallaci, Aureæ, &c.* a large catalogue of which Appellations we may read in *Pliny* (*lib. 2 cap. 7.*) *Plutarch* (*lib. de Fortuna Romanorum.*) and *Natalis Comes* (*lib. 4. Mythолog. cap. 9.*) This *Pliny*, with ſome indignation at the ridiculous delirium of the world in the Deification of this *Non-entity*, takes ample notice of in theſe words: *Toto mundo, & locis omnibus, omnibuſque horis, omnium vocibus Fortuna ſola invocatur, una nominatur, una accuſatur, una cogitatur, ſola laudatur, ſola arguitur, & cum convitiis colitur; volubilis, à pleriſque verò & cæca etiam exiſtimata; vaga, inconſtans, incerta, varia, indignorum fantrix: huic omnia expenſa, huic omnia feruntur accepta; & in tota ratione mortalium, ſola utramque paginam facit; adeoque obnoxia ſumus ſortis, ut Sors ipſa pro Deo ſit, qua Deus probatur incertus.*

Article 7. All ſober Philoſophers vindicated from the guilt of aſcribing *Divinity* to Fortune.

We are not ignorant (nor, in duety to the præſervation of their memories from ingratefull Detraction, ought we to conceal) how difficult it is for any man to impeach any one *Philoſopher*, among thoſe many, whoſe Names or Writings have hitherto eſcaped the jawes of Oblivion, of this abſurd Deluſion of aſcribing *Divinity* to Fortune. For though *Plato* (*de legibus. lib. 4.*) hath this ſaying; *Deum omnia, ac ſecundum Deum Fortunam & Tempus omnia gubernare*; & *Ariſtotle* (*2 Phyſ. 4.* affirmes that ſome there were, who held, *Fortunam eſſe cauſam quidem, ſed humanæ menti obſcuram*; & *Stobæus* (*Eccleſ. Phyſic.*) tells us of others, *Qui partem aliquam Fortunæ, ex eo eſſe Divinam cenſerent, quo quidam temere agentes optatum finem conſequerentur, cæteros verò prudentia utentes optata deſtituerent*; who opinioned, that Fortune was in ſome part *Divine*, for this reaſon, that ſome men, who enterprized their deſignes raſhly and inconſiderately, did notwithſtanding accompliſh them ſucceſsfully, and happily attain their ends, while others who grounded theirs upon the moſt apparent probability, and managed the means conducing to their procuration, with

great prudence and circumſpection, were however fooled in their attempts, croſt in their hopes, and fruſtrated of their purpoſes, by the ſuddain intervention of ſome occult impediment, which as no Forecaſt could diſcover, ſo no Caution prævent: yet cannot all this be juſtly interpreted any other then their wary and tacite Confeſſion of their Ignorance of the cryptick ways, and imperceptible Ends of *Providence Divine*; nor did theſe great Book-men ſpeak other then the Dialect of the Illiterate, and conforme their Expreſſions to the cuſtomary notion of the Multitude, when they referred to Fortune thoſe *Contingents*, which to the jndgement of Reaſon ſeemed to want a Natural Series of Cauſes proper for their induction, being as it were obtruded upon man by a power *Supernatural, i. e.* ſo far above the præcaution of his *Prudence*, as the inveſtigation of his *Sapience*. And though ſome few perhaps, whoſe Curioſity was weak, but Superſtition ſtrong, may be found to have contributed toward the propagation of this Error; yet cannot that in reaſon be extended to the attainder of the major and more judicious number of Philoſophers: who upon the ſtricteſt examination of their Reliques, muſt be found guilty of no more then the continuation of that laudable cuſtome of their Prædeceſſors, in tranſmitting the moſt abſtruſe and difficult myſteries of Science, in the more comprehenſible Allay of *Symbolical* and *Emblematical* traditions; and in this particular, what the Multitude could not well underſtand under the Metaphyſical notion of *Providence Divine*, diſpoſing the confederations of Natural Cauſes to the production of Events either above or beſides their native and proper virtues, or, at leaſt, above the inveſtigation of Reaſon; this they accommodated to weaker Capacities, in the eaſie *Repræſentation* of *Fortune*.

Article 8. The Neceſſity and uſe of *Allegorical*, *Symbolical*, and *Emblematical* Traditions, invented by the Ancients.

We ſayd *the more comprehenſible diſguiſe of Symbolical & Emblematical Traditions*; becauſe, though it be commonly conceived, that primævous Antiquity uſed to invent Parables and Emblems rather to invellope the *Arcana* of Philoſophy and ſo conceal them from the prophaning eyes of Ignorance, then to render them more intelligible: yet Parabolical and Poetical Fictions conduce

duce *tam ad lumen & illuſtrationem, quàm ad involucrum & velum*, as well to the illuſtration of darker, as the involution of more evident peices of Truth; as the Oedipus of this laſt Century, the *Lo. S^t. Alban* (*in præfat. ad lib. de Sapient. Veterum*) hath acutely obſerved.

Nor ought we to be ſo vainly credulous as to admit, that the Ancients, being better acquainted with Simplicity and Benevolence, then Fraud and Envy, would expoſe their names to infamy, and the juſt execration of ſucceeding Ages, by drawing a curtain of *Allegories*, *Symboliſms*, and *Similitudes*, betwixt the eyes of Poſterity, and the naked glories of Verity; thereby to detain them in the moſt horrid darkneſs of Ignorance: eſpecially while tis manifeſt, that ſuch was the rudeneſs of the Illiterate in thoſe blinder times, when *Contemplation* was accounted inglorious Idleneſs, and *Action* the only end of life, that moſt were either incapable of, or impatient of the ſtudy requiſite to learn any thing, which was not reduced down to a familiarity with *Senſe*; and conſequently, that the profeſſors of Science had no other way left to inſinuate the Maximes, and ſecret Concluſions in phyſiology, into the narrow minds of their Scholars, but by the mediation of their Senſes affected with *Corporeal Repreſentations*. Which is alſo the reaſon, why *Hieroglyphicks* were much more ancient then *Letters*; and *Parables* then *Arguments*.

Article 9. Their Deſcriptions of Fortune, only *Emblematical*.

Now, that the Philoſophers Deſcription of Fortune was only *Emblematical*; needs no other remonſtrance, but this of *Pacuvius* (*apud Auth. lib. 2. ad Herennium*)

Fortunam inſanam eſſe, & cæcam, & brutam perhibent Philoſophi; Saxoque illam inſtare globoſo prædicant volubilem; Ideo, quò ſaxum impulerit Fors, cadere eò Fortunam autumant. Cæcam, ob eam rem eſſe iterant, quod nihil cernat, quò ſeſe applicet: Inſanam autem aiunt, quia atrox; incerta, inſtabiliſq; ſit: Brutam, quia dignum atque indignum negat internoſcere.

Philoſophers paint *Fortune*, mad and blind,
Fix't on a Globe revolv'd by every wind

Of *Casualty*: importing her to fall,
Where *Chance* converts her whirling pedestall.
Her eyes vaild over with the skarf of Night;
'Cause she doth ne're distinguish *wrong* from *right*.
Frantique, because Unconstant, Giddy, Cruel
To him, at night, who was, at morn, her Jewel.
Irrational, 'cause she doth ne're elect,
By *merit*, whom to grace, whom disrespect.

Article 10. As also the Images of Fortune framed by *Painters*, and *Statuaries*.

Nor had those ingenious *Painters* and *Statuaries*, whose happy Fancies invented an Alphabet of *Things*, and composed a silent language of *Figures*, intelligible by the eye, to express the several attributes of *Fortune*; any other design, then by a pleasant affectation of the *Sense* (the only *Criterion* of illiterate Heads) to offer a gentle violence to the mind, and by a most familiar way of information, conduct the captived thoughts through the labyrinth of the mystery, to an easy and durable perception of the *Deuteroscope*, or *Mythological* intention. Thus the *Scythians*, as *Piccolominеus* (*in* 8. *gradu Philosoph. Moral.*) relateth, had an Image of Fortune without feet; sensibly intimating, that the Goods of Fortune must be beholding to the leggs of *Virtue*, to support them in the constant benignity of their nature; *i.e.* they fall to the ground, and perish in a depraved use, unless they be managed by *Prudence*. Thus the *Smyrnaans*, as *Pausanias* (*lib.* 4. *Messenicorum. pag.* 178.) hath recorded, had a statue of Fortune, like *Atlas*, supporting the Pole with one hand, and holding in the other the Amalthæan Horn, or *Copia Cornu*: intuitively importing the Universality of her Empire, and that Riches are rather showred down on the heads of Mortals, by the free bounty of *Providence Divine*, then collected by the hands of *Human Industry*; which had I beheld, I should instantly have reflected upon that observation of *Salomon* (*Eccles.* 9. *vers.* 11.) *That the race is not to the swift, nor the battell to the strong, neither yet bread to the wise, nor yet riches to men of Understanding, nor yet favour to men of skill; but Time, and Chance happeneth alike to all.* Thus others, pourtraying her

her bestriding a *Serpent*; would have the Spectator intuitively understand from the theory of that Expres; that Fortune holds the bridle to Human *Prudence*, and can at pleasure countermand the profoundest Policy. And others, by representing her riding on a running Horse, lash't on by Fate, which treads upon his heeles; tacitely instruct the beholder, that Fortune must at last be overtaken, and vanquisht by *Destiny*. To conclude, a copious list of many the like Emblematical and Symbolical Idols of Fortune, together with their several Significations and Mythologies; the ranging pen of *Bernhardus Cæsius* (*de Mineral. lib. 2. cap. 5. Sect. 12.*) hath collected, and exhibited together in one sheet: and therefore we should defraud the Curiosity of our Reader, not to remit him thither for more ample Satisfaction.

Article 11. The review, tolerating the name of Fortune, in respect to man: but detesting it, in respect to God.

Now, from a review of this disquisition into the nature of Fortune, tis obvious to the meanest capacity that if we respect only the *Prænotion* and *Expectation* of *human Reason*; then none the most præcise in Christianity can justly quarrel at the customary use of the Notion: but if we respect the influence and disposition of *Providence Divine* extended to all occurences in the world; then none but the most barbarous, or Atheistical Ignorance dare defend it. Which distinction the learned *Spondanus* (*in Comment. in Homeri Iliados libr. 7. pag. 123.*) hath more fully and elegantly delivered thus; *Minime audiendi sunt, qui sortium dispensationem fortuitam esse dicunt. Quod Ego tamen admitto, si Homines tantum spectaveris: sed illa etiam ex Providentia Dei omninò pendent. Eo sensu etiam accipiendum est nomen Fortunæ; quæ enim consilio humano non fiunt, causam quoad nos non habent: sed illa omnino Deus regit & moderatur.*

CHAP. IX.

Of Fate.

Sect. I.

Article 1. The convenient reduction of all opinions, concerning the eſſence of Fate, to 2. *General Heads.*

THIS not unknown to the meaneſt in the Commonweale of Learning, that no leſs then an Age can ſuffice to the obſervant lecture of that Vatican of Books compoſed by Philoſophers of all times, concerning this perplexing *Theorem*; there being more Diſcourſes (abating thoſe, which the kindneſs of Time hath ſubſtracted) now extant therenpon, then any other ſubject, that ever exerciſed the cogitations and pens of Scholars: as muſt be acknowledged by any, who hath ſurveyd the ſingular Iatrophilological Treatiſe of that judicious Pariſian, *Gabriel Naudæus*, *de Fato & Vitæ Termino*. But yet, ſuch hath bin the ſingular fortune of Fate, that it hath obtained an exemption from that general Experiment, *Tot ſententiæ, quot Authores*: there being found, upon a juſt audit of them all, fewer Opinions then Books concerning it; nay, what is one degree of wonder higher, a diligent ſcrutiny may ſoon explore, that they all fall under the comprehenſion of only *Two* Catholique Heads; ſome underſtanding *Fate* to be *Aliquid Divinum*; a certain power *Divine*, and the reſt, *Aliquid merè Naturale*, a certain Conſtitution merely *Natural*.

In the Claſſis of thoſe, who have conceived Fate to be a *Divine Power*, the higheſt ſeat belongs to the *Platoniſt* and *Stoick*; according to whoſe doctrine, methodized and ſummaried

maried by *Plutarch* (*lib. de Fato*) we may conſider it in a *twofold Notion*.

Article 2. What the *Platoniſt* and *Stoick* meant by Fate, conſidered (ὡς οὐσία) as a *ſubſtance*.

Firſt, ὡς οὐσία, *ut Subſtantia*, as a *Subſtance*. In which ſenſe it is accepted for *God Himſelf*, or that ſempiternal Reaſon, or eſtabliſh't method, according to whoſe tenor He hath præordained and diſpoſed All things in the World, and ſo connected Cauſes to Cauſes, that all Events whatever, Arbitrary and Fortuitous, individually depend upon, and indeclinably reſult from that ſubalternate Series, or Complication of Efficients. For thus *Plato* (*in Timæo*) one while affirmes that Fate is *ipſa Anima Mundi*, the very Soul of the Univerſe; and another while, *Naturæ Univerſi æterna ratio ac lex*, the eternal reaſon and law of Nature: and thus alſo both *Zeno* and *Chryſippus* are cited by *Plutarch* (*in* 1. *placit.* 28.) as defining Fate to be, *Vis ſpiritualis, ac Ratio ordinis univerſa gubernans*, a Spiritual Power, and conſtitution governing All things according to an order eternally præcogitate and prædecreed. And all the reſt of the Stoical Family, as well generally quoted by *Diogenes Laertius*, as *Panætius* and *Poſſidonius* (at leaſt, if He be the true Father of that Book, *de Mundo*, vulgarly conſcribed to *Ariſtotle*, out of which the text is extracted) quoted by *Stobæus* (*Ecl. Phyſic.*) have unanimouſly held, that *Fate* was the ſame with *God*, *Jupiter*, and the *Univerſal Mens*. To whom we may juſtly aſſociate *Seneca* alſo, who, (*in* 4. *de Benefic. &* 2. *Natural. Quæſt.* 45.) ſayth, in downright terms; *ſi Fatum, Jovem dixeris, non mentieris*: if you pleaſe to aſſert that Jupiter and Fate are one and the ſame thing, you ſhall ſpeak the truth. Hence comes it, that though *Poets* ſometimes refer all events to the procuration of *Jupiter*; and ſometimes again to *Fate*: yet may not the niceſt Critick impeach them of Inconſtancy or Contradiction; ſince thoſe Terms differ only in the ſound, not in the notion; as ſignifying one and the ſame *Eternal Principle*, diſpoſing the virtues and conſpirations of all ſecond Cauſes to the opportune effecting of Events, deſigned by it ſelf, and ſo made indeclinable. Thus *Homer*, introducing *Agamemnon* as pleading his excuſe for being inſtrumental

instrumental to a misfortune, makes him incriminate upon *Fate* and *Jupiter* at once, in these words:

——— Ἐγὼ δ' οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι,
Ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς, καὶ Μοῖρα, ———

Non Ego Causa,
Verum Jupiter & Fatum.

Article 3. And, what (ὡς Ἐνέργεια) as an *Energy* or *Act*: together with the etymological reasons of those sundry *Appellations*, the *Stoicks* have imposed upon it.

Secondly, ὡς Ἐνέργεια, *ut Actus*, as an *Act*; according to which Acceptation, we may understand Fate, partly to be *ipsum Dei decretum*, the very Decree or absolute Command of God, whereby He hath determined all Events to Necessity of Futurition; from whence the Latin word, *Fatum*, importing a Decree *pronounced*, is by Grammarians derived: and partly, *ipsum ordinem, seriem, vel concatenationem Causarum, in natura statutam*; the order, series, or subalternate concatenation of Causes, according to whose præscript tenor all Events prædestined come to pass, in respect to the Decree pronounced. For thus much may be collected from that Definition of Fate ascribed to *Plato* by *Plutarch* (*de Fato*) *viz. est lex Adrastæa*, the law of Divine Justice, consigning to every thing, what is convenient to its nature, and which no man can elude, or infringe: but more perspicuously from that notorious one of *Chrysippus*, *Fatum est sempiterna quædam ac indeclinabilis series rerum, & catena volvens semetipsam, & implicans per æternos consequentiæ ordines, ex quibus adapta, connexaque est*; which we have formerly introduced, and interpreted, in our Chap. concerning the *Mobility of the term of mans life*. To which, for more assurance, we may annex the respective signification and importance of each of those various *Appellatives*, which the Stoicks have accommodated to Fate. For they have named it (1) Εἱμαρμένη, because 'tis a connected series, or subalternately-dependent syntax of Causes and Effects: (2) Περῶσα, because it involves and contains All things in that definite and invariable concatenation: (3) Ἀνάγκη, because all Events are the Necessary designations thereof; or, because it self is also under the same restraint of an immutable definition:

(4)

(4) Ἀδράστια, becauſe no attempt can prævail to an alteration infringement of its tenor: (5) Αἶσα, becauſe it is a Conſtitution Eternal: (6) Νέμεσις, becauſe it is a diſtribution made to every Individual: (7) χρεών, becauſe it comprehends whatever is, by Conſignation, due to every man: (8) Κὴρ, becauſe as the original, ſo alſo the Diſſolution of all things, is ſubject to its appointment: Μοῖρα, *Parca*, becauſe it is the peculiar Lot or Portion deſtined to every man. But as for this æquivocal Denominative, *Parca*; inſomuch as it not onely determineth the ſtate of all other things in general, but alſo the Life of man in ſpecial, *quaſi Nendo*, as it were by ſpinning out a thread of commenſurate longitude: thereupon did *Heſiod* (*in Theogn.*) dichotomize it into three diſtinct ſpecies; *viz.* (1) Ἄτροπος, in reſpect to the Irrevocability of time *paſt*, which exactly reſembleth a thread already ſpun, and wound upon the reel or ſuze; (2) Κλωθὼ, in reſpect to the Decurrent, or *Præſent* time, which reſponds to a thread now in twiſting, in the hand of the Spinſter; (3) Λάχεσις, in reſpect to the *Future*, or Lot yet remaining behind to every man, which holds an analogie to Flax not yet ſpun off the diſtaff. Which is the Summarie of *Poſſidonius* (*de mundo*) and *Apuleius* (10. *de repub.*) their Mythologie of the ingenious Figment of the *Three Fatal Siſters*.

Sect. II.

Article 1. The ſecond *Claſsis* of Philoſophers, who underſtood Fate to be a Conſtitution meerly *Natural* ſubdivided into 2 diſtinct *Sects*: *viz.* (1) thoſe who aſſert the *Immutability* & *Inevitability* of Fate; (2) thoſe who defend the poſſibilty of its *Alteration* & *Evaſion*.

IN the other *Claſſis* of Philoſophers, who have apprehended *Fate* to be *Res purè Naturalis*, a Conſtitution meerly *Natural*, devoyd of all Divinity, nor dependent upon any eternal Decree; we find a ſubdiviſion of two different Sects. For,

(1) *Some* have propoſed to themſelves a Series of Natural Cauſes, ſo harmoniouſly adapted and linked together by mutual revinction, that the poſterior being continually ſuſpended on and moved by the præcedent, performe their operations *compulſively*, *i. e.* they cannot but do, what they do: ſo that thereby is inferred a *Neceſſity* ſo abſolute, that it admits of neither

ther Evasion, nor opposition; such a necessity, as would be no whit inferior to the Stoicks *Lex Adamantina*, or *Adrastea*, formerly mentioned; if this only difference be allowed, that according to that, Fate would be a Chain of Causes constituted by *God*; but according to this, a subalternate series of Causes, whose Constitution, reciprocal concatenation, and eternal duration are made by, and dependent upon *it self*, and is therefore no less Necessary and Invariable then the other. And

(2) *Others* have, indeed, likewise allowed a Series of natural Causes mutually complicated; but yet have they reputed, that the Inferior Causes in this chain are not so dependent upon, nor commoved by the Superior, but that they may be *impeded* from doing those things, which by the impulse of their inhærent Efficiency, and without the intervention of any impediment, otherwise they would have done. *Impeded*, we say, by things purely *Contingent*, or Counter Agents endowed with, and using the *Arbitrary* Liberty of their Will.

Article 2. The Leaders of the First Sect, *Heraclitus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Parmenides*, and chiefly *Democritus*.

The *Coryphæi*, or Leaders of this Sect of Philosophers, were *Heraclitus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Parmenides*, and (who took the right hand of all the others) *Democritus*; as we have found upon the list of *Cicero* (*de Fato*.) For, albeit the Foundation of his Physiologie was the same with that of *Epicurus*, *Fortuito factum esse mundum*, that the Universe was made by *Chance*; which Hypothesis we have formerly explained, examined, and exploded: yet did He strenuously endevour to impose thereupon this disagreeing superstructure, *Fato omnia fieri*, that all things are effected by *Fate*; confounding two most contrary Notions, meer *Contingency*, and ineluctable *Necessity*.

Article 3. *Democritus* justly charged with the patronage of *Inevitable Fate*: and his doctrine concerning it, concisely rehearsed.

If any demand, how we can justify this our Accusation of *Democritus*; we answer, that it may be genuinely collected from hence: that it was his opinion, that *Fortune* is nothing else in reality but *Nature*, and that Nature is bound, by her own adamantine laws, to do what she doth, in all particulars. For the *First* of these positions, that *Nature and Fortune are Identical*; we cannot much dispute: since all the Attributes of Fortune

tune are but ſurreptitious, and uſurped from Nature; nor doth Fortune, in a meer philoſophical Senſe, import more then Mans *Ignorance* in the *Dubiety* of many Effects, which Nature produceth, or are at leaſt produced by natural means. For the *Second*, that *Nature is its own Fate*, or, more expreſly, that Nature being only a conſtitution of Cauſalities reſulting from Chance, or from a fortuitous diſpoſition and ſetlement of the Univerſal Matter, in that Figure the adſpectable World now beareth; doth neceſſitate her ſelf to the cauſation of all things: this He hath conceived inferrible from this proceſs of reaſon. Atoms (ſaith He, *apud Magnenum*) being the Catholique Principle, of which all things conſiſt, have an ingenite or connatural Motive Faculty eſſentially inhærent; by the unceſſant activity whereof they are perpetually agitated or commoved: and all things, by coaleſcence compoſed of Atoms, cannot but conforme to the ſame motions, by which their principles are commoved. And ſithence ſome Atoms tending one way, are by the occurſe and juſtling of others diverted to another courſe; both the Diverting and Diverted from the direct line of their native tendency, cannot but obſerve, continue and purſue thoſe neceſſary motions. By the ſame reaſon, ſome bodies, compoſed of concreted Atoms, as they are præcipitated one way, by the impulſe of their own coeſſential Faculty, may, by the occurſation and arietation of others ſteering a different courſe, be deflected from the perpendicular of their motion congenial, to ſome other tranſverſe, oblique, rectilinear, &c. ſo that both the Deflecting and Deflected cannot but obſerve, continue, and purſue thoſe compulſive motions. And this, in General, is that Fate, or *Neceſſity*, whereby *Democritus* would have all things effected, and by which the World was at firſt compoſed, in the ſame Figure, we ſpeculate at this day; for, as the Univerſal Principle, Atoms, concurring, crowding, rebounding reciprocally, in an infinite ſpace, by the agitation of their own inexiſtent Faculty, could not but convene, coaleſce, and cohære into any other Forme, but what they did: ſo now having acquired that forme by Chance, can they not either change it, or not obſerve and execute thoſe motions begun, and by the mediation or interceſſion

whereof all Events are brought to paſs. For, in *Plutarch*, (1. *placit.* 26.) He ſayth plainly, *Neceſſitatem nihil eſſe aliud,* ἢ τὴν φορὰν, καὶ τὴν πλαγὴν, καὶ τὴν ἀντιτυπίαν τῆς ὕλης, *quam lationem, percuſſionem, repercuſſionem Materiæ*; that Neceſſity is nothing elſe but the Lation, Percuſſion, Repercuſſion of the material Principle of all things, *i. e.* of *Atoms*. From hence we have an opportunity to interpret that paſſage in *Simplicius* (2. *phyſic. comment.* 59.) that ſome of the Ancients held an opinion, that Ἀνάγκη ὑλικὴ, *Material Neceſſity* was the ſole Cauſatrix of all Effects; in reſpect that the Matter of Bodies is not idle and unactive, as moſt have dreamt, but unceſſantly operative; and that, not by impreſſion, but *Inharency*, as being to it ſelf the *Principium à quo* of all its motions. And this we here touch upon, opportunely to diſcriminate this Doctrin from that of others, who conſtituted a meer *Formal*, or *Agent* Neceſſity, diſtinct from the material principle of the world; whether that Agent be ſimply *Natural*, according to the Phyſiology of *Ariſtotle*; or *Primus Opifex*, the Firſt Operator, according to the hypotheſis of *Plato*, and the *Stoicks*, who alſo ſometimes radicated that Neceſſity, whereby Evils are continually exiſtent in the world, in the *Matter* thereof, as *Seneca* (*de Provid.* 5.) excuſing the non ablation of Evil by the Creator, ſayth poſitively, *Non poteſt Artifex mutare materiam*, it was not in his power to Abſtract it, becauſe not to alter the *Matter*. But, not to leave our Explanation of *Democritus Fatum Materiale* imperfect; we may, from what hath præceded, perceive at what mark theſe words of his were directed; *Neceſſitatem, quâ omnia fiunt, eſſe & Fatum, & Juſtitiam, & Providentiam, & opificem mundi* (*apud Plutarch.* 1. *placit.* 25.) that the *Neceſſity*, whereby all things are effected, is both *Fate, Juſtice, Providence*, and *Maker* of the World: *viz.* this, that the Series of things, in which the reaſon or eſſence of Fate doth conſiſt, could not have bin otherwiſe conſtituted; that upon this Series it depends, why one thing is accounted Juſt, and another Unjuſt; why the world is governed thus, and all things proceed according to the præſent method, and no other; and why the adſpectable form of the Univerſe was made in all points reſponſible

reſponſible to what it now holds, &c. For, He referred the Cauſation of all things to thoſe newly explicated congenial motions of Atoms; and ſo conceived that even the *Soul*, or Mind of man (which He alſo fancied to be a certain *Contexture of ſpherical or orbicular Atoms*) is variouſly agitated, not only by thoſe *internal* motions of its own inſenſible particles, which vary according to its individual Complexion (*i. e.* the Atoms compoſing the Soul of a Melancholy man, are of one ſort, at leaſt of one contexture; thoſe of a Cholerick, of another; thoſe of a Phlegmatick, of a third, &c.) but alſo by thoſe *Extradvenient* motions cauſed by Objects; by whoſe *Species*, or Images incurrent (which Atoms alſo conſtitute) the Mind cannot but be *Attracted*, if they be conſentaneous and allective, or gratefull; nor not be *Averted*, if they be diſſentaneous and repulſive, or ingratefull. That, if the Mind be not alwaies allected by Attractive Species; the reaſon is, becauſe at the ſame inſtant there occur unto it the more potent ſollicitations of their Contrary, *Averting* Species: and if it be not alwaies Averted by Repellent; the reaſon is equal, *viz.* becauſe at the ſame inſtant it is more ſtrongly ſollicited by their Contrary, *Attractive* Species. That therefore, the Mind cannot but be carried on toward Good, or that which is gratefull and allective, ſo long as it diſcovers no Evil admixt thereto: nor not be averted from Evil, or what is ingratefull and averſant, ſo long as it perceives no Good to be commixt therewith. That therefore, the Mind cannot, when two Goods are objected, but purſue the greater Good; as that which attracteth more potently: nor, when two Evils are objected, but avoyd the greater; as that whereby it is averted more potently. That, when two objects, the one Good, the other Evil, at the ſame time præſent their Species; it cannot but neglect the Good, ſo long as the Evil averts more potently then the Good attracts: nor not be carried towards the Good, while the Evil averts more weakly, and the Good attracts more ſtrongly. Finally, that ſince, by reaſon of the Ignorance, or Dimneſs of the Mind, it doth frequently not perceive the Evil conſequent upon its proſecution of ſome Good; therefore is it ſubject to *Deception* in ſome caſes, and is often carried

carried on to that, from which it ought to have bin averted: nor perceive the Good that is conſequent upon its proſecution of ſome Evil, and is therefore, as often averted from that object, to which it ought to have bin converted. But notwithſtanding, inſomuch as all objects, by this and no other way, occur unto, and affect the Mind; ſtill it cannot but *Neceſſarily* be carried whither it is carried; nor but be averted from that, from which it is averted: and conſequently, that there remains to it only *a Deſire of Truth, i. e.* that no *Counterfeit Species* may occur, but that all objects may appear ſuch as in reality they are, nor Good be concealed under the diſguſting vizard of Evil, nor Evil gilded o're with the ſplendid ſemblance of Good. For this is the ſumme of what *Empiricus* (2. *adverſ. Phyſio.*) makes *Democritus* to have deſiderated, when He ſayd; Εὔχεσθαι ἐυλόγων εἰδώλων τυγχάνειν, *Exoptat rerum imagines conſentaneas poſſe nanciſci.* Now, by this complex Argumentation, *Democritus* may be underſtood to have inferred; that though ſome Actions ſeem ſituate within the præcincts of our own juriſdiction, or that it is abſolutely in our power to *Elect*, or *Reject* this or that object; inſomuch as every mans experience doth demonſtrate to him, that he doth and can conſult and deliberate about the Good and Evil of Objects, and actually electing the one, refuſeth the other; and that, not by Compulſion, but *Freely*: yet notwithſtanding is nothing really in our power, becauſe not only the *occaſion* of our Conſultation, but alſo the *Conſultation* it ſelf is impoſed upon us by inevitable *Neceſſity*. *Firſt*, that the *Occaſion* of Conſultation (or the *Exhibition* of many objects, which almoſt equally affecting the Mind, and by reaſon of the æquipondium of their Veriſimility, or moments of Good, holding it ſuſpended in æquilibrio, of neceſſity ingage it to a *Deliberation*) cannot but be impoſed upon us; we conceive it not obſcure to him, who ſhall deduce the conducing Series of things from a due Epoche, or height, and analytically undoe the chain of Cauſes: and *Secondly*, that alſo the act of *Conſultation* is a *Neceſſary* Effect, is manifeſt from hence; that when two objects occur to the mind, ſo equally Attractive, that their Apparencies of Veility, or Præſentations

Præſentations of Good, are æquilibrated, and reciprocally counterpoiſe each other; the mind muſt of neceſſity be agitated by a kind of *Fluctuation*, and detained in the ſuſpence of *Indifferency*, or *Indetermination*, or *Conſultation*, untill it acquieſce in its *Election* of that Object, whoſe præſentation of Vtility ſeems to præponderate the others. Which, æquitably audited, amounts to no more then this; that *Election* is nothing but the proſecution of an Object which either really is, or at leſt ſeems more Good; and that a ſpontaneous one, without all coaction or renitency: in reſpect that man doth both ſpontaneouſly affect, and willingly proſecute Good. And that you may not admire this bold aſſertion, *viz.* that both the Occaſion and Conſultation, and free, or rather libent Election of Objects, are all links in the Chain of Fate, and ſo comprehended under this Natural Neceſſity, propugned by *Democritus*: the *Stoicks* intercept your wonder, by obtruding another as ſtrange, *viz.* that it depends on the ſame Concatenation of things, *that you now read this our diſcourſe of Fate*; as *Manilius* (*lib.* 2.) *Hoc quoque fatale eſt, ſic ipſum expendere Fatum.* And this, becauſe whatever Action of any man you ſhall ſuppoſe; it can be no difficulty, according to this Hypotheſis, to find out the proxime Cauſe exciting him thereunto, and to refer that Cauſe to the permotion of another remote one, and that third to the permotion of a fourth, that fourth, to the induction of a fifth, &c. unravelling the ſeries of Cauſes, ſo that it muſt at length be inferred, that that ſuppoſed action could not but follow upon thoſe other actions ſubalternately præcedent, and conſequently, that it muſt be, as *Democritus* would have it, *Fatal*, or *Neceſſary*. Which opinion *Ariſtotle* ardently impugneth (*in lib. de Interpre. cap.* 8.) when diſcuſſing the verity and neceſſity of Propoſitions, He contends to evince; that though of two oppoſite ſingular propoſitions, which concern a thing either *Præterite*, or *Preſent*, one muſt be true, the other falſe: yet the Canon holds not in two Contrary ſingular propoſitions, which concern a thing *Future*; the Verity of the one not neceſſitating the Falſity of the other. For, as He there argues, if every *Affirmation*, or *Negation* concerning a thing to come, were true or falſe, *ex Neceſſitate*: then would the

the Futurity of any thing include a Neceſſity of its Futurition, *i.e* whatever is *Future* would be *Neceſſary*, and on the contrary, whatever is not Future, would be Not-neceſſary: and upon juſt inference, nothing could remain either *Fortuitous*, or *Arbitrary*; which to admit, is an *Incongruity* ſo manifeſt, that the repugnancy of every mans Experience detects it; an *Incommodity* ſo intolerable, that it not only diſparageth, but confuteth it ſelf. And this, if there be any Fidelity in the records of our Memory, is the *Summary* of their Theory, who have apprehended and aſſerted *Fate to be a meer Natural Conſtitution of Cauſes, ſubalternately connected; as not dependent on any thing Divine, nor any Eternal Decree; ſo not capable of any mutation or interruption, by the intervention of any Impediment, purely Fortuitous, or Counter-activity of any Arbitrary Agent.*

Sect. III.

Article 1. The Principal of the *Second* Sect, *Ariſtotle* and *Epicurus*.

IN the other *Diviſion* of *Philoſophers*, who alſo conceded Fate to be a meer Natural Conſtitution of Cauſes ſubalternately dependent, &c. but yet denied the inevitable or neceſſary inſequution of all Effects upon that concatenation; allowing the poſſibility of its mutation, or interruption by either Chance, or mans Free will: the Principal are *Ariſtotle* and *Epicurus*.

Article 2. The Grounds of the *Authors* imputing the opinion both of Fates *Identity* with Nature, and the poſſibility of its *Mutation* & *Declination*, by either *Fortuitous* or *Arbitrary* Antagoniſts, to *Ariſtotle*.

Firſt, as for *Ariſtotle*; that He held Fate, or fatal Neceſſity to be nothing but very Nature, or (if you like it better) every particular Cauſe acting *ſecundum ſuam naturam, naturalémve ductum*, according to its proper or natural Virtue; is manifeſt from his own words, in ſundry places of his Writings. To particular; (1) He ſayth (*in 2. phyſ. cap. 6.*) *Eas generationes, acretiones, & alterationes, quæ violenta ſunt (ut dum ex arte, & ob delicias, cogimus plantas aliquas præmaturè pubeſcere,*

pubeſcere, adoleſcereque) *eſſe* ἀκ εἱμαρμένας, *non Fatales, hoc eſt non Naturales*; making *Fatal* Effects to be meerly *Natural*. And (2) He ſayth (1 *Meteorol. cap. ultim.*) χρόνων εἱμαρμένων, *Fatalibus temporibus magnas quaſdam hyemes, imbriumque exceſſus, quibus creentur diluvia, contingere; eo modo, quo & contingit hyems ſtatis anni temporibus*: which rightly paraphraſed, imports thus much; that as Winter, the Sun receding from our climate, at ſome certain period of the yeer, according to the Ecliptick progreſs conſigned unto it by Nature, is the regular effect of the Suns remove to larger diſtance; even ſo are hard Winters, and immoderate rains, the regular effects of ſome periodal Conjunctions of the Planets, proceeding in their motions according to the ſetled Conſtitutions of Nature. From whence we have an advantage to obſerve, that though *Stobæus* (*Ecl. Phyſ.*) tells us; *Ariſtotelem non tam exiſtimaſſe Fatum eſſe Cauſam, quàm modum Cauſæ advenientem rebus ex neceſſitate ſtatutis*; that *Ariſt.* conceived not Fate to be ſo much a Cauſe, as the manner of a Cauſe, advenient to things determined by Neceſſity: yet nevertheleſs are we ſo to comment upon this his nice deſcant, as that we underſtand, Fate not to be any new kind of Cauſe, but Nature her ſelf, which, in reſpect to her *Agency*, is called a *Cauſe*, and in reſpect to the certain, proper, and neceſſary *manner* or way of her acting, is called *Fate*. And, that He impugned the former Error, *viz.* that all Agents, included in this Univerſal Subalternation, act *ex inevitabili neceſſitate*, or cannot but doe, what they doe; is not obſcurely intimated in this, that He defined Fate to be pure *Nature*. Since the Works of Nature are not effected of inoppugnable *neceſſity*; as may be boldly concluded from the frequent Experiments not only in Generation, which is commonly impeded, by the intervention of any indiſpoſition or impatibility of Matter, and other reſiſting Accidents; but alſo in Generous and virtuous Minds, which eaſily ſubdue and countermand thoſe ſtrong inclinations, or propenſities to Avarice, Luxury, Audacity, Incontinency &c. which may not unjuſtly be eſteemed the genuine Effects of their very conſtitutive Principles, and branches that ſhoot up from the root of their Corporeal Temperament. Upon which reaſon,

we may conjecture, that *Arist.* reflected, when He sayd of *Socrates, prater naturam, ac fatum suum, continens evasit:* He acquired an Habit of *Continency*, even in spite of the contrary sollicitation of his individual *Nature*, and particular *Fate*.

Article 3. *Epicurus* unanimous to *Arist.* in the point of *Physical* and *Eluctable* Necessity.

Secondly, as for *Epicurus*; that his thoughts made an Unison with those of *Aristotle*, in the key of a *Non-ineluctable Fate*, is sufficiently constant from hence; that having admitted a certain *Necessity Natural* in this sentence, *Naturam à rebus, ipsarúmve serie, (διδαχθῆναι τὴν ἀναγκαιότητα) doceri, cógique, sive necessitate agi (in Epist. ad Herodotum:)* He yet denied the *Inevitability*, or *Absoluteness* thereof, in another Fragment of his revived by *Stobæus (in Ecl. Phys.)* where He delivers as a general Canon, *Omnia fieri trium modorum aliquo, (κατ' ἀνάγκην, καὶ αὐτοματίαν, καὶ τύχην) Necessitate, Consilio, Fortuna.* For, in that he makes *Fortune*, and *Consultation*, or mans Free will equal competitors in the empire of the world with *Necessity* Natural, He manifestly excludes it from being πάντων δεσπότιν, sole *Despot* or Monarch, and reserves to the two others an equal dominion. Which assurance may duely be augmented by the superaddition of this also; that *Cicero (de Fato)* introducing *Epicurus* disputing about the verity of Future Events, makes him deny, with *Aristotle*, that of two contrary singular Enunciations about a thing to come, the one must be true, and the other false: subnecting this reason; *Nulla est in natura talis Necessitas.*

Article 4. The scope of *Epicurus* his Figment of the *Declination* of *Atoms* in the human Soul: and his Accommodation thereof to the tuition of mans *Liberty*, epitomized.

And, certainly, as He stood equal with *Aristotle*, in the denial; so hath He outdone him, by many degrees, in his endevours for the Refutation of this unsound opinion of an Absolute Necessity: insomuch as he excogitated his Hypothesis of the Declination of Atoms (illustrated in the incomparable Commentary of *Gassendus*) as a motion, which once conceded, doth totally infringe the indispensable rigor of Fate, and conserve an Evasory or Declining Liberty for the Mind of man. This *Plutarch* taught us, in two perspicuous texts: (1) when He sayth (*de Anim. Solert.*) that the motion of the Declination of

of Atoms in the Human Soul, was ſubtilly invented by *Epicurus*, ὅπως εἰς τὴν ζωὴν ἡ τύχη παρεισέλθῃ, καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν μὴ ἀπολλῦται, that *Fortune* might be brought on the theatre of the world, there to act her part, and the *Arbitrary* power of man might not be abrogated: (2) when He declares (*de Stoic. repub.*) that the ſame *Epicurus* (*ſeſe in omnem partem verſare, ingeniúmque contendere, in id incumbendo, ut quomodocunque à motione ſempiterna liberum tueatur Arbitrium, ac prævitatem eſſe inculpabilem non patiatur*;) rack't all the nerves of his wit, to find out a way for the protection of mans *Free will*, and ſo that evil might not prætend to *inculpability*.

Now, though we may not train along the thoughts of our Reader, out of the direct tract of our præſent Theme, into a wide Digreſſion concerning *Epicurus* his whole Romance of the *Declination of Atoms* in the Soul; eſpecially having lately remitted him to *Gaſſendus* his accompliſht Comment thereupon: yet can we not impede his progreſs along the ſtreight line of method, here to arreſt him, while we informe him briefly, How he accommodated that fiction to the vindication of mans *Liberty* from the inexorable Coaction of Fate. We conceive, that *Epicurus*, having obſerved 3 kinds of Motion in Animals, but principally in Man, *viz. Natural*, *Violent*, and *Voluntary*; took it for granted, that the primary Cauſe of each was to be deduced from *Atoms*, the *Principium à quo* of all motion: and hereupon concluded, that the ſpring of all *Natural* motion, was the primary motion congenial or inhærent to Atoms, *viz.* that whi h phyſiology calls the motion of *Gravity*, whereby an Atom is præcipitated *ad lineam rectam*, to a perpendicular; that the ſpring of all *Violent* motion, was the motion of *Reflexion*, or that which ariſeth from occurſation, arietation, or repercuſſion of one Atom by another, whereby the Atom reflected, is carried *ad lineam obliquam*; and laſtly, that the ſpring of all *Voluntary* motion was the motion of *Declination*, to which no region is determined, nor time præfixt.

Article 5. An *Exception*, in the name of *Democritus*, against *Epicurus* Inference.

But might not *Democritus*, and other *Defendants* of *Abſolute Neceſsity natural*, have excepted againſt this, as inſufficient to the protection of mans *Evaſory Freedome*, by returning; that becauſe this motion of *Declination* is no leſs *Natural* (for it is derived from no other principle, but Atoms themſelves) then that of *Gravity*; therefore doth it ſtill remain, that All things are effected by Fate, as well when *Epicurus* his Hypotheſis is conceded, as before. Inſomuch as all things, which were to come to paſs, by reaſon of thoſe various motions of Arietation, Repuls, Declination &c. by an eternal ſeries, and kind of ſubalternate Concatenation, are conſequent one upon the heels of another; and particularly that event of *Cognition* and *Appetition*, to which mans *Liberty* appertains; and ſo are brought to paſs by an equal *Neceſsity*. For, that the Mind of man may diſplay, or execute that *Liberty Elective*, whereby it affects and proſecutes any object, conceive it to be an *Apple*; neceſſary it is, that the *Image* or Species of that Apple be firſt emitted from it, and being tranſmitted through the mediatory organs of ſight, invade, percell, and commove the Mind to know, or apprehend it. Neceſſary to the Apple, before it can transfuſe its viſible Species to the eye, that it be put in ſome place convenient for adſpect, by him, who gathered it from the tree or received it elſewhere. Neceſſary, that the Tree, which bore that apple, be firſt generated by a ſeed, and nouriſhed by the moiſture of the earth, concocted by the heat of the Sun. Neceſſary, that that Seed be derived from a former apple, and that from a former tree, planted in this or that determinate place, at this or that determinate time: and ſo by retrogreſſion to the beginning of the world, when both the Earth, and all its Vegetable ſeeds had their origination from the Concurſions and Complexions of Atoms; which could not (being agitated by the impulſe of their own inhærent Faculty Motive) but convene and coaleſce, and acquieſce in thoſe Figures, thoſe ſituations, at that time. Again, if the *Soul*, or Mind be alſo a Contexture of orbicular Atoms; thoſe Atoms muſt have bin contained in the Sperm of the Parents; muſt have confluxed thither from certain meats and drinks, as alſo from the Aer and beams

beams of the Sun; thoſe meats muſt have bin ſuch and no other: and ſo ſubalternately ſucceſſive from eternity, the Event will be found to come to paſs by the ſame Adamantine Neceſſity, whatever of the Cauſes, lateral or concurrent (which muſt run up to an account beyond all Logarithms) you ſhall pleaſe to begin at. Becauſe from Eternity Cauſes have ſo cohæred to Cauſes, that the laſt cauſes could not but concurr; which being deduced into act, the Mind could not but know, and knowing affect, or deſire that particular object, *viz.* the Apple. And what is here ſaid of *Cauſes*, the ſame in all points is to be underſtood alſo of *Atoms*, which conſtitute thoſe cauſes, and from whoſe congenial motions the Cauſes derive thoſe their *Motions*, by which they attain to be Cauſes.

Article 6. The juſtification thereof, by a *Reſpons* conforme to the Phyſiology of *Epicurus*.

To this *Exception*, that we may compoſe ſome *Reſponſe*, ſuch as may ſeem Conſentaneous to the Doctrine of *Epicurus*, and to contain ſomewhat of Probability, at leaſt; we muſt uſurp the liberty to aſſume: that ſuch is the Contexture of Atoms in the Soul, or Mind, its *Declinant Atoms* can break that *Rigidity* ariſing from other Atoms, and ſo make its nature *Flexile* to any part; in which *Flexility*, the root of *Liberty* doth conſiſt. And therefore, the mind, being allected by the Species of any object, is indeed carried towards that object; but ſo, that if another object ſhall inſtantly occurr, whoſe Attraction is æquivalent, it may again be invited by, and carried towards that object alſo: ſo that, deflecting from the firſt, it may become æquilibrated or indifferent to either part; which, doubtleſs, is to be Free, or Arbitrary. And that the Mind, being thus conſtituted *Flexile* and Indifferent, doth at length determine it ſelf rather to one then the other part; this ariſeth from hence: that the *impreſſion* of one *Species* is more violent then of the other; and conſequently that the *Election* ſucceeds, upon the *Apprehenſion* of that object, whoſe ſpecies appears either poſitively good, or comparatively more good. Finally, that the Mind, when it electeth or willeth any object, is as it were the principal Machine, or main Spring, by whoſe motions all the Faculties, and the members deſtinate to execution are excited, and carried thither,

whither the Mind tendeth: and this by mediation of the *Spirits* diſcurrent, or rather tranſmitted through all parts of the body. All which *Lucretius* fully expreſſeth in theſe Verſes:

Declinamus item motus, nec tempore certo,
Nec regione loci certa; ſed ubi ipſa tulit Mens:
Nam dubio procul his rebus ſua quoique voluntas
Principium dat; & hinc motus per membra vagantur. *lib.* 2.

Again, perhaps *Epicurus* will not gainſay, but that the motion of *Declination* is as much *Natural* as the motion of *Gravity*; But yet will He by no perſwaſions yeeld, that the Mind, being contemperate of Declinatory Atoms, is ſo affected and attracted by Neceſſity toward one object, that it cannot inſtantly be deflected to another. For, as a mixt Nature is made, ſo is the Mobility of its inſenſible parts varied: and from various Natural motions retuſed or refracted, ariſeth a Third Nature, according to which its motions may be ſayd to be Voluntary and Natural both; inſomuch as they proceed *à Natura libera*, from Nature free and uncoacted. Nor will He deny, ſuppoſing the Occurſation and Arietation of Atoms, that it is pure Neceſſity, that Percuſſions, Repulſes, and either Reflexions or Cohæſions ſhould ſucceed among them: but yet may He refuſe to allow a Neceſſity of ſuch Occurſations, as if they could not be impeded, nor their Conſequents be diverted. Hence, concerning that eternal ſeries of the Cauſes of the Apple, and the Mind; *Epicurus* will grant, that when things are already effected, a kind of Neceſſity may be attributed thereunto, ſuch in reſpect whereof thoſe things cannot be uneffected; ſince, *non datur jus in præterita*, there is no countermanding things Præterite: but before thoſe things were peracted, there was no ſuch Neceſſity; ſince both Fortune, or Contingency, and the oppoſing Liberty of mans Will might have interrupted, inverted, and changed it. For few are ignorant of the wide diſparity between theſe two Affirmations, *viz.* What is once done, cannot be not done: and what is done, might not have bin done. Since, in the *Former*, a thing is conſidered as already *paſt*; and in the *Later*, as yet *to come*:

come: and as according to the *Former* it is *Neceſſary*; ſo according to the *Later*, it may be or *Contingent*, or *Voluntary*. By which reaſon, was it poſſible, that the *Apple* might not have bin præſented to the eye; poſſible, that the Tree which bare it might firſt have withered; that the Seed, of which that tree was generated, might either have proved abortive and ſteril, or elſe have bin ſowed in ſome other place; that other of its Cauſes might have bin divers ways præpeded: which alſo may be affirmed of the Mind, and its Cauſes; and conſequently none of the many Cauſes, which did antecede the Appetition of the Apple, can be conceived to have bin Neceſſary, as they might if the Cauſes were of themſelves uncapable of Impediment, or if there were one Cauſe Paramont to all others in the Concatenation, which by an abſolute ſoveraignty, or deſpotique power, had directed and coacted them. Allbeit we concede, that the *Apperition* of the Apple by the mind, is the Conſequent of the Minds *Cognition* thereof, and that Cognition the conſequent of its *Occurſation* to the eye, and that the Conſequent of its *Poſition* in a place convenient for ſight, and that the conſequent of its *Exiſtence*, and ſo from link to link retrograde up to eternity: yet notwithſtanding can no man juſtify this Inference, that therefore the *Mind is Neceſſitated to that Appetition*; becauſe ſtill there remains a *Poſſe* to the Mind of being *Averted* from the Affectation and Proſecution thereof, in caſe either the Species of a better object, or a ſuſpicion of poyſon therein concealed, ſhall intervene, or a refrigeration of the Stomach by the dyſpeptical and flatulent juice thereof be feared, or any other Cauſe of moment ſufficient to perſwade the mind to abſtain from the uſe thereof, ſhall be interpoſed.

Nor is this *Rejoynder* diſſwaſive; that, when the Mind is averted from the Appetition of the Apple, the *Cauſes Antecedent* were not ſuch as might induce the mind to an Appetition, but ſuch as induced it to an *Averſation*; and that theſe *Averting*, not thoſe Attracting Cauſes were ſo connected to the ſeries of Fate, that the mind could not but be averted from it.

Article 7. The moſt weighty *Rejoynder*, (of the connexion of thoſe Cauſes, which *Avert* the Mind from, ſo found too light

well as of thoſe, which *Attract* it to an object, to the eternal *Series* of *Fate*) to overbalance *Epicurus* his defence of mans *Liberty*. For,

For, though the Mind be contemperate of ſuch a Contexture of Atoms, as that it may be *Commoved* by the irruent Species of external Objects; yet is the nature of its contexture ſuch alſo, as that it can derive from it ſelf ſome motions diſtinct from, nay contrary to thoſe motions excited by Extradvenient Images; which motions being inſtituted by no other Principle but it ſelf, are manifeſtly *Spontaneous* and *Voluntary*, and by which it is empower'd to reſiſt *External* motions, and therefore may not ſo be carried to one Object, as not to be, upon advantage, deflected to another: And hence we may *Conclude*, that the Mind is not obliged to a neceſſity of any one Object; but ſtands *Free* to refuſe that, and elect another: and that the Reaſon of a thing to *come*, is not a little different from that of a thing already *paſt*; ſince, in reſpect to a thing *Future*, there remains an *Indifferency* to the Mind of electing either of two Objects, but in reſpect to a thing *Præterite*, there is a *Neceſsity* of its election of one. If this *Solution* be thought too light, we can ſuperadd another of weight ſufficient to counterpoyſe the Doubt; *viz.* that which *Carneades* in *Cicero* inſinuated, when he taught, that the *Epicureans* might have defended the Liberty of mans Mind, without their commentitious *Declination* of Atoms. For having once declared, that the Mind hath Voluntary motions of its own inſtitution, they needed no other Argument to confute *Chryſippus*: to whom when they had conceded, that no motion can be without a Cauſe *Movent*; there remained no reaſon why they ſhould have granted, that all Effects have their *Antecedent* Cauſes; ſince to the will of man no Cauſes are Antecedent, it being to it ſelf the *Principium à quo* of all its motions Voluntary.

And this is the faithfull Abridgement of *Epicurus* his Doctrin concerning Fate, as a Conſtitution meerly Natural, and capable of interruption, alteration, oppoſition, by either of the Two other in his Triumvirate, *viz. Fortune* or pure Contingency, and the *Liberty* of mans mind, which He conceived Copartners in the Empire of the World. ¶.

SECT.

Sect. IV.

Article 1. *Mathematical* Fate briefly deſcribed.

THere is yet another *Species* of Fate, retaining to our Second *Genus* (ὡς Ἐνέργεια) whoſe exceeding vanity and inconſiderableneſs had well-nigh occaſioned our total Inconſideration thereof, in this place; and that is *Fatum Mathematicum ſive Aſtrologicum*, the *Mathematicians* and *Aſtrologers Fate*; being a certain imaginary Neceſſity Natural, impoſed upon all Sublunary Agents, and more eſpecially upon Man, as the moſt analogous Recipient, by the inoppugnable Influence of Celeſtial Bodies, reſpective to their Motions, Poſitions, Connexions, Aſpects.

Article 2. The groſs *Vanity* thereof concealed from many *Philoſophers*, only by the cloud of *Tranſcriptive Adhæſion to Antique Traditions.*

Tis no wonder, we confeſs, that the *Chaldæans*, a Mercurial and volatile Nation generally infatuated with *Aſtral Idolatry*, were the *Inventors* of this *Planetary Deſtiny*; ſince they Deified all they underſtood not, and advanced their obſervations of the circumvolutions of the Sphears, together with their Orbs of light, to ſuch a height of inſolence, that they fancied the Hebrew Alphabet repreſented in the Figures of the Aſteriſms, and prætending to the skill of reading the Celeſtial Ephimerides, by ſpelling thoſe Characters, which the Planets in their Conjunctions, Oppoſitions, and other Apparitions ſeemed to make, into words and ſentences perfectly ſignifying, to the exact and intelligent obſerver, the intent of God concerning not only the ſubverſion of Monarchies, mutation of States, religions, &c. general Events, but alſo the proſperity or adverſity, the health or ſickneſs, life or death of particular perſons: as *Rabbi ben Ezra*, and out of him *Gaffarel* (without the concealment of his ſtrong inclination to the ſame ſuperſtitious Arrogance) hath obſerved, and by ſeveral experiments alleaged endevour'd to patronize, in *the* 13. *Chap. of his Unheard of*

Curiosities. Nor is it a wonder, that the *Hebrew*, and after them the *Grecian Astrologers*, with great ostentation of transcendent knowledge, and no less then privacy with the three Fatal Sisters, sedulously promoted the same splendid Error, of ascribing the Empire of the world to a Heptarchy of Erratique Starrs: since, upon the testimony of the greatest *Antiquaries*, * we may justly affirme, that the Hebrews added to the vanities and absurdities of the Chaldæan, and the Græcians to the wild Romances of the Hebrew Astrology; the stream thereof, by long running in the channel of time, contracting more and greater Impurities. Which is a chief reason, why we inhærite so dark and imperfect a knowledge of the great *Astronomical Sagacity* of the more simple and upright times of *Abraham* and *Moses*. Though this be no wonder, we say, yet tis a considerable one, that even many *Physiologists*, who prætended the indagation and tradition of nothing but Verity, of verisimility at least, have liberally contributed towards the diffusion and propagation of the same Delusion. Witness that peremptory speech of *Pliny* (1 *nat. Histor.*) *singulis sydera tributa sunt, clara divitibus, minora pauperibus, obscura defunctis, & pro cujusque sorte lucentia ad munera mortalibus.* Nor can we conjecture, what should occasion the Deception of so many and so great judgements, in this easy particular; unless that grand Cause of Popular mistakes, *viz. Transcriptive Adherence* to all, that seems præsented in the reverend habit of *Antiquity*, especially if guilded over with the Estimation of *Rare* and *Sublime*: the Wit of man being naturally prone to Affect and Admire, rather then Indubitate and Examine those Transmissions, which concern the remotest Difficulties in Nature, and above all, the Energy and Configurations of Celestial Bodies. *Prodigia cum narrantur, excipi solent favore mirantium, & quanquam non ad verum exacti sint, postquam semel Scriptorem invenerunt, pluribus placent, veneratione crescunt, vetustate commendantur*; was *Nicopompus* his saying, *in Joh. Barclaii Argenis, lib. 2.* For, had they devested their minds of all traditional Præjudice, and but reflected their thoughts, either upon the *Hypothetical Necessity* of the *Matter*, or Subject, whereon the Starrs are supposed

* *Rabbi ben Ezra, in ductore dubiorum.*

ſuppoſed to diſcharge and fix their uncontrollable influence; or upon the extremely *different Fortunes of Twins*, conceived and borne under the ſame Conſtellation; or upon the *double Impiety* of aſcribing to remote, weak, and perhaps unconcerned Cauſes, thoſe Effects, which proclaim their deſignment by an *Infinite Wiſedome*, and their Præordination to Ends above the ſagacity of Human Providence; and of charging all the moſt nefarious Villanies of ſinfull man upon the innocuous and exceeding both uſefull and comfortable Creatures of God: had they, we ſay, but pondered any one of theſe Reaſons, that ſufficiently demonſtrate the Abſurdity of Planetary Neceſſity; doubtleſs, they had ſoon reclaimed their belief from this diſhonorable ſeduction, and would no longer have abuſed themſelves with an opinion, that all the Occurrences of every Individuall mans life, together with the time and manner of his death, are the inevitable Effects of thoſe Starrs, which were Lords of the Horoſcope, either at his Conception, or Nativity, or both.

Article 3. The Abſurdity of *Sydereal Neceſſity* evicted (1) by an Argument deſumed from the *Hypothetical Neceſſity* of the *Matter* on which Celeſtial Impreſſions are to operate.

The *Firſt* Reaſon, whereby this *Chaldæan Fate* may be demonſtratively redargued of extreme *vanity*, we deſumed from the *Hypothetical Neceſſity of the Matter*, whereon the Planets exerciſe their power. For, according to their own Conceſſion, *Omnis receptio eſt ad modum recipientis*, All bodies ought to be *Analogous*, *i. e.* prædiſpoſed to admit either the benigne, or maligne influences of the Heavens; for *Alteration* is of neceſſity prævious to *Production*, and before a body be configurate, neceſſary it is that the Matter, whereof it is compoſed, be altered and variouſly præpared; and præpared it is by *Second* Cauſes, but perfected by *Firſt*. Thus the Geniture of the *Male*, though perfect and prolifical in its ſelf, muſt yet be fruſtrated of its end, unleſs it meet with convenient and patible Materials whereon to actuate its Plaſtick virtue, *viz.* the Blood and ſeminal infuſion of the *Femal*, proportioned both in quantity and quality to its Efficiency. Thus the Aer of Ægypt, becauſe *Nilus* (being ἄνυδρος) doth yeeld no Evaporations ſufficient to the generation of Clouds, continues ſtill ſerene and unobnubilated; notwithſtanding the potent Attraction of the Sun,

Moon, and other Sydereal Magnets: and though all the Planets ſhould convene in the watery ſigne of Piſces, as before the catholique Deluge *, and threaten an *Apertio portarum* to that Climate; yet, becauſe the material Cauſe of rain, *Evaporations*, is there wanting, muſt their conſpiracies be defeated, and their Influences become languid and ineffectual. And therefore, by equal reaſon, unleſs the Planet, which is Lord of the Geniture, ſhall find a Subject qualified in all points for the admiſſion and promotion of this Celeſtial Fate, which our effronted *Genethliacks* have conceived it to immit into Embryons and Births, all its magnified Influx muſt miſcarry, and be loſt in an invalidity as abſolute, as the labour of that Statuary, who ſhould attempt to melt Marble with Fire, or mould ſand into an Image, without a convenient Cement. If this be, as it muſt be true; that the *Præparation* of the Matter, on which the Impreſſions of Superlunary Bodies are to operate, doth depend upon *Sublunary* and *determinate Cauſes*: then may we, with more honour, recurr to that excellent ſentence of the *Poet*;

Libera ſit at nobis mens, nulli ſubdita cœlo.

* *Reſpice pag.* 143.

Article 4. (2) By the common Experiment of the unæqual Fortunes of *Twins.*

The *Second* prægnant Argument, wherewith the more ſober ſort of Book-men uſually deride the Arrogance of our *Genethliacks* (who bluſh not to promiſe to the world exact Copies of the Rolls of Deſtiny, and divine as confidently as if they had bin of the Cabal with all the Afteriſms) we derived from the common *Experiment of Twinns*: who, though procreated of the ſame Seminalities, fæcundate in the ſame Ovarie or bed of nature, and (for ought even our moſt perſpicacious *Harvey* knows to the contrary) conceived in the ſame moment, and ſo under the ſame *Aſcendent*; are notwithſtanding many times obſerved to differ in Sex, phyſiognomy, genius, condition of life, and moſtly in the manner and time of their death. Thus *Eſau* and *Jacob*, who may, without the diſpenſation of a Figure, be ſayd to have bin but one and the ſame Birth, the younger Midwifing himſelf into the world by holding faſt his brothers heel, and ſo if not indubitating the right of Primogeniture, yet at leaſt portending his future purchaſe and uſurpation thereof: were yet ſo diſparate in

n their Complexions, Diſpoſitions, Fortunes, courſe of life, Age, and diſſolution; that our Secretaries of Heaven muſt either demonſtrate that the face of the Heavens was varied in that ſhort moment that intervened betwixt their neer Nativities; or confeſs it to be the hand of *Providence Divine*, which diſtributed to each his peculiar Lot, not the irrational Starrs that cauſed that vaſt diſproportion. And thus *Proclus* and *Euriſthenes*, Gemini not only in their production, but in the Crown of *Lacedæmonia*, and ſo æqually diſpoſed by their Fortunes alſo to the promotion of that Influence, which the then paramont Conjunction of the Planets had impreſſed upon them: did neither live in equal glory, nor periſh by equal and ſynchronical Fates. On the *Reverſe*; how many Myriads have proved Twinns, in their Deceaſe, who were utter Aliens in their blood, nativity, conſtitutions, profeſſions, inclinations, fortunes? Dare our Judicial Aſtrologers affirme, that All, who fall in battle at once, had one and the ſame ſydereal Fate, which neceſſitated that their Copartnerſhip in the grave? unfainedly, nothing acquainted with letters can be ſo contradictorily impudent. What excuſe have they then left them, for ſtopping their ears againſt that grave Admonition of the oraculous *Zoroaſter*; μὴ σὺ γ' ἄυξανε τὴν εἱμαρμένην, *Ne tu augeas fatum*, Beware thou doſt not aggravate thy Fate. which ſignifies no leſs then this; in thy power it is, either to promote, or fruſtrate the virtues of Celeſtial Influxes: to promote them by Cooperation, to infirme and defeat them by Counter-inclination or repugnancy. To which we may accommodate alſo that memorable Aphoriſme of the Prince of Aſtrologers, *Ptolemy*; *Poteſt is, qui ſciens eſt, multos ſtellarum effectus avertere, quando naturam earum noverit, ac ſeipſum ante illorum eventum præparaverit.*

Our *laſt* Argument to confound Chaldæan Fate, is the *Double Impiety* inferrible thereupon. (1) If the Infelicity of every man be the indeclinable Effect of that malicious Tincture, which the unfriendly Complexion of the Heavens at his Nativity infuſed into his nature; as our *æthereal Mercuries* affirme: then

Article 5. (3) By the double *Impiety*, Inſeparable from the belief thereof.

then muſt it follow, that thoſe glorious orbs were created by God more for the *harme* and *ruine*, then benefit and comfort of mankind; for whoſe ſake only, ſubordinate to his own Glory, the whole Creation was intended. And (2) if all the regicides, parricides, homicides, inceſts, rapes, rapines, blaſphemies, ſacrilegies, rebellions, proditions, &c. nefarious acts of Miſcreants (the very naming whereof will bliſter the moſt innocent lips) be the executions of thoſe deſignes, which the malevolent ſtarrs in their Confœderations have determined to accompliſh by ſuch and ſuch unhappy Inſtruments: then muſt it be conceded, that no Malefactor ought to be accountable to juſtice, becauſe he can plead, *Non equidem vellem, ſed me mea Fata trahebant*; as alſo, that *God is the Author of Evil*, by giving to the ſtarrs ſuch noxious power, and ſuch unlimited Commiſſions, as doe autorize them to operate to the Deſtruction of his *Maſterpiece*.

To theſe 3 Redargutions of *Aſtrological Neceſsity*, we might have annexed as many ſcore, borrowed from *Picus Mirandulanus*, *Bradwardine* B. of Canterbury, *Sixtus Senenſis*, *Merſennus*, *Gaſſendus*, All which heroical Champions of truth and Providence Divine, have drawn their victorious ſwords, in this quarrel, againſt the Hoſt of Heaven: but, remembring that proverbial axiome, *Frnſtra fit per plura, quod fieri poſsit per pauciora*, we found our ſelves obliged to decline ſupererogation, and referr the unſatisfied to theſe incomparable Authors. However, we ask leave to inſert the memorable and not commonly quoted Confeſſion of *Hillarius Altobellus Senior* (*in præfatione ad Tabulas Regias Diviſionum* 12. *partium Cœli*) in theſe words. *Cum igitur per tot ſecula fluctuarit Aſtronomia, & mendax tanto tempore peragrarit totum orbem, quot modis, quot locis, quot viribus, quot cum temerariis vel ignavis auctoribus, inverecunda, fronte perfricta, fornicata eſt? nunquam, nullibi, nullis* (*ante Tychonem, & à Ptolemæo poſt aliqua ſacula*) *annuam veracem revolutionem dedit, neque eventuum verum tempus conſignavit, non ipſa, non dilectiſsima filia Aſtrologia. Utraque enim pavit curioſos mendaciis & adulationibus. Si autem interdum mendaces non fuere, ſors favit, vel caſus, vel*

per

per accidens congruentia ſyderum ad illa puncta, & non docta ac naturalis conjectatio. By which ingenuous Confeſſion of a *Perſon*, whoſe aſſiduous inqueſt into the moſt recondite myſteries of Aſtronomy, non only by indefatigate lecture of the choyceſt of Urania's Secretaries, but alſo by the moſt exact uſe of Inſtruments and Tables, and frequent tempeſtive Experiments, had enabled him to detect all thoſe pernicious Frauds, which either the *Ignorance*, or *oſtentation* of ſucceeding Ages had foiſted in upon the ſimple and demonſtrable *Uranometrical obſervations and Axioms* of Antiquity; not only to the *Corruption*, but eternal *Defamation* and contempt of that noble *Science*: how much of juſt *Diſparagement* is inferred upon *Judicial Aſtrology*, which the *Avarice* of Divining Impoſtors, on one hand, and the ſuperſtitious *Curioſity* of abject minds, on the other, have exalted to the height of *Deſtiny*; we ſhould rudely derogate from our *Readers* Capacity, not wholly to entruſt to his own immediate judgement. To ratifie and terminate this our reprobation of our *Genethliacal Schematiſts*, we have the like cenſure of them from *S^t. Ambroſe* (*in Hexæmero*) *Nonnulli tentaverunt exprimere Nativitatum qualitates, qualis futurus unuſquiſque, qui natus ſit, eſſet; cum hoc non ſolum vanum ſit & inutile quærentibus, ſed impoſſibile pollicentibus.*

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

The Liberty of Mans Will, Fortune, and Fate conciliated to Providence Divine.

SECT. I.

Article 1. The intent of the chapter.

THus long have we exerciſed the Candor and Patience of our Reader, with the prolix *Recitation*, and neceſſary *Explanation* of the Ancients opinions concerning *Fate:* and the reſidue of our province is to gratify him with the conciſe *Declaraement* of our own, both concerning the legitimate Admiſſion of this notion of Fate, and the *Conciliation* thereof to mans *Free-will, Fortune*, and *Providence Divine*; which we have formerly invited him to expect, as the grand ſcope at which all our prævious Meditations were directed, and the point in which all theſe lines of this ſmall matter of Book are concentred.

Article 2. *Democritus* Fate, inconſiſtent both to the Fundamentals of *Religion*, and the *Liberty* of mans Will: and therefore deteſted.

Firſt, we are to abominate the execrable Opinion of *Democritus*; not only becauſe it is uncapable of due Conſiſtence with the ſacred and indubitable Principles of Religious *Faith*, which aſcertain that the Creation, Molition, Conſervation, and conſtant Adminiſtration of all things, are impoſſible rightly to be aſcribed to any Cauſe but the *Supreme Being* alone: but alſo becauſe it is *è diametro* repugnant to the evidence of that infallible Criterion, the *Light of Nature*; which demonſtrateth the Soul of man to be an *Arbitrary* and uncoacted Agent. For, that man hath in himſelf a power of inhibiting, or ſuſpending his *Aſſent* unto, and *Approbation* of any object, the Verity

Verity of whose Species is not sufficiently clear and distinct, but *Dubious*; is a perfect Demonstration of the Indifferency, or *Liberty* of his Intellect, and so also of its charge, the Will, or *Faculty Elective*: as *Cartesius* excellently observes, *in Princip. Philosoph. part.* 1. *sect.* 6.

Article 3. *Aristotle* and *Epicurus* their Fate admitted, in that it is Iden ical to *Nature*: but abominated, in that it clasheth with the *Certitude* of Divine Præscience.

Secondly, that opinion of *Aristotle* and *Epicurus*, may, indeed, be defended so far forth as it makes *Fate* and *Nature*, or the Concatenation of natural Causes, to be one and the same thing in reality, though expressed by different Terms: but ought to be exploded, insomuch as it not only denies the *Verity* of Future Events, and so substracts from God the proper Attribute of his most perfect Essence, *Omniscience*, by not conceding to him an infallible Science of all things to come; but also supposeth no Creation of natural Causes, no disposition, no moderation of their Efficiencies by *Providence Divine*.

Article 4. The *Platonick* and *Stoick* Fate embraced, so far as it is conceded to be a *Constitution* of the *Divine Wisdome*: but abandoned, in that it detracts from *Divine Omnipotence*.

And thirdly, as for that more specious opinion of the *Platonist* and *Stoick*; we can discover no danger in our adhæsion to it, so far as it affirmes the primitive *Constitution*, and continual *Gubernation* of all things in the Universe by God; by defining *Fate* to be that Method, series, or systeme of Causes, which the *Divine Nature* at first constituted, and established, in order to the præcise, and opportune effecting all things prædecreed by his infinite *Wisdome*: But yet we must cautiously abandon it in this, that it not only blasphemously invades the cardinal Prærogative of Divinity, *Omnipotence*, by denying him a reserved power, of infringing, or altering any one of those Laws, which Himself ordained, and enacted, and chaining up his armes in the adamantine fetters of Destiny; but also, in great part, excludes the mind of man from acting any voluntary part on the theatre of the world, and leaves no room for the intervention of *Contingents*.

Article 5. In what qualified sense *Christianisme* may tolerate the use of the term, *Fate*.

Nor is there any substantial reason to deterr the most scrupulous *Christian* from admitting the use of this term, *Fate*, in a rectified sense; *i. e.* provided that He thereby understand, not

any blind and unpræmeditate *Neceſsity*; but a provident and well ordered Concatenation of Cauſes, which (like the *Magnetick Chain*, where all the inferior links are dependent on the imprægnating or invigorating Emanations of the Firſt,) was conſtituted by the *Fiat* of the *Eternal Wiſdome*, and may be varied or inverted by the occaſional Determinations of the ſame; and this without incurring the Imperfection either of *Inconſtancy* or *Improviſion*. For our warrant in this we have no leſs a Præcedent, then *S^t. Auſtin*; whoſe words are theſe: *Qui omnium connexionem ſeriemque Cauſarum, quâ ſit omne, quod fit, Fati nomine appellant; non multum cum iis de verbi controverſia certandum eſt: quandoquidem ipſum cauſarum ordinem, & quandam connexionem ſummi Dei tribuunt Voluntati; ac proinde Fati voce qui voluerit uti, ſententiam teneat, linguam corrigat.* (*in* 5. *de Civit. Dei. cap.* 8.) ¶.

Sect. II.

Article 1. *Fate* and *Fortune* conciliated, in the point of *Providence Divine.*

NOw, as for the Abolition of the ſeeming *Enmitie* between *Fate* and *Fortune*; tis not obſcure, that the Conceſſion of the one is very far from adnihilating the other. For, if we admit *Fate* to be a Law, by the Divine Will impoſed upon Natural Cauſes, according to the tenor whereof all things are done, that are done; and *Fortune* to be an Event reſulting from a concurſe of Natural Cauſes, beſides, above, or contrary to the expectation, conjecture, and forecaſt of man, though præciſely præordained by the Providence of God, and connexed to the ſeries of Cauſes, or Chain of Fate: we cannot but ſoon perceive their Convention, Concentration, and Identity in the point of *Providence Divine*; not is there any veil of *Diſcrepancy* betwixt them, in their naked and ſimple Realities, but that light and thin one, which either the *Ignorance* or *Sophiſtry* of man hath rudely, and perhaps profanely drawn. When a *Prince* diſpatcheth two Poſts to the ſame place, by ſeveral waies, neither knowing of the others miſſion; and they meet each other in one

one moment at their journeys end: though we may rightly call it Fortune, in reſpect to them, who nevet thought of that Convention; yet ſtill is it providence, in reſpect to the Prince, who ſent them; and limited their time of travell to ſuch an houre. And undoubtedly, by the authority of no leſs reaſon are we bound to acknowledge, that though many Events hourly occurring to us, which the higheſt Human Prudence could never ſo much as ſuſpect, may without derogation to the ſacred Monarchy of God, be ſtyled meerly Fortuitous, in relation to our Improviſion: yet ſtill are they the wiſe and convenient Prædeterminations of his Special Providence. Our Memory may rehearſe, that the Terme, Fortune, hath a double importance; (1) a Concurſe of Cauſes; (2) mans prævious Ignoration of the Event reſulting from that Concurſe: and our Reaſon cannot but hence inferr, that according to the Firſt, Fortune may be admitted in reſpect to man, though not of God; and according to the Laſt, nothing can interdict our aſſertion, that *Fortune* is a part, not only of *Fate*, but alſo of *Providence Divine*, which, as hath bin profuſely demonſtrated, comprehends all occurrences, as well thoſe which are, as thoſe which are not præviſed by Man. And in this ſenſe only are we to interpret that ſentence of *Plato* (*Epiſt. 6.*) *Deum apparare Fortunam*; as alſo that other, (*in 4. de Legibus*) *Deum, & cum Deo Fortunam humana omnia gubernare.* This duely conſidered, we cannot but conclude; that Fortune is conſiſtent with Fate, by the ſame intereſt, that a Species doth conſiſt with its Genus: for that the Analogie is conſimilar, is manifeſt from what immediately præcedes.

Article 2. *Plutarchs* ingenious Aſſimilation of Fate to the *Civil Law*: and his deſign therein.

Plutarch, when deſcanting upon *Plato* his Diſtinction of *Providence* into *Supreme*, *Planetary*, and *Sublunary*; judiciouſly interpreteth the ſupreme, to be *Intelligentia & benefica Dei voluntas*, the Intelligence and benefical Will of God: and this for two reſpects; (1) that He might with greater reaſon enunciate, that Fate is to be reputed ſubordinate to the *Divine Will*; (2) that He might with greater auctority contradict that proverbial error, *Omnia Fato fieri*; though he conceded,

ceded, *Omnia Fato complecti*, that all things are comprehended in Fate. We say *All* things, not only meerly *Fortuitous*, and more General *Contingents*; but also τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, such whose Event is ambiguous, and suspended on the Election or Aversation of Mans Free-will. And the scope at which He aimed this Distinction; was to insinuate and commend the *Analogie betwixt Fate and the Civil Law*. For (sayth He) as all actions are not *Legitimate*, *i. e.* are not done according to the rule of the Law, which are under the comprehension of the Law (for the Law comprehends Prodition, Desertion, and many offences of the same kind, which yet no man can justify to be Legitimate: since that only is Legitimate, which is præscribed by the Law; and therefore He, who kills a Tyrant, doth not a Lawfull, (though a Commendable, at least not a punishable Act) but only those, which are enjoyned and expresly præscribed by the Law: even so, though Fate doth comprehend all Events, yet are not all Events therein comprehended, *Fatal*, or the *Designations* and *Effects* of Fate; but only those, which follow upon *Causes* (ἐν τῇ θείᾳ προνοίᾳ) in the *Divine Disposition Antecedent*, or *Necessary*; such as are the motions of the Planets, upon which their Rising and Setting follow of Necessity.

Sect. III.

Article 1. *Fate* concentrical to mans *Elective Liberty*, in the point of *Predestination*.

And finally, concerning the Enodation of that more then Gordian Knot, (about which many Ancient *Philosophers* have broken the teeth of their *Reason*, and as many *Christian Theologists* bin driven to make use of the sword of *Faith*, to cut it asunder) *viz. the Conciliation of Fate to its apparent Contrary, Mans Free-will*; we conceive the most hopefull way of dissolving the mighty Difficulty to be, with the most penetrating *Thom. Aquinas*, to understand *Fate*, in respect to man, to be no

no more but that part of Providence Divine, which Theologists intend by the Term, *Prædestination*. For the vulgarly conceived Antipraxis between Providence Divine and Liberty Human, being once removed: the Repugnancy between Fate and Liberty will also vanish of consequence. This that we have, in the 4. *Sect.* of our *Chapter concerning the Mobility of the Term of mans life*, to more then a small part performed; the Memory of our Reader is a sufficient record. However, that we may leave no stone unturned, under which any the most minute particle of Truth, to whose Explanation the concernment of our præsent Theme doth adlige us, may be thought to lye neglected: we shall, with permission from, and due submission unto the Censure of the *Church* (from whose Fundamentals we humbly beseech the *God of Truth* we may never recede in the least) make a second attempt to expound the mysterious Riddle of *Prædestination*; that so we may with more perspicuity evidence the Conciliability thereof to mans *Arbitrary Agency*.

Article 2. The Concord betwixt *Theology* and *Philosophy*, in their admission of 2. orders of Causes natural, *viz. Necessary*, and *Free*; the ground of the *Affinity* both betwixt the *Difficulties*, and and *Solutions*, on either part: as to the Abolition of the seeming *Repugnancy* between *Fate* and mans *Free-will*.

In order hereunto, we are to observe, that as *Theology* holds it for a maxime, that God created two distinct orders of Causes, in the General, *viz. Necessary*, and *Free*; and that both of these constantly and faithfully execute the commission of their Natures, respectively, *i.e.* the *Necessary* operate by *Necessity*, and the *Free* by *Liberty*: so also doth *Philosophy* admit it for Canonical, that both the Necessary and Free æqually acknowledge God for their Author, and are so comprehended in the episcopacy of Fate; that the Necessary operate Necessarily, or Fatally, and the Free not Fatally, but Freely. And from this *Consent* comes it to pass, that as the *Difficulties*, which perplex both Divines and Philosophers, are of great *Affinity*, if not *Identical*, in the main: so also are the *Responses* thereto of æqual moment: Wherefore it must commend our studies, to select only those *Two Cardinal Doubts*, to which all others may, in some relation, either direct, or collateral, be referred: and, to the perspicuous *Solution* of each, accommodate such prægnant Reasons, as may be of correspondent extent in their importance.

Article 3. The *First* capital *Difficulty*, desumed from *Divine Præscience*; as stated by *Divines*.

The *Former*, being desumed from *Divine Prænotion*, is by the *Theologist* propoled thus. *Either God knew definitely and certainly, that* Peter *would deny Christ: or He did not know it. That he did not know it, cannot be affirmed; first, because He præcisely prædicted his Abnegation; secondly, because Truth it self cannot lye: and if He had not known it, He not bin Omniscient, and consequently not God. Therefore He knew it definitely and certainly: and upon inference; it was impossible to* Peter, *not to deny. For had it bin left to his Election, and he using that Liberty had not denyed: then might the Prænotion of God have bin argued of Fallacity, and his Prædiction of Falsity. But if it was not in* Peters *power, not to have denyed; 'tis manifest, that he wanted the Liberty of Election.*

Article 4. The same, as stated by *Philosophers*.

And by the *Philosophers* thus. *Either the Gods have a definite and infallible præscience of the future events of Contingents (i. e.* whether of 2. contrary Events, in possibility, shall be deduced *extra Causas*, or actually succeed) *or they have no knowledge at all of future things; or they have an indefinite, and only conjectural cognition, such as even Man may justly pretend to: but neither the 2. nor 3. proposition can be endured, without the joynt toleration of most horrid* Absurdities, *and inevitable præcipitation upon that dangerous rock*, the Commensuration of the Infinite Science of the Gods, by the Finite extent of mans capacity; *and therefore the First remains only to be asserted. If therefore the Gods have a certain Prænotion, which of 2. Contraries, whose Event is equally possible, as to the virtues of their Causes, shall come to be effected: manifest it is, that that particular Event, whose Ambiguity is determined to Certainty of Futurition, and is actually brought to pass, is Fatal or* Necessary, *i. e.* could not but come to pass. *For, otherwise, the Gods must be confest subject to* Mendacity. *One of the two therefore, must be granted,* viz. *that all things come to pass,* Necessarily, *as they are foreknown and Prædicted by the Gods*; and *so that the word,* Contingens, *is excluded, as importing no* Reality, *but a meer* Chimæra; *or, that the Affairs or Occurrences*

Occurrences of man, are neither præcognite, nor procured by the Gods; the Impoſsibility of which aſſertion, doth alſo fully exclude all Contingency.

Article 5. The full ſolution of the ſame, by virtue of the *Divines* Diſcrimination of *Neceſsity* into *Abſolute* and *Hypothetical.*

To the Solution of this Difficulty, 'tis well known, the Divines have moſt judiciouſly accommodated their Diſtinction of *Neceſsity* into *Abſolute* and *Suppoſitional.* For inſtance; that 2. and 3. make 5. or that yeſterday is præterlapſed, is Abſolutely Neceſſary: but, that I ſhould to morrow take a journey into the Country, or write a Conſult for ſuch or ſuch a Patient, is not abſolutely Neceſſary; yet if I ſuppoſe, that I ſhall travel; or write; then there ariſeth a Neceſſity of my travelling, or writing, *ex Suppoſitione*, from that my Suppoſition. Now, in reſpect 'tis manifeſt from this Diſtinction, that the Neceſſity *Abſolute* of any Action doth deſtroy the *Liberty* of the Agent; but the *Suppoſitional* doth not (for though I journy, or write, according to my Suppoſition, yet was it poſſible to me to have done neither) thereupon doe they moſt excellently reaſon thus: that *Peters* Abnegation was foreſeen and prædicted by God, as an Event to come of *Neceſsity*, not Abſolute, but *Suppoſitional*, by which nothing was detracted from *Peters* Liberty of not denying. For, as now in the *præſent*, if He be interrogated concerning his Maſter, he is intirely *Free* or to avouch, or diſavow his knowledge of him; ſo alſo will He be in the *Future*, when He ſhall be interrogated. Wherefore, as, if He now determine himſelf rather to deny, then affirme, and according to that determination actually deny; He doth that *Freely*, notwithſtanding from the moment he denied, his denial is Neceſſary, inſomuch as it is ſuppoſed that he hath actually denied: ſo alſo in the Future, when He ſhall determine himſelf rather to deny, then affirme, and according to that determination ſhall actually deny, ſhall his denial be Free, or Arbitrary; however it cannot but be granted Neceſſary that He hath denyed; becauſe he hath already actually denied. Nor is it paradoxical, or difficult to affirme, that this *Suppoſitional Neceſsity*, and *Peters Liberty* are not Ἀσύμφωνα, *Diſcordant*, or *Inconſiſtent*, in any reſpect; becauſe the Neceſſity is ſubſequent,

ſubſequent, not antecedent to the Determination of his Liberty; and becauſe it doth not conſiſt ſo much in *Re, vel Actione*, in the Thing or Action it ſelf, as *in Temporis Circumſtantia*, the Circumſtance of Time when 'tis done. Since, when we ſay, tis Neceſſary that *Peter* hath denyed; that Neceſſity is not underſtood to have bin any thing Antecedently in him, which compelled him to deny: but that it is radicated now in *Time* it ſelf, which as it is really paſt, and cannot be not paſt; ſo the Action done in that paſt time, however it was done, cannot be not done. And hence it is evident, though no man can juſtly aſſert, that twas Neceſſary to *Peter* to deny, becauſe according to that aſſertion, there muſt be underſtood ſome Antecedent Cauſe, by which he was coacted to deny: yet juſtified it may be that Now tis Neceſſary that he hath denyed; becauſe the Action being once done, and ſo impoſſible to be not done, all the Neceſſity falls upon the *Præterition* of the Time. Now, in reſpect that God is *Omniſcient*, He cannot but *Foreſee* that *Peter* will deny; yet that *Divine Prænotion* of *Peters* Abnegation, is ſubſequent to the *Divine Præviſion* of *Peters* Free Determination: and therefore God Foreſees that *Peter* will deny, only becauſe He Foreſees, that *Peter*, abuſing his Liberty, will freely determine himſelf to a denial. And hence comes it to be embraced amongſt the moſt judicious School-men, as a truth indiſputable; *That* Peter *will deny, not becauſe God hath præviſed and prædicted that he will deny:* but that, *becauſe* Peter *will deny, when he ſhall be examined, therefore and for no other reaſon doth God Foreſee and Foretell that he will deny.* For, *uti Scientia, præteritam rem pro objecto habens, nullam rei præteritæ, ut ita & non aliter fieret, neceſſitatem infert: ita Præſcientia, rem futuram pro ſuo objecto habens, rei futuræ, ſive Futuritioni nullam poteſt inferre neceſſitatem: utraque enim eſt extra rem, & in Deo actio Immanens*; that as *Science* having for its object a thing *Præterite*, doth induce no neceſſity thereupon; that it ſhould have bin ſo, and no otherwiſe, ſo alſo doth *Præſcience*, having for its object a thing *Future*, inferr no neceſſity upon its *Futurition*, that it ſhall ſo and no otherwiſe come to paſs; for both *Science* and *Præſcience* are diſtinct from, and

and alien to their Objects, and Actions *Immanent* in God, *i. e.* not at all effluxed to the object, to the deſtruction, or alteration of its Nature: this, we ſay, is a Verity which demonſtrateth it ſelf, and which we have more præciſely inſiſted upon, *in the 4. Articl. 4. Sect. of our diſcourſe of the Mobility of the term of mans life.* And that all *Cognition* is a thing really diſtinct from, and extraneous to its Object; and that a thing comes to be actually, what it is, not from the Cognition thereof by an Idea in all points conſimilar, but from it ſelf, or its Efficient Cauſe: needs no other probation, but the conviction of this inſtance; that *Snow* is white, not becauſe tis known to be white, but contrary, that it is known to be white, becauſe really it is ſo. To ſpeak a profound truth plainly, in few words; herein conſiſts the *Diſparity* between *Divine* and *Human* Cognition, *viz.* that *Human* can be extended only to *Præſent* and *Præterite*: but *Divine* doth extend it ſelf, with equal Certitude, to *Future* Contingents alſo. Now, inſomuch as *Præterite* Contingents were ſometimes Future, and in the ſame condition with thoſe, which are yet Future; and again, thoſe which are yet *Future* may be underſtood to be præterite in time to come, and in the ſame condition with thoſe, which are already Præterite: manifeſt it is, that as neither Divine, nor Human Cognition is the Cauſe, why Contingents already Præterite, are præterite; but, *è contrà*, they are known as Præterite, becauſe really they are ſo: in like manner, that thoſe which are Future, are not therefore Future, becauſe God holds an exact prænotion of them, as Future; but, *è contrà*, becauſe they really are Future, therefore doth God hold an exact prænotion of their Futurition. And upon this Baſis was it, that many Schooolmen erected that *Axiom, Prævisionem Dei nihil influere in humanas actiones*; that the Prævision of God hath no influence (*coactive*) upon the actions of man. Now, what hath bin argued for the Prævision and Prænotion of God, is alſo to be extended to his *Prædiction*; eſpecially becauſe tis uncontrovertible, that Prædiction is poſterior or ſubſequent to the Prænotion of any Contingent, yet in the womb of Futurity: ſince what is not exactly *foreknown*, can never be certainly

foretold. For which reſpect, ſhall any urge upon us, that the Divine Prænotion and Prædiction cannot be *Fallacious*; we ſhall moſt willingly concede their poſition, as moſt indubitate, becauſe nothing can be prognoſticate by God, as Future, which is not really Future: but, when it ſhall be thence inferred, that if *Peter* had once the abſolute power in his own hands to have not denyed, and rightly uſing that arbitrary power, had actually not denyed; in that caſe, the prænotion and prædiction of his denyal by God had proved Fallacious; we muſt reject the *Illation*, as illegal and abſurd, becauſe had not *Peters* denyall bin realy Future, God had neither præviſed, nor prædicted the ſame. For, it is the *Reality* of its *Futurition*, that ſupports the *Certitude* of the *Prædiction* of any future Contingent. And therefore, in caſe *Peter* had bin not to deny; God had as certainly prædicted, that He would not deny: ſince ſo the *Suppoſition* had bin quite *contrary, viz.* that *Peter*, rightly uſing his Liberty of Election, would determine it, not to a Negation, but *Affirmation*. Whereupon we may ſafely conclude (1) that *Peters* Abnegation was Future, and (2) that God both præviſed and prædicted the ſame, upon no other Neceſſity but only this: that *Peter*, when it ſhould be in his own power to determine himſelf to either part, would then actually determine himſelf rather to *Diſclaim* and *Abjure*, then own and avow, his Maſter. Thus the *Divines.*

Article 6. The *Solution* of the ſame by the *Philoſophers* proving that the definite Prænotion of future Contingents, is no Cauſe of their definite Contingency: but, *è contrà*, the *definity* of their *Futurition*, the cauſe of their *definite Prænotion.*

And thus the *Philoſophers. Non quia Dii definitò norunt Contingentia, ideo illa eventura ſunt. Neque enim, quia Dii norunt, ideo neceſſariò eveniunt; ſed quia, cum naturæ ſint anceps, aut talem, aut talem exhibebunt exitum; norunt Dii neceſſariò qualem, ſeu utrum obtinebunt: adeo ut Contingens, ex ſua quidem natura indefinitum ſit, ſed reſpectu tamen notitiæ Deorum definitum. Quinetiam conſtat, noſtra quoque notitia Contingens definitè cognoſci; cum, viz. propriè Contingens deinceps non ſit: ſed neceſſariò conſequitur antegreſſas, cur fiat, Cauſas:* Saith *Ammonius* (*in lib. de interpret.*) The whole importance whereof is this. That the definite prænotion of Contingents by God, is in no relation the cauſe of their definite Contingency;

Contingency; but, their being of themſelves definitely Future, or their *Ambiguity* being to be determined to *Definity* of Futurition, is the Cauſe of their prænotion by God. For, though a Contingent be *Indefinite*, in reſpect to its own nature, *i. e.* it is equally determinable, by the Liberty of its Cauſes, to either of two contrary Events: yet, in reſpect to the *Prænotion* of God, it is *Definite*; becauſe God hath an infallible prænotion, to which of two contrary Events its Cauſes will determine it. All which may be confirmed *à Minori*, from the Prænotion of Man; experience aſſuring, that Phyſicians frequently prognoſticate and prædict the death of their deplored Patients, even to an hour. Not that their Prognoſticks have any influence upon the Diſeaſe, to determine it to Mortal, when yet 'tis Dubious: but that the determination of the diſeaſe from Dubious to definitely Mortal, by its cauſes, is the ground of their Prognoſtick.

Article 7: The Diſparity betwixt Divine and Human Prænotion.

Here, leſt we be miſconceived to confound *Divine* and *Human* Prænotion, we advertiſe; that the Prænotion of God is *Infallible*, becauſe *à Priori*, *i. e.* He foreknows Contingents, while they are yet only in Poſſibility, and in the womb of their Cauſes; nor to him, who demands, Why, or How God foreknows Events, while they are yet in the Dark, or Nothing of Futurity? can any other reſponſe be given, but this, that He is *Omniſcient*, *i. e. God*: but the Prænotion, or (rather) *Præſagition* of man, is *Fallacious*, becauſe deſumed *à Poſteriori*, from Effects educed *extra Cauſas*, into actual Exiſtence.

Article 8. The ſame *exemplified.*

Which vaſt Diſparity may be moſt adæquately *Exemplified* thus. *God* certainly Foreknows that *Peter* ſhall fall ſick, and die of ſuch or ſuch a diſeaſe, *viz.* a Peſtilent Fever. How? becauſe He foreknows, that thoſe Cauſes, which in reſpect to the Ambiguity or Indifferency of their event may, or may not generate an intenſe putrefaction and malignity in the humors of *Peter's* body, ſhall loſe that their Poſſibility, and determine themſelves to the actual production of that particular malignant or peſtilential inquinament in his blood, which conſtituteth the

eſſence of that diſeaſe: and that the diſeaſe ſo generated will be ſo violent and inoppugnable by the force of Nature, that the Temperament of *Peters* body, being too weak to ſuſtain ſuch a diſproportionate Encounter, will thereby be diſſolved, and ſo Death ſhall inevitably ſucceed.

But the *Phyſician* can only *conjecture*, that *Peter may* fall ſick of ſuch a malignant Fever; why, becauſe He diſcovers that *Peters* prævious Intemperance hath prepared the continent Cauſe, or Fewell for a putrid Fever; and that the acceſs of Malignity, either by Contagion communicated, or from an intenſe Corruption of humors internally kindled, may, according to the Aptitude of its nature, ſeiſe upon that præpared fewell, and Ferment it into a peſtilential Fever: but *Definitely* He doth not know, that *Peter ſhall* fall ſick of ſuch a peſtilential diſeaſe; in regard, it tranſcends the maximes of his Art, and the Capacity of his limited Reaſon, to foreknow, whether the Poſſibility of ſuch an Effect from ſuch Cauſes, ſhall be determined to Neceſſity. Nor can He prædict, that *Peter* being invaded with that diſeaſe, ſhall certainly periſh thereby; untill the Dubioſity of the Fever be actually determined to *Lethality*: for then, from Symptoms, that ſignify the total Succumbency or yeelding of Nature to the victorious fury of the diſeaſe, he may, with good warrant and honour, præſage the imminent death of *Peter*. ¶.

Sect. IV.

Article 1. The *Second* Capital *Difficulty*, erected upon a ſophiſm called *Ignava Ratio*; as it reſpecteth both *Theology*, and *Philoſophy*.

THe other Capital Difficulty, being erected upon a certain circumventing Socraticiſme, or Interrogatory Sophiſme (moſt adæquately denominated by *Cicero* (*de Fato*) ἀργὸς λόγος, *Ignava Ratio*, an *unactive Argumentation*; becauſe, prævailing upon the mind, it ſtupefies the ſame to a perpetual *Reſtiveneſs*, or *Supinity*, by charging even the *Thoughts* of every man upon the abſolute and inoppugnable prædordination of Deſtiny; and conſequently adnihilating the uſe of *Piety*, *Prudence*, and *Circum-*

Circumſpection in all the actions of our lives) on that ſide which reſpecteth *Theology*, beareth this forme.

Either I am, from Eternity, predeſtined and Elected to immarceſcible Glory; or Reprobated to interminable miſery. If the Former; then notwithſtanding all my Impieties, I cannot be Damned: if the Later; then notwithſtanding all my pious endeavours, I cannot be ſaved. But one of the two muſt be true: and therefore, ſince all my Good or Evil actions are of no avail, to what end ſhall I afflict my ſelf with unneceſſary, becauſe fruitleſs care in any action of my life? Better is it for me, to grant a general Indulgence to my Genius, and provide for nought, but the ſatisfaction of all my Senſual deſires; ſince that, nor ought elſe, can neither countermand my Election, nor promove or confirme my Reprobation.

And on the other ſide, which reſpecteth *Philoſophy*, it is preſented thus. *If the Decree of Fate be, that I ſhall recover of ſuch a ſickneſs; then, whether I conſult the Phyſician, or not, I ſhall however recover: but if the decree of Fate be, that I ſhall not recover; notwithſtanding my uſe, or neglect of the Phyſician, I ſhall not recover. And one of the two is neceſſarily Future: therefore is it vain and needleſs for me to uſe the Phyſician.*

Article 2. Two eminent Opinions of *Divines* touchant the Solution of this Difficulty, recognized: and their judicious Modeſty, in duely acknowledging the myſtery of *Predeſtination*, to be *Arcanum Divini imperii*, commended.

In order to our hoped *Solution* of this prodigious *Problem*, we begg leave to be our Readers Remembrancer, that among Divines there are two eminent Opinions, concerning this Δυσνόητον, or almoſt incomprehenſible myſterie; in both which they have expreſſed ſo opportune and becoming a Modeſty, as muſt extort from every ingenuous perſon not only a worthy Acknowledgement, but ſuperlative Commendation. For, being reduced to an admiſſion of ſome kind of *Neceſſity*, and conſidering how inconſiſtent any the weakeſt Neceſſity is with *Liberty*, wherein the *Good* and *Evil*, and ſo the *Laudability* and *Culpability* of all the Actions of man, muſt be confeſſed to be eſſentially radicated: they thought it the higheſt point of Wiſdome to ſecure their routed judgements by a mature retreat to the Sanctuary of Ignorance; conceiving it a pitch ſublime enough for the moſt aſpiring thoughts of man to mount up to the

Apoſtles *ô Altitudo!* and ſoberly becalming the diſtractions of their Reaſon, by the Laudanum of Faith. If ſo, tis no ſhame for us to confeſs this Wonder of Prædeſtination to be *Arcanum Divini Imperii*, not only imperveſtigable by the acuteſt and profoundeſt Speculation of Man, but alſo too abſtruſe for the clearer intelligence of *Angels*.

The *Former* opinion ſtates the Abſtruſity thus. That God, from all eternity, did Prædeſtinate, or *Elect*, out of the whole ſtock, or maſs of mankind, a definite number of perſons, to whom, *ſine ullis eorum meritis, operibuſve bonis prævisis, & ex pura ſui Bonitate*, without any reſpect at all to his Frævision of their Good works, but meerly of his own Favour and Benignity, He had decreed eternal Felicity: and the reſt He decreed to *Reprobate*, or Damne to eternal Infelicity; yet, *ex prævisis eorum malis operibus*, in reſpect to his prævision of their Future Evil works.

The *other* thus. That God did as well prædeſtinate ſome men to Glory, from his prævision of their Good; as others to miſery, from his prævision of their Evil actions. Or thus. God, from Eternity, decreed to create the World, and therein a certain number of men, who ſhould be capable of deſerving well, or ill at the hands of his Mercy, or Juſtice, according to the right uſe, or abuſe of that Liberty of their Underſtanding and Will, which He was pleaſed to endow them withall. And, compaſſionating the Deceptibility of their Nature, He alſo decreed to diffuſe upon the ſouls of all men, that Supernatural Aſſiſtance, which Divines call *Sufficient Grace*; that ſo they, who ſhould, by the right uſe of their Elective Liberty, husband their ſtock or portion of ſufficient Grace, to empower them to the performance of Good Actions, ſhould be Elected to Glory: but they, who ſhould abuſe both their Liberty, and his Auxiliant Grace, to the doing of Evil Actions, ſhould be Reprobated to miſery. And *finally*, becauſe He foreſaw, that ſome would rightly uſe his Auxiliatory Grace, and conſtantly perſevere in that ſtate of Piety untill death; and that others would neglect, condemn, and abuſe it, and never repent perfectly, but die in that horrid ſtate of Impiety: therefore did He decree everlaſting Glory to *thoſe*, and as laſting miſery to *theſe*. And this we conceive

ceive to be the moſt intelligible Adumbration of this more then Ænigmatical Subject.

Article 3. The *First* opinion found totally uncapable of Expedition from the Sophiſme, *Ignava Ratio.*

Now, of theſe two Opinions, the *Firſt* ſeems as wholly incapable of Expedition from the intricate Entanglings of the præcedent *Interrogatory Sophiſme*; as the Abſolute Decree of Reprobation is of a full Conciliation to the Liberty of mans Will. For what Liberty can remain to thoſe men, who are, by a decree Antecedent to all prævision of their future Good actions, prædeſtinate to Glory? And were there any Contrapractical Liberty remaining to them, and ſhould their Will, according to that liberty, elect evil, and they do ſuch actions, whoſe guilt might deſerve Damnation Eternal, at the tribunal of Juſtice Divine: in that caſe, would the Decree of their Election be eluded and countermanded. Nor is it leſs Contradictory, to reſerve a Liberty to thoſe, who are *Reprobate*; ſince, for this reaſon alone, that they are not Elected, it is impoſſible to them, notwithſtanding all their Good inclinations, endevours, and performances, to bring themſelves into the number of the *Elect*. And yet damned they ſhall be, and juſtly too, for their Evil works: but how is it poſſible for them to doe Good, and not Evil of Neceſſity, when the decree of their *Reprobation* is ſuppoſed Antecedent to Gods Prævision of the future concurſe, or conſpiracy of their Will to the tenor of that Decree; and when they are left ſuch deplorable wretches, to whom Damnation, and ſo the Patration of evil Actions only remain *poſſible*? To evade this Difficulty of Difficulties, many eminent Doctors of the Chaire as well in Univerſities, as Synods, have fabricated for themſelves as many Sanctuaries of Diſtinctions. Some adſcribing to God a certain Science *Conditionate*, or *Hypothetical* (they unanimouſly phraſe it, *Scientia Media*, and are ſo immoderately delighted with the Acuteneſs thereof, that, as the more then generally learned, *Dr. Prideaux* hath ſatyrically obſerved (*in prælect. de Scient. Media.*) *de genuino ejus parente, haud ſegnius ac de Puero vivo inter meretrices, 1 Reg. 3. eſt decertatum*, there hath bin as paſſionate and ſharp a conflict between *Fonſeca, Molina, Leonhardus Leſſius Lovanienſis*, &c. Jeſuits, for the

the honor of its Invention, as was betwixt the two Harlots about the right to the Living Child) others requiring, if not to the juſtification of the Decree it ſelf, yet at leaſt to juſtify the Execution thereof, the concurſe of *Good Works*, ſo neceſſarily, that no man can ever attain to Glory, but by the ſcale of *Merits*, at leaſt thoſe of our *Saviour*: and others mincing, or extenuating the Elective Liberty of man into a meer and ſimple *Libency* (which we have more then once ſpecified, and as often deſcribed) and accordingly attempting to ſalve the *Repugnancy* thus; that the Elect are therefore Free, becauſe they do their Good works *Libently*, or Willingly; and likewiſe, that the Reprobate are alſo Free, becauſe they doe their Evil works *Libently*. Hereupon, to him, who ſhall charge upon them with this *Unactive Argumentation*, they inſtantly oppoſe; that there is very great reaſon, why every man, endowed with this *Libency*, ſhould moſt ſtrenuouſly endevour the conſtant practiſe of Good, rather then Evil: becauſe, though He be uncertain of the Decree concerning his Election or Reprobation; yet is He certain of this, that no man ſhall ever be aſſumed into Glory, unleſs he ſhall have done Good, nor any be excluded the Celeſtial Eden, unleſs He ſhall have done Evil. To which they add, that it is the main Duty of every man, to the utmoſt of his power, to aſcertain himſelf rather of *Election*, by his perſeverance in good; then of *Reprobation*, by a debaucht and deſperate reſignation of the ſceptre of his Will to all the temptations of Evil: that ſo he may prævent, or mitigate that *Fear* and *Anxiety*, which muſt otherwiſe unceſſantly excruciate his mind, during his whole life, by acquiring a ſetled confidence, that from God, who is infinitely Good and Juſt, he hath no cauſe to expect evil, while the ſcope of all his endevours is, to deſerve well, at leaſt to obtain Mercy at his hand. To conclude, leſt man ſhould in the interim either *Glory* in himſelf, as if He ought, according to juſtice, to be Elected, for his good works ſake; or *Complain* of the rigour of the Decree of his Reprobation, murmuring that it was not his fault, why his name was not inſcribed in the Book of life: they check his Glorying with this cooling card of the Apoſtle, *O Homo! quis te diſcernit?* and huſh his Complaint with, *Tu qui es,*

qui

Qui reſpondeas Deo? Nunquid dicet vas Figulo, quare me feciſti ſic? Nunquid facere illi licet aliud vas in honorem, aliud verò in contumeliam? (*Roman. chap. 9. ver. 21.*) And if this ſatisfy not; they here ſet bounds to Curioſity, and lime the wings of thoſe Eagle Wits, who would ſoare higher then the lower region of the myſterie, with that grave advice of the Canonized Doctor: *Quare hunc trahat Deus, illum verò non trahat, noli judicare, ſi non vis errare*; or that modeſt rule of *Cornelius Tacitus*, *Sanctius & reverentius viſum, de actis Deorum credere, quàm ſcire.*

Article 4. The *Second* Opinion, to a great part, extricated from the ſame Labyrinth.

But as for the *Second* Opinion; to our firſt inquiſition, that ſeemes capable of extrication from the forementioned Labyrinth, without much difficulty thus. *I am* (ſays *Adraſtus*, or the Fatiſt) *either Elect to glory, or Reprobate to miſery, by an eternal Decree of God.* This we grant to be moſt true; but with this additional qualification: *that Himſelf is Now the Cauſe, why He was from eternity Elect, or Reprobate.* For, He is now in that very ſtate, in which God foreſaw that he would be, when educed into exiſtence, endowed with reaſon, and aſſiſted with ſufficient Grace, for the clear diſcernment of Good from Evil; and it now depends upon the Liberty of his Will, that God hath prævi ſed him operating good or evil: ſo that the Decree of his Election, or Reprobation, is ſubſequent or poſterior to the Divine Prævi ſion of his future good, or evil Demerits. To ſpeak yet louder; God therfore *Elected* him to Glory, becauſe He Foreſaw that he would uſe both the Liberty of his Underſtanding and Will, and that Supernaturall Light, or Divine Grace, which the Compaſſion of God vouchſafed for his Aſſiſtance, as he ought, to enable him to lead an honeſt and pious life: and therefore *Reprobated* him to miſery, becauſe He Foreſaw that he would Abuſe the Lights of Nature and Grace, in conſtantly and impenitently doing actions point-blank repugnant to their frequent and importune Adviſoes. This being inferred, the *Fatiſt* cannot but perceive, that it lyes on his part, now to doe well, and with all the nerves of his Mind to *Cooperate* to Divine Grace: that ſo God, from eternity foreſeeing that his Conformity to the dictates of his Grace, may have Elected him.

For if he ſhall counterinflect his Will to the Inclinations of Divine Grace, and purſue Evil: thoſe Evil works ſhall be very they, which God from eternity having reſpect unto, hath Damned him for the Guilt of them, and impœnitence for them.

Article 5. The *Fatiſts* Subterfuge, of the *Infallibility* of Divine Prænotion, præcluded.

Nor can He elude this truth, by pleading; that God doth from eternity *Foreknow*, whether He ſhall be Elect, or Reprobate: and that therefore of Neceſſity he *ſhall* be, what he *will* be; ſince the Divine *Science* is uncapable of *Eluſion*, or *Mutability*. Becauſe, though God, indeed, had an infallible Prægnition, from Eternity, whether he would be Prædeſtinate, or Reprobate; yet is that Prægnition grounded upon his own eternal Decree, and that eternal Decree grounded upon his eternal Prævifion of the Fatiſts Good or Evil life. So that the actual Determination of the Will of man to the conſtant proſecution of Good, is the *Baſis*, or firſt Degree in this myſterious *Climax* of *Prædeſtination*; the *Prævifion* thereof by God, the *ſecond*; the reſpective *Decree* of God, the *third*; and his indeceptible *Præſcience* the *fourth* and laſt. Not that theſe *Antreceſſions* and *Conſecutions* are *Temporary*, *i.e.* not that the Præſcience of God is poſterior to his Decree; and his Decree poſterior to his Prævifion (for thoſe 3. make but one ſimple and intire Act in the Divine Intellect and Will: and Eternity is but one permanent *Now*, incapable of Diviſion, becauſe of Ceſſation) really, but *Anthropopathically*: *i.e.* that narrow and remote Man, when he ſpeculates the nature of his own *Free-Will*, and that of *Divine Juſtice*, as integrally *Conſiſtent*; is neceſſitated, for comprehenſion ſake, to ſuppoſe ſome *Momenta Rationis*, or Priority and Poſteriority in *Eternity*, as we have ſingularly enunciated *in the* 2. *Artiol.* 4. *Sect.* 6. *chap.* præcedent.

Article 6. A ſecond ſubterfuge of the Fatiſt, viz. that *the Subſequence of the Decree to Prænotion, doth implicate the poſſibility of its Eluſion and Mutability*; prævented.

Again, the Fatiſt can juſtly promiſe to himſelf no greater protection by this farther objection; *that, if the Divine Decree be ſubſequent to Divine Prævifion: therefore is it in his power to ſtagger the Certitude of the Decree, and diſſolve its rigour into an arbitrary Mutability.* Why? becauſe the Decree is not made, *niſi ſupponendo, quid eſſet factturus*, but upon a Suppoſition what the

the future Actions of his life would be: and the *Immutability* thereof is eſtabliſhed upon the *Neceſſity Suppoſitional*, which can diminiſh nothing of the Liberty of man, as we have more then once profeſſedly evinced.

Article 7. A third Concluſion, viz. *that the poſteriority of the Decree of Election to Gods prævision of mans future Good actions, doth make man the Author of his own Diſcretion*; detected and redargued.

And as little ſolid reaſon hath He to argue thus. If God did therefore Elect me, only becauſe He eternally prævi ſed thoſe Good works, which I now do: then (*ipſe ero, qui me diſcernam*) *ſhall I my ſelf be to my ſelf the Author of my* Diſcretion. For, tis not man, who by his own ſingle power can make this *Diſcretion*, but the very *Grace of God* alone; without which no man can ever attain ſo high as the foot of Goodneſs.

Article 8. Two *Extracts* from the præmiſes; (1) that the Cooperation of mans Will to ſufficient Grace, may be conceived a Cauſe of his Election: (2) that to render a reaſon, why God did not conſtitute All men ſuch, as that All ſhould cooperate to ſufficient Grace and ſo be Elect; is an impoſſibility to mans underſtanding; other then this, that *ſuch was his eternal will.*

Conclude we, therefore; though it be not difficult to mans Reaſon, to inveſtigate the *Cauſe*, Why God was pleaſed to ordain this veſſel for Honour, and that for Diſhonour; why He, by the vigorous Magnet of his ſpecial Indulgence, doth Attract this, and not that man; ſtill diſpenſing a ſufficient portion of his illuminating Grace to all men: ſince it is not obſcure, that the *Concurſe*, *Conſpiracy*, and *Cooperation* of this mans Will to that *ſufficient Grace*, may inoffenſively be conceived to be the Cauſe, at leaſt a Cauſe, and ſo *è contra*. Yet is it (and the Acuteſt Wits have, from the Flaws made in them by the more then Adamantine Hardneſs of this Rock, had great reaſon to conjecture it will always continue) the moſt Deſperate Difficulty, that ere perplexed the Cogitations of inquiſitive Mortality, to explore the reaſon, why God made men of ſuch a condition, as that ſome would be deſtinate to Honour, and others to Diſhonour; and not All men ſuch, as that they ſhould willingly ſuffer themſelves to be Allected by the Loadſtone of his Love, or be willing to cooperate to his Grace diffuſed upon them: when, had it ſeemed convenient to his Wiſdome, He might have made All men ſuch, as that they would, with all ardency of Affection, and force of their Wills, have Cooperated to his Grace, and ſo have bin Elected to Honor. And certainly, from hence alone, that our *Delection* of *Virtue*, or *Vice* (conforme to which our Minds are carried on with a kind of infrænable Tendency; and

to which the Prævision of God being extended, He hath either Elected, or Reprobated) is necessarily dependent upon the *Notions*, or *Species* of things objected to our Senses, and traductively to our Cognoscent Faculty: there remains to us more then a great occasion of applauding and admiring the Modesty and judgement of the *Apostles* Exclamation, *ô Altitudo*! especially when the *Exhibition*, or Præsentation of those Notions, and Species doth depend upon that *Concatenate Series*, or subalternate syntax and Disposition of Causes and Effects, which God, when He Created the World, according to the Model of his own imperscrutable Wisdome, thought good to institute. And this we have judged to be a faithfull Summarie of what the *Divines* Respons to this Circæan Charm, or *Sophisme* of *Adrastus* containeth.

The Remnant of our Assumption, is only to contract those voluminous Discourses of *Philosophers*, which perpendicularly point at the Solution of the same most bloody and impious Sophisme, into a few medullary or essential lines.

Article 9. The former Sophisme, (*ignava Ratio*) in part dissolved, by *Plutarchs* Distinction; *that though All effects are comprehended in, yet all are not caused by Fate.*

Plutarch (*de Fato*) as *Platos* Interpreter, insisting upon the prærecited *Adæquation* of *Fate* to the *Civil Law*; hopes to decide the mighty Controversy by distinguishing thus: *Tametsi omnia, quæ fiunt, Fato contineantur; non tamen Fato omnia fieri: ac ejusmodi esse ea, quæ Contingenter, sive Liberè, ac « Fortuito fiunt.* That though all things, which come to pass, « are contained in Fate; yet are not all things effected By Fate: » and particularly those Events, which are meerly Fortuitous, « and those which are effected by Arbitrary Agents. Now, according to this eminent Distinction, we may concede; that it is, indeed, comprehended in Fate, not only that Thou, being cast upon the thorny bed of Sickness, shalt or recover, or perish, but also that thou shalt or Consult, or Neglect the Physician: But positively deny, that therefore either thy Convalescence, or Death is Fatal, since tis *Contingent*; as also, that thy use, or neglect of the Physician, is Fatal, since tis *Arbitrary*.

Notwith-

Notwithſtanding this nice and ſpecious Diſtinction, we confeſs, there remains a *Difficulty*, and ſuch a one as the greateſt *Oedipuſes* of the World may, without diſhonour to their Perſpicacity, deſpair of its ſatisfactory Diſſolution; *viz.* How it can be, ſince there is ſome Cauſe, which conduceth rather to thy Convaleſcence, then Deſtruction; or, *è contrà*, rather to thy Deſtruction, then Convaleſcence; and ſome Cauſe, which induceth, or inclineth thee rather to Conſult, then Neglect the Phyſician, or, *è contrà*, rather to Neglect, then Conſult him: and ſince thoſe Cauſes had others Antecedent to them, and thoſe were connected to others, and thoſe to others, &c. retrograde along the chain of Fate: How it can be, we ſay, that theſe Effects, being admitted to be Contained in Fate, may not be alſo admitted to be Cauſed by Fate. Eſpecially, when we cannot, without paſſion, quarrel at his Conſtruction, who ſhall tell us; that to be Contained in Fate, is as much as to be *connected to the Series of Cauſes*, and that little leſs, then to be Effected by Fate. To palliate, not cure the Itch of Curioſity in this particular; we ask leave, with the ſublimeſt and moſt daring Contemplators of the World, to recurr to that General Aſylum; *Non debet Humana Sapientia ſupra Divinam illam gloriari, juxta quam vetamur ſcrupuloſiùs inquirere, quamobrem Deus ſic ordinarit.* And this the reaſon was of our ſaying, that the ſecond opinion of Divines, to our firſt inſpection, *ſeemed* capable of Extrication from the Labyrinth of the Fatiſts *Unactive Argumentation:* for our ſecond and more profounding meditations have found it far otherwiſe. However, we judge it worthy our Readers Patience, here to acquaint himſelf with the ſubtle *Evaſions* of ſome *Philoſophers*; eſpecially when He ſhall ſurvey them in epitome.

Article 10. The inſufficiency of that Diſtinction, to the total ſolution of the *Difficulty*, duely acknowledged.

Article 11. The moſt promiſing Reſponſes of ſome Philoſophers, conciſely præſented: *viz.* of 1. *Plato.*

Plato (*in* 10. *de Repub.*) ſagely diſcourſing about the future *Infuſion* of *Souls* into Bodies, imagineth ſome certain *Sortes*, or *Lots*; which *Lacheſis* diſtributing to ſouls, as ſhe pleaſes, thus inaugurates them: *Non vos Damon excipiet, ſed vos Damonem eligetis*; your Genius ſhall not obtrude it ſelf upon you, but

but every one ſhall elect his own particular Genius. And ſoon after, as a Comment upon his former Parable, He ſuperaddeth thus much; *Virtus ſola extra omnem ſervitutis noxam eſt; libera planè & ſervire neſcia: quam prout quis vel honorabit, vel negliget; ita plus vel minus ex ea poſſidebit. Culpa omnis eſt penes eligentem; Deus eſt extra omnem culpam.* Virtue « is alone ſuperior to all ſervitude and compulſion, being abſo- « lutely Free, and neſcious of ſubjection: of which every man « ſhall poſſeſs more or leſs, according to his eſtimation, or neg- « lect thereof. All blame is lodged on the *Electors* ſide: and « none can be on *Gods*. In both which parabolical præſenta- tions collated, we need not the opticks of *Sphinx* to diſcover a lively adumbration of the Later opinion of Divines, which is yet warme in our memory; for therein appears a ſhadow or pale deſcription of *Divine Prædeſtination*, joyned hand in hand with the future uſe of mans *Liberty*: and this becomes the more viſible by *Virtue*, which is but the repræſentative, or ſuc- cedaneum of *Divine Grace*.

And as for the mythology of his imaginary *Sortes*, or Lots; *Plotinus* (*Enn. 2. lib. 3. cap. 15.*) unriddleth them to be, not only the Diſpoſition of the Univers, at what time the Soul is immerſed into the body; nor only the individual Temperament of the Body, derived by traduction from the Parents; nor only the condition of the Climate, region and place; but alſo All other Extraneous Influences, by which the Mind may be either Adjuvated, or Impeded, in its right Ratiocination, Judicature, Election, and Proſecution of Good, or Evil.

2. *Seneca.* *Seneca* (*in 2. Nat. Queſt. 35.*) vindicating their Devotion, who fled to the Sanctuary of Prayers, Vowes, and Expiations, as a more certain Præſervative from the Combuſtion of Light- ning, then a Chaplet of Laurel (whoſe caſe holds no remote Analogy to theirs, who in ſickneſs addreſs to the Phyſician) hath this obſervable and pertinent paſſage. *Hoc habent commune nobiſcum, quòd noſ quoque exiſtimamus vota proficere, ſalva vi, ac poteſtate Fatorum. Quædam enim à Diis immortalibus ita ſuſpenſa relicta ſunt, ut in bonum vertant, ſi admota Diis pre- ces fuerint, ſi vota ſuſcepta. Ita non eſt hoc contra Fatum, ſed*

ipſum

ipſum quoque in Fato eſt. Aut futurum, inquit, eſt, aut non. Si futurum; etiam ſi non ſuſceperis vota, fiet. Falſa eſt interrogatio; quia illam mediam inter iſta exceptionem præteris. Futurum, inquam, hoc eſt, ſi vota ſuſcepta fuerint. Hoc quoque neceſſe eſt, inquit, Fato comprehenſum ſit; aut ſuſcipiat vota, aut non. Puta me tibi manus dare, & fateri hoc quoque Fato eſſe comprehenſum, ut utique fiant vota; ideo fient. Fatum eſt, ut Hic diſertus ſit; ſed ſi literas didicerit. Ab eodem fato continetur, ut literas diſcat; ideo diſcet. Hic Dives erit: ſed ſi navigaverit. An in illo fati ordine, quo patrimonium illi grande promittitur; hoc quoque protinus fatum eſt, ut naviget, ideo navigabit. Idem dico tibi de Expiationibus; effugiet pericula, ſi expiaverit prædictas Divinitus minas; at hoc quoque fato eſt, ut expiet; ideo expiabit, &c.

And *Chryſippus* (*apud Agellium, lib. 6. cap. 2.*) being preſſed hard by the ſame ponderous Argument of the *neceſſary Exhibition of the Species of objects of the Mind*; is driven to aſſimilate the *Mobility* of the Mind to that of a *Cylindre*, or *Bowle*, which in reſpect to both its Gravity and Figure, is naturally indifferent either to acquieſce, or be agitated, according as it is either permitted to its own quiet, *in plano*, or diſturbed from it, by an external impuls. And this upon Deſign, by that familiar Compariſon to illuſtrate the Liberty of the Mind to be of ſuch a conſtitution; that though it cannot but be commoved by the Species of Objects irruent through the gates of the Senſes: yet nevertheleſs is it ſtill in its own power to afford, or deny its aſſent unto them, *i. e.* or to *Elect*, or *Reject* them. Which was our only ſcope, in our præcedent Diſcourſe concerning the *Firſt Motions* of the Mind, and their *Conſequences*. The words of *Chryſippus* are theſe. *Sicut* (*inquit*) *lapidem Cylindrum, ſi per ſpatia terræ prona atque deruta jacias; cauſam quidem ei, & initium precipitantiæ facis; mox tamen ille præceps volvitur; non quia tu id jam facis; ſed quoniam ita ſe modus ejus & formæ volubilitas habet: ſic ordo, & ratio Neceſſitatis Fati genera ipſa, & principia cauſarum movet; impetus verò conſiliorum, mentiumque noſtrarum, actioneſque ipſas voluntas cujuſque propria, & animorum ingenia moderantur.* 3. *Chryſippus.*

To

4. *Aquinas.* To which we may conſarciate the moſt plauſible and promiſing Reſpons of a *School-man*. *Voluit Deus homines deliberare, eligere? Deliberant ſine ulla vi, & eligunt per voluntatem. Et tamen hoc ipſum, quod electuri fuerunt, vidit ipſe ab æterno: ſed vidit, non coegit; ſcivit, non ſanxit; prædixit, non præſcripſit. Quid titubant hîc noſtri Curiones? Miſelli! non alius mihi locus videtur inclariori luce, niſi quod petulca mens iſta identidem ſe ſcalpit, & exaſperat, malâ quidem ſcabie infecta litigandi, & diſſerendi. Quomodo enim (inquiunt) ſi Deus prævidit me peccaturum, & non poteſt falli iſta præviſio; non peccem neceſſariò? Certè non neceſſariò, pro tua mente: liberâ voluntate hîc interveniente. Nempe hoc prævidit Deus, ut eo modo pecces, quo prævidit: providit autem ut liberè; igitur neceſſariò liberè peccas. Satin' hoc clarum? ſed enim Deus ipſe in nobis omnis motus Auctor. Communiter Auctor, fateor: ſed non niſi boni Fautor. Ad virtutem accingeris? illo ſciente & excitante fit. Ad vitium? Sciente, ſinente, & ſapienter moderante in bonum finem.*

Article 12. These acute *Reſponſes* æquitably audited, & their import found to be no more then this; *that man hath a Freedom of Aſſent, but not of Diſſent to the will of God.*

But alas! All this is Aer: and Curioſity is no Chamæleon. For though we extend theſe ductile *Diſtinctions* to the extreme of their capacity, and rack their importance with all the nerves of the ſtrongeſt reaſon: yet will they at length be found ſo far ſhort of attaining ſo much as to the outſide of the remote Myſterie, as Impoſſibility is beyond Difficulty, Infinite beyond Finite, Omniſcience beyond Neſcience; in a word, as the inſcrutable Counſels of Divinity are above the comprehenſion of narrow, craſs, and frail Humanity. Had they ſayd no more then He, who being aſſaulted with the ſame conſternating Scruple, returned in ſhort; *Fata volentem ducunt, Nolentem trahunt*: they had contracted (but increaſed the weight of) their Speculations. For that rich and emphatick Sentence comprehends the ſubſtance of all their larger Evaſions; and yet for all that the ſumme thereof ariſeth to no more then this: Though man hath *a power of Non-reſiſtance, yet he hath no power of Reſiſtance*; *i.e.* though man hath ſuch a Liberty, that he may be drawn *Not-unwillingly*, yet not ſuch as that he may not be drawn

drawn *Unwillingly*; or, more plainly, that man hath a *Freedome* of *Assent*, but not of *Dissent*; *for who hath resisted the Will of God?*

Nor could it have proved any *Disparagement*, but contrarywise, the highest *Honour*, to which the circumscribed Intellectuals of dark Mortality have any reason to aspire, here to have confessed a *Ne ultra*, and humbly acquiesced in a becoming despair of other satisfaction then this: *Deus, ab æterno, Fati syntaxin, causarumve naturalium seriem subalternatim sic ordinavit, & sanxit; quia sic ordinavit & sanxit, i.e. quia imperscrutabili ejus sapientiæ sic visum est.* When the Wit of man, wanting the Ballast of Piety, bears too much sail, it cannot escape oversetting: especially when it adventures upon the immens, vertiginous, and bottomless ocean of Providence Divine; where All that is discoverable, is darkness and horror. What greater Prudence did the great *Plato* ever shew, which might consecrate his Memory to the venerable esteem of inferior Ages, then that in his introduction of *Socrates*, præparing his Auditors, when He was to dispute about some things which concerned the Attributes of the Divine Nature, with this excellent Allay, or suppressive of immoderate scrutiny in such reserved mysteries; *Æquum est, nos meminisse, & me qui disseram, & vos qui judicabitis, Homines esse*; meet it is for us to remember, that both I who am to discourse, and you who are to judge, are but *Men*. The *Arcana* of Gods Decrees are like the meridian Sun; on which the more we gaze, the less we perceive: and all we can gain by our audacious inspection, will be only *Blindness* and too late *Repentance*. When the most Learned and Acute, whose monuments of Perspicacity are the most refulgent Gemms in the embroidered coate of Fame, have found their Disquisitions terminated in the sensible Mellifice of Bees, the contexture of Spiders, the spinstry of Silkworms (not to advance to those Giant Problems of the reciprocal Afflux and Reflux of the Sea; the sensible torrent of the Aer from West to East under the Tropicks; the Cause of Earthquaks; the motions and distances of Celestial or Quintessential bodies; the Circumference and

Article 13. A *Dehortation* from immoderate Curiosity, in Divine Mysteries: and concise *Adhortation* to conform unto, and calmly acquiesce in the *Revealed will* of God.

Diametre of the Globe Terraqueous, and its Libration or ſuſpenſion upon Nothing; the verticity and Alliciency of the Loadſtone; the nature of the Soul, &c.) we ſay, when the moſt Eagle-eyed Indagators have found themſelves diſcouraged, and at a loſs in theſe minute Mechanicks of *Nature*: what a diſtracted Inſolency is it for us to Attach thoſe infinitely more inexplorable Abſtruſities of the Divine Præordination, which are too intenſe for the ſtronger Opticks of Cherubins? What did grave and modeſt Antiquity deſign, by their erecting of the ſtatue of that Monſter, *Sphinx*, over the doores of their Temples? only this; by the commination of imminent Deſtruction, to deterr the Curious from prying into the recluſe and abſcondite *Sanctum Sanctorum* of the *Deity*. This the profound *Euclid* more then glanced at, when, being interrogated by ſome Philopragmoniſt (who hoped to confound the Mathematicks with the Metaphyſicks) concerning the Nature and Politie of the Gods, He made this incomparable anſwer: τὰ μὲν ἄλλα οὐκ οἶδα, τοὺς μὲν φιλοπράγμονας ὅτι μισοῦσιν, ἀσφαλῶς οἶδα; as for other things concerning the Gods, I know nought, but this I know full well, that they deteſt and abominate the profanely Curious. And this that reverend *Father* alſo reflected on, when He ſayd; *Ut multò facilius invenit ſyderum Conditorem humilis Pietas, quàm ſyderum ordinem ſuperba Curioſitas; ita firma ſtabilique fide ſciamus omne Dei judicium juſtum eſſe, & ubi inveſtigare non poteris quare ita judicaret, ſufficiet ſcire quis judicaret.* Since therefore it is impoſſible for us to make our ſelves privy to the *Concealed* Will of our Creator; all that remains on our part, is to endevour, with all humility and ſerenity, to conforme and cooperate to his *Revealed*: aſſuring our ſelves, that He, who is All *Wiſdome* and *Goodneſs*, can will nothing but what is Good, nay infinitely better for us, then what our imperfect and deceptible underſtanding can inſtruct our Will to deſire for our ſelves. This was the nobleſt reſolve of the noble *Epictetus*: *Semper magis volo, quod Deus vult, quàm quod Ego: adjungar illi, velut miniſter & aſſecla; cum illo appeto, cum illo deſidero, & quod Deus vult, volo.* And in truth, this is the

the only true Halcyon, that can calme all the diſtracting tempeſts of our Cares; the imperturbed Haven, wherein the Weather-beaten veſſels of our Minds may ſafely Anchor, and bid defiance to all the impetuous Guſts of Adverſity, and Temptations; the Magiſterial Elixir of all *virtue*, and ſo of all real *Delight*; nay, Heaven anticipated; and the Term wherein both my *Cogitations* and *Pen* ſhall acquieſce.

All Glory be to God on high, on earth Peace, and Good Will towards men.

FINIS.